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UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 1970-1980: 
ABSTRACT. 
This study explores the content, context and contradictions in the making of United 
States' policy for the Indian Ocean region during the decade of the 1970's. In 
approaching this undertaking, the study will focus on the strategic dimension to policy 
from both an historical and an analytic perspective. 
The work explores three major themes: first, that the need to reverse a perceived 
decline in U. S. power constituted a common ground for U. S. administrations' during 
the 1970's; secondly, that the approach to this ob ective found a critical geopolitical focus j 
in the Middle East and Northern Indian Ocean region; and thirdly, that the modalities of 
regional engagement redefined, in turn, the nature of regional multipolarity . The 
principal dilemma to be explored for U. S. policy concems the reconciliation of the rising 
importance of the region to the United States with diminishing U. S. leverage, in an era 
of diffusion of power and emergent strategic bipolarity. 
In methodological terms, the research design adapts the controlled comparison case 
study model developed by Alexander George amongst others. In this context, the class 
of events under scrutiny is policy - broadly defined - for the Indian Ocean region under 
differing strategic concepts, with a focus on bureaucratic interaction, organizational 
process, and military posture. The parallel analysis of macroscopic processes in world 
economics, inter-state relations and the central balance provides a conjunctural setti 
for a structured, focused, comparison of source material drawn from Congressional 
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Hearings, policy documentation, reports, interviews and internal departmental and 
intelligence memoranda. For the source material itself, the research programme has 
accessed much material recently declassified under FOI legislation and on record in the 
National Archives, the National Security Archives and the Nixon Presidential library. 
The ordering of the work is as follows: for the six major chapters, chapter one 
locates the origins of United States' strategic interest in the Indian Ocean widlin a 
critical account of U. S. relations with the existing British power. Chapter's two and 
three commence the main historical part of the work in considering the Indian Ocean 
policy of the Nixon administration, in terms of the local application of the 'Nixon 
Doctrine'. Here, the objectives and restraints for U. S. policy are assessed with reference 
to two major themes of this study, great power strategic parity and regional 
multipolarity. These themes are referenced to signal historical developments in the region 
- the withdrawal of British forces, the changes in the world oil market and the 1971 
India-Pakistan and 1973 Middle East wars. The emerging strategic focus on the Indian 
Ocean for the Ford administration is taken up in chapter four within the parallel 
perspectives of U. S. military posture and the evolving distribution of power in the 
region itself. This context leads into the Indian Ocean policies of the Carter 
administration. Chapter five provides an overview of the U. S. -Soviet naval arms 
limitation talks (NALT) of 1977-8, while chapter six undertakes a three part exposition 
of the 'Carter Doctrine'. In this, the emergence of the South West Asia/Indian Ocean 
region as the focus of great power competition is located widiin analysis of the Iranian 
revolution, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. 
Altliough aspects of U. S. regional policy have been sub ect to a substantial literature, j 
iii 
the stance taken here combines an historical analysis with a parallel essay at synthesis 
-a perspective that locates the region within the overall cast of U. S. national security 
policy. The study posits a strategic determination for the Indian Ocean policy framework, 
one whose unifying process accentuated - pari passu - the differentiation of means - In 
these terms, it concludes that a differentiation of ends, and notably, those involving 
effective disengagement from the Indian Ocean, was displaced as a possible option. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE INDIAN OCEAN IN GLOBAL POLITICS. 
ýrratum 
age three, line 21; for Agnell, read Angell. 
age 239, line 11; read, "... extend beyond the realm of 
3ureaucratic longevity'. As was freely admitted by the ---" 
engaged a novel and problematic divorce of military power from political process. For 
the national security strategies adopted by both great powers in the Indian Ocean region, 
the pursuit of local advantage and geopolitical competition was so modulated faute de 
mieux at the start of the 1970's era by elements of co-operation, not least because of the 
region's own continuing volatility. By the end of the decade, though, this tension had 
become resolved in favour of confrontation. The 'arc' of the Northern Indian Ocean 
littoral had become the geographical nexus of a 'New Cold War. 
13 
INTRODUCTION: THE INDIAN OCEAN IN GLOBAL POLITICS. 
In the 1970's, the established European and Pacific terrain of demarcation in world 
politics between the United States and the Soviet Union had undergone significant 
revision. A distinctive third front of strategic engagement had emerged between the great 
powers. This, geographically, was the Gulf, the African Hom and South West Asia, and 
in a wider geopolitical context, the region of the Indian Ocean., If such development 
marked the growth of strategic process in an extensive sense hitherto unseen, it also 
characterized the opening of an era when politics as such had become more truly 
global. 
The latter, conjunctural, aspect of the 1970's was distinguished in other ways delimiting 
the distribution of power in the international system. The advent of a functioning 
multipolarity was accompanied by an exponential evolution of weapons of mass 
destruction. If this 'strategic revolution2'had rendered more comprehensive the distinction 
between the great powers and otherwise significant international actors, it had also 
engaged a novel and problematic divorce of military power from political process. For 
the national security strategies adopted by both great powers in the Indian Ocean region, 
the pursuit of local advantage and geopolitical competition was so modulated faute de 
mieux at the start of the 1970's era by elements of co-operation, not least because of the 
region Is own continuing volatility. By the end of the decade, though, this tension had 
become resolved in favour of confrontation. The 'arc' of the Northern Indian Ocean 
littoral had become the geographical nexus of a 'New Cold War. 
13 
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The focus of the following analysis is upon the role played by the Indian Ocean region 
in the global strategies of the leading great power - the United States - In asserting a 
univocal significance to this interrelationship, the study will issue three specific historical 
arguments. First, that the reversal of a perceived decline in world power constituted the 
governing strategic imperative for the United States during the 1970's. Secondly, that for 
the successive U. S. administration's, the maintenance of a singular position in the South 
West Asia/Gulf/Indian Ocean region was seen as necessarily correlative to addressing the 
wider issue of secular decline. And, thirdly, that whilst the relation between the global 
and regional dimensions of U. S. power had become, in the above terms, historically 
given, it was the reciprocal and differentiated regional leverage on the United States itself 
that, as sufficient measure, defined the final terms of engagement. Consideration of the 
historical record in support of these assertions will constitute one level of enquiry for this 
study. The accompanying analytic framework will question the extent to which the 
encounter with regional multipolarity had redefined the exercise of U. S. power. 
Clearly, the assertion of phases in U. S. history is, ceteris paribus, somewhat arbitrary 
in terms of the span of given administrations. The correspondence asserted here will take 
a common perception of systemic change and historical challenge as the terrain for a 
working approach to conjunctural analysis. The study will be taken up from a dual 
perspective. A detailed account of process will be combined with analysis of historical 
context. Throughout, the empirical referent under scrutiny is the institutionalized 
expression of U. S. strategic purpose, the evolution of policy. In relating heuristically 
between the above, the study will frame what will be taken as the central dilemma facing 
U. S. policy for the Indian Ocean region during the 1970's: that is, the question of 
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reconciling the rising importance of the region to the United States with the diminishing 
of U. S. leverage in an era of diffusion of power and strategic parity with the Soviet 
Union. It is the responses to this dilemma that comprise the focus of this work. 
In approaching such questions, the problem, as Alexander George has observed, is to 
design a research framework wide enough to 'capture the major elements of historical 
explanation. 
14 To this it might be added that the framework be narrow enough to retain 
the empirical content of historical focus. In addressing this task, the chosen analytic focus 
will restrict, pari passu, the potential range of the sub ect matter: in that significant j 
developments in great power relations and developments widiin and between significant 
regional actors will appear, in the first instance, as objects for policy consideration by 
the United States. It is thus the emergence of the Indian Ocean region as an integrated 
strategic arena within U. S. policy which provides the conceptual demarcation for this 
analysis. During the period under study, the scope of U. S. interests in the region 
underwent considerable definitional change. In charting the evolution of regional security 
policy, in particular, from a status that will be argued as that of a 'lesser included case' 
wit1iin overall containment strategy to one approaching an 'excluded case' de novo, the 
analysis will explore the terins of bureaucratic interaction and organizational processs in 
relation to factors of budgetary priority and diplomatic and military posture. 
The classic historiographical tradition of analysis of the relationship between territorial 
expansion, economic configuration and the ends of power has assumed a fresh relevance 
in recent times - The work of J. A- Hobson, Norman 
Agnell and H. N. Brailsford brought 
a distinctive focus to these issues at the start of the twentieth century. At its closure, 
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whilst individual issues - notably, concerning the arms race, ethnic and civilizational 
conflict and the central strategic balance - have received due prominence, the conceptual 
and methodological barrier has expanded, perhaps somewhat extraneously, between the 
discursive and qualitative focus around specific issue-areas typical within the discipline 
of modem history and the more quantitative, multiple issue bias of political science. 6 To 
be sure, historical analysis is, ab initio, interpretative rather than predictive, it is 
however, within this 'family resemblance' that, as in Wittgenstein's observation, such 
a 'complicated network of similarities 
17 
can form, for the policy sciences, precisely their 
point of departure. 
The intention behind the work offered here represents such an essay at synthesis, 
albeit, within some necessarily limited parameters, taking recent historical process as 
its subject matter and taking advantage of the recent availability of primary sources. The 
occupation of the United States' Tehran embassy in November, 1979 released a 
comprehensive - if somewhat involuntary - range of primary material on U. S. foreign 
and security policy in the Gulf and Indian Ocean regions and, perhaps as important, 
provided an additional momentum toward the release of further corroborative data. 8 
The aim of this study is, following what have been notably effective historico-analytical 
syntheses in the work of John Lewis Gaddisq and Alexander George, lo to take up the 
fortuity of available sources toward a structured, focused comparison of United States' 
policy approaches under differing strategic concepts and, in so doing, to confront the 
questions arising from the policy models and methodology empirically present in the 
execution of policy itself. 
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The work will thus critically assess the development of policy from the declared 'low 
profile' of U. S. involvement in the Indian Ocean during the first Nixon administration 
to the declaration of 'vital national interest' in the Gulf region proclaimed by President 
Carter. To introduce the major themes and analytic context for the work, the 
following sections will undertake a brief summation. 
After Hegemony: U. S. Singularity in the International System. 
The post-World War Two era was characterized by the division of world affairs by 
competing political/military blocs and, at a deeper level, competing systems of social 
/economic organization. This period was also defined by the unique strategic status of 
the United States. The military predominance of the U. S. conveyed by its having, at 
first, a monopoly of, then an overwhelmingly superiority in, nuclear weaponry was 
paralleled by its ascendancy in economic development. In terms of both the quantity 
measures of GNIP and the organizational features of production and distribution,,, the 
U. S. economy had become, effectively, the commanding factor in determining the 
direction of economic growth in the non-communist world. The strategic aspects of U. S. 
power, and the institutions created to make it operational were not, therefore, ends in 
themselves, but were functional to a global process of economic reorganization, 
complementary to this pattern most evolved in (but not exclusive to) the United States 
itself. 12 Thus, as Robert 0. Keohane observes, 'In the shelter of its military strength, 
the United States constructed a liberal-capitalist world political economy based on 
multilateral principles and embodying rules that the United States approved. 
'13 This 
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ordering of priorities was, as will be shown, explicitly reflected in the policy process 
from the outset14 within the post-war planning agendas of the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations. In analysing the modalities of power and the development of policy, it 
is thus the economic dimension that presents the point of departure for this study, and 
notably so within the regional tenns of reference. Here, analysis will focus on the policy 
requirement for restructuring those political and economic arrangements in the Middle 
East, particularly pertaining to the management of oil resources, which were perceived 
as incompatible with the circulation of U. S. economic activity on a projected world 
market. At the outset of this period, these aspects of U. S. definitions of strategic interests 
came into focus around the question of relations with the British presence in the region. 
The principal barrier to releasing such resources was the established hold on the region 
of the United States' major Western ally, the British Empire. That a critical focus of 
U. S. economic concern was also within the geopolitical reach of the West's major 
military, political and ideological adversary - the Soviet Union - had added the 
corresponding great power dimension to the policy process, as the United States was 
to employ its singular standing in the international system toward redefining individual 
allied interests within a concept of generalized interest for the Western political economy 
as a whole. 
There were thus, from the outset, multiple objectives to a U. S. strategy which would 
aim to displace British economic, and in some respects, political influence in the Middle 
East, whilst retaining the politico/military aspects of British power in the wider Indian 
Ocean region as party to the global containment of the Soviet Union. 
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In establishing the historical context for the main body of the work, this study will 
offer a critical disaggregation of the several aspects of regional policy which, in turn, 
will reflect on the constitution of strategic interest for the immediate post-war period. In 
particular, attention will be drawn to the extent to which the latter dilemmas of inter- 
alliance management and strategic imperative were to recur. The tensions within 
the Western alliance were, though, of a different order to those with the Soviet Union 
and, as will also be shown, were to be resolved on the level of the primacy, for both 
Western powers, of strategic factors and, faute de mieux, simple U. S. ascendancy over 
its junior ally. Britain's continuing decline, however, was to leave a strategic dilemma 
for U. S. policy in those areas 'East of Suez' where the historical British presence had 
presented a low cost strategic option for the West. An increase in direct U. S. military 
capability - considered, albeit contested internally in the national security bureaucracy 
of the early 1960's, 5 - was to be comprehensively compromised by U. S. involvement 
in Vietnam. Military reverses in the war in South East Asia were, moreover, to be 
mirrored in an overall attenuation in the United States' global position, proceeding from 
economic challengel, from other Western/market oriented states and the rise to strategic 
parity by the Soviet Union. With the Nixon administration, and specifically, through 
the 'Nixon Doctrine' a new focus was thus adopted by U. S. policy, that of delegation, 
for the first time in the region, of major security functions to a non-westem power, Iran, 
and the moves toward a regionally based security system. 
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It is the dilenunas of U. S. policy in an era which, as Henry Kissinger observed, was, 
'bipolar militarily and multipolar politically'u, that form the main historical focus of this 
study, particularly, the effort to relate those remaining areas of global preeminence - 
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in strategic and economic affairs - to situations of increasing multipolarity and, indeed, 
respond to leverage extended upon the U-S- by local alignments of states - 
The United States in the 1970's had retained, and in several respects, increased its 
predominance in some areas of the international system. Despite the negative secular 
trend, the U. S. economy was still substantially the largest in GNP terms and the most 
established in its global linkages. In the nuclear sphere, the U. S. had drawn ahead 
conclusively from other states in the West. In the Gulf and Middle East, the U. S. had 
also retained and consolidated the position of vantage developed in the 1950's. 
This latter relationship was, though, to yield paradoxical results for U. S. policy. Just 
as the United States was uniquely influential with the, otherwise contending, major actors 
in the Middle East - Israel, the conservative Arab states, Iran - the very elaboration of 
these linkages, and the evident stake in the region of successive U. S. administrations, had 
given the several powers an increasing purchase on Washington itself. The resolution of 
this dilemma, pursued at first with some success, was to rest on the U. S. position as the 
common regional interlocutor. Despite the dangers raised in the 1973 Middle East war, 
it was Washington which had emerged apparently strengthened in its singular position. 
It was this very singularity, however, which was to form the focus of opposition, 
notably, in Iran. With the revolution in Iran overturning the assumptions of the Nixon 
Doctrine, and, in a more profound sense, the assumptions of U. S. policy for the third 
world since Truman,,,, the United States was to turn to those areas of policy still retaining 
the greatest scope for unilateral action - notably, the military dimension. If the Nixon 
Doctrine had represented one model for regional security policy, that of delegation, the 
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Carter Doctrine introduced an alternative., direct course for exercising power in the 
region. 
The heightened focus on military factors and instrumentalities in the determination of 
policy to be analysed here bear upon contemporary (post -Cold War) reconsiderations 
of bipolarity/multipolarity in the context of the differentiation of 'positional' or 
I relational' and 'absolutist' factors as detenninants of interstate relations. 2o Within the 
acknowledged limitations of this analysis, it is hoped to use the particularly rich and 
multi-layered context offered within the exploration of United States' engagement in the 
Indian Ocean region to add some empirical qualification to the contemporary debate on 
interstate confrontation and co-operation and the salience of such 'relative gains. '21 These 
perspectives are developed in the next section. 
The Diffusion of Power: Adversity and Opportunity. 
As has been outlined above, an emerging characteristic of the international system in 
the 1970's was the diffusion of power. The increase of military and productive capacity 
in both the Western and the Soviet alliance was to become a major factor in U. S. policy. 
The development of the Nixon Doctrine had coincided with the rise of an organized third 
world coalition in world affairs - politically, in the Non-Aligned Movement and 
economically, in OPEC - and took into account the growing endogenous capability of 
emergent d1ird world actors. Notable here were Iran, India, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The 
geopolitical heart of this new politics of multipolarity was thus loosely bounded by the 
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Indian Ocean; albeit, the Nixon Doctrine originated above all in response to the signal 
demonstration of U. S. relativism in South East Asia. Given the loss of comparative 
advantage across the range of categories of U. S. power, it had come to have global 
application. The U. S. would thus have to account for the third factor in policy making. 
Although the Nixon Doctrine assumed that this factor could also be turned to an asset for 
U. S. policy, the application of such policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia, which became the 
'twin pillars' of the U. S. alliance in the Indian Ocean region, was to have contradictory 
results for the architecture of United States' global strategy. 
The South Asian expression of the Nixon Doctrine, however, while expressedly 
designed to serve a function in security affairs, was also to find a wider application in 
the usage of the region to redress the erosion of U. S. influence in other categories of 
power - notably, economic power. Whilst much was made of the 'imperatives and 
opportunities of a pluralistic world' in the administration's public utterances, the specific 
local opportunities for the devolution of power in the Gulf was also, as shall be argued, 
to contain a complementary, albeit, somewhat ad hoc, economic component. A 
significant contributor to U. S. global influence - and, critically, influence over the 
Western alliance - lay, as in the Marshall Plan era, in U. S. predominance in the political 
economy of oil (Keohane, 1984: 150-181). Given that the existing corporate structure of 
the would oil market had become similarly pluralistic, in the sense of resistant to 
governmental agency,, 7 the accommodation of the effective nationalization of oil 
production and distribution by allied states would present net advantages to the United 
States, in addition to the clear utility of conceding what, as will be shown, the consensus 
view of both governmental agencies and the administration regarded as the inevitable. 
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The accession of price and 'participation' functions in the oil industries of the Gulf, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia was perceived to have clear advantages in tenms of the Nixon 
administration's security objectives - viz., the consolidation of friendly regimes. It 
would also, given the deepening political and security involvement of the latter with U. S. 
policy, indirectly serve to reassert a measure of influence in the oil market as a whole, 
In this way, the decline of U. S. comparative advantage and political leverage in a world 
market of increasingly economic autonomy was to be addressed in terms of the 
remaining dependence of the regional powers on the United States in strategic affairs - 
That, in the event, pluralism was to triumph over U. S. policy in this region was to be 
one further area of challenge to the Nixon Doctrine that would lead to its superscession 
under the Doctrine announced 'under last minute pressures23 on January 23,1980 by 
President Jimmy Carter. 
The perspectives on the distribution of power outlined above bear upon both the 
empirical construction of policy for the Indian Ocean region and the more theoretical 
terms of debate concerning the enabling conditions for possible policy alternatives. As 
shall also be argued, the foreign economic policies adopted by the Nixon administration 
in the Middle East should be taken within the wider context of U. S. efforts to restructure 
the institutional arrangements governing the international political economy. 24 
In terms of the contemporary debate, the stance taken here addresses the 'neorealist' 
stress on the centrality of state actors as the empirical point of departure for analysis and 
the concern for 'positional' factors by states as a primary policy motivation. 13 The 
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salience of such factors in accounting for policy development in the specific case of the 
United States will be taken as an index of the decline of U. S. singularity. 2, The nexus 
between the relative decline of the United States' economic position in the early 1970's 
and the continuing returns in an 'absolute'27 sense derived from the U. S. position at the 
apex of the capitalist economic system bears upon what will be taken as the central 
systemic feature of the post war period: that is, the. emergence of 'market like forces' 
which, 'had become autonomous from, and indeed dominated the policies of all states 
alle, if not equally' (Arrighi, 1982: 61). It is not, however, necessary for this analysis 
to advance any formal connection between the structural features of late c20th. 
capitalism and the contemporaneous advent of inter and intra-state plurality of power 
institutions to assert that their interaction was, empiricaUy, one of reinforcement. As the 
record will show, the perhaps uncovenanted autonomy of both state and non- 
govermnental actors - in the case here under scrutiny, the U. S. oil corporations - in 
the international system of the 1970's was to compel a reevaluation of perceived U. S. 
national interest which, again in contemporary terms, would be conducted according to 
more closely defined 'relative gains' criteria. 
That the early Carter administration was to place the possibilities for mutually 
beneficial, 'absolute gains' explicitly in the forefront of its foreign policy platform, only 
to take on a stance perhaps more explicitly 'positional' than its predecessor in some 
issue-areas - notably, security - suggests, along with realist predictions, a clear 
'distributive' qualification. 27 However, the trenchant reappearance of distributive 
considerations in the declared imperatives of the 'Carter Doctrine' herewith can, though, 
be further explicated in terms of the further systemic dimension to the constitution of 
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be further explicated in terms of the further systemic dimension to the constitution of 
world politics in the 1970s that concerns the geopolitical terms of this analysis: namely, 
the advent of bipolar strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
This will be considered below. 
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 
Given the reciprocation, advanced above, between the particulars of local policy 
contingency and the dynamics of global strategic context, our study will extend to some 
relevant aspects of U. S. nuclear weapons posture and doctrine in the Indian Ocean 
region. These will be taken up with respect to the integrating function of nuclear doctrine 
toward regionally discrete theatres of operations and in terms of the interrelation of these 
two (allied and nuclear) dimensions of strategic engagement. The respective roles and 
status of nuclear posture and alliance policy are, in an operative sense, representative of 
opposite ends of the deterrence spectrum. In a functional sense, however, their relation 
can be viewed as one of equivalence: in that the one has (historically) constituted a 
symbolic accumulation of power, the other, a similarly indirect exercise of power, by 
means of substitution. The dilemmas of relating the direct engagement of U. S. forces in 
the traditional Clausewitzian sense were a wholly novel feature of the bipolar global 
order in the post-war, nuclear, age, and one recognized from early on by U. S. national 
security doctrine. As summarized by Henry Kissinger, the problem, simply stated, was 
that, 'far from giving freedom of action, the power of modem weapons seems to inhibit 
it ... our weapons 
technology and the objectives for employing them have become 
m 
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incommensurable' and, moreover, 'no more urgent task confronts the U. S. than to 
bring them into harmony. '29 The analysis will be addressing such attempts to so 
harmonize the nuclear and political aspects of foreign and security policy in the Indian 
Ocean region. It will thus become apparent that, with the failure of indirect, delegated 
regional management in the Nixon Doctrine and its essential continuation in the first two 
years of President Carter's term, renewed attempts were made to reestablish the link 
between strategic posture and regional policy with the Carter doctrine. Here, the logic 
I 
of 'counterforce' as a tool of extended deterrence and - pari passu - alliance 
management will be analysed, in the context of a parallel account of the operational 
doctrine of preemption. 
Strategy, Model and I Image'. 
In approaching the terms set for this study, any attempt at comprehensive regional 
policy analysis for the United States must account for at least three dimensions at 
interstate level, namely: U. S. -Soviet relations, U. S. -Western relations and U. S. relations 
with the regional powers themselves. It is the combination and differentiation of these 
dimensions that gives meaning to the policy process. This meaning is again, though, 
subject to analytic division. Thus, it must recognize uae central role of doctrine which 
has served to relate and channel the several policy areas, not least toward instruction for 
the policy instruments - the bureaucracies and planning process - and, at a prior 
level, provide the organizing logic - the 'image'" - of international engagement 
for mobilizing domestic support. For the United States in this period, the central image 
U 
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so promoted was containment of the Soviet Union. In external affairs, the doctrine of 
containment, in turn, served to provide a mechanism for establishing a hierarchy of 
U. S. relations with allied states and for conducting the deeper systemic contest widiin the 
lesser powers by providing a legitimating political framework for ruling elites. In 
analysis of U. S. policy, this process is demonstrable by the existence of overt 'doctrines' 
proclaimed by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon and Carter, two of which 
specifically and the other two, implicitly, have concemed the status of great power 
engagement in the Middle East/Indian Ocean. 
For the purposes of this study, it is proposed to treat the ideological composition of 
U. S. domestic politics as an historical constant. The dynamic and reciprocal interaction 
between U. S. domestic and foreign policies, is, though, an object of analytic focus, 
notably concerning the appeal to embedded ideological notions of primacy - The 
continuing salience of this appeal will, as will be shown, have far reaching material 
consequences for the procurement of strategic systems, the configuration of military 
posture and the setting of geopolitical priorities in those areas of U. S. international 
relations that are the subject of scrutiny. 
Methodology: Termsq Issues, Dermitions, Restrictions. 
The methodological approach to be adopted in this study is as follows: whilst recognizi 
UL - importance of ideological and social-psychological factors in policy decision maldng, he 
this level of determination will, as outlined above, be treated as constant with regard to 
m 
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the historically embedded features of U. S. domestic polity. Accordingly, the analytic 
focus to be explored will begin by counterposing bureaucratic and organizational 
perspectives within an identification of overall systemic context and 'rational actor 
131 
considerations at interstate level. The format will develop thematic and historical 
narratives within the natural chronology of events. In concrete terms, the pattern of 
policy engagement is charted through such consistent instruments as arms transfers, 
military posture, alliance diplomacy and the political economy of oil. 
For the wider issues raised by the question of U. S. singularity, operative as 
'hegemony', in the international system, I am indebted to two accounts, provided in 
Giovanni Arrighi (1982,1983)3, and Robert 0. Keohane (1984) . 33 Whilst deriving from 
differing and, ceteris paribus, opposing theoretical traditions - 'neomarxist' and 
'neoliberal' respectively -a common ground can be acknowledged in relation to the 
admission, in both schema, of a primary focus on the institutional features of United 
States' hegemonic leadership in the international system and a common acceptance of 
some central premises of 'realism'. As the realist Robert Gilpin has observed, 'some 
remarkably similar perspectives on the nature and dynamics of international relations, ' 
obtain amongst 'both political realism and Marxism, ' notably with regard to the 
explanatory focus on 'the differential growth of power amongst states. '34Thus, within this 
common heuristic terrain, the analytic status of U. S. hegemony is established with 
reference to its predicates in the operation of the world market, and in particular, the 
ensuing institutional framework, as expressed in formal and informal 'regimes'.,, Of 
primary relevance to this study, the parallel development and decline of such regimes in 
energy and security policy is addressed in terms of their common application in 
m 
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grounding U. S. Indian Ocean policy as a fulcrum of relations with the Western alliance 
as a whole. 
The key characteristic of United States' policy in the 1970's under scrutiny concerns 
the development of new instruments for the management of regional affairs. The 
innovation is identified here in the extent to which endogenous local power capabilities 
were to figure in the constitution of U. S. policy. To consider the grounding for such an 
approach, a main analytic focus will thus rest upon the formal expressions of 
U. S. /regional interaction, with regard to bureaucratic directives, institutional 
arrangements and configuration of military posture. The history of policy making is, 
in a secular sense, the history of institutions. In setting the terms for analysis, the area 
of national security policy has been focused as the most economical for relating the 
overall current of U. S. power in the Indian Ocean region, and, in turn, the importance 
of the region itself to the current of U. S. global engagement. In adopting this approach, 
the following justification will be offered. Whilst of varying levels of significance, and, 
in some instances, antagonism toward other policy areas, the institutions of national 
security planning serve a unique function as the material expression of the state., 6 This 
latter distinction can, to be sure, be qualified on the grounds that major decisions taken 
by any state, and, expressedly, by the post-war U. S. planning process in the Indian 
Ocean region, have employed a marshalling of all relevant assets - of which military 
capability is only one and not, in some instances, the most significant. Again, however, 
if the military component was clearly less prominent, in the day-to-day policy process, 
than economic and politico-diplomatic factors, it is argued that, throughout, the enabling 
condition for such process was found in the prior establishment of strategic superiority. 
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And, moreover, as U. S. comparative advantage declined in other categories of power, 
it was the military component which, as will also be argued, was to come increasingly 
to the fore. 
The Six Chapters: Structure and Narrative Composition. 
In concluding this brief exposition of the major themes and questions to which the 
study is addressed, a short outline of its structure would prove useful. Of the six major 
chapters, the first is concerned with the commencement of United States' strategic 
interest in the broad quadrant of the Eastern Mediterranean, South Asia and Indian Ocean 
littoral hitherto under effective British domination, and, in particular its incorporation 
within an Anglo-American Security System. In establishing the context for the 
development of U. S. policy, the chapter sets out a dynamic encompassing global 
strategy, regional strategy and the mediation served on both levels by relations with 
Britain. Hereafter, two sets of complementary arguanent are pursued, concerning Anglo- 
U. S. strategic alliance and politico-economic competition. The chapter thus assesses how 
the development of U. S. policy, initially focused on economic interests in the Middle 
East, would move on to engage security interests in the Soviet 'Northern Tier' and 
then extend to a wider interest in the Indian Ocean as a strategic unit. In charting this 
process, the discussion provides an opening perspective on U. S. objectives for the 
political economy of Middle East oil in post-war reconstruction. The analysis of 
subsequent U. S. priorities is undertaken within the historical context of the Truman 
Doctrine, relations with Iran and the development of the CENTO alliance following the 
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'Eisenhower Declaration' of 1957. Finally, the discussion provides a critical account of 
the extent to which the British security system in the Indian Ocean was to be incorporated 
in the later framework of U. S. regional planning. 
The second chapter opens the main historical focus of the work with consideration of 
the Indian Ocean application of the Nixon Doctrine. Here, the specific needs of regional 
policy are established in relation to the overall strategic concerns of the Nixon 
administration following the British retrenchment from the Middle East/Indian Ocean. 
The enhanced role of the U. S. Navy in the reconfiguration of global military posture will 
emerge as a counterpoint to a structured devolution of regional power. It is argued that 
the logics of such devolution were to further suggest the basis for a wider devolution of 
political economy in the region. A critical comparison is thus drawn between the use of 
U. S. oil corporations as a foreign policy instrument during the Truman/Eisenhower 
administrations and the focus of the Nixon policy framework on regional states. This 
process is related to the declared conceptual design of administration strategic 'doctrine' 
to restore a more utilitarian relationship between the aims and instrumentalities of U. S. 
power in the international system. 
Within this context, the discussion in chapter three then assesses the importance of the 
1971 Tehran oil agreement as an economic counterpoint to the administration's strategic 
focus on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the nexus of an emerging regional security system. 
These aspects of regional policy are further taken up within chapter three in the context 
of U. S. naval deployments in the 1971 India/Pakistan war. 
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The importance of the region as a whole to United States' strategy is reconsidered for 
chapter four in tenns of the consequences of the 1973 Middle East war. For the latter, 
the regional policies of the Ford administration are analysed as a primary response to the 
emergence of an operative multipolarity in the international system. If the conclusion of 
the October war had diminished the Middle East as the main arena for revitalised 
competition with U. S. adversaries, the success of the producers oil embargo had also 
revealed the extent of allied leverage on the administration. It is argued that the 'diffusion 
of power' which had initially provided the grounding for the Nixon Doctrine was now 
perceived to be working against U. S. policies in the region. The consequences of the 
1973 war are thus followed up in terms of: [1] the reassessment of the strategic status 
of the Indian Ocean region and, [2] the coeval effects of the latter debate on U. S. 
military posture. A further aspect of the debate is provided by analysis of the conjunction 
of oil politics with the emergence of a more general coalition of 'nonaligned' interests 
in the region, and the formal expression of such interests in the 'Zone of Peace' 
proposals at the United Nations. The context for the debate is provided by analysis of the 
several Congressional hearings on Diego Garcia. Here, the comparison of U. S. and 
Soviet policies in the region provides a counterpoint to the discussion of U. S. strategic 
engagement with the regional powers. 
For chapter five, an analysis of the major themes of the foreign policy of the Carter 
Administration is located in respect of the challenges to U. S. policy outlined above. In 
this chapter, the redefinition of regional policy pursued by the 1977 Democratic 
administration is assessed in the context of the latter's expressed approach to global 
institutional renovation. The influence of the Non-Aligned Movement in informing a 
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regional policy perspective is discussed with reference to the Carter administration's 
rapproch6ment with India. The differentiation and continuity with earlier U. S. policy is 
presented through a survey of anns sales and arms control perspectives. The discussion 
then takes up a detailed account of the 1977-1978 Naval Arms Limitation (NALT) 
negotiations, drawing on interview material with (former ACDA director) Paul Warnke. 
A strategic context is outlined widiin analysis of the administration's revisions to military 
posture. For the latter, the emergence of conflicting priorities is related to the wider 
internal debate widiin the U. S. policy community. The policy conflicts between arms 
control and regional security are further explored as administration policies toward Iran 
and Saudi Arabia are reviewed. This is followed by consideration of the administration's 
wider regional agenda in Ethiopia, Yemen and the African Horn. 
The final chapter undertakes a three-part exposition of the 'Carter Doctrine'. The last 
two years of the Carter administration would see the Gulf /Indian Ocean region elevated 
to a central strategic concern. The concluding sections are thus devoted to the 
administration's policies for reestablishing a 'regional security framework' in the context 
of: [1] the Iranian revolution, [2] the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and [3] the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. 
The first of these sections opens a detailed review of DOD/DOS assessments of U. S. - 
Iranian relations. Hereafter, the pattern of crisis management provides an operative 
context for analysis of continuity and dislocation of U. S. policy in the wider region. The 
initiation of direct intervention planning for the Indian Ocean is located in the context of 
Middle East Peace diplomacy and the advent of contemporary crises effecting other 
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regional allies in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and North Yemen. For the second, a 
major focus is provided on efforts to achieve a direct U. S. military presence in the region 
and the formation of the 'Rapid Deployment Force'. This section presents a detailed 
account of force structure and mission for the RDF and assesses how the administration's 
politico/military and politico/diplomatic objectives for the region would be sustained by 
the renewed primacy of great power factors after Afghanistan. 
Within the third and final section, the reinforcement of U. S. regional capability is 
related to the overall reconfiguration of global strategy and military posture considered 
under Presidential Directive (PD) 59. The concert of U. S. allies in the Gulf is located 
in the context of U. S. policy for NATO and the wider Western alliance. Again, the 
incidence of regional conflict (Iran/Iraq) is assessed in terms of mobilizing a framework 
for security co-operation in the Indian Ocean. The chapter draws together the several 
strands of analysis in considering the corresponding moblization of strategic nuclear 
policy, regional intervention and cold war ideology in locating the Gulf/Indian Ocean 
region as the strategic nexus of the administration's 'countervailing strategy I. 
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INTRODUCTION: FOOTNOTES. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the term 'Gulf' will be used in preference to the connotive 
'Persian Gulf'; the term 'South West Asia' arose in U. S. policy literature of the early 1980's 
as an attempt to define a single strategic theatre for the CENTCOM region. South West Asia 
includes the Horn of Africa, the Gulf states, the Arab states bordering on the Mediterranean 
from Egypt East and Israel. The term 'Indian Ocean' includes both the EUCOM maritime 
demarcation within the Red Sea/Gulf areas and the expanded PACOM area to '62 degrees East 
longitude'. 
2) See, discussion of the issues in, Henry Kissinger, For The Record - Selected Statements 
1977-80 (London: Weidenfeld, 1981), pp. 202-7 (p. 203). 
3) See, for example, Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1983, 
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optimism about the future of the East-West relationship' (p. 12). 
4) See, Alexander L. George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of 
Structured, Focused Comparison, ' in, Paul Gordon Lauren (ed. ), Diplonzacy (New York: The 
Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68 (p. 57). 
5) This analysis accepts the broad significance of the 'Organizational Process' and 'Bureaucratic 
Politics' models in qualifying any 'Rational Actor' perspectives on given policy outcomes. 
See, Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); for a 
contemporary view, see also the 'Political Process' model developed in, Roger Hillsman, Yhe 
Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic 
Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1987). 
6) For discussion of comparative methodologies, see, for example, R. B. J. Walker, 'History 
and Structure in the Theory of International Relations', Millenium, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1989) 
pp. 163-83; -for representative views, see also, Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case 
for a Classical Approach', World Politics, XVII (April, 1966), 361; J. David Singer, 'The 
Behavioural Science Approach to International Relations: Payoff and Prospects', SAIS Review, 
X (Summer, 1966), pp. 12-20 
7) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: 1953), p. 1,66,67, pp. 31-2. 
8) The Embassy archives, including cables, reports, threat-assessments and intelligence 
memorada for the State Department's Near East and South Asia division were published in 
Tehran as a 63 volume set of Documents from the U. S. Den of Espionage; these are available 
at the National Security Archives, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., Washington D. C. See also, 
NSA, Iran: the Making of U. S. Policy 1977-80, (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1989), 
2vo. /microfiche. For related background on U. S. Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation, 
see, for example, The Strange Case of the Nixon Archives (Alexandria, VA: National Archives 
and Records Administration, Office of Presidential Libraries; Nixon Presidential Materials 
Project, 1988). 
See, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy (New York: OUP, 1982). 
10) See, Alexander George/Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice (New York: Columbia, 1974). 
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For a useful discussion of the organizational innovations characterizing the U. S. economy - notably, 'Taylorism', Tordism' and the transnational division of labour - see, Giovanni Arrigbi 'A Crisis of Hegemony', in Samir Amin (ed. ), The Dynamics of Global Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1982) pp. 56-60. In Arrighi's view, the 'main objective' of U. S. foreign 
economic policy in this period, '. .. seerns to have been to guarantee an "open door", not primarily to trade but to capitalist enterprise, particularly against threats of 
nationalization'(p. 58). For discussion of U. S. views on investment and nationalization, see, for example, Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U. S. Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976 (Los Angeles/Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1980) pt. 3, ch. 9. 
12) For discussion of the historical and institutional characteristics of 'Hegemonic Cooperation in 
the Postwar Era', see, for example, Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: PUP, 
1984), pp. 135-82. 
13) ibid., p. 137. 
14) These processes have been comprehrensively detailed in, Laurence H. Sc'houp/WilliamMinter, 
Imperial Brains Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and U. S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Monthly Review, 1977). 
15) See chapter one of this study. 
16) See detailed discussion of the changing U. S. economic role in, Robert Gilpin, The Political 
Economy of International Relations (Princeton: PUP, 1987), part. chs. 8/9. 
17) See, Gary Sick, 'The Evolution of U. S. Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf 
Regions', in A. Z. Rubinstein (ed. ), The Great Game (New York: Praeger, 1983). 
18) Henry Kissinger, cited in, Department of State Bulletin (DSB), LXXVI, No. 1963 
(February 7,1977), p. 102. 
19) See, Henry Kissinger, 'On Iran' in, Kissinger, 'Record', op. cit., pp. 172-187; Kissinger 
observes, inter alia, that, 'the ... view for decades has been that economic development would 
more or less automatically produce political stability ... has turned out to be clearly 
wrong'(p. 176). 
20) The central question at issue here concerns the primacy accorded (global) structural factors in 
accounting for conflict and cooperation between states. The essence of the debate between 
realists/neorealists and 'neoliberals' has been well expressed by Joseph M. Grieco: thus, 
'while neoliberals see states as "rational egoists" interested in their own utility, realists view 
states as what I have called "defensive positionalists" interested in achieving and maintaining 
relative capabilities sufficient to remain secure and independent in the self-help context of 
international ana chy'; Joseph M. Grieco, 'Understanding the Problem of International 
Cooperation: the Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory', in, 
David A. Baldwin (ed. ), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New 
York: Columbia, 1994), p. 303. 
21) The classic realist position has been stated by Kenneth Waltz, thus, 'When faced with 
the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states ... are compelled to ask not "Will both of 
us gain? ", but "Who will gain more? ", Kenneth N. Waltz, 77zeory of Intemational Politics 
(Reading, Mass: Addison -Wesely, 1979), p. 105. For a view that emerging multipolarity can 
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Duncan Snidal, 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', in Baldwin, 
op. cit., pp. 198-201 . 
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No. 1 (1992), pp. 1- 15. 
23) For further contemprorary qualification of the Carter Doctrine, see, (former Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs) David D. Newsome, 'America Engulfed', Foreign Policy 43 
(Summer, 198 1) pp. 17-32; in Newsome's view, 'Despite [this] extension of U. S. discretion 
and responsibility, the American public has uncritically accepted the commitment to the Carter 
Doctrine, which itself grew out of last minute pressures for a presidential speech' (p. 17). 
24) For an extended realist perspective on U. S. efforts to restructure the 'Bretton Woods' system 
of exchage rate parities, see Gilpin, 'Political Economy' , op. cit, pp. 131- 54,308-317. 
25) For a recent neorealist exploration of relative gains case-study, see, Michael Mastandundo 'Do 
Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy', Intemational 
Secufity 16 (Summer, 1991), pp. 73-113. 
26) Thus, for Mastandundo, 'As its relative economic power declines, a hegemonic state will 
feel that it is less able to afford, and thus will be less likely to tolerate, "free riding" by its 
allies that works to its relative economic disadvantage'; ibid., pp. 80-1. 
27) This view accords with both realism and institutionalism: as Robert Gilpin observes, 'the 
scale, diversity and dynamics of the American economy will continue to place the United 
States at the centre of the world economic system'; Robert Gilpin, U. S. Power 
andMultinational Corporations (New York: Basic Books, 1975) , p. 253. 
28) The possibilities for such empirical qualification are, however, acknowledged by 
institutionalists; as Keohane observes, 'the fact that asymmetrical gains have implications for a 
given set of future power relationships constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
states to worry more about relative than absolute gains' (1994, op. cit., p. 276). 
29) Henry Kissinger, 'Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, No -3 
(April, 1956) pp-349-366 (p. 352). 
30) See, for example, Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations 
(Princeton: PUP, 1970), Farrel/Smith (eds. ), Image and Reality in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1968); see also, Alexander L. George, 'The Operational 
Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Decision-Making', International Studies 
Quarterly, X11 (June, 1969) pp. 190-222. The approach to 'doctrine' taken in this analysis 
follows that of John Lewis Gaddis, wherein 'there exist for presidential administrations certain 
'strategic' or 'geopolitical' codes, assumptions about American interests in the world, potential 
threats to them, and feasible responses, that tend to be formed either before or just after an 
adminstration takes office and ... tend not to change much thereafter'; 
Gaddis, 'Strategies of 
Containment', op-cit., p. ix. 
31) For the rational state as unitary actor approach, see, for example, Stanley Hoffman, 
Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall, 
1980); see also discussion of 'rational egoism' in Keohane, 1984, op. cit., pp. 27- 30,79- 4. 
The approach taken in this study is supportive of Robert Powell's observation that, 'States as 
rational unitary actors do not exist. They are a theoretical construct. Thus, the question of 
whether states maximize absolute gains or are concerned about relative gains is empirically 
meaningless The real question is, which assumptions about state preferences is more useful? '; 
Robert Powell, 'Absolute and Relative Gains in international Relations theory', in, Baldwin, 
'Neorealism', op. cit., p. 229. 
32) Giovanni Arrighi, The Geometry of Imperialism: The Limits of Hobsons paradigm (London: 
Verso, 1983), 'A Crisis of Hegemony', in Amin, Me Dynamics of Global Crisis' , op. cit. 
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33) Keohane, 'Hegemony, op. cit. 
34) Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, Mass: PUP, 1981), p. 93. 
35) See discussion in Keohane, 'Hegemony', op. cit., pp. 49-65; Keohane observes that, 'Regimes 
consist of injunctions at various levels of generality, ranging from principles to norms to highly 
specific decision making procedures ... From a theoretical standpoint, regimes can 
be viewed as 
intermediate factors or "imervening variables" between fundamental characteristics of world 
politics such as the international distribution of power on the one hand and the behaviour of 
states and non-state actors such as multinational corporations on the other' (p. 64). 
36) In terms of the theoretical literature, this bears upon distinctions between the domestic and 
international realms of political analysis; thus, for Kenneth Waltz, 'The difference between 
national and international politics lies not in the use of force, but in the different modes of 
organization for doing something about it ... a government has no monopoly on the use of force ... An effective government, however, has a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force', 
Waltz, 1979, op. cit., pp. 103-4. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE ANGLO-AMIERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM. 
The main historical focus of this study concerns United States policy for the Indian 
Ocean region in an an era of challenge and retrenchment for the U. S. globally - the 
decade of the 1970's. In so identifing the latter period, a concept of historical conjuncture 
is employed, wherein constellations of different forces affecting the distribution of power 
in the international system can be analysed in their dominant trends. To establish the 
terms for undertaking such conjunctural analysis of 1970's United States' policy, it is 
useful to begin by considering the origins of regional strategy and policy after World 
War two, a time when U. S. power was at its apogee. In treating these questions with the 
detail below, it will thus become apparent that, whilst much of the later development of 
policy - notably concerning military preparedness - was present in embryo, the clear 
overall policy preference was for a differentiation of non-military means widlin bilateral 
relations with individual regional states, underpinned by limited military delegation to 
Britain. Whilst the U. S. had assumed direct security responsibilities in Europe and South 
East Asia, the policy instraments taken up for the Indian Ocean region were to stress 
economic and political factors. However, if an antecedent version of the Nixon Doctrine 
will perhaps be discerned in the 'Anglo-American security system, there was also, as 
will further be shown, a basis for the more direct option. The salient characteristic of 
U. S. regional policy at this time was its almost wholly novel nature. Although 
Washington had begun to take on limited economic interests in the Middle East since the 
1930's, the comprehensive scope demanded of post-war policy objectives - and, as 
significantly, the chosen form for their realization - were to give an index for the 
distinctive cast of U. S. power in the international system. 
ýamlghmmw 
28 
At the close of World War two, the position of the Indian Ocean in United States' 
strategy was preeminently derived from economic considerations at a global level and 
relations with Britain at a regional level. The strategic appreciation governing both 
these ends was reflected in the extent of direct U. S. military commitment - the 
small advisory and training missions in Iran and Saudi Arabia. By the end of the Johnson 
administration, U. S. interests had expanded to include security agreements with Iran and 
Pakistan, military assistance and arms sales programmes to the latter states and Saudi 
Arabia, and the basis for a direct military presence on the island of Diego Garcia. This 
chapter will assess how the development of U. S. policy, originally focused on economic 
interests in the Middle East, would move on to encompass security interests in the Soviet 
Union's South Asian periphery - the 'Northern Tier' - and then extend to a wider 
interest in the Indian Ocean as a strategic unit. 
Whilst the necessary basis for U. S. national security policy will be identified in the 
lineages of Cold War, the operative constituents for regional policy will be posed in the 
interlocking dynamics of economic competition and strategic alliance with Britain. To 
establish the context for discussion, it is first necessary to consider some background 
issues concerning the status of the Indian Ocean - and the colonial question in general - 
in the internal alliance politics of World War two. 
1. The Grand AYea Strategy and the 'Sterling Area'. 
Beginning in the early 1940's, the working 'war aims' agenda devised in the U. S. 
State Department's 'Advisory Committee on Post War Foreign Policy', envisioned a 
, Grand Area', including,, 'the United Kingdom itself as well as the Western Hemisphere 
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and the Far East 12 which would support a maximally free market underpinned by 
'unquestioned' U. S. and allied military power. The strategic aspects of 'Grand Area' 
planning assumed a continuation of Britain's global military commitments commensurate 
with British involvement in constructing the institutional framework of post-war order. 
However, U. S. support for Britain as a viable national economy, a focus for stability in 
Europe and a source of historically grounded overseas legitimacy did not entail support 
for the British imperial system. The Empire's institutional framework - notably the 
'Imperial Preference' tariff arrangements and the monetary structures of the 'Sterling 
Area' - was, in Washington's view, both a political anachronism and a primary obstacle 
to overall market integration. Of particular contention, and relevance to this discussion, 
was the British hold on the oil resources of the Middle East. Whilst it should be stressed 
that there was a clear order of preference in official U. S. 'anti-colonialism', the overall 
direction did represent a rooted normative bias in U. S. political culture. Such sentiments 
had found a popular echo in the U. S. media, where the 1942 'Quit India' movement had 
evoked much sympathy. 'One thing we are sure we are not fighting for', a contemporary 
Life Magazine editorial commented, '... is to hold the British Empire together. ', 
Indeed, practical steps in this direction had provided a counterpoint to U. S. military 
and economic aid to Britain from the beginning. The terms of the 1941 'Lend-Lease' 
agreement had required that the British should, inter alia, eliminate 'discrimination' 
(i. e., Imperial Preference) in international trading practice; a point fin-ther reinforced at 
the time of the agreement's (August, 1945) unilateral abrogation by the United States and 
replacement by a conditional $3.7bn. loan. In a similar vein, Washington's reading of 
the August, 1941 'Atlantic Charter' was to lend a more literal interpretation to Article 
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three's 'national self determination' provisions than Whitehall would allow. Aside from 
the compelling economic case, moreover, a perceptible - if selective - progress toward 
decolonisation from its wartime allies was required by the Roosevelt administration on 
strategic grounds, reflecting the conviction that sovereign states, grounded in liberal 
4 economic practices, would be less susceptible to revolutionary upheaval. 
Given the above considerations, substantial areas of disagreement in Anglo-U. S. 
relations were evident in the immediate post-war period, particularly concerning Britain's 
autonomous strategic capabilities. The 'McMahon Act' of 1946 had sought to prevent 
Britain obtaining nuclear weapons technology. Britain's position in the Middle East was 
challenged by the opening of U. S. economic and military aid to Iran and Saudi Arabia 
(eligible for 'Lend-Lease' since 1943), while Whitehall's approach to retaining the 'Canal 
Zone' garrison in Egypt and conducting the UN mandate in Palestine was subject to 
sustained opposition by the U. S. Congress and - in the latter case, critically - President 
Truman himself. 5 Underpinning the particulars of Washington's expanding regional 
diplomacy lay the unresolved issue of Middle East oil. In contrast to the institutional 
arrangements agreed on world trade (GATT) and finance (the 'Bretton Woods' system), 
the principal Western powers - in effect, the U. S. and Britain - had failed to establish 
the grounds for a formalized energy regime. 6 The issues at stake, on both sides, were 
clear. 'We must resist any concessions to the Americans', Foreign Office negotiators 
had observed at the (inconclusive) Anglo-U. S. 'Oil Talks' of 1944, 'which are likely to 
result in the introduction into the area of a foreign power to rival our influence. 
'7 If 
initially questioned by some within the post-war Attlee Govermnent, 8 the institutional 
icli, nate of opinion' within Whitehall was strongly oriented toward consolidating the 
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British presence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean regions as an essential 
grounding for continued world-wide influence, if not imperial power in the sense 
understood before World War two. 
Overall, Britain's position on the South Asian periphery had thus combined three 
characteristics, which would - successively and collectively - provide the context for 
two decades of U. S. regional policy. Hereafter, the intermediate post-war period would 
find British and U. S. interests univocally opposed economically, intermittently opposed 
politically and increasingly joined strategically. If the alternation of these factors had 
proceeded from both regional developments and the wider evolution of the Western 
alliance, there was also common ground, whose further contradiction was not lost on 
British policy makers. In Whitehall's view, as a 1949 War Office (COS) planning 
assessment makes clear, 'the privileged position that we ... enjoy with the 
United States 
and the attention which she now pays to our strategic and other opinions ... is directly due 
to our hold on the Middle East and all that this involves. ', o 
U. Strategic Accord: The Truman Doctrine and the Pentagon Talks of 1947. 
In Washington, the disposition of political and military strategy for the Middle East and 
Indian Ocean was evolving at this time - The economic 
imperatives for the region were, 
though, clear from the outset. Here, the mould for future policy was being established 
in Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the Saudi case, U. S. interest stemmed from oil concessions 
granted in 1933 to Standard Oil of California. Although supported by the British 
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government,,, the Saudi monarchy sought to widen its political options by agreeing 
exclusive rights with a consortium of U. S. companies ('ARAMCO'), which had 
themselves been restricted from operating elsewhere in the Middle East by an agreement 
of 1928.12 During the war years, the U. S. airforce had set up a staging post at Dhahran 
in Eastern Saudi Arabia. Relations were ftn-ther consolidated by a meeting between King 
Ibn Saud - notionally, a co-belligerent - and President Roosevelt in 1945. Following the 
establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1948, U. S. involvement with the Kingdom 
was to extend to a 'Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement' (1951), providing for 
continuing USAF usage of air facilities at Dhahran and the arrival of a U. S. military 
assistance training mission (USMAAG), replacing a previous British mission, in 1952-11 
The U. S. State Department would also lend active diplomatic support for Saudi border 
claims against the British protectorates of the lower Gulf and Kuwait and the technically 
sovereign 'allied' territories of Oman. 
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Of more directly strategic U. S. interest was Iran. Again an area of established British 
influence, Iran had been occupied by Russian and British forces during World War two 
and had provided the access for U. S. Persian Gulf Command supply lines to the Soviet 
Union. State Department aid for the civil administration in Tehran was complemented 
by a small U. S. military mission (GENMISH) in 1943 to provide for the Iranian 
Gendarinerie., 5 Iran had been viewed as an 'important I but not I vital I concern for U. S. 
security policy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the immediate post-war period. 
16 
However, as elsewhere, a reassessment of the U. S. interests in the Near East region 
was taking place m the context of what, following George Kennan's widely circulated 
analysis of February, 1946, was beginning to be termed 'containment"' of the Soviet 
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Union. It is thus a matter of some historical interest that the first significant instance of 
public U. S. pressure on the Soviet Union had appeared, in March, 1946, in support of 
Iran's efforts to disengage remaining Soviet forces from its territories.,, Whilst U. S. and 
international support at the United Nations - and adroit Iranian diplomacy, g - had, by 
May, 1946 induced a Soviet retreat from Iran's Northern provinces, 2o the region had also 
assumed a higher priority in U. S. strategic thinking. By October, 1946, a review 
conducted by the JCS was to recommend acceding to Iranian requests for 'defensive' 
military equipment. 21 This view was endorsed by State Department recommendations to 
Secretary Byrnes. = Although avoiding formal guarantees, U. S. 'readiness' to assist 
Iranian security would be affirmed in the availability of Export-Import bank lines of 
financial credit and an expanded U. S. military mission ('ARNESH') emplaced in 1947.23 
With the expanding conception of U. S. interests had come a bureaucratic 
reorganization, establishing a new 'National Security Council' and a reconstituted 
intelligence service - the CIA - more commensurate with the U. S. global role. Inter- 
agency planning would, in consequence, encompass a more systematic approach to the 
Middle East as a strategic unity. The Truman administration's priorities were, though, 
focused on economic reconstruction in Europe and, collaterally, the defeat of the 'Asia 
First' wing of the Republican party. 24 Given the latter domestic divisions, a renewed 
enthusiasm for sustaining Britain's established politico-military influence in the Near East 
becomes apparent. Britain had, in January, 1947 informed the administration that it could 
no longer afford to provide financial and military support for Greece and Turkey. 2sAs 
with the contemporaneous 'European Recovery Program', an unequivocal stress on the 
Soviet threat would be used to secure Congressional support for both the United 
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Kingdom and the allied regimes on the USSR's Eurasian periphery - As (then Under 
Secretary) Dean Acheson was to tell House leaders on February 22,1947, 'Soviet 
pressure on the (Bosphorous) Straits, on Iran and on Northern Greece ... might open up 
three continents to Soviet penetration ... these are the stakes that a British withdrawal from 
the Eastern Mediterranean offered to an eager and ruthless opponent. '26Such an approach 
was to enter the public arena with President Truman's announcement that support against 
'outside pressures' for these regions would become 'the policy of the United States. 
However, although the President's March 12,1947 policy declaration - the 
'Truman Doctrine' - was to contain vague but sweeping commitments to 'support free 
people who are resisting subjugation, the administration was also committed to 
tightening the defence budget. 2,, Congress was so assured that, 'there are no plans to send 
to Greece or Turkey combat troops of any nature. '29 Such allied combat troops as were 
in Greece, as throughout the Middle East and North Africa, were British. Moreover, the 
continuing strategic uncertainty in Europe and the progress of the Chinese and 
Vietnamese revolutions in the Far East would lend, for the administration, a 
contemporary urgency to older, more visceral fears of Russian threats to the Middle East 
rte from the Chiefs of Staff (COS), the and South Asia, relayed from Whitehall in repon, 
Cabinet 'Joint Intelligence Committee' and the newly established 'Russia Committee' 
of the Foreign Office. 3o 
Accordingly, in September, 1947, Foreign Secretary Bevin and State Department NEA 
Director Loy Henderson recorded 'a somewhat extended conversation... on the strategic 
situation of the whole Near East. ',, By December, such 'tentative ideas' had established 
35 
the context to concert Anglo -U -S- strategic co-operation on a more formal footing - The 
outcome of the 'Pentagon Talks', conducted in Washington, would, 'after ... a full 
exchange of views with both American and British military advisors, 
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establish both a 
threat-assessment and a joint agenda. Here, proceeding from the premise that, 'the 
security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of 
the United States,,, the policy progranune had declared that such security, 'would be 
jeopardized if the Soviet Union succeeded in its efforts to obtain control of. Ataly, 
G 11 reece, Turkey or Iran, ' and that the U. S. 'should assist in maintaining [the] territorial 
integrity and political independence' of the latter. In pursuing this course, the U. S 
'should be prepared to make full use of its political, economic and ... military power in 
such a manner as may be found effective. 34And moreover, as the British representatives 
were gratified to hear, 'it would be unrealistic for the U. S. to undertake ... such a policy 
unless the British maintain their strong strategic, political and economic position in the 
Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and unless they and ourselves follow parallel 
policies in that area. 
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From a British standpoint, the Pentagon Talks had been a signal success and served 
to institutionalize Britain's Middle Eastern holdings as integral to global containment. 
Britain could, the War Office believed, 'find a way of holding the Middle East at the 
beginning of a war with our own resources and of developing offensive action against 
Russia from that area. 
'16 The focus of U. S. planning tended toward more immediate 
concerns. Thus, agreement was reached on establishing joint facilities in Libya (and the 
Libyan state 
itself)37 
and berthing rights secured in Bahrain which would establish the 
U. S. Navy's MIDEASTFOR contingent . 
38 Britain was particularly reassured by U. S. 
36 
agreement that its position in Iraq constituted 'a formidable military barrier between 
Saudi Arabia and Russia. 
139 In concert with the expanding international framework for 
the U. S. alliance system, the administration had also, by this time, secured a domestic 
consensus behind the 'Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with 
such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on ... effective self-help and 
mutual aid and as affects its national security'4o - which was given formal expression 
in the June 11,1948 'Vandenberg (Senate) Resolution. 141 
The prospects for a wider Anglo-American political understanding in the Middle East 
had also developed after 1947. Britain had, in May, 1948, withdrawn from Palestine. 
Despite much public acrimony attending the creation of the Israeli state, Whitehall had 
also moved to establish a close intelligence relationship both with and within the former 
mandateewhich served, in Washington, to bring strategic as opposed to recent historical 
factors to the fore. India, long a test case for U. S. 'anti-colonialism' had become 
independent. And whilst Nerhu's neutrality and 'deeply ethical tone 
143 had aroused some 
misgivings in Washington, British support for the new Pakistani government of Liaquat 
AH44 
provided reassurance of strategic continuity in the Eastern Gulf. In Egypt, the 
efforts of Ernest Bevin and the successor Churchill/Eden governments to retain the Canal 
Zone facilities 'on a basis of equality and partnership 
145 
with the host nation received 
strong support from the new NSC. The 'Middle East Base' at Port Said, Suez and 
Ismailia was, at this time, the focus for NATO contingency planning in the event of a 
general conflict with the Soviet Union, 4, and outline discussion would thus proceed in 
terms of an extended NATO Middle East command structure. 
47 Although the U. S. and 
Britain had, by the sunnner of 1951, secured French and Turkish participation for the 
37 
proposed 'Middle East Defence Organization', the plan was rejected on October, 15 by 
Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha. 48 
Ifl. An Order of Priorities: NSC 68 to the Suez Crisis. 
The summary rejection of 'MEDO' by Nahas Pasha and the latter's own displacement 
in July, 1952 by the 'Free Officers Movement' was also, however, attended by the 
re-emergence of more general policy differences between Washington and Whitehall. 
These would concern both Britain's established role in the political economy of the 
Middle East and the appropriate method of incorporating the region in a globally 
structured security system. For the Truman administration, a comprehensive expression 
of the parameters for U. S. global strategy had been set forth in the April, 1950 policy 
review, 'NSC 68. '49To be sure, the new national security orthodoxy offered an expansive 
strategic agenda. 'The assault on free institutions is world-wide now', the document 
records, '... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. '5o Under such 
conditions, even the United States 'Cannot, as Secretary Acheson was to tell a May, 
1950 session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,. '-scatter our shots equally 
all over the world. 's, Whilst admitting a passing reference to the need for 'A 
strengthening of the British position ... if it is to be a focus of resistance to communist 
expansion in South and South East Asia, 52 the main geopolitical focus of NSC 68 was, 
t1lough, on Europe and Far East. Here it was felt that the didactic impact of the review's 
'Hemingway sentences' might elicit the greatest domestic resonance in contriving what 
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was, in effect, a Keynesian programme of military expenditure from a conservatively 
inclined congress. -" 
The omission of a systematic account of Soviet threat to South West Asia in NSC 68 
was indicative of the administration's strategic as well as political priorities. It was not 
until a further policy review of 1952 - NSC 135/354 - that the administration was to 
address what State's (then) Policy Planning Director Paul Nitze would significantly term 
'problems we'd ignored' (in NSC 68) in 'intervening areas, not only the Middle East, 
but Africa. ',, Here too, the 'problems' were to be couched in terms of the rise of local 
nationalisms rather than imminent Soviet or communist takeover. -% For Whitehall, 
1. it was axiomatic that, in spite of Atlantic Charters and all that sort of stuff, 's7 the 
existing, essentially pre-war, political arrangements in the Middle East should still obtain 
in order that Middle East oil continue to underwrite the role of sterling as a world 
currency. From a U. S. perspective, this nexus between British economic and political 
particularism in the Middle East would increasingly need unpacking from the 
advantageous strategic aspects of the continuing British presence in the region. 
For the Truman administration, such contradictions had been sharpened by 
unilateral British measures, introduced between April-December, 1949, to restrict all 
sterling area oil transactions involving U. S. affiliates to purchases from British or Anglo- 
Dutch suppliers. 's From Washington, these actions were perceived as a protectionist 
threat to U. S. commercial activity in general, and a political threat to the U. S. position 
in Saudi Arabia (which had excluded the operation of all non-U. S. oil companies) in 
particular. Under such circumstances, an internal State Department memorandum noted 
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that a 'Loss of one-quarter annual revenue might stalemate Saudi Arabian 
progress.. jeopardizing the unique co-operation and friendship now existing between the 
U. S. Saudi Arabia. ', g Hence, whilst the immediate 'sterling-dollar-oil-problem' would 
be resolved by mutual agreement in May, 1950,6o the issues raised were to engage a more 
concerted U. S. response to both the restrictions of Britain's Middle East oil regime and 
the wider operation of what one State official had described as 'the dead hand of 
the sterling area. '61 
Given the broader U. S. perspectives on the construction of post-war order, and the key 
role of the 'Marshall aid' arrangements for Western Europe in particular, U. S. policy 
was, in any event, to assign a high priority to the political economy of the Middle East. 
Here, as summarized in a subsequent (1975) Senate FRC report, 6, the Truman 
administration's objectives were three. Firstly, 'the U. S. desired to supply a steady 
supply of oil to Europe and Japan at reasonable prices ... for sustained economic growth. 
Second, the U. S. desired to maintain stable governments in the non-communist, pro- 
Western oil exporting countries. Third, the U. S. desired that American based firms 
become a dominant force in the world oil trade. '6, Thus, in the first instance, 'The large 
amount of Marshall Plan aid that went for petroleum was administered by the Economic 
Co-operation Administration (ECA). '64 This enabled the latter government agency to 
establish price guidelines which, 'foregoing localized high returns, ' would effectively 
undercut what, as we have seen, were British attempts to establish an independent price 
structure or an Anglo-American monopoly 'favouring Anglo-Saxon consumers. 
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Moreover, the ECA's Portfolio powers would also help assure the 'dominant, position 
of U. S. corporations since, as Dean Acheson observed, 'It is ECA policy [that] in every 
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petroleum transaction an American company must be involved. '66The concentration 
of such market power would, in turn, promote 'stability' in the Middle East. As the FRC 
Report furdier records, 'If the weak economies of the Persian Gulf states were to remain 
friendly to the West, large amounts of money needed to be pumped into the 
area ... Delegating such a major foreign policy function to the American (oil) majors was 
the easiest way for Washington's national security bureaucracy to solve its problem. '67 
The method to achieve the required level of transfer payments was initiated in Saudi 
Arabia. After December 30,1950 the Saudi government's income tax requirement was 
to be creditable against the U. S. income tax liability of the major American oil 
companies operating in Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, ARAMCO would shift its tax payments 
from the U. S. Treasury to the Saudi exchequer, whose tax income thus rose from $66m. 
in 1950 to $11 Om. in 195 1.68The extension of the system to cover all U. S. overseas oil 
operations would serve to further differentiate U. S. foreign economic policy from what 
13*- s I re ident Truman's inaugural address had termed, 'the old imperialism .... exploitation 
for foreign profits', which, as the President went on to declare, '... has no place in our 
plans. '6, 
For Washington, the destabilizing effects attending British attachment to 'the old 
imperialism' in the Middle East were next apparent in refusal of the -Anglo-Iranian oil 
company to negotiate a 50% profit sharing arrangement with the Iranian government of 
General Ali Razinara. Anglo-Iranian's stance was accompanied by an upsurge of anti- 
British demonstrations in Iran and the assassination of the Iranian Prime Minister. In 
the light of the similar profit sharing contract that been concluded between 
ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia, AIOC's intransigence would be contrasted with 
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'the ... happy situation of all other companies in all other countries. 7o It would also 
provide State Department mediators with an opening to displace the British-owned 
company from its monopoly position in the production of Iranian oil. U. S. policy toward 
Iran had been reviewed in NSC 54 of July 21,1949.71 Whilst restating the level of U. S. 
strategic interest in Iran found in the 'Pentagon Talks', such interests were best served, 
in the administration's view, in the context of increased social and economic progress by 
the Shah's regime -7, Accordingly, a 
$25m. Export-]Import loan and $1/2m. in Point Four 
grant aid was agreed in October, 1950.73 It was clear, however, that U. S. efforts to 
promote internal reform in Iran would be compromised by the continuing British refusal, 
backed by military threats, 74 to agree terms with the incoming 'National Front' 
government of Mohammed Mossadeq which had, in March, 1951, consolidated its own 
position by nationalizing the British oil corporation. 
Throughout the last two years of the Truman administration, U. S. negotiators had 
continued to stress the 'disastrous consequences'7-, that could proceed from the 'very rigid 
position 
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maintained by the Eden Foreign Office. If Washington could agree that 
Mossadeq had 'acted unwisely, '7, the British approach - involving a break in diplomatic 
relations and an international boycott of Iranian oil7s - was to be met by U. S. threats to 
funfln+, Ch 
aterally ... give 
fmancial aid to Iran', even at the risk of 'great bitterness in Anglo- 
American relations. '79 In Whitehall's view, Mossadeq was a 'dubious character' whom, 
Foreign Minister Eden remarked, with some prescience, 'would probably not be around 
for much longer. 'go By November, 1952, a ftu-ther review of U. S. policy - NSC 136/1 
- had decided to effect 
'an early and equitable resolution of the oil controversy', 
4 
without, however, 'permitting the 
UK a veto over U. S. actions. '81 
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Thus, although the incoming Eisenhower administration would itself take up British 
plans to overthrow Mossadeq - activated in the August, 1953 'Operation Ajax's-2 - an 
'equitable resolution' to the marketing of Iran's oil assets had indeed been achieved on 
U. S. terms. The British stake was reduced to a level of 40 % in the new oil 
'consortium'. u Overall, by the end of 1953, U. S. companies had gained a controlling 
mterest in 60% of Middle East oil. 84 
If the U. S. had thus, by the first year of the Eisenhower administration, largely 
secured its politico-economic ob ectives to, inter alia, underwrite the 'weak economies j 
of the Persian Gulf' within a reconstructed Middle East oil regime, there remained 
questions concerning the retention of such 'pro-Western' regional states' politico- 
strategic orientation. 'Many of the Arab League countries', Secretary Dulles had 
observed, '... are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or 
France, that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. ' However, regional 
consultations taken in early 1953 had also convinced the Secretary of State that, 'where 
the Soviet Union is near', the "'northern tier" of nations shows [an] awareness of the 
danger' and that, 'there is a vague desire to have a collective security system. '85 
In fact, initial steps toward formulating 'collective security' arrangements were, with 
'the fullest support and encouragement'&6 of the United States, to be independently 
undertaken by Pakistan and Turkey by late 1953. Whilst the Turkish regime of Ismet 
Jn6nu had a not unfounded strategic interest in widening its aRiance structure to the East, 
given the recent history of Soviet pressure, s7 the concerns of Pakistan were centred on 
the long-standing border dispute with Afghanistan and the regional balance with India. 
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For both powers, however, the signing of a five year 'Agreement for Friendly Co- 
operation' in Karachi on April 2,1954 was also grounded in the expectation of increased 
U. S. economic and military aid. 8s This, for Pakistan, would be forthcoming with 
Eisenhower's fonnal. offer of MAP support of February, 25 confmned in an initial $25m. 
aide memoire of May, 19. " The U. S. interest in 'constructive step[s] ... toward ensuring 
the security of the whole (Middle Eastern) area'go had also been noted in Iraq, as had the 
extent of U. S. military aid provision to Turkeyq, and Washington's stricture on Britain 
to establish an 'equitable' oil regime in Iran. Iraq had registered a request for U. S. 
military aid in March, 1953. This had been approved by the Dulles State Department 
on April 21,1954.9, In March, King Feisal was to open security negotiations with 
Pakistan. In August, ftirther talks were commenced with Turkey by Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nuri es-Said. 93The latter two govermnents would thus, on January 24,1955, 
conclude a five year 'Treaty of Mutual Co-operation', open for accession to any member 
of the Arab League, 'or any other state actively concerned with security and peace in 
the Middle East. '94This 'Baghdad Pact' was the basis for the eponymous South West 
Asian alliance organization. 
The prospect of Iraq developing an expanded range of political and military options 
- embracing both the regional powers and the United States - had engaged a more 
active interest in the evolving collective security system from Britain. London had 
initially, as a State Department briefing paper records, 'shown little enthusiasm for the 
"Northern Tier" concept. " However, the perceived setback of 'Abadan' and certainty 
of withdrawal from Egypt after 1956% had prompted an extensive review of British 
strategic policies 'East of Suez'. 
970f particular concern to Whitehall was the need to 
44 
retain the two British air bases in Iraq (Habbaniya and Shaibah)" and Britain's established 
position as Iraq's principal ally. As the basis for both the operative and less tangible 
British assets was under threat with the (1957) expiry of the 1930 'Anglo-Iraq Treaty', 
Britain was, on April 4,1955, to itself accede to the Baghdad Pact, and concurrently 
agree a new bilateral treaty with Iraq in which RAF access to the bases was to be 
continued in return for British aid in equipping the Iraqi airforce. 99 
The ambit of the Baghdad Pact was to be further extended during 1955, with the 
accession of Pakistan (September, 23) and, on October, 23, Iran. The delay on the behalf 
of both powers owed much to efforts to encourage a formal adherence from 
Washington. loo The military priorities of the Eisenhower administration were, however, 
focused elsewhere. 'In view [ofl the retarded status [of] regional defense planning', 
Foster Dulles was to instruct the Tehran Embassy, '... the U. S. cannot commit itself, 
even indirectly, to any specific concept of ME (Middle East) defense. 'lol In Dulles' view, 
'laying the political foundation for Northern Tier' was, self-evidently, in the 'best 
mterests' of the parties directly concemed., o, Iran, in particular, should thus not 'regard 
accession to [the] Baghdad Pact as a favor to [the] U. S. for which [the] latter should pay 
a high price. I mWashington was, to be sure, to issue a declaration of formal support for 
the Pact and to appoint, on November 19,1955 the U. S. Ambassador to Iraq to function 
as U. S. 'Military and Political Liaison' to the opening sessions of signatories on 
November 21-22.,,,, Such gestures would not, though, involve any revision of U. S. 
military posture in the Middle East. 
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The Eisenhower administration's policy of avoiding outright commitment to the 
Baghdad Pact in favour of more indirect 'liaison' was to give rise to some 
misunderstanding in the regionlo' - despite Dulles' pedagogic efforts - and be subject to 
a particular level of misinterpretation within the Eden government in Britain. From 
Washington's perspective, however, such a de facto approach was entirely in keeping 
with tile administration's assessment of the nature of the present (politico-military) threat 
and of the region's position in the overall context of U. S. global strategy. Eisenhower 
was not opposed in principle to the use of selective or covert military means in the third 
world. Significant instances took place in Guatemala (1954) and, as we have seen, Iran. 
But the more open-end and formal commitment entailed by the Baghdad Pact would, in 
the President's view, rather serve to restrict U. S. options in the region and provide fresh 
stimulation to both Arab radicals and remaining isolationist sentiment in the U. S. itself. 
As a general principle, moreover, the administration was determined that the 'vague 
desire' for regional collective security should be clearly identified with the regional 
powers themselves, rather than with Dulles' Seventh Floor offices at Foggy Bottom. 
The administration had, by October, 1953 undertaken a wide-ranging reassessment of 
global defence posture. Within NSC/162/2 - 'The New Look' -a premium was 
placed on the 'massive retaliatory powers', o6of nuclear weapons, as opposed to what 
Eisenhower had tenned 'old fashioned (conventional) forces' which the United States, 
'could not ... maintain all around the world. 
'lo7Whilst the 'New Look' was clearly engaged 
in counterpoising the more Keynesian propensities of NSC 68 - and would administer 
a decline in U. S. defence expenditure from a baseline (1953) 13.8% of GNP to a level 
of 9.6 % by 1956, os - the Eisenhower approach was to also assume much of the latter's 
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conceptual underpinning. For if NSC 68 made much of the 'militancy' of the 'Kremlin 
Design', the empirical threat was identified as much in perceptions of the central balance 
and was thus to be addressed 'by all means short of war. 'log A 'Soviet acknowledgement 
of realities',, o - principally, nuclear ones - was expected, and indeed, transpired at the 
1955 Geneva Summitu, and conclusion of the Austrian neutrality treaty. For the Middle 
East, the main secular thrust of Soviet strategy was also viewed as political rather that 
overtly military. To be sure, the Soviet Union had strongly attacked the Baghdad Pact 
at the United Nations 112 and continued to stress its opposition to 'aggressive military 
blocs. 1113 However, in terms of the possibility of Moscow itself initiating a military 
riposte, 'the U. S. doubts', Foster Dulles had informed the Shah of Iran, '... that USSR 
would go so far as to take actions which would prejudice its assiduously developed 
current peace campaign. 
1114 The Secretary was to further note the Soviet willingness to 
sign commercial and frontier agreements with the 1954 government of the Shah, 'rather 
than with [the] previous vacillating, Commie-infiltrated Mossadeq regime. ',,, 
If the United States' Middle Eastern allies had suffered from some mis-apprehension 
that participation in the Baghdad Pact could lead to more 'substantial' outflows in 'dollar 
aid' than the 'extreme financial stringency' 
116 
perceived in Washington would allow, the 
approach to the alliance from Britain was to involve a more fundamental misconception. 
For Eden, the Pact was viewed as, potentially, 'a NATO for the Middle East'117 and 
certainly as a diplomatic coup that 'strengthened our influence and our voice' throughout 
the region. us Such sentiments were supported by the Labour opposition. Shadow 
Commonwealth Affairs Spokesman Patrick Gordon Walker had endorsed Eden's 
diplomacy as a necessary response to 'a vacuum ... in the Middle East ... that we should 
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not leave' and declared that, '... the only way it will be filled up is by this sort of pact. 
However, whilst British strategy had still ascribed the premise, retained in successive 
post-war planning estimates since 1946,12o that 'Our Middle East air bases are a valuable 
deterrent to Russian aggression' 12, and viewed the possibility of 'developing offensive 
action against Russia from that (Middle East) area', 22 as a real, if remote, basis for 
Britain's own essay in 'counter-value' nuclear deterrence, the more immediate threat 
was perceived in militant Arab nationalism concerted from Cairo. Britain would, 
accordingly, make strenuous efforts to employ the alliance as a forum to counter Egypt's 
President Nasser's anti-British activism and to extend the Baghdad Pact's membership 
to Jordan. 123 
Dulles, though, could look to other instruments to 'assure ... the friendship and 
understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from colonialism. '124 
The Secretary had, particularly following the successful 1954 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, 
come to view Nasser as potentially the 'wheel-horse of Western policy' in the region. 12s 
Washington had, Tmancial stringency' notwithstanding, extended a $40m. loan to the 
Nasser regime and was considering a $56m. arrangement from the World bank to finance 
Egypt's Aswan dam project. 126Moreover, such acute divergence of Anglo-American 
priorities - if not ultimate ends - in the Middle East and South Asian littoral was to 
admit a further dimension to the dangers of a regional 'vacuum' to those posed by 
expressions of British policy conventionally on view. A survey of U. S. activities in 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 'Persia' and Pakistan, would suggest, for Britain's Washington 
ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, a confirmation of Whitehall's 'very understandable 
suspicion that the Americans are out to take our place in the Middle East. ', 27 
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Perhaps the nadir of U. S. relations with Britain in the Middle East was reached with 
the October 31,1956 Anglo-French attack on Egypt and the Suez Canal, following on 
the Israeli invasion some days before. Here, the comprehensive nature of the Eisenhower 
administration's response was to release two strategic consequences of some significance 
for later U. S. policy. The first of these was an intensification of the Franco-Israeli 
collaboration in the development of nuclear weapons, 2, which would, by 1969, establish 
Israel as both a nuclear power and, ceteris paribus, the major U. S. strategic partner in 
the region. The second was the closure of Britain's geopolitical options that would 
compel the Macmillan and Wilson governments to restructure British defence posture for 
the Middle East around an Indian Ocean-based security system. 
Eisenhower was not, even before Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 
1956, in any ignorance of the general British desire to both re-occupy the Canal Zone 
and 'knock Nasser off his perch. ' Nor, indeed, was Nasser. Britain's contingency plans 
for what became 'Operation Musketeer' had been passed to the Egyptian General Staff 
by U. S. ambassador Henry Byroade. 129 Britain had calculated that a combination of 
factors, concerning Nasser's relations with the Soviet Union - an $80m. arms transfer 
had been agreed in September, 1955 - and the proximity of the November U. S. 
Presidential elections would, in the last analysis, compel Washington to, in Dulles' 
phrase, 'pull their (British) chestnuts out of the fire. ',, o However, as the minutes of the 
administration's November, 1 NSC meeting make clear, Eisenhower and Dulles had, 
on the contrary, 'almost reached the point of deciding... whether we think the 
future lies with a policy of reasserting by force colonial control of less developed nations 
or whether we shall oppose such a course of action by every appropriate means. 1131 
If 
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allowances can be made for some hyperbole, an 'appropriate means' to compel a British 
withdrawal from Suez was certainly to hand. By November, 6, Britain had lost 15 % of 
132 her foreign currency reserves and faced a world-wide oil embargo. The price of U. S. 
support, Dulles was to tell Harold Macmillan (at the Exchequer), was a cessation of 
hostilities in place by November, 7.,,, While U. S. logistics experts were, soon after, to 
supervise the clearing of the Suez Canal, Nasser was to receive a $54m. U. S. aid K- 
subvention. and access to surplus wheat stocks under PL 480. Eden was to resign on 
January 9,1957. 
IV. Strategy Renewed: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Central Treaty 
Organization. 
In considering the broader context to the Suez crisis, it should be stressed that some 
in Washington were not unsympathetic to the idea of a more selective operation, as 
originally envisaged by France and Israel, to engage a localized military strike on 
Egypt's forward-deployed air and armoured capability. 134Nasser's trenchant opposition 
to the Baghdad Pact, and military relations with Moscow, were construed as, at the least, 
admitting an indirect avenue for increased Soviet influence in the region. The force of 
United States' opposition to 'Suez' had, rather, stemmed from Eden's encompassing war 
aims - viewed as completely unrealistic - and the method of their execution. 'It was a 
bad thing', Paul Nitze relates, '-for a junior member of the (Western) alliance to get 
out of hand ... Foster 
(Dulles) felt that the thing had been done behind his back. 1135 
However, if U. S. influence in the Middle East had clearly benefited from curtailment of 
Britain's essay in I the old imperialism', the dangers to stability inherent in Nasser's 'Pan 
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Arab' programme - widely disseminated in the daily transmissions of the 'Voice of the 
Arabs' - would also require a more positive response. Nasser had, in April, 1955, met 
with other third world leaders at Bandung - And whilst much has been made of Dulles' 
censure of 'neutralism' in the nascent movement for 'Afro-Asian Solidarity' as, 'an 
immoral and short-sighted conception, ',, 6Eisenhower was, as ever, weighing the financial 
costs of the alternatives. In this respect, as the President was to tell conservative 
Senators, neutrality had, indeed, a positive merit in terms of the fiscal priorities 
informing the 'New Look'. 137 In thus proposing to, 'wage the cold war in a militant, but 
reasonable style, ', -u Eisenhower had determined to gain Congressional approval for a 
$200m. military and economic aid supplemental for the Middle East for the budget 
appropriations of FY 1957.1,9 
However, whilst Eisenhower might, in conclave, consider a 'reasonable style' 
most appropriate to promoting U. S. security interests in the Middle East, the conventions 
of a Congress suspicious of 'do-gooder giveaways', 4o in the field of foreign aid would 
demand a more 'militant' presentation. Accordingly, on January 5,1957 the President 
was to request and on March, 9, receive a Congressional endorsement of his proposals, 
couched in terms of the 'vital ... national interest' involved 
in 'preservation of the integrity 
and independence of the nations of the Middle East. 
'14, The United States would, 
moreover, be 'prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such 
nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by 
Mternational communism. '142As with earlier U. S. pronouncements, many observers - not 
least in the Middle East itself - were to neglect the domestic context of what became 
known as the 'Eisenhower Doctrine'. In the wake of Suez, the declaration had produced 
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an, at best, ambivalent international reception, underscored by its wholehearted 
approbation by only the embattled Falangist President of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun. 
In London, though, the Joint Resolution would be taken up as a new mandate for 
Britain's presence in the Middle East. Eisenhower had moved swiftly to diffuse 
some of the bitterness of Suez. The administration had mobilized a consortium of 15 
U. S. oil companies, the 'Middle East Emergency Committee', to provide an emergency 
oil lift programme to Britain amounting to 380,000 barrels-per-day over pre-crisis 
levels., 43For its part, the new Macmillan government, while detem-dned to retain at least 
the residuary of 'world power', had no illusions of engaging in a quasi-imperial role in 
open opposition to Washington. 
The Eisenhower administration's increased focus on alliance politics in the Middle 
East was marked by the dispatch of a special Presidential envoy to the region, 44and, in 
January, 1958 by the presence of Secretary Dulles at the fourth 'Ministerial Council' 
sessions of the Baghdad Pact., 4s On July, 14, however, a military coup in the Iraqi capital 
had both deposed the Hashemite monarchy and put in question the wider basis of the 
collective security regime for South Asia. 146AIthough U. S. regional commitment was to 
be reasserted with the deployment, on July 15, of a Marine Task Force to Lebanon and 
a British Parachute Brigade to Jordan - both under somewhat ambiguous military 
justification - Foster Dulles had publicly raised the possibility that the formal 
arrangements of the Pact be allowed to 'wither on the vine. '147 Support for some form 
of security association from the regional states and Britain was, though, to receive U. S. 
endorsement in the July, 28 'London Declaration'. Here, meeting under the (notional) 
auspices of the Fifth Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, all the remaining members 
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were to, 'declare their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist 
aggression, ' and affinn that, 'the need which called the Pact into being is greater than 
ever. 
1,48 If the United States had still stopped short of formal membership of the alliance, 
Washington was prepared to 'promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to 
this co-operation. 
' 149 Accordingly, the administration would take the occasion of 
inaugurating the Baghdad Pact's successor - the 'Central Treaty Organization' (CENTO) 
- to enter a series of new bilateral arrangements with the three regional powers. These, 
with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, were signed at CENTO Headquarters, Ankara, on 
March 5,1959., -, o 
Whilst the three bilateral agreements would become the preferred avenue for U. S. 
military and economic aid to the CENTO powers, it is useful at this stage to examine the 
scope of CENTO itself as an indicator of the general cast of U. S. priorities for the 
region. In the first instance, as repeated U. S. policy statements were to emphasize, 
'CENTO is an entirely different animal from NATO. '151 Its purpose, as summed up in 
one (1964) State Department position paper, subsists rather as a 'limited political 
instrment' which, 'helps to bind the regional powers politically and psychologically to 
the West. 'lm As such, the alliance's direct military and security dimensions were, despite 
regional promptings, 'somewhat incidental. ', nThus, while Washington had concurred in 
a resolution, proposed at the ninth 'Ministerial Council' sessions in April, 1961,1m for 
upgrading command structures to include 'a CENTO military directing agency' - on 
the lines of NATO's permanent military committee - and, similarly, a (four star rank) 
CENTO 'Supreme Commander', U. S. refusal to appoint a senior officer to the post 
was to leave the prospects for 'an appropriate and effective' military planning machinery 
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much as before. 15s Although a range of contingency schedules were, on a yearly basis, 
prepared by the 'Combined Military Planning Staff',, -% these were limited to developing 
'basic assumptions ... for a situation of global war. 'ln The restriction of CMPS terms of 
reference to 'aggressive threat[s] ... instigated or supported by international 
Communism, ',, & would be questioned by the regional powers - and in particular, by 
Pakistan. 1,9 Such language though, as DOS policy guidance makes clear, was specifically 
framed 'to exclude planning against India. '16o 
However, if CENTO was not to be in a position to fulfil some of the more 
encompassing regional ambitions and, after Suez, lose British enthusiasm for 'a NATO 
for the Middle East, '16, a range of projects and activities were undertaken that would 
approximate the original aims of the Eisenhower Doctrine and Dulles' aspirations for 
the 'Northern Tier'. These included a Turkey-Iran-Pakistan communications (microwave) 
link, Turkey-Iran road and rail infrastructure, the upgrading of regional port facilities 
and the establishment of a modem air traffic control system between Ankara, Tehran and 
Karachi. 162 In concert with smaller technical and capital assistance programmes, U. S. 
economic aid to the CENTO area amounted to some $55m. by 1964., 63Whilst the latter 
projects could claim a generalized strategic return for U. S. regional policy, some direct 
- if limited - military benefits were also forthcoming from the periodic joint exercises, 
notably involving air defence (the semi-annual 'Shabhaz' series),, 164 and the annual 
'NUDLINK' senes of alliance naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, 165 In addition, the 
CENTO framework would provide a useful political 'cover' for U. S. forces on 
occasional bilateral assignment in the region. 166 
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V. The Global Arena: McNamara, Mobility and Flexible Response. 
The CENTO alliance, in providing for limited military co-ordination, an annual 
'informal' meeting of ministers at the commencement of the UN General Assembly, 67 
and a focus for routine policy co-ordination at the State Department's Bureau of Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 68 had thus far represented the extent of U. S. collective 
security diplomacy in South Asia. With the advent of the Kennedy administration, an 
expanded conception of U. S. regional interests would emerge that was to extend beyond 
the CENTO powers and encompass the wider boundaries of the Indian Ocean. The 
Democratic Presidency had brought with it a general belief in active government, 
conceived as a political counterpoint to its commitment to Keynesian economics. For 
security policy, a similar expression of expansible material means would be found in the 
revisions in strategic doctrine and military posture. The Kennedy administration's 
approach was, to be sure, attuned to developments independently occurring in both the 
region and in the wider context of great power relations. Also possessing its own 
dynamic, however, was the direction thus represented in U. S. national security thinking. 
Many now in the administration had been arguing for such an expansion of means since 
NSC 68.1" 
To consider the regional implications of the Kennedy/Johnson programme, it is 
thus first necessary to turn to the administration's wider approach to security policy. 
Here, whilst the Kennedy campaign platform had made much of an alleged 'missile gap' 
between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, the revisions inaugurated in goverrument 
were to also reflect a more over-arching critique of defence policy, posture and strategic 
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doctrine, extending back throughout the Eisenhower/Dulles era. For Kennedy and his 
advisors, this was focused on both the 'imbalance' perceived in the paramount nuclear 
weapons emphasis of the 'New Look, and what were further seen as insufficient levels 
of capability for the strategic systems themselves. The perceived failings of both U. S. 
nuclear and conventional force levels under Eisenhower had been earlier featured in the 
November, 1957 'Gaither Report' 170 on 'Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age'. 
The report of the bi-partisan Presidential panel had voiced the widespread dissatisfaction 
in the Washington policy community with the inflexible doctrinal basis of Dulles' 
'massive (nuclear) retaliation' strategy, as also with the Republican administration's 
equally inflexible commitment to fiscal conservatism. Both were to be addressed as the 
Kemedy administration's own defence outlay was to rise from an inherited $47.4bn. (FY 
1961) to $53.3bn. for FY 1964,17, and embrace the full range of U. S. strategic, 
conventional and 'unconventional' warfare capability. The administration's conceptual 
aims, moreover, reflected a further differentiation from the objectives of U. S. national 
security policy adhered to under Dulles and Eisenhower. Paul Nitze, Chairman of the 
1), r, ms I j-e- ident's national security transition 'task force' and back in goverment as 
Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (ISA) had given public notice on what was to become a familiar 
theme. In concert with allied forces, Nitze observed, the administration's strategic 
programme, I gives the West a definite nuclear superiority'. And furthermore, 
'We ... believe that this superiority can 
be maintained into the future. '172 
The attainment of strategic 'superiority' did not, as is clear from the above, mean a 
neglect of conventional forces by the administration. Me paradox of atomic weapons', 
in the view of State's influential Director of Policy Planning, Walt W. Rostow, '... has 
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permitted the lesser powers degrees of bargaining freedom they would not have if 
military force had not taken so violent and discontinuous a technical leap - 
1173 The 
imminent prospect that, as Rostow again observes, 'the arena of power will ... become 
truly global' 174 was to figure strongly in the administration's revision of defence doctrine 
and procurement policy. In particular, these considerations would accelerate the 
development, long urged by Kennedy's chief military advisor and future CJCS, General 
Maxwell Taylor, 17s of strategically mobile forces. The new U. S. strategic doctrine - 
termed 'flexible response I- was articulated by Kennedy himself in the administration's 
first 'State of the Union'. Of central importance was a programme of increased air and 
sea transport capability, 176which, the President announced, 'will better assure the ability 
of our conventional forces to respond, with discrimination and speed, to any problem at 
any spot ... it will enable us to meet any deliberate effort to ... divert our forces by starting 
limited wars on widely scattered parts of the globe. '177 
The civil component of the new administration's approach - and clearly complementary 
to policies pursued in both defence and the domestic economy - was a commitment to 
the global circulation of the 'Keynesian revolution' . 
17, To demonstrate that the 
'underdeveloped nations' can move successfully to economic growth 'within the orbit of 
the democratic world', was, in Walt Rostow's view, 'the most important single item on 
-the Western agenda. 
'1790f 
particular moment was the fear that states unresponsive to the 
need for 'progressive' social-economic transformation would become 'the main focus of 
communist hopes. 'm Precisely these concerns had been underscored by Nikita 
Khrushchev's January 6,1961 foreign policy address proclaiming an era of 'wars of 
national liberation'. The Soviet leader's widely publicised speech had been delivered a 
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week before the Kennedy Inaugural. For Rostow, as for others in the Kennedy 
administration, un the implications for U. S. policy were clear: 'our interests', as 
conceived in the March, 1962 draft 'Basic National Security Policy' ýI... are likely to be 
better served by accepting the risks of leaning forward toward more modem groups ffian 
the risks of clinging to familiar friends rooted in the past. 
1182 
For the littoral of the Indian Ocean region - home to one-third of the world's most 
'underdeveloped' populations - the inclusion of an overtly 'modernist' component 
within the Kennedy administration's foreign policy architecture provided a conceptual 
unity previously lacking in U. S. policy. Taken in tandem with the revisions advanced 
in strategic doctrine and military posture, such a perspective would work to actively - 
if selectively - reassess U. S. relations with the regional states. Here, the issues 
surrounding the failings of 'massive retaliation' in deterring external threats to (and from) 
the 'lesser powers', the utility of mobile forces in confronting such threats and the 
administration's attraction to supporting 'progressive' local movements within, were to 
present an early challenge to U. S. policy in the context of Iran. 
In considering Iran, a January, 1961 inter-agency report had concluded that 'vigorous 
action' on a range of domestic reforms was required by the Shah's regime to avert either 
a military coup or a revolutionary upheaval. mThe latter prospect, with the potential for 
bringing together the suppressed 'Tudeh' (communist) party in alliance with the 
'dissident urban middle classes', uhad, indeed, been likened by Khruschev himself to a 
, ripe plumb'18s waiting to drop for the Soviet Union. United States' pressure on Iran to 
allocate its budgetary priorities to civilian rather than military expenditure and 
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'strengthen its social and economic structure' 186 had, as we have seen, been pursued in 
successive policy directives of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.,,,, The Dean 
Rusk State Department had, though, determined on a more active backing for reform, 
identified with Prime Minister Ali Amini, and was prepared to, 'make abundantly clear 
to [the] Shah that the achievement of Amini 's initial objectives remain Iran's best hope 
for surmounting critical current economic and political problems. 'ln However, if the 
Shah's resistance to such efforts was, in the view of U. S. analysts, tempered by the 
conviction that, 'alignment with the West offers his best hope ... of assuring his 
dominance within Iran, 'lsg a real, if essentially political threat from Soviet military 
pressure could not be discounted.,, o Moscow had, from August, 1961 begun to release 
confidential Baghdad Pact contingency documents secured after the (1958) Karim Qassem 
coup in Iraq. 191 As these had suggested, in accordance with 'New Look'. strategic 
orthodoxy, an early use of nuclear weapons,, q, the McGeorge Bundy NSC was to 
thus examine the possibilities of developing a U. S. 'rapid reinforcement' capability to 
permit a greater range of conventional military options for contingencies in South West 
Asia. 193 In this way, the administration could also hope to deflect Iranian pressure for 
increased military aid and to 'shift the Shah's focus ... to economic 
development. '194 
By 1963, the administration had, however, come to accept the Shah's own programme 
of domestic reform, the 'White Revolution', as offering the best hope for stability in 
Iraniq-, and, accordingly, agreed a five year plan for the modernization of Iran's armed 
forces.,, * Washington was, though, resistant to Iranian requests for 'prestocking' U. S. 
military equipment to provide for possible joint contingencies. 
197 However, if the 
13rosp, ects for a specific mobile forces capability for the Northern Indian 
Ocean were, at 
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this stage, in abeyance, a reaffmnation for the concept of strategic mobility itself would 
be found in the establishment of a U. S. (CONUS)-based mobile reserve -' Strike 
Command' (STRICOM) - set up within Defense Secretary McNamara's 1963 
reorganization of the 'Unified Conunand Plan'. 198 While the arguments for mobile strike 
forces had been much discussed in the services and the academic community, the 
configuration actually chosen was to stem from McNamara's internal DOD reforms and, 
in particular, the methodological innovations introduced by the newly formed JCS 
'Special Studies Group'. McNamara had disestablished the system of individual service 
assessments of defqnce need in favour of a requirement to present joint position papers 
in the form of a 'Draft Presidential Memorandum' (DPM). The DPM was intended to 
establish a common ground for systems analysis with the JCS-SSG. One of the first 
assignments of McNamara's overall 'Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System' (DPPBS) was to put the case for strategic mobility on a scientific footing. 199 
The resulting study, entitled 'The Rapid Deployment of Forces For Limited War' 
appeared in several phases from 1963-7. Within it, the SSG, according to Project 
Director Lawrence E. Lynn, 'posed threats in (given) contingency areas, for example, 
Korea, South East Asia and the Middle East ... two basic strategies evolved: rapid 
deployment of troops inunediately to blunt aggression, and the slow deployment of 
troops, to build a solid force in the country. 'wo Thus equipped, McNamara had 
approached Congress from 1963 with a programme for a new class of heavy transport 
aircraft, the C-5A, complemented by 30 'Fast-Deployed Logistical Ships, (FDL's) to 
be prepositioned. with supplies near likely theatres of conflict. 2o, Questions of command 
structure, troop levels and inter-service responsibility accompanying the FDL programme 
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were, at this stage, deliberately left open. Although largely successful in securing the 
C-5A - 81 out of the requested 120 were authorized for FY 1965202 - an 
initial $131m. funding requirement to develop four FDL's was halved for Fiscal 1966 
and finafly rejected in the Defense Procurement Act for FY 1968. = If the hopes of some 
in the DOD to produce a comprehensive 'rapid deployment' capability (as it became 
known) for STRICOM itself had been thus far restricted, an avenue for possible future 
development had also been indicated. Thus, whilst the overall methodological model for 
strategic mobility had been agreed between all the services, the task of determining 
modalities of logistical support had fallen to the Systems Analysis office of the U. S. 
Navy. Here, under the direction of (then) Cmdr. Elmo, Zumwalt, the Navy's report 
had indicated that the principal 'contingency area' in most need of theatre logistics 
prepositioning lay in the Middle East., N The natural points of access to the Middle East 
were to be found in the Indian Ocean. 
However, whilst STRICOM in its present form had assumed a notional geographical 
responsibility for the Middle East, and the U. S. Navy, from 1963, would commit an 
occasional Carrier Task Group to participate in the 'MIDLINK' series of CENTO 
exercises in the Indian Ocean, 2o5 the declared policy of the Johnson administration, 
approved in early 1964, to institute a more regular pattern of CTG. transits was never 
fully implemented. The Navy was, by this stage, heavily committed to Vietnam, 2o, 
Secretary McNamara was, moreover, resistant to the large scale expansion of U. S. 
power m the reglOn fTOM the outset. The U. S. did not, as repeated 'National Intelligence 
Estimates' made clear, regard the Soviet threat to the Middle East/South Asian littoral 
as being primarily a military one. w7The political dangers posed by local nationalisms, 
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SOCiO-ecOnOmic 'instability' and 'subversion' throughout the Gulf region, South Asia and 
East Africa were, though, of more active interest to a Democratic administration 
concerned to establish a firm direction to the 'stages of economic growth' than to 
its more laissez-faire Republican predecessor - Under these circumstances, a fresh U. S. 
interest in supportmg the British presence 'East of Suez' had emerged. Hereafter, if 
the increased U. S. perception of a broadly-figured strategic significance to the Indian 
Ocean region was proceeding necessarily, as it were, from the renascent globalism of 
the 'new frontier', its empirical development would owe much to the renewed perception 
of the Indian Ocean as a strategic unit found independently in Whitehall's regional 
defence planning. 
VI. The Anglo-American Security System. 
For Britain, a major strategic dilemma had been presented by the creation, in the 
aftermath of Suez and the Iraqi coup, of what was termed the 'Middle East Air Barrier' 
between bases in Europe and the range of commitments in the Far East and Indian 
Ocean. Accordingly, work had commenced between 1958-61 on a network of Indian 
Ocean facilities which served, together with the reorganized regional command 
arrangements, m, to restore to the area something of the strategic unity once derived from 
defence of India. For the Royal Navy, a carrier task group was to be permanently 
stationed in Singapore, complemented by a two-frigate force in Simonstown, (South 
Africaym and an amphibious warfare squadron based at Aden . 7.1o The British Army's 'East 
African Command' was to spend 0.5m. from 1957-9, on extensive support facilities 
in Kenya. 211 With Kenyan independence in 1964, the 6,000-strong garrison was 
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transferred to Aden, which would thus become the focus of forward planning for the 
Indian Ocean region. In March, 1962, Defence Minister Harold Watkinson had 
announced a 'fundamental change' in British Defence policy. Henceforth, British forces 
were to no longer be dispersed around the world 'in small pockets, ' rather, there would 
be a 'concentration' of military posture, 'on three main bases from which to fan out by 
sea and air. These bases are Britain, Aden and Singapore. '212 
The new confidence with which the Macmillan government was pursuing its 
strategic aims in the Indian Ocean owed much to support from Washington. In 
December, 196 1, Assistant Secretary Nitze was to stress the importance placed on 
Britain's continuing role in official exchanges and before the more public arena of 
Institute of Strategic Studies . 2,, Events in the region itself had also seemingly born out 
Britain's theatre-mobile strategy. In July, 1961,45 Royal Navy ships with attendant air 
and ground support were swiftly deployed to Kuwait in response to a possible Iraqi 
invasion. 214 Although the military threat from Iraq was perhaps overdrawn, the efficiency 
of Britain's response was commended by Secretary McNamara and JCS Chairman 
Lyman Lemnitzer. 215Deepening U. S. involvement in Vietnam, McNamara was to tell 
a February, 1962 session of the Senate Military Appropriations Sub-committee, made it 
ftnperative that Washington not be 'isolated' as the only Western power on the 
Asian periphery - 
216 
If Britain's individual efforts in the Kuwait mobilization had received a favourable 
view from the Kennedy administration, the advent of ftu-ther regional crises in October, 
1962 would provide the stimulus for joint Anglo-U. S. security policy in the wider Indian 
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Ocean region. The outbreak of border hostilities between India and China had brought 
a prompt response from London and Washington. Following Prime Minister Nehru's 
October, 29 request for military aid, a British delegation, headed by former Defence 
Minister Duncan Sandys, had arrived in New Delhi to co-ordinate incoming supplies 
and assess longer term military needs for the Indian forces. Kennedy had released 
$60m. U. S. military supplies from NATO stockpiles, invoking a section of the 1961 
Foreign Assistance Act on executive order . 217 The regional agenda for Anglo-U. S. 
defence co-operation was to be further developed at the December, 1962 Nassau 
Summit Conference between Kennedy and Macmillan2is here, the agreement of a $120m. 
joint military aid package to India had raised hopes, long nourished in Whitehall, of a 
more active Indian defence relationship with the Western powers. These hopes were not 
entirely misplaced. Between 1963 and 1965, the United States would provide some 
$95m. in military aid, including equipment for six army divisions and an air-defence 
system . 219 Britain would, in November, 1963, deploy an RAF fighter squadron for air- 
defence exercises over New Delhi and Calcutta. no 
On the civil side, the apparent breakdown of the 'Bandung' consensus also seemed 
to offer, for Washington, the opportunity to demonstrate the merits of a capitalist 
approach to the development process, as opposed to the statist programme being pursued 
in China's 'Great Leap Forward'. From the Policy Planning desk at the State 
Department, Walt W. Rostow considered societies poised for economic 'take off' as 
being particularly vulnerable to., 'the seizure of power by communist conspiracy. '221 India, 
in Rostow's view, virtually a textbook case, =2 would thus be helped negotiate the 
'transition' to economic growth by a sufficient use of Western financial inputs and 
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planning methodology. The Kennedy administration was to be generous with both. 
Overall, New Delhi would become the largest single recipient of U. S. aid programmes 
(export credits, Point 4, and PL 480) which would amount to some $9,801bn. between 
1951-71. W 
However, despite the scale of U. S. aid efforts on the sub-continent, and their energetic 
promotion by U. S. ambassador J. K. Galbraith, there was to be no long-term increase 
in regional security co-operation. The prospects for an enhanced Indian strategic 
relationship with the West had, in any case, been more entertained in Whitehall than on 
Capitol Hill. A $500m. Indian request for military aid, registered in 1963, made little 
progress despite endorsement by a Presidential commission. 224 The requests of a May, 
1964 Indian Military mission to Washington for procurement of a wide range of modem 
weapons systems were again deferred, under the influence of Pentagon concerns to retain 
the established military relationship with Pakistan. 22, The increased focus on regional 
affairs by the State Department foRowing the 1962 war, combined with the post-Nassau 
political amity with Britain had, though, set a point of departure for future U. S. 
security policy in the Indian Ocean. The possibilities of establishing a direct mobile 
forces capability for the region had already been raised widiin both the Defense 
Department's extensive 'strategic mobility' discussions and the localized circumstances 
of the U. S. security dialogue with Iran. It was within the more encompassing defence 
relationship with Britain however, that a process of, in one analysts's expression, 
'continuous cross-fertilization' of strategic discourse226 would effect an operational 
programme for the Pentagon and Department of Defense out of Britain's own approach 
to the strategic mobility issue in the Indian Ocean. 
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For Whitehall, if most attention had been focused on the construction of land 
based facilities in Kenya and Aden, a parallel development of island -based air facilities 
was also envisaged; originally as a complement to the multi-purpose garrisons in East 
Africa and South Arabia, but increasingly, for both political and financial reasons, as an 
alternative. Despite the public pronouncements and the considerable (E20m. )=, financial 
investment in the Aden facilities, the possible end to Britain's tenure had been foreseen 
as early as 1962.2n The use of off-shore staging posts had first been proposed by RAF 
Transport Command in 1960.229 Against a background of intense funding rivalry with the 
Admiralty, air strategists were to adapt the scheme to include the projection of airpower 
and airborne forces in the Indian Ocean, utilizing a chain of Island facilities from the 
South Atlantic to Australia. Strongly prompted by the RAF, the Defence Ministry 
announced, in March, 1962, that it was conducting a feasibility study, involving surveys 
of Tristan da Cunha, Prince Edward Island and Aldabra. 23o Other islands with existing 
or wartime air facilities were also considered, including Sal (Cape Verde Islands), Gan 
(Maldive Islands), Socotra, Ascension Island, Diego Garcia and Mauritius. Masira 
Island, site of an operational RAF base, and the RAAF base on the Cocos Islands were 
looked to for possible expansion. In November, 1963, The Times was to report the 
setting of more detailed planning options for Aldabra. 231 
The island-base strategy for the Indian Ocean was, at this stage, still strongly opposed 
by the British Admiralty. 232 It had also, however, acquired an international dimension. 
Discussions on the feasibility of joint Anglo-U. S. regional facilities were formally 
broached by DOD officials in early 
1964.233 In July and August of that year, joint 
surveys were undertaken of likely locations, with Aldabra and Diego Garcia - site of 
66 
a small naval air station in World War Two - being selected as most suitable for 
fliture development 
.,, 4 Whilst the immediate State/Defense initiative in concerting such 
plans owed much to political uncertainty surrounding the imminent British elections, 
a general U. S. strategic interest in Britain's Indian Ocean possessions was longstanding - 
Paul Nitze, when Director of Policy Planing in the Acheson State Department, had 
considered the possibility of leasing British island sites in the Indian Ocean for the 
theatre stockpiling of war-surplus U. S. mat6riel. 235 In 1953, the merits of a joint island 
base structure for Gulf/Middle East contingencies had again arisen in inter-agency 
discussion of the Dulles 'Northern Tier' strategy . 236 Widiin the Pentagon, Stuart B. 
Barber, Assistant Director of the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO) 'Long Range 
Objectives Group', had begun a series of contingency studies for the region in 1960, 
in response to, 'a vacuum of realistic planning to meet possible future national and Navy 
needs in the Indian Ocean. n7AIso initiated through the CNO's office at this time, were 
the 'political efforts which kept Diego Garcia under British control-and led to the 
remarkably generous base rights agreement.,,, 
If the origins for what would become the 'remarkably generous' Anglo-U. S. 
agreements on the future of Diego Garcia are thus attributable to the Office of the 
Pentagon's Chief of Naval Operations, their final huition owed much to inter- 
departmental support for the scheme from the State Department. By 1962, the CNO's 
planning had received formal endorsement from the Joint Chiefs., 39 The more detailed 
assessment established by 1963 had contained schedules for construction funding (for FY 
1964). These were not proceeded with at this stage due to doubts about the islandis 
forInal status in international law. 
24o The momentum for pursuing the scheme was . 
67 
however, a political rather than immediately military priority. Throughout 1964-5, U. S. 
pressure had been mounting on the Home and Wilson governments to remain militarily 
'East of Suez', even at the expense of NATO conunitments in Europe-24' From both 
State and the NSC, the argument had thus gained ground that a symbolic U. S. 
involvement would add a further inducement to Britain retaining its regional defence 
role. 242Aside from the wider politico-diplomatic considerations, Secretary McNamara - 
originally opposed to the 1960 CNO planning 243 - was determined to avoid the further 
pressure for an expanded U. S. Navy presence in the Indian Ocean that would inevitably 
arise from a British withdrawal., " Accordingly, in July, 1965, McNamara was to use the 
occasion of a Washington visit by (then Chancellor of the Exchequer) James Callaghan 
to develop a more detailed agenda for Britain's possessions in the Indian Ocean. 24, 
Thus, on November 8,1965, Whitehall was to issue an Order in Council creating 
a new administrative unit, termed the 'British Indian Ocean Territory' (BIOT). Reflecting 
the outcome of the several planning requirements since 1960, the 'territory' would 
consist of the Islands of Aldabra, Farquar and Desroches detached from the Crown 
Colony of the Seychelles, and those of the Chagos archipelago (including Diego Garcia) 
detached from the Dependency of Mauritius. 'These islands', Colonial Secretary Michael 
Stewart informed the House of Commons on November, 10, '-will be available for the 
construction of defence facilities by the British and United States govermnents. '2" 
For Secretary McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the case for Britain 
remamIng militarily engaged in the Southern Hemisphere had gained increasing urgency 
with the expansion of Washington's own commitments in Vietnam. For the Wilson 
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Government, such considerations were to now become central to the political as well as 
strategic rationale for retaining, despite mounting Commons and Treasury opposition, 
a significant military posture in the Indian Ocean. The British Chiefs of Staff had earlier 
noted that Britain's claims to 'world power' were directly related to the 'privileged 
position we enjoy with the Americans' conveyed, in turn, by 'Britain's hold on the 
Middle* East. ' The first (December, 1964) Ministerial visit of Harold Wilson to the 
Johnson administration had found the Prime Minister informed on current U. S. thinking 
on the position. As placed before Parliament, this would reinvest the old 'special 
relationship' argument with a new twist. 'Our American allies, ' Wilson had told the 
December, 16 sitting of the House, are not so impressed by our 'claims to be a world 
power' by a simple 'arithmetic of megatons, ' rather, 'what does impress them is our 
ability to mount peace-keeping operations that no one else can mount. '247 However, if 
Wilson's Atlanticist arguments were becoming increasingly compromised by their 
identity with the U. S. role in Vietnam, Britain's own 'peace-keeping' capabilities were 
to be placed similarly in question by the intractable nationalist insurgency in Aden. 
Following repeated political and military efforts2" to negotiate a continuing presence in 
the South Yemen colony after the (January, 1968) deadline set for independence, 
Defence Minister Denis Healey had announced, in February, 1966, that Britain's 
withdrawal would be total. 249 It was, though, a more mundane 'arithmetic' of successive 
British budget deficits that was to finally compel the Prime Minister to announce, on 
January 16,1968, that British forces would be withdrawn from throughout the Persian 
Gulf and Far East by December, 
1971.25o 
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The U. S. pressure - sustained to the lasv,, - to retain the British presence in the Indian 
Ocean was, as we have seen, matched by a parallel mobilization of Washington's own 
planning for the region. A close interest from the Departments of State and Defense was 
thus maintained in the fierce Whitehall competition over procurement policy for the Navy 
and Royal Air Force. = Here, Britain's April, 1965 decision to cancel the RAF's TSR-2 
long range strike aircraft in favour of the American (General Dynamics) F- 111 A has 
raised strategic implications for future U. S. regional policy. If the primary U-S- interest 
was focused on Diego Garcia, 253 the creation of the wider 'British Indian Ocean 
Territory' was also seen as facilitating the RAF's island base scheme. For Britain, the 
BIOT provisions were to be shortly followed by the 'Britain-Maldive Islands Agreement' 
of July 26,1965 (for Gan), 2u while British access would also be maintained to other 
existing bases in Bahrain, Mauritius and Masira Island. 2,, Entirely new facilities were 
to be developed on Aldabra. For the latter, reporting in the November, 1967 Economist 
suggested that, 'troop carriers could fly from Britain via the American base on the 
British island of Ascension ... From Aldabra the planes could then fly to ... Arabia and the 
Persian Gulf ... for operations in East or Central Africa the island could also be used as 
a base for strike aircraft to support the infantry. '2m Such late advocacy is perhaps 
indicative of the depth of the Whitehall funding battle. On November 18, however, 
Denis Healey announced the abandonment of the Aldabra project in tandem with an 
overall E100m. reduction in defence spending for 1968-9.257 
For Washington, doubts concerning the eventual realization of Britain's multi-island 
strategy had become stronger after the earlier defence cutbacks set out, along with the 
withdrawal from Aden, in the February, 1966 Defence 'White Paper'. 258 The critical 
70 
item was the decision to cancel the Royal Navy's projected carrier programme, 119 to 
be replaced by a theatre-deployed force of 12 F- 111 A's (out of the total order of 50). 
Future British operations in the region, it was announced, would only take place in co- 
operation with 'allies. uo In acknowledgement of the likely direction that a future balance 
of (respective) capabilities was taking, a more specific Anglo-U. S. arrangement for BIOT 
was signed on December 30,1966. In this, all the territories 'comprising British Indian 
Ocean Territory' would be made available to the U. S. goverment for, 'the defence 
purposes of both govermnents as they arise'; 26, whilst the island(s) eventually selected for 
development were subject to a lease of 50 years, with the option of a 20 year extension. 2Q 
In a classified note to the agreement, the United States, 'agreed to provide up to half the 
British "detachment" costs' - incurred in establishing the island territories - to an 
amount 'not exceeding $14m. '2o The latter costs were to be met from the DOD's 
budgetary allocations, originally in the form of an incremental waiver for the standard 
5% R&D surcharge on the April, 1963 'Polaris Sales Agreement', but finally, in view 
of Britain's financial distress, provided as a lump sum., 64 
Thus, following the final settlement of the legal status of Diego Garcia, the CNO's 
office submitted a detailed study of possible contingencies in the Middle East and 
Northern Indian Ocean to the Joint Chiefs for consideration in mid-1967. The base 
proposals, again drawn up by Stuart B. Barber, were centred on creating an oiling 
facility for carrier task forces in transit from Norfolk, Virginia, to 'Yankee station' off 
the coast of Vietnam. The 1967 'Indian Ocean Base Study' was, however, rejected by 
the systems analysis division at the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the grounds of 
cost ($26m. ) and marginal utility-261 In March, 1968, the JCS had prepared a modified 
71 
development plan for Diego Garcia, costed at $19m., focusing on the need to span 
a VLF conununications 'gap' between U. S. facilities at North West Cape (Australia) 
and Asmara (Ethiopia) . 266 Other possible functions, including ASW (P-3) patrols and 
reserve oi L) capability were also provided in a three-phase option schedule; 
extending from the status quo 'option "A"', to an ambitious $55m. 'option "C"', 
involving forward submarine deployment, staging of ground forces, theatre logistics and 
air projection capabilities. Whilst the conscientiously medial communications' option 
('option "B "') was to be again questioned by OSD's Systems office - on the grounds 
of imminent improvements in satellite technology26, - and further challenged in a joint 
State/Defense analysis of U. S. Base Requirements in the 1970's of December, 1968,2s7 
the development was provisionally approved by DOD and the Pentagon, with final 
funding arrangements deferred for consideration under the incoming Nixon 
administration. 
Conclusions. 
Given the importance of Middle East oil resources in the post-war order, and the 
proximity of the Soviet Union, it is clear that some level of United States' strategic 
interest in the Indian Ocean was inevitable. There are, though, two aspects to the 
expression of such interest in the period we have been considering that deserve comment. 
Thus, what is striking in the first instance is the use of the private sector as the principal 
vehicle of U-S- foreign policy. Britain's attempts, at the height of the Cold War, to 
present the Middle East as an arena for forward contaimnent were actively discouraged. 
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The second aspect concerns the foundation of a direct U. S. intervention capability in the 
Indian Ocean region during an era wherein the Soviet military threat had, if anything, 
actually diminished. The direction of Soviet policy in the early 1960's was, to be sure, 
somewhat unpredictable. The key variable at issue here, however, was surely the U. S. 
conviction that the attainment of strategic 'superiority' could - and should - become a 
permanent feature of the international system. 
If this is taken as the point of departure for U. S. policy, a subsidiary logic then 
becomes apparent; relating to the optimum balance of integrated U. S. and allied 
capability within a given theatre of operations. The focus of policy thus shifts toward 
identifying the minimum conditions for a controlled U. S. strategic involvement in the 
Indian Ocean region, in order to deny the conditions for more uncontrolled military 
escalation. It is thus with some consistency that the McGeorge Bundy theatre-mobile 
force proposals appear in relation to the ambitions of the Shah, in tandem with the 
McNamara DOD's support for the British regional presence in relation to the ambitions 
of the U. S. Navy. At the end of the Johnson administration, the final expression of such 
strategic economy can be seen in the Navy's own programme for Diego Garcia in 
relation to what Stuart B. Barber candidly describes as more 'covert arrangements (by 
the Pentagon) for the ... use of base facilities 
in populous, weak or unstable nations around 
ý1- - uae periphery, ' which, the former CNO official concludes, would 'obligate us to support 
a new crop of ineffective dictatorial regimes in the Saigon style. '268 
If the war in Vietnam had presented insurmountable practical difficulties for 
implementing a more comprehensive programme of u. S. military capability for the 
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Indian Ocean region, the signal absorption of U. S. strategic efforts in the Indo-China 
conflict had also placed the wider assumptions of United States' foreign and security 
policy in question. Overall, it was thus the uncertain returns from the Kennedy/Johnson 
administration's essay in differentiating locally the 'stages of economic growth' alongside 
a global military posture of 'flexible response' which had provided the growing 
momentum towards inter-agency acceptance of DOD and U. S. Navy planning 
perspectives for another potentially volatile area of the third world, notably by the State 
Department. As the next chapter will show, the new administration was to avoid the 
dilemmas of W. W. Rostow 's 'takeoff' theorizing by downgrading concerns for the 
internal factor in foreign and security policy, if not ignoring it altogether. In the Indian 
Ocean, as elsewhere, the Nixon administration was to make a conspicuous virtue of its 
focus on external affairs. The differentiation of means was, rather, to be emphasized in 
military posture. The conventional provisions of flexible response were to be taken up 
by a restructured regional alliance system for the United States, notably, in Iran. The 
extent to which this new approach was to itself be subject to a range of wholly 
unforeseen political and strategic dilemmas will be considered in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO. THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: 
D9TENTE AND DEVOLUTION. - 
The first term of the Nixon Presidency would mark a sustained reassessment of U. S. 
foreign and security policy. Moreover, despite the conventional tendency for incoming 
U. S. administrations to define policy in terms (if not in practice) first of all 
distinguishable from the old, it should be stressed that, whilst the Nixonian lexicon was 
to not lack in terminological innovation, the departure in policy so signified would be 
as real as it was involuntary. 
For the new administration, the necessary adjustment to tan increasingly 
heterogeneous and complex world' was to embody both continuity and contradiction. 
'The American people', as the administration freely acknowledged, 'have grown 
somewhat weary of twenty-five years of international burdens. " The latter, as was also 
abundantly clear, were most acutely felt in the military sphere. Hereafter, the priority for 
United States' policy would turn on recasting the structures of U. S. global engagement 
in areas of abiding strength - economic and political. Confronting such an approach, 
however, the rise to strategic parity and global reach by the Soviet Union was to 
otherwise re-establish the terms of bipolar strategic competition in a fresh context. Here, 
if tile United States was determined to withdraw militarily from Vietnam, the nexus of 
economic and strategic interests represented within the Middle East/South Asian crescent 
would assume a perhaps heightened importance to composing the new U. S. global 
position. For the region itself, the undertaking for policy was faced by both transformed 
local milieux and a strategic environment potentially extending throughout the wider 
Indian Ocean. 
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In temis for concrete policy consideration, the prospective withdrawal of British forces 
from the Indian Ocean - and continuing U. S. involvement in Vietnam - was to present 
the more developed U. S. regional allies as classic cases for local devolution of security 
ftinctions under what would come to be designated as the 'Nixon Doctrine. Albeit, the 
rise of new centres of politico/military and economic influence in the Middle East were 
also, within the overall reconfiguration. of U. S. military posture, perceived as an 
opportunity to review long-standing ambitions to assume a more forward role in the 
wider trans-oceanic region by the Pentagon and the U. S. Navy. 
If the national security bureaucracy was considering the options for U. S. strategic 
engagement in the Indian Ocean, the region had also begun to focus attention elsewhere. 
The advent of a new U. S. administration, the reorientation of Britain's military and 
foreign policy concerns to Europe and NATO, signalled in 1968, and the growing 
assertiveness of the regional powers themselves had brought forth increased interest in 
the Indian Ocean, in both more public Washington forums and internationally. Thus an 
'Indian Ocean' conference held at CSIS in Georgetown in March, 197(Y had attracted 
U. S. officials and academics, as well as representatives from the littoral states and Japan. 
The subject of 'great power' naval and military competition in the Indian Ocean would 
also be given much prominence at the September, 1970 Conference of Heads of Non- 
Aligned Nations at Lusaka (Zambia). In this, the NAM had called for 'all states' at the 
United Nations to, 'consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace from which 
great power rivalries-are excluded. " Further provision concerning 'bases conceived in 
ý1- - the ... context of such rivalries' was to make the resolution 
increasingly controversial 
when adopted, in December, 1971, at the UN itself. 
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The increasing focus on the Indian Ocean as the geographical and perhaps, geopolitical 
centre of an emergent third world coalition was paralleled in developments in Soviet 
policy. The Soviet Union had, in June, 1971, registered a carefully worded initiative 
suggesting 'an equal bargain' for mutual limitations on 'the navies of the Great Powers"' 
to be taken up in concert with the 'Zone of Peace' programme at the UN. This was, with 
some qualification, linked in turn to a major theme of Soviet regional diplomacy of 1969- 
71 for 'coRective security' arrangements amongst Russia's Asian neighbours bordering 
the Indian Ocean. -' To be sure, the unavoidable anti-Chinese implication of these 
proposals was to leave more in the way of circumspection fl= endorsement for Moscow. 
The Soviet Union's efforts amongst some traditional U. S. allies in South Asia - notably, 
PaIdstan and Iran - would, however, suggest a new pragmatism to Soviet diplomacy in 
the region which, for some U. S. policy makers, was uncomfortably close to the 
realpolitik approach to ideology in the international system so promoted under the Nixon 
Doctrine. 
Conceptually and chronologically, the administration's agenda for the Indian Ocean 
divides into three aspects, encompassing restructured U. S. policy instruments, East/West 
relations and the material application of policy within the regional arena. In charting the 
Indian Ocean policies of the Nixon administration, the following two chapters will thus 
establish the grounding for Policy development in an introductory overview, the 
discussion will then assess the changmg strategic balance and regional military posture, 
and some operational considerations pertaining to both attending the 1971 India-Pakistan 
war. The concluding section will present a critical summary of administration aims and 
instnImentality's concerted with the principal U. S. regional ally, Iran. 
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The End of the Post War Era. 
In contrast to the exuberance initiating the Kennedy era and the expansive 'Great Society' 
rhetoric of Lyndon Johnson, the advent of the Nixon administration on January 20, 
1969 promised only the possibility of retreat from Vietnam - 'Peace with Honour' - 
and a somewhat unspecified reassessment of America's role within the international 
system. Vietnam aside, such foreign policy themes as were produced from the Nixon 
campaign platform had appeared in close correspondence with the concerns of Nixon's 
conservative Mid-Western and Californian constituency and indeed, the President's own 
previous record in public office. For many observers, the internationalist Republican 
tradition, in more direct lineage from Eisenhower, had been diminished by the defeat 
of Nelson Rockefeller. In this sense, Richard Nixon was, as National Security Advisor 
Henry Kissinger records, 'the first Republican President in thirty-six years. " In practice, 
however, Nixon's well-rehearsed alienation from the mainstream of Washington political 
culture and - again in contrast to his immediate predecessor - personal interest in 
foreign affairs would provide a dynamic reinforcement to the more conceptual 
'conservative' agenda of the fonner Rockefeller and Council on Foreign Relations 
consultant who had become Nixon's personal choice to direct the National Security 
Council. 
For the Nixon administration, foreign policy, defence policy and, perhaps more 
extemporaneously, foreign economic policy were to receive an integrated treatment 
unseen since the wartime cabinets of Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. In Kissinger's 
view, this close correspondence between issue-areas was required to redress the 
95 
separation of 'power' and 'diplomacy' seen as vitiating previous U. S. policy. Here, 
for Kissinger, 'we never succeeded in translating our military superiority into political 
advantage. " If the latter assertion can, at the least, be questioned in terms of the record 
of U. S. ascendancy after 1945, the promotion of a more Clausewitzian dialogue between 
(politico-military) means and given ends would become axiomatic for the Kissinger 
NSC's approach to 'the end of the post-war era. ' The instrumental grounding for this 
process was premised on the ends of U. S. policy themselves being subject to a more 
rigorously utilitarian assessment consistent with a studied 'concept of our national 
interest. " Hereafter, in contrast to the 'exuberant over-extension' of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations, the U. S. national interest was to be redefined as anterior to 
more open-ended concepts of global engagement concerning the Western alliance and the 
'free world' as a whole. For the latter, indeed, the 'stronger' position of U. S. allies 
would bring a competitive edge to Washington's relations with both the emergent 'new 
nations '9 and the hostile but 'now divided' Communist world. In thus seeking a position 
point d'appui in the unfolding 'geopolitical' balance, the 'new American role' conjoined 
systemic analysis at the service of a fresh secular expediency. 'Some vestiges of the past 
consist of essentially sound relationships', the NSC's staff writers had observed in the 
second administration Foreign Policy Report, 'They should be preserved. Others must 
be liquidated ... We must avoid practising either consistency or novelty 
for its own 
sake. 110 
However, if the administration's avowed pragmatism in foreign affairs was to be 
premised on the enabling contingency of 'multi-polar Communism' as much as necessary 
accommodation to diminished U. S. global leverage, such prescriptives to 'set aside 
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octrme" I were functional to an undisguised conservatism of ends in U. S. policy. The 
displacement of ideology by great-power considerations was, in operative terms, equally 
premised on an inherent 'conservatism' of major actors toward the process of systemic 
engagement itself. In stressing that the U. S. would 'regard our Communist adversaries 
first and foremost as nations. "' the Nixon administration was also signalling a limit to 
concern over the internal structures of states in general. 11 Although, in Kissinger's 
dictum, 'the analysis and strategy of the conservatives' could, where appropriate, include 
contracting with the 'tactics of the liberals, 114 this entailed a clear subsidiarity. Such 
modular methodological constructs as W. W. Rostow's 'Stages of Economic Growth' 
were to be disestablished, concurrently with the universalist clafins of the 
Ka ennedy/Johnson political programme, in favour of laissez fair as a policy toward the 
domestic arrangements of U. S. allies. In application this would achieve, as will be found, 
a particular moment within the 'moderate authoritarian' states of the Gulf, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. 
The ideological conservatism governing the Nixon administration's view of the ends 
of U. S. policy would thus not preclude a radicalism of means. This, in the first 
instance was to apply to the structure of the foreign policy bureaucracy. The motif of the 
'freedom' of the statesman in conflict with the 'necessity' of bureaucratic routine forms 
a consistent backdrop to Kissinger's philosophy of history. " If the essential precondition 
for a successful foreign policy - 'the acid test' - was, for Kissinger, 'its ability to 
obtain domestic support 
116 then this, in immediate terms, will involve 'the problem of 
legitimizing a policy within the governmental apparatus. 
117 For the latter, however, 
'Success consists in moving the administrative machine to the point of decision. The 
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quest for "objectivity" ... involves the danger that means and ends are confused. 
"' Such 
reductionist tendencies within the bureaucratic process, which in Kissinger's view, had 
hobbled the foreign policy structures of the Eisenhower administration, were to persist 
in those of Kennedy and Johnson. If the Eisenhower system had suffered from excessive 
formalism, with a stress on consensus from the full National Security Council, decision 
making under Johnson had tended toward a polar ad hoc extreme - the 'Tuesday 
lunches'. 11 Throughout, for Kissinger, the scope for executive action had been 
undermined by 'a form of administrative democracy. '10 Accordingly, at the December 
2,1968 press conference confumiing Kissinger's appointment, Nixon was to announce 
Ia very exiting new procedure' for policy making in the NSC which, 'Doctor Kissinger 
is setting up at the present time. 1 
21 
In formal terms, the revised NSC structure, drafted in December, 1968, was to retain 
the six inter-departmental 'Regional Groups', now termed Interdepartmental Groups 
(IG's), from the Johnson system which would be chaired, as before, by State Department 
Assistant Secretaries. The Department's 'Senior Interdepartmental Group' - effectively, 
a policy constitutive body at Under Secretary level - was, however, to be abolished. 
The latter was replaced by an 'inter-Agency Review Group' (IRG), chaired by the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), whose function 
was to assess the respective 'National Security Study Memoranda' (NSSM's), developed 
to (Kissinger's) order at IG level. A further bureaucratic mstrunient at Kissinger s 
disposal was the 'cover memo' containing his own views which would accompany the 
completed NSSM to the Oval Office prior to formal NSC endorsement. As each IG was 
to also include an NSC aide with de facto Assistant Secretary status, the result, as one 
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former staffer recalls, was that 'the lines of control ran from every level of the 
system ... by means of his authority to originate and sign the NSSM, Kissinger 
determined the context of the policy review, the questions to be asked and the calendar 
of discussion ... this endowed him with something like the power of his own 
executive order. '22 
The operative significance of the administration's consolidation of bureaucratic Power 
in the NSC would emerge in what became the most thoroughgoing review of U. S. 
global strategy since NSC 68.13The parameters of Nixon's 'New Strategy for Peace' can 
be identified in four aspects. Firstly, the 'stability' seen by Kissinger as fundamental to 
the reconstruction of U. S. power in the international system was to be pursued within 
a primary focus on relations with the Soviet Union. Kissinger had frequently criticized 
earlier U. S. administrations for having 'lost our opportunity' to secure a comprehensive 
settlement with Moscow during the period of maximum American ascendancy after 
World War two. "' Given the evident willingness of the Kremlin - signalled during the 
Johnson administration - to open negotiations on strategic weapons and trade issues, 
the basis would be developed for a wider 'linkage' with Soviet systemic 
engagement in the management of regional affairs. This formed the second tier of 
administration strategy. In Kissinger's view, 'events in different parts of the 
world ... were related to each other, even more so 
Soviet conduct in different parts of 
the world. '15By the same token, 'Our posture in arms control could not be separated 
r_. - from the resulting military balance, nor from our responsibilities [to] a global system of 
alliances. '21 Hence, 'The administration resorted to linkage' as an organizing logic to 
promote exchanges on discrete issue-areas. For collateral, as was made clear by the 
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a inistration, ground was to be laid for a 'de-linkage' of generic revolutionary 
upheaval in the third world ftom the interests of the Soviet Union. 27 
The perceived viability of approaching such arrangements with Moscow is apparent 
in the third aspect of the administration's strategy: a re-configuration of U. S. global 
military posture away from the need to counter major strategic threats in both European 
and Asian theatres (21/2wars'). A concerted Soviet and Chinese attack on the U. S. and 
allied powers was, in any event, unlikely as Nixon and Kissinger had both independently 
concluded. 21 The restructured I 1/2Wars' posture provided a signal reinforcement to U. S. 
diplomatic efforts to open relations with Beijing. 29Here, as analyst John Lewis Gaddis 
observes, 'It is difficult to diink of anydiing that the Nixon administration could have 
done that would have produced a more dramatic shift in world power relationships of 
greater benefit to the United States at less cost. '10 The architecture of Nixon and 
Kissinger's approach would, however, owe more to Clausewitz than Le Corbusier. 
Given the inhibitions on direct military involvement in third countries by any great 
power, the administration was to turn the 'global diffusion of power' to its advantage. 
For in the fourth component of the strategy - the 'Nixon Doctrine' itself - Washington 
would 'furnish military and economic assistance' to its allies, whom would then 
themselves assume the 'primary responsibility' of providing the manpower for their 
defence. " 
Complementary to the Nixon Doctrine's conceptual stress on a 'more responsible 
participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress"' were the more 
concrete measures aimed at a basic reconfiguration of U. S. military posture. True to the 
100 
pursuit of the 'full range of options' sought in the administration's bureaucratic 
reorganization, a study of alternative approaches - 'NSSM 3' - had been launched on 
January 21,1969. Conducted by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard through 
the Defense Program Review Committee, the study had presented 10 'general purpose' 
force options before the IAG, 11 which were then narrowed to the conventional three 
for Nixon's consideration in October. These assessed a shifting scale of threat and policy 
guidance in respect to: [11 conventional forces for the established (90 day) criteria for 
countering a Warsaw Pact offensive in Western Europe and for 'simultaneous assistance' 
(logistics and limited combat support) to resist attacks on an Asian ally 'short of a full 
scale Chinese invasion, ' [2] had focused on either a NATO initial defence or major 
conflict in Asia, whilst [3] would retain the existing the McNamara strategy of 
addressing simultaneous major contingencies in Europe and Asia and a 'limited 
contingency' elsewhere. 
14 
Kissinger's recommendation of 'option two' on October 2,1969 reflected both the 
international strategic considerations of 'multi-polar' communism and a domestic 
awareness that anydiing more ambitious would not pass Congressional scrutiny. " To be 
sure, the overall reductions in defence outlay envisaged under 11/2 wars were 
substantial. The immediate economies returned in 'breaking the cycle of submitting a five 
year defense plan to Congress"' had, in addition, realizable political benefits for the 
administration. In total, the FY 1970 budget was revised to $77bn. (from a projected 
$85.6bn. in the Johnson estimates) whilst the Total Obligational Authority (TOA) for 
1971 was set at $72.9m .-a fall from 9.5 % to 7% gnp. 37 In concrete terms, this would 
enable the reduction of airforce squadrons from 169 in FY 1968 to 110 by FY 1974, 
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army and marine divisions from 23 to 16 in the same period and navy ships from 976 to 
495.11 The programme was to also result in the closure of 392 overseas bases and 
installations. " Such retrenchment was, in some areas, not dissimilar to the estimated 
(post-Vietnam) 'peace dividend' envisaged by a range of media and former Johnson 
administration critics of the DOD., if not the annual defence 'alternative budgets' 
proposed by the House/Senate caucus of 'Members of Congress for Peace through 
Law'., " However, in keeping with the administration's studied relativism toward the 
'tactics of the liberals, ' such losses would be compensated elsewhere. 
In the event, the somewhat involuntary rigour of NSSM 3 was to yield considerable 
benefits for the administration. The new flexibility in military posture was matched by 
an economy of force structure. The force levels notionally attributed to '21/2wars' had, 
in practice, never been generated even under the early McNamara DOD. 42Hereafter, 
U. S. forces were to be restructured toward perceived strengths in naval, air and strategic 
systems. The political dividend from 'reordering national priorities' in line with 
governing Congressional opinion was to be realized in the latter's acceptance of longer- 
term funding programmes for a new generation of weapons systems, notably 'Trident' 
(SSBN), Cruise (SSM/SLCM) and the 'B-l' bomber. 
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In historical perspective, it is clear that much of the Nixon Doctrine's conceptual 
grounding was - 'new era' rhetoric notwithstanding - to fall well within the purview of 
standard U. S. politco-diplomatic practice. The focus on the 'primary' defence 
responsibilities of allies had also been pursued by Truman in the European Recovery 
programme and by Eisehower and Dulles wid-fin the elaborated regional pacts - notably, 
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in the 'Northern Tier' arrangements of SEATO and CENTO. 'Linkage'. as an operative 
tool was not, as Kissinger acknowledges, 'an idiosyncrasy of the administration. '44What 
did, however, mark an area of departure was the rigour with which these policies were 
related, stemming from a tightness of bureaucratic control from their inception. For the 
Gulf and Indian Ocean regions, the priorities for U. S. policy were two. Firstly, to ensure 
continuity in the territories hitherto under (somewhat ambiguous) British control and 
secondly; to employ the conceptual guidelines being developed under the Nixon Doctrine 
to diminish the influence of the Soviet Union. The approach here was, again, clear in 
concept, if complex in execution. 'Detente' with the Soviet Union would be used to 
address the (favourable) status quo at regional level. The devolution of local security 
functions to U. S. allies would ensure U. S. interests; whilst great power agreement on 
bilateral issues (trade, strategic weapons) would secure the framework for detente itself. 
The regional implications of this approach will be considered below. 
U. The Regional Balance: the Nfiddle East, ) the Shah and NSSM 
66. 
For the Nixon administration, the development of U. S. policy in the Indian Ocean was, 
particularly given Kissinger's 'geopolitical perspective, to be taken in tandem with 
overall policy for the Middle East. Here, given the factors of indigenous volatility, 
allied political and economic rivalries, increasing Soviet involvement and, indeed, 
enduring domestic salience in U-S- Politics, pressure for diplomatic initiatives was 
apparent from the outset of the administration. 45For the lower Gulf and wider Indian 
Ocean region itself, more strategic considerations were paramount, proceeding from 
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a need to ensure local security linkages in the context of Britain's forthcoming 
withdrawal. In this, however, a substantive measure of inter-agency preparedness was 
extant from the end of the Johnson administration. The discrepancy between the 
agency's perceptions of the respective Indian Ocean and Middle East policy areas was 
apparent in the priority accorded the latter in the NSC. Thus, 'NSSM 2', 
commissioned on January 21,1969 was conceived to elicit the positions being prepared 
by the several bureaucratic actors - notably, the State Department"I - as much as to 
concert U. S. policy for the Middle East itself. The NSC's second 'National Security 
Study Memorandum' was to be followed by the similar regional studies of NSSM 17 
(February, 6), NSSM 30 (March, 19) and NSSM 33 on March, 21.1 
The calendar for discussion on the NSC's agenda was reflected in the extent of State 
Department diplomatic activism in the region . 
41 However, the latter process was also, 
in some measure, a reflection of the administration's internal brokerage and Nixon's own 
domestic sensitivities to Middle East affairs. The allocation of the Middle East by Nixon 
as virtually the only foreign policy area for independent initiative by Secretary of State 
Dý 
Rogers had only underlined the extent of White House ambivalence on the issues. Thus, 
as former NSC aide Morton Halperin recalls, Nixon had, to some extent, 'wanted to get 
into the Middle East ... from early on in the administration, 
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a view seemingly born out 
by remarks at the first Presidential press conference of January, 27.10 Albeit, here, 
I 
Nixon's qualified call for, 'strategic arms talks in a way ... that will promote ... progress 
on outstanding political problems at the same time - for example, on the problems of the 
Middle East' was perhaps a more accurate indication of the direction policy would 
develop in practice. Without the wholehearted support of the White House, Rogers' 
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efforts would remain, as Kissinger observes, 'in the overcrowded limbo of aborted 
Middle East peace plans. 
151 
Kissinger's own preference - which would, by default, become administration policy - 
was essentially laissezfaire and, in this sense, more consistent with the 'conservative' 
ideological grounding of the Nixon Doctrine. As expressed in the administration's first 
Foreign Policy Report, this approach places clear qualifications on prospective areas 
ofcommitment for the United States. 'We will help', the Report declares, 'where it 
makes a real difference and is considered in our interest. 
152 From these perspectives, as 
Kissinger records, the 'Arab-Israeli conflict' was viewed as essentially a conjunctural 
manifestation of an underlying 'Arab radicalism', whose internal dynamic of 'social and 
economic dissatisfaction' and 'opposition to the Arab moderates "I would remain 
unaffected by any diplomatic settlement at inter-state level. For Kissinger, the key 
variable was the effect of any such settlement on the promotion of 'Soviet influence' 
in the region. In the broader context of the Nixon Doctrine's lexicography, the 
mounting of a purely diplomatic effort such as the December 9,1969 'Rogers Plan' 
would be tantamount to allowing 'commitment' to shape U. S. 'interests' by granting 
away rights of definition. Thus, given that 'The causes of social and economic unrest 
would persist' in the Middle East, and that 'Western capitalism would remain anathema 
to the radicals, ' the more restricted U. S. aim of securing the 'Arab moderates' 
against the time of possible de facto arrangements with Israel would be best served by 
exploiting areas of long-term U. S. strength - economic and geopolitical - at the expense 
of perceived long-tenn Soviet and 'radical' weakness in both spheres. In this way, 'the 
Arabs will come to realize it is the U. S. and not the USSR that holds the key to what 
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they want ... At some point it will become apparent that time is not working for the 
Soviets ... patience could be our weapon. ' 
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Thus, in the above context, Indian ocean policy was to assume a clear tertiary role. 
Such a laissezfaire approach was premised on the assumption of continuing stability in 
the Gulf/Indian Ocean region providing an essential ballast to administration endeavours 
to let 'patience be our weapon' in the wider Middle East. The strategic category of 
'stability', whilst somewhat open ended in conception, was of key importance to the 
execution of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf and South Asia. Although of an established 
conventional usage in U. S. official discourse, it also had a particular theoretical 
formulation in the Kissinger schema. 'Stability', the then Harvard History Professor had 
observed, '... has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace, but from a generally 
accepted legitimacy ... [which] ... means no more than an 
international agreement about 
the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. "I Such agreed methodology 
would, a priofi, take the domestic arrangements of individual states as its point of 
departure. For the Gulf and the Middle East, the practical consequences were made 
plain by the administration. 'I am not in any way trying to make a case', as Assistant 
Qpl- 
.. retary Joe Sisco, was to inform one (1972) House Sub-committee '... that what we are 
doing is going to bring the democratic trappings to this area. 
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In contrast to the increasingly public inter-agency conflicts over Middle East policy, the 
administration's approach to the Gulf and Indian Ocean regions reflected a more 
established cross-govermnental consensus. As Assistant Secretary Sisco again observes, 
'We tried to look at this very systematically as early as 1968 ... because we knew the 
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British were going to get Out. 
157 As well as the operational side of policy, the 
institutional framework was to be similarly restructured. Inter-departinentally, the Indian 
Ocean region fell under the responsibility of the State Department's Bureau of Near East 
and South Asian Affairs, whose primary concern was with the Middle East. In terms of 
bureaucratic profile, the region had thus lacked a 'central organizational focus on its 
affairs' until the appointment, in early 1971, of Ronald Spiers, Director of Politico- 
51 Military Affairs at State, as overall policy co-ordinator. On the policy side itself, the 
principal vehicle for analysis - 'NSSM 66' - was to address the immediate security 
position in the Gulf. Other NSC studies were to examine wider aspects of U. S. interests 
in the Indian Ocean region, including the regional naval balance (NSSM's 104,110,119) 
and relations with South Africa (NSSM 39). Commissioned on July 12,1969, NSSM 
66 sought a comprehensive review of policy options from the Near East and South Asia 
Inter-Departmental Group, to be delivered to the NSC 'Senior Review Group' by 
September, 30.19 The study was focused on three areas. Firstly, 'Discussion of the 
problems created by withdrawal from the Gulf of the British presence in its present 
form, including the possibility of an Arab-Iranian confrontation in the region'; secondly, 
discussion of 'our choices in setting a general U. S. posture toward the various political 
entities in the Gulf area', to include political relationships and arms aid policy, and 
thirdly, a 'description of the specific decision to be made regarding continued U. S. naval 
activity in the region after the British withdrawal. '10 
Whilst sub-categorized here for analytic convenience, the three issue -areas for U. S. 
Gulf policy were, in fact, closely linked. In concrete terms, the flash points of possible 
'Arab/Iranian confrontation' would, inter alia, concern the Shah of Iran's territorial 
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claims on strategic islands (Abu Musa and the greater and lesser Tumbs) in the lower 
Gulf and on the British administered island of Bahrain. The prospective status of 
I various political entities' comprising the Trucial Sheikhdoms was of similar importance 
to the regional balance as, in the broader context, were the more established polities of 
Kuwait and Oman. Whilst the 'specific naval decision' would involve the future 
arrangements for the U. S. Navy's MIDEASTFOR, subject to negotiation with a future 
authority in Bahrain. 
Thus, during the period of NSSM 66's conception, immediate attention was 
focused on the nature of the political arrangements for the lower Gulf Sheikhdoms. The 
territories - Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Ras al-Kaimah and Fujairah - had been 
negotiating the formation of a 'Federation of Arab Emirates' (FAE), under British 
auspices, with the original aim of including Qatar and Bahrain. Here, however, the 
considerable divergence's in oil, population, natural resources and political cohesion 
between the Trucial States were objects of concern to U. S. policy, particularly given the 
unhappy precedent of earlier British 'state building' in the 1964 'South Arabian 
Federation'. An uncertain outcome could, as CIA analysts observed, potentially disrupt 
both the regional balance and bilateral U. S. relations with the respective regional states. 
'This tenuous venture at combining the seven Trucial sheikhdoms with Bahrain and 
Qatar', a January, 1969 'National Intelligence Estimate' (NIE) records, '-seems 
unlikely to achieve any significant unity. 161 Moreover, the 'continuing opposition' of 
the Shah to the inclusion of Bahrain - reflecting Iran's 'recently revived' historical claims 
on the island - may, 'further encourage the Federation's tendency to look to Saudi 
Arabia as its main source Of Support. " The prospect of such a clash of interests between 
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its principal allies had become the central issue for the administration's regional 
policy. Aside from the disputed status of Bahrain, Iranian demands on the three Gulf 
islands had also raised areas of economic contention - involving possible undersea oil 
deposits6l - as had the unresolved question of the (international) 'median line' of 
territorial demarcation in the Gulf waterway between Iran and its neighbours. 64 
Accordingly, Iran's insistence that relations with Saudi Arabia would be conducted 
in a framework of 'positive co-operation', set forth in a personal communication from 
the Shah of December, 196961 was to receive strong endorsement from Nixon in a 
Presidential response of February, 1970.66 In March, this 'positive' trend in Iran/Saudi 
relations was to be incorporated in administration policy, as the completed NSSM 66 
came before the NSC. Thus would be established what was to become known as the 
'Twin Pillar' approach to security in the Gulf, formally ratified in National Security 
Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 92 in November, 1970.67 As later (1979) DOS 
summation observes, 'Since the U. S. had strategic interests in both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, U. S. support for either in isolation would alienate the other. Stability would 
depend on their co-operation in the face of Arab radicalism encouraged by the Soviet 
Union. '" Clearly, Iran was earmarked to become the senior 'pillar' for U. S. interests in 
the region. However, Saudi Arabia, as U. S. regional specialists were well aware, 'has 
a political entrde to the Gulf that Iran, for all its superior strength ... cannot match" and, 
as Assistant Secretary Noyes was to further inform (1972) Congressional Hearings, 
'(Saudi) King Faisal early realized that, with the departure of the British, it would be 
necessary to cooperate with Iran to assure stability throughout the Gulf. '70 
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The principal forms of Saudi contribution would be political and - as befitted the 
'worlds largest oil exporter 
171 
- financial. With estimated foreign currency reserves of 
'$2.5bn', 71 Saudi Arabia was not only in a position of 'major aid donor to a number of 
Arab countries in the peninsula 173but able to provide a further 'entr6e' to U. S. diplomacy 
in the wider Arab world. The Kingdom had, after the August, 1967 'Khartoum 
Agreement', committed an annual $378m. subsidy for Egypt and Jordan. 74For Egypt, 
the '76 percent' of the annual ($250m. ) Arab League subsidy supplied from Saudi and 
Kuwaiti revenues would admit some reciprocity. 'Nasser', as 1970 CIA analysis 
observes, '... is not likely to risk offending these donors by adventuring in the Gulf. '75 
Ra elations were to further improve following the (September 28,1970) death of Nasser 
and Egypt's increasing abandonment of 'Arab Socialism'. If U. S. policy could thus 
expect a substantive politico/economic and a- less tangible - ideological return 
from the 'center of Islam 
176 in the Middle East, the military component in U. S. /Saudi 
relations was not to be neglected. By February, 1972, Riyadh had signed arms 
agreements to the value of $312,405m. for F-5B/E aircraft, mobile artillery systems and 
a naval modernization programme involving '19 small ships, construction of shore 
installations and training -" 
The prospect of British retrenchment in the region sharpening the ambitions of Iran had 
also featured prominently in State/NSC assessments at the close of the Johnson 
administration. Here, a clear U. S. irritation at 'Britain's self-imposed three year 
deadline 178 - notwithstanding, as we have seen, the best efforts of Robert 
McNamara, 
Dean Rusk and the President himself - is joined with concerns that the Shah, hereafter, 
I expects concessions to him. "I The locus of these was also clear to the administration. 
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'The Gulf', as one State/NEA 'background paper' (prepared for the Iranian monarch's 
state visit of June, 1968) observes, 'has become the Shah's great preoccupation. ' And 
thus, 'Although the Shah is not displeased to see the British go', the anticipated period 
of readjustment in the region has, 'created an intense situation for the Shah against any 
real or imagined adversary. ' The Shah accordingly, 'began almost at once to jockey 
widiin political and economic uncertainties to make the post-1971 Gulf come out in a 
shape advantageous to Iran. 'I* However, despite the level of 'pique' at Britain displayed 
in Tehran's extensive regional agenda, NEA analysts were also reasonably confident that, 
'these claims [are] things to be bartered' and, moreover that 'the British have ... outlined 
the possibility of some kind of "package" that might take care of the Shah's territorial 
preoccupations. ' 11 
The precise extent of the Anglo-Iranian 'package' was to become clear in 1971. Here, 
concurrently with the deadline for British withdrawal on December, 1, Iranian 
troopswere to forcibly occupy the disputed Tumbs islands and, by 'arrangement', the 
island of Abu Musa. "' Although strongly contested by the Arab league, " U. S. reactions 
were to stress that Washington had 'never taken a position' on the issue. 114AIso addressed 
under a wider 'barter' was the Shah's opposition to the continuing presence of the U. S. 
Navy's MODEASTFOR in Bahrain - and indeed, to the Bahraini state itself. Washington 
was to applaud the 'statesmanlike' approach of Iran in entering formal recognition of 
Bahrain after August, 1971111 and on, December 23, sign an executive agreement wi 
new Bahraini government to 'demonstrate the continuing interest of the United States ... in 
that strategically important area. '16The MIDEASTFOR, an independent command from 
the Sixth (Mediterranean) Fleet, would consist as before of two destroyers rotated from 
ill 
CINCLANT and an updated flagship (the USS TaSalle') developed from a marine 
assault vessel, albeit here, 'not configured in a comba=t role. 
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Despite administration efforts to avoid any public compromise of Bahrain, the 
tpremature' disclosure of the NUIDEASTFOR arrangements in January, 197211 had also 
brought forth Congressional and media concern that the U. S. was adopting a more overt 
military role in the region - particularly as a similar executive agreement was signed 
with Portugal during the same month to provide for continuing U. S. naval/air staging 
rights on the islands of the Azores. " Officials were thus to stress that, 'The (Bahrain) 
stationing agreement... contains no military or political commitment, either explicit or 
implicit, to the Government of Bahrain'90 and that, 'The United States has assumed none 
of the former British military role or functions' and, '... has no intention of seeking or 
appearing to replace the British presence in the Gulf "I London's security presence itself 
had, in fact, been more restructured than withdrawn in its entirety. 'When one speaks 
of the "departure" of the United Kingdom', Deputy Assistant Secretary Noyes was to 
tell the February sitting of the House Near East Sub-committee, 'one must keep in mind 
exactly what this means. 92 Whilst Britain was to abrogate the formal responsibility 
for defence and foreign relations for Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE and the defence 
provisions in the 1961 treaty of 'close friendship' with Kuwait, 9.1 British military 
personnel were to continue serving on 'secondment' in the former protected territoriesI4 
and the United Kingdom would provide arms, training missions and conduct regular 
joint exercises in the region. A more substantive presence was to be retained in Oman, 
where British special forces were engaged, along with those of Iran, in counter- 
insurgency operations in Dhofar. 91 Britain would also retain the use of an 'air 
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facility' on Masira island. 91 
The British Conservative goverment, elected in June, 1970, had, indeed, actively 
considered reversing some of the 1968 defence cutbacks 'East of Suez', which had 
been strongly resisted in opposition. 91 If these moves found little favour with the larger 
Gulf powers - notably, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia98 - the Heath goverment would 
have more success elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. In March, 1971 , Britain announced 
the restoration of naval links to South Africa (principally the resumption of regular visits 
to the former 'South Atlantic Command' headquarters in Simonstown) and sales of 
'defensive' naval and other arms to the Pretoria regirne. 99 The case for expanded UK., 
U. S., or NATO naval co-operation with South Africa had been widely canvassed wi i 
the British defence community and, as noted in (1971) Congressional Hearings, had 
been 'repeatedly brought up in the editorials of the Economist magazine. '100 However, 
if the supposed requirement to secure the transit of tankers and other sea-borne traffic 
around the South African Cape had been also featured in some U. S. analyses of possible 
naval missions in the Indian Ocean, 101 the undoubted need to assuage the trenchant South 
African lobby in Conservative party politics was of perhaps more immediate concern to 
Whitehall. For the Nixon administration, though, an awareness of the probable domestic 
reaction against such a change in South Africa policy had precluded even a public 
endorsement of the (inter-agency) consensus option of 'limited association' chosen in the 
1969 policy review 'NSSM 39'. 102For the Portuguese African colonies, policy was, in 
the NSC's view, 'influenced by countervailing factors, '101 notably concerning the Azores 
transit agreements. The administration would thus continue to permit exports of certain 
categories of 'dual use' (MilitarY/civil) items and technologies and ftmnel discreet EXIM 
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aid to the Lisbon government. "' In return, Angolan and Mozambican ports would 
continue to be made available for refuelling units of the MIDEASTFOR. 101 Given the 
luncertamity' of overflying rights in Northern and central Africa, 'there is', as NSSM 39 
records, 'U. S. military mterest in alterriative routes through Southem Africa to support 
contingency operations in the Indian Ocean and Middle East areas. '101 Albeit, whilst the 
possibility of 'the establishment of a NATO ASW task-force, permanently based in 
Simonstown"07 proposed by some in the Pentagon would not be feasible, more 
covert contacts with South Africa were also to be maintained in the spheres of 
Intelligence and maritime surveillance co-operation. 101 
Of more immediate utility to the U. S. naval planning programme for the Indian 
Ocean, Britain had, in December, 1970 given formal endorsement to the DOD's 
construction programme for naval comniunications facilities on the island of Diego 
Garcia, 119 and agreed joint regional strategy guidelines during meetings between Prime 
Minister Heath and President Nixon in London and Washington. 110 Overall, the Nixon 
administration remained confident of 'continuing ... British support' 
for U. S. policies in 
the Indian Ocean region, 'where major British strategic and commercial interests parallel 
our own. 1111 
111. The Strategic Arena: the ABM Treaty, the Naval Balance and Regional 
Dkente and the Nixon Doctrine. 
By 1972, initial administration concerns over Arab-Iranian antagonism in the Gulf and 
the tenuous, future of the UAE had been substantially allayed. The 'withdrawal' of 
114 
British forces had, in the DOD's view, 'left no vacuum in the usual sense of the word. 
1112 
'The Persian Gulf 
, as James Noyes was to further inform the February HCFA, '... is not 
looked upon as a house of cards that is going to collapse at a moment's notice. "I' In 
parallel with the 'encouraging' trend toward intra-regional security co-operation 
concerted after NSSM 66, the region's status in the central balance was to also be 
addressed, under the wider precepts of the Nixon Doctrine. Given the anachronism of 
earlier 'basic assumptions' for conducting airborne tactical nuclear exchange from bases 
in the CENTO area (see Chap. 1), the focus of both U-S. and Soviet strategic planning 
had found a primary emphasis on naval contingencies in the Indian Ocean. These, in 
turn, involved two principal aspects: the deployment of submarine nuclear weapons 
(SSBN) and the collateral deployment of surface units and other counter-measures for 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Here, the characteristics of what U. S. Chief of Naval 
Operations (Adml. ) Elmo Zumwalt was to term the region's 'geopolitical asymmetry' 
were mstrumentalized, in respect to deployed force-structures, by an asymmetry of 
mission. The advantages of the region as a theatre for sea-based nuclear weapons would 
ahnost entirely accrue to the Western powers and the United States. In practical terms, 
however, this potentially significant strategic factor was to figure more as a negotiating 
asset to offset any possible large scale movement of the Soviet navy to the Indian Ocean. 
The latter prospect was, for a variety of reasons, beginning to assume some 
prominence in U. S. media and Congressional debate"' following the well- 
publicised transit of a Soviet naval flotilla. 
Although the region had seen previous use by Soviet commercial and research vessels 
and replacement units to the Pacific from the Northern fleet, I 
16a 
specific Indian Ocean 
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naval task group had appeared for the first time from March 22-July 15,1968. The 
Soviet flotilla, consisting of three combatants and attendant support vessels detached 
from the Pacific fleet, had completed a circuit of the Northern Indian Ocean and 
ný 
Red Sea littoral, visiting ports in India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Somalia and Aden 
in the newly-established Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). 117 The 
regularity of subsequent deployments (November 1968-April, 1969, May-October, 
1969, August, 1969-March 1970), and patterns of size, composition and itinerary"' had 
indicated, for one leading U. S. analyst, 'an initial wide-ranging inspection of facilities 
throughout the area during the first twelve months of the operation, "I' after which a 
'steady state' of force rotation was to be sustained through port visits to sympathetic 
regimes, notably in the PDRY and Somalia. 120 For others though, the coincidence with 
the withdrawal of Britain's permanent naval presence from 'the last great vacuum area 
of the world' 
121 had, rather, suggested that the January, 1968 British decision had 
active y enticed' the Soviet fleet to undertake a more forward role in the region. 
122 The 
application of such a 'power vacuum' thesis to the Indian Ocean as, by the same token, 
to the Gulf and environs was, however, strongly resisted by the administration. Aside 
from having unwelcome budgetary and procurement implications for U. S. naval 
planning, it would undercut the whole conceptual basis of the Nixon Doctrine in South 
Asia. 
Thus, whilst agreeing that the Soviet Union, 'like the Czars' have, 'long had an 
interest in the Indian Ocean, and that 'the growing Soviet naval capability in reference 
to the so-called choke points (of entry)' could, 'not but exert some influence on the 
political orientation of those nations who would be most affected' by a hostile use of 
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such a capability, 123 State's Ronald Spiers was to offer an essentially conservative 
interpretation of Soviet Indian Ocean policy to date. Observing that, since the 1950's, 
lalmost two-thirds of their (Soviet) financial and economic aid has been devoted 
to d3ird world countries in the Indian Ocean area' and that, 'some twelve percent' 
of the regional merchant marine traffic was Soviet registered and, 'the growing Indian 
Ocean fishing fleet' now accounts for 'ahnost one-third of their annual catch, 
'114 the 
PMA Director was to accordingly place the 'classic peacetime employment' of Soviet 
naval assets in the context of, 'using sea power to complement ongoing economic and 
political objectives 
'121 in the Indian Ocean region. The perception of a 'relatively low 
order' 
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of Soviet military threat, presented in the first (public) comprehensive review 
of U. S. Indian Ocean policy of June, 1971, was to be reinforced in similar administration 
assessments as the House Near East Sub-committee reconvened the following year. Here, 
for Deputy Assistant Secretary Noyes, 'the Soviet naval presence and military assistance 
programs have supported Soviet policy and helped expand its influence; they have not 
themselves been the initiator of this influence. 
1127 And, as Assistant Secretary Joseph 
Sisco further records, 'We do not believe that this (region) ought to become an area of 
confrontation between the major powers' rather, 'an area of peaceful competition 
between the Soviet Union and the United States' and 'an important testing area for the 
principles that were expressed in the (July, 1972) "Moscow Communique to . 
1128 
The identification of the Indian Ocean as an arena for practical demonstration of the 
'Basic Principles of U. S. -Soviet relations' was, to be sure, presented as a classic instance 
of the operation of linked inducements and restraints on Soviet policy premeditated under 
the Nixon Doctrine. It was also closely related to administration efforts to put the 
117 
military aspects of U. S. - Soviet competition in the wider Middle East 'on ice' in the 
approach of the November, 1972 U-S- elections. 119 However, the U. S. confidence 
that great power competition in the Indian Ocean 'should emphasize the political '110 
would also reflect the arrival of more specific lines of accord with Moscow on the 
region's strategic status as developed in parallel with the most significant arms control 
agreements to date - ABM and SALT 1. 
Here, if the conclusion of the May, 20 1972 limitations on offensive strategic 
weapons - 'SALT' - drew much impetus from Soviet concerns to contain the perceived 
U. S. advantage in submarine nuclear systems (SSBN), 
132 the collateral agreement on 
restricting the development of Anti-Ballistic Missile defence (ABM) was further 
predicated on the subsidiary but not unhnportant status of the Indian Ocean as a theatre 
for SSBN deployment. On entering office in January, 1969, the Nixon administration 
had inherited both a set of provisional Soviet proposals on opening strategic arms talks"' 
and the proceeding U. S. programmes for the weapons themselves. The latter included 
Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) on existing systems 
('Minuteman IIF), a new MIRV submarine system ('Poseidon') and a- more 
contentious - programme for ABM defence ('Sentinel/Safeguard). 114Whilst the 
Soviet Union had itself deployed a limited ABM system in several phases from 1961,111 
the Soviet offer, relayed by Foreign Minister Gromyko in June, 1968 for 'mutual 
reduction and subsequent limitation' of nuclear weapons was specifically extended to 
both 'offensive and defensive' strategic systems, 'including anti-ballistic missiles. "" 
The Soviet willingness to discuss ABM reflected several factors, some of which 
concerned a realization of the substantive technical difficulties in the systems 
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themselves. 137 These had also been brought out in the extensive U. S. research 
programme. "' Perhaps more significant from the U. S. perspective, however, was the 
public signalling of changes in Soviet strategic doctrine inherent in the USSR's new 
negotiating position, "I and the scope thus offered to operationalize the 'linkage' 
between the strategic and eopolitical levels of U. S. - Soviet engagement so envisaged 4-1 9 
under the Nixon Doctrine. 
At the strategic level, the Soviet approach stemmed from a policy preference to stabilize 
the central balance following the approach of 'parity' with the U. S. in offensive 
systems"O - and the parallel concern for possible third country nuclear expansion, 
notably from China. 
141 However, if the Soviet interest in retaining a minimal ABM 
capability to deter 'nth country' threat was proceeding independently of fears of possible 
U. S. ABM advances - particularly given the public controversy over actual ABM 
deployment in Washington'42 - the deterrent effectiveness of the Russian 'Galosh' ABM 
network could, regardless, be compromised by advances in U. S. offensive systems and 
patterns of forward deployment. "' For the latter contingency, a clearly advantageous 
area for U. S. planning was apparent in the region of Arabian sea. With the deployment 
of the (2,500rum. ) Polaris A-3 system after 1963, the South Russian industrial complex 
would come under threat, as would Moscow itself. I" 
The significance of the Indian Ocean as a theatre for possible U. S. SSBN operations 
had become flirther heightened with the McNamara DOD's focus on the containment 
of China, following the successful Chinese thermo-nuclear test of June, 1967.145 In July 
the same year, the Pentagon announced contingency studies for a sea-based ABM 
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system. 
141 By developing existing Polaris technology, the proposed 'SABMIS' system 
would potentially offer, for the first time, a true 'mid-course intercept' capability against 
incoming ICBM's. Plans for the 'forward deployment of submarines' were, it can be 
recalled, envisioned in the 1968 'option T"' funding schedule for Diego Garcia. The 
implications of the DOD ratified 'option "B 11 1 were equally clear to Soviet analysts, if 
subject to some public reticence by the administration. The 'austere' communications 
facility would enhance traffic along VHF frequencies which were most suited to 
providing command and control with submerged submarines. 147 Overcoming the 
acknowledged 'gap '141 in such capability would thus complete an Indian Ocean VFH net 
planned from 1961 and commenced in May, 1963 with the agreement to develop 
facilities at N. W. Cape in Western Australia. "' The final link in the chain would be 
provided by upgrading the existing military communications base at Asmara (Ethiopia), 
which was to be transferred entirely to the U. S. Navy by 1971.150 
The Soviet concern at the apparent trend in U. S. nuclear strategy was earlier indicated 
in draft 'Measures for Further Easing International Tension and Restricting the Arms 
D -M I Race registered at the United Nations on December 7,1964. "1 The Soviet memorandum 
had proposed that nuclear free zones be established in the Mediterranean and Indian 
Ocean regions. From Moscow's perspective, the dangers of opening a third geopolitical 
zone to U. S. targeting options were compounded by an awareness of the technical 
advances imminent in U. S. delivery systems. The first funding request for the Poseidon 
0 
programme was placed before Congress on January 18,1965.152 Of further 
consideration to Soviet strategy had been the British acquisition of the Polaris A-3 system 
after the Nassau summit of December, 1962. Of the five submarines originally 
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scheduled, a possible three could be on station at any onetime. "' Here, given 
that a deployment of two SSBN was considered more than adequate to fulfil the 
'Moscow criterion' 114 from North Sea and Atlantic stations, the third could logically 
be emplaced in the Arabian Sea. This would be consistent with earlier British (counter 
value) deterrence posture in the Middle East and the additional disposition within the 
Wilson government to consider - under U. S. prompting - the 'containment of China 
as a major rationale for Britain's 'independent, strategic capabilities. 
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However, by the beginning of the Nixon administration, the grounds for U. S. - 
Soviet agreement on strategic systems - offensive and defensive - had been clearly 
established. Early Soviet confidence in ABM development had been succeeded, by 1968, 
by the Soviet initiative to restrict or ban ABM's altogether. Further, if subsidiary, 
momentum toward addressing Soviet 'nth country' concerns in the Indian Ocean was 
provided by the imminent British retrenchment from the region. "I The far greater 
consideration of potential U. S. deployments of SSBN had also gone into abeyance. The 
Pentagon's 'option "C"' for Diego Garcia was not proceeded with. Furthermore, in 
the 'anti-miliwy orgy spawned by Vietnam', any move by Washington to open a new 
theatre of operations would, particularly in the nuclear sphere, meet intense 
Congressional opposition and compromise the administration's programme of 'damage 
157 limitation' on prospective Pentagon budget items like Trident and B- 1. U. S. nuclear 
targeting priorities, had, moreover, sought to move away from the position wherein 'any 
analysis of possible use of nuclear weapons tended to presuppose that the Soviet Union 
and China were a single target area"" and thus the requirement to develop a joint 
targetmg capability from the Arabian sea. 
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Thus, while most attention on the SALT 1 agreement would focus on the limitations on 
offensive (ICBM) systems, the separate treaty limiting ABM's, signed concurrently at 
the Moscow Summit of May, 1972, was to also ratify a mutually advantageous 
strategic status quo for the Indian Ocean. 119 
IV. Lm*u*ted Contingency in a Global Context: Project 60 and 'Total Force 
Planning', 
After 1972, the level of possible theatre strategic significance for the Indian Ocean had 
clearly diminished with the SALT and ABM treaties and the administration's 
rapprochdment with China. The Pentagon could thus, with some sincerity, claim to have 
addressed Soviet and nonaligned concerns toward SSBN deployment in the Indian 
Ocean, in that 'We won't have them there. 
'160 If the DOD could equally claim that the 
'low profile but nevertheless positive indication of U. S. interests in the Indian Ocean 
region"" provided by the NMEASTFOR was an adequate level of direct U. S. military 
presence, such confidence reflected not only the downgrading of the region from great 
power strategic considerations but also the compensatory approach to the regional 
balance adopted under the precepts of 'Total Force Planning - "I' 
Introduced in the DOD's Annual Report for FY 1972, the new terminology would 
also launch the first five-year defence programme to be individually conceived by the 
Nixon administration. "' The 'conceptual thrust' of the administration's agenda was to 
become further refined by the time of 'designing the Nixon Doctrine forces to implement 
the program 
1164 in FY 1973. In 'considering the spectrum of potential conflict"61 for the 
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FY 72 programme, Secretary Laird's typology of 'strategic nuclear war' and 'theatre 
nuclear war' offered much continuity with previous DOD planning. For the latter 
categories, U. S. forces would bear the 'primary responsibility'. 116 For 'theatre 
conventional war, - the 'major contingency, of successive Pentagon war planning - allied 
forces would 'share the responsibility'. It is in the fourth category of 'sub-theatre or 
localized warfare' that the Nixon Doctrine comes into its own. Here, 'the country or ally 
which is threatened bears the primary responsibility. '167U. S. involvement was thus to be 
confined to 'military and economic assistance', albeit, 'where 'appropriate' bolstered by 
'sea and air combat support' and only in, 'some special cases' would limited ground 
combat support be extended. 
161 Given that, in a contemporaneous DOD view, 'no littoral 
state is of direct strategic importance to the United States, '119 it is here that the new 
security doctrine would most apply to the Indian Ocean. Widiin the specific local 
characteristics of the region, however, a particular scope - in terms of economic 
strength and indigenous military capability - would also be found 'to use all appropriate 
resources for deterrence -- U. S. and Free World -- to capitalise on the potential of 
available assets. '110 
In concrete terms, the practical application of the administration's 'Total Force' 
provisions to the Indian Ocean region can be considered in three aspects. These are: [11 
structural reorganization, [2] force structures and [3] military aid programmes (MAP). 
To further establish the relation of these structural components within the parameters of 
the revised I 1/2Wars' military posture, it is useful to review the changing conceptual 
development of the 'lesser contingency' itself in U. S. military doctrine. As the previous 
chapter has shown, earlier attempts to prepare U. S. forces for missions involving 
123 
'limited wars on widely scattered parts of the globe' had assumed an institutional 
expression in the establishment of STRICOM. With the increasing commitment of 
Vietnam, however, the growth of what was originally envisaged as a 'lesser contingency' 
into the proportions of a major one had led to atrophy of the original functions of 
STRIKE. '71 The mobility systems originally envisaged - FDL and C-5A - were 
also subject to both the changing procurement priorities of the war and increasing 
Congressional opposition to developing a 'brushfire war' capability as such. 172Thus, 
although some analysts had emphasized the political rather than purely military 
limitations preventing the full implementation of '21/2wars"71 it was, by 1969, also clear 
that aside from a total mobilization of the reserves, 'limited war in the present climate 
is not an option for the U. S. today. 
'174 
The accuracy of the above contention was brought home, for many in the defence 
community, by the authority of the source - fortner CJCS General Maxwell Taylor. 
However, if the 'half war' capability of U. S. forces was acknowledged as unsatisfactory, 
planning would continue to account for a principal theatre of operations for the lesser 
contingency being found, as before, in the Middle East. "' For this undertaking, the 
ground was to be laid within a wide ranging reorganization of the military planning 
apparatus. The early move of Secretary Laird to abolish the unitary McNamara TPBS' 
arrangements - thus restoring a measure of inter-service autonomy to the PI 
i 
process - was widely supported in the Pentagon. 176 Furffier welcomed was the 
reorgamzation, effective from January, 1 1972, of the 'Unified Command Plan'. 
177 In 
this, 'The area of responsibility of the U. S. European Command (EUCOM) was 
expanded to include the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East to the Eastern 
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border of Iran ... the area of responsibility of the Pacific Command (PACOM) was 
expanded to include the Indian Ocean to 62 degrees east longitude [and] those South 
Asian countries formerly assigned to USCINCMEAFSA. '171 The expansion of 
hemispheric areas of responsibility had also involved the dissolution of STRICOM. Its 
replacement, the 'U. S. Readiness Command' (REDCOM) was set up to reflect both the X 
Laird DOD's sensitivity to Pentagon dislike of joint command structures and 
Congressional sensitivity - reflected in change of the name - to an overt intervention 
capability. Thus, REDCOM, established at MeDill Airforce Base, Florida, would have 
no specified geographical designation and be 'manned austerely'. Whilst retaining a 
notional combat capability, 179its main task was to 'provide a general reserve of combat 
ready forces ... perform deployment planning' and, 'assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
developing doctrines and techniques for the joint employment of forces. "I' 
Overall the dissolution of STRICOM as 'a fire brigade organization to speed 
military forces to the worlds trouble spots, "" as a valedictory DOD press release was to 
put it, reflected the main conviction of the Nixon Doctrine that, 'our aflies can and must 
bear the primary task for planning to cope with sub-theatre and localized conflicts. 
'112 
Thus, although Melvin Laird was to maintain that, in any event, 'the rapid deployment 
capabilities of U. S. forces are substantial, ' the Defense Secretary would also insist that 
for FY 1972 and hereafter, 'our goal is to minimize the need for such deployments in the 
future, ' and that the 'modifications to our own forces' underway will thus, 'enhance 
their complementary role, rather than a supplanting role. "I' 
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The reassigmnent of the geographical areas in the Middle East and Indian Ocean 
regions formerly under STRICOM to the hemispheric commands had also resolved some 
outstanding organizational rivalries in the Pentagon. The U. S. Navy had regained 
operational control of the MIDEASTFOR in Bahrain. "I The provision of military 
assistance groups (MAAGS) for the Middle East was reassigned to EUCOM. 
Concurrently, the stress on 'strengthening the planning capability for the defense of the 
Southern flank of NATO' thus adopted was also reinforcement for the administration's 
policy of integrating European NATO more closely within its strategy for the Middle 
East. 115Here, the functional significance of the administration's organizational review 
was reflected in changes in force structure. In particular, the function of integrating the 
several hemispheric theatres of operations would find an enhanced role for the U. S. 
Navy. 
Thus, following some internal studies on naval force structures (NSSM 50) and 
procurement policy (NSSM 54) - and a wider intra-service debate reported at the time 
as the Navy's 'greatest period of reappraisal since World War two"" - Nixon had 
appointed, on July 1,1970, Admiral Ehno R. Zumwalt as the new Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), with a brief to conduct a 'bottom up' review of U. S. naval posture - 1111 
The result, termed 'Project 60', was delivered in September, 1970 and had recommended 
a change in the Navy's principal mission area from 'force projection' (involving a 
necessarily limited number of carrier task groups) to 'sea control' requiring, in 
Zumwalt's view, an expanded number of more modest 'flat tops'. In keeping with the 
DOD Is stress on 'long range planning', the new 'hi-lo mix' required the U. S- Navy 'to 
give up a very large amount of current capability in order to make investments in future 
126 
capa i ity. "I The Navy's inventory would, accordingly, be reduced from 976 vessels 
in 1970 to a projected 508 by 1975. "1 In compensation, the Navy could expect to equip 
some eight 'sea control' ships for the cost fonnerly bome by one nuclear carrier. 110 For 
Zumwalt, the need for 'a large number of escort vessels' would have a particular 
relevance to the Indian Ocean, in terms of 'the possibility that (the Navy) would be called 
upon to protect tankers on the ... long voyage from the Persian Gulf to the United 
States, Western Europe or Japan. 1191 
To be sure, the new CNO's views on naval posture were not, even at this- stage, 
uncontested within the NSC and wider inter-agency milieu. As recalled by Adml. 
Zumwalt, the policy discussions on the deployment implications of 'Project 60' of 
November, 1970-June 1971 prefigured much of the later, more public, debate on Indian 
Ocean policy. For the present stage of policy discussion, however, the CNO was, in 
accordance with the practice of the Nixon NSC, to provide a private briefmg for 
Kissinger on November 6,1970 where decision could be agreed 'in principle'. The full 
NSC would then meet on November, 9 to consider NSSM 104. The latter study, 
conceived as 'an assessment of possible Soviet Naval threats to U. S. interests in the 
Indian Ocean area', had also produced options for, 'the development of friendly naval 
force and basing alternatives ... over the 
1971-5 period. '191 Here, despite argument from 
ACDA and State that, 'no vital U. S. interests' were at stake in the Indian Ocean, " 
Zumwalt was to succeed in augmenting the MIDEASTFOR with a periodic carrier task 
group deployment from the Seventh Fleet, to take effect from April, 197 1.114 
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Whilst a separate Indian Ocean command for the U. S. Navy - beyond those functions 
currently undertaken by MIDEASTFOR - was not contemplated under the 'Project 60' 
planning schedule, '" the extension of the Navy's regional capability was affirmed by 
funding and construction approval for the facilities on Diego Garcia. This was voted 
$5.4m. (out of a projected $19m. total) in the military construction appropriations for FY 
1971.191 When completed in 1973, the development envisaged an 8,000 foot hardened 
runway, VHF communications, 'a very small logistic POL storage' and accommodation 
for 274 British and American personnel. 197 Although the 'austere' facilities planned for 
BIOT were not, at this stage, a particularly controversial DOD budget item, "I 
questioning at (1971) Congressional Hearings had revealed the existence of 'earlier 
plans' (the 1968 'Option "C"') and, as State's Ronald Spiers was to acknowledge, that, 
'Potentially Diego Garcia would be capable of serving much more extensive purposes. '199 
Some outline of the latter was to also emerge in the Congressional testimony. Thus, in 
stressing that 'it is not intended to be a base', PMA Director Spiers had further affirmed 
that 'there is no intention to use it for servicing nuclear submarines. ' And while the 
proposed airfield 'theoretically could take fighter-bombers' there was, 'no intention to 
use it for that purpose. " However, if force projection, in keeping with revised 'Project 
60' guidelines, was indeed not an immediate requirement for Diego Garcia, the island 
facilities would present a clear augmentation for the Navy's priority 'sea control' 
programme. The runway, with parking facilities for two aircraft was designed to 
accommodate C-130 and C-144 air transport. 201 It was equally adaptable to the P-3 
maritime patrol which was also the Navy's principal airborne anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) platform. And if - after SALT 1- SSBN offensive systems were, defactog 
excluded from Indian Ocean operations, the VFH establishment would remain capable 
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of providing communications with nuclear or conventional 'hunter-killer' submarines 
in tandem. In this context, a U. S. ASW carrier task group had begun extensive 
exercises in the Indian Ocean in April 1971 - 'to practice their skills in ... relatively 
unfamiliar waters'202 - upgrading a mission which had previously been conducted by the 
more modest MIDEASTFOR. 
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In parallel with structural reorganization of the 'Unified Command Plan' and the 
revised force structures of REDCOM and 'Project 60', the third aspect of 'Total Force' 
planning most immediate to the Indian Ocean region was to be found in arms transfers, 
military aid and military assistance. And in parallel with the DOD's elaborated scale of 
possible threat scenarios, the planning requirements of 'Total Force' were similarly 
subdivided into: [i] 'Unilateral force planning' (confined to U. S. forces), [ii] 'Combined 
force planning' (allowing integration with allied forces), [iii] 'Complementary force 
planning', which aimed towards specialist air and logistics support for allies, 
'[but] ... does not include prepositioned, 
integrated U. S. forces during peacetime' . 204 and 
[iv] 'Supplementary force planning', concerned with, 'supplementing local capabilities, 
primarily through the provision of appropriate security assistance. '201 It was the latter 
level of 'supplementary' force planning - conceived as the functional expression of the 
DOD's category of 'sub-theatre or localized warfare' - which would assume the primary 
burden of the Nixon Doctrine security provisions for the Indian Ocean. 
Again, the security assistance programme falls into two categories: MAP (grant 
military assistance) and FMS (export credits and direct sales). For both, the pI i 
requirement for 'all security related aid programs' was to be integrated for the FY 1973 
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budget, planning for which was to be brought entirely within the Pentagon's revised 
PPB System. 101 This would be administered by two new bureaucratic instruments, the 
'Defense Security Assistance Council' and the 'Defense Security Assistance Agency I. 207 
However, in seeking overall 'to reduce the need for American ground combat support 
by shifting the emphasis to Military Assistance Programs, 1208 the Defense Secretary was 
to also acknowledge a significant corollary; that, 'It is the policy of the 
administration ... that we should move our military assistance from a grant to a sales basis 
as the economies of the recipient countries improve. '109 
The extent of FMS provision to 'countries more able to bear their share of the 
burden"" would become fundamental to the exercise of the Nixon Doctrine in the Middle 
East and wider Indian Ocean region. The administration's aims, however, were more far 
reaching than relayed by the staple prefixions of 'partnership' and 'burden sharing' 
conventionally attached to programmes of military exports. As Melvin Laird and the 
Pentagon were well aware, the U. S. capabilities to conduct the posited 'half war' in the 
revised military posture were, in fact, far from 'substantial'. This was brought home in 
the preparations for intervention in the 1970 'Black September' crisis in Jordan. Here, 
as Kissinger recalls, mustering a significant capability would have 'enlist[ed] our entire 
strategic reserve. 
121 1 Awareness of these factors was, though, to underlie the 'conceptual 
thrust' of the Nixon Doctrine's military component from the outset. The material U. S. 
constraints on conducting 'brushfire wars' were to acquire a compensatory flexibility 
within a more unified approach to global strategy. 'The Total Force approach', as so set 
forth in Secretary Laird's official summation, '... involves much more than a mere 
division of responsibilities or the analytical separation of potential threats into categories 
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of required forces', rather, 'Total Force calls for a new order of co-ordination and co- 
operation. 
1212 'The potential and significance of the concept'. Laird concludes, '... are 
profound. ' 
Despite conjecture amongst some critics on the parallel significance of the Defense 
Secretary's own order of political ambition, "' the hyperbole attending Melvin Laird's 
account of his departmental programme for FY 1973 was not unfounded. Following the 
Tehran oil agreement of February, 1971 and the Tehran summit of May, 1972, the extent 
to which both the immediate defence 'burden' and altogether less manageable categories 
of power was to 'shift' to U. S. allies in the Middle East would be profound indeed, 
albeit with consequences perhaps not wholly anticipated by the administration. 
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CHAPTER THREE. THE NIXON DOCTRINE 01): 
THE DIFFUSION OF POWER. 
The previous section identified the conceptual grounding for the Indian Ocean application 
of the Nixon Doctrine, in tenms of the international enviromnent, the Washington policy 
environment and the perspectives brought to bear by the incoming administration. The 
analysis will now move on to consider significant operational manifestations of Nixon's 
'New Strategy for Peace', as it sought to harness some local components of the 'diffusion 
of power' in the Gulf, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. 
1. The Tehran Agreement, the 'Twin Pillars' and the New Economic Policy. 
If the successful conclusion of SALT I had permitted a practical down-grading of the 
Indian Ocean from strategic nuclear competition amongst the great powers, the pursuit 
of regional stability engaged widiin the 'total force' strategy would also require more 
positive measures. 'It is important to re-emphasize', Secretary Laird's FY 1973 Annual 
Report observes, '. - -that any realistic assessments and resulting plans 
for military 
forces 
... must include political, economic and social considerations. 
' And, moreover, 
I we must give careful consideration not only to the strengths of potential adversaries but 
also to the deficiencies in their capabilities and the various constraints with which they 
must cope. " For the Soviet Union, such 'deficiencies and constraints' had glaringly 
existed in the sphere of economic attraction, and particularly so in the Middle East. The 
ability to 'shore up ... the weak economies of Persian Gulf states' ensured by the 
commanding market power of U. S. oil corporations had, for two decades, 
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underwritten Washington's strategic objectives in the region. However, as both State and 
Defense officials were to stress in early 1971, 'ahnost two thirds of (Soviet) financial and 
economic aid has been devoted to third world countries in the Indian Ocean region' 
since the 1950's and, furthermore, 'The Soviets in this and other regions are showing 
an increasing propensity to support incumbent conservative and non-communist 
govermnents where there is political capital to be gained. I This policy, 'often at the 
expense of radical leftist groups with poor prospects' was demonstrative, for DOD's 
Robert Pranger, that, 'Political realities are prevailing over ideological motivations. " To 
be sure, this perception of Soviet pragmatism had formed precisely the grounding for 
dI 6tente for the Nixon administration. The reduction in cold war tensions in the Middle 
East would also, though, bring more localized economic and political factors to the fore 
and hence admit a new level of regional leverage on both the administration and the 
erstwhile executors of 'U. S. foreign policy objectives' in the ma or oil corporations. i 
Thus, just as the advent of Soviet strategic parity had removed one pole of United 
States' singularity in the international system - and provided the conditions wherein 
'smaller allies' as Kissinger observes, were 'all the more tempted to conduct independent 
foreign policies" - the erosion of another had taken place with the loss of U. S. 
predominance in the field of oil production. And whilst much attention had been paid to 
the effects of Soviet parity on the strategic balance, the effects on the U. S. global 
position would be equally subversive in this other dimension to the 'diffusion of power'. 
It is useful to briefly reconsider some background conditions concerning the interaction 
between the (U. S. ) internal and the international oil markets and the historical relation 
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of both to U. S. power in the international system. As we have seen, a central concern 
for the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had been the securing of a dominant 
position in the production of Middle East oil. When combined with the capacity of U. S. 
domestic production, this had endowed Washington with a decisive margin of market 
power. The flexibility to influence both European allies - as at Suez in 1956 - and the 
producing countries of the Middle East had provided an essential complement to the 
operation of more formalized international economic 'regimes' in trade and liquidity. 
However, just as the latter had begun to work to U. S. disadvantage by the end of the 
1960's, ' a decline in domestic oil capacity would produce a similar reduction in the 
abilities of government to exercise market regulatory functions. The necessary 
conditions for U. S. predominance in the political economy of oil lay in the security of 
its own domestic supply. This had, most recently, enabled Washington to overcome the 
oil embargo organized in July, 1967 by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEQ' in response to Israeli military conquests in the six-day war. Although 
founded in September 1960, the capabilities of OPEC had hitherto been disregarded by 
U. S. analysts due, inter alia, to conditions of global surplus in oil production capacity. I 
Although the latter were to still obtain, on a global basis in 1970,1 the position had 
changed for the specific capacity levels in the U. S. A February, 1970 Cabinet Task 
Force Report on 'The Oil hnport. Question' had confirmed a growing U. S. dependence 
on imported oil, which was predicted to reach a level of 27 % of total consumption by 
1980. By early 1972, the U. S. oil fields were, for the first time, producing at full 
capacity. I 
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If the possible 'long range national security issue[s]' raised by U. S. oil imports had 
been acknowledged in general terms by the Energy Task Force and other 
administration studies, 10 the circumstantial cause for the wider market transformation lay 
in an exploitation of internal oil industry rivalry by the emergent 'Revolutionary 
Command Council' in Libya. II This had resulted in the lesser oil 'independents' yielding 
a 40c. p/b (20 %) price increase and Libyan goverment control over levels of 
production. 12 The success of Libya's claims would establish a new precedent for the 
OPEC cartel. Accordingly, a fresh package of demands on price and (equity) 
'participation' was launched at the December 1970, OPEC conference in Caracas. " The 
iiqdustry was given a thirty-one day deadline to comply with these conditions, after which 
OPEC would reconvene to consider 'other measures' on January 19,1971 in Tehran. 
Here, faced with the ostensibly 'radical' and 'moderate' wings of OPEC united behind 
a 'separate but necessarily connected' 14 negotiating platform, the immediate choice 
before the Nixon administration was perceived in political and strategic rather than 
strictly economic terms. A clear account for the latter was, in any event, proving difficult 
to quantify. 15The administration's priorities lay in securing the regional 'stability and co- 
operation' sought in NSSM 66 and reaffmned in November, 1970 by NSDM 92.16 The 
blossoming of Saudi-Iranian co-operation apparent within OPEC" was, on a strategic 
level, not inconsistent with these overall ahns for the 'Twin Pillars' of U. S. regional 
security policy. Albeit, some appearance of a unilateral U. S. option toward the old 
energy regime had also to be recorded, in order to maintain the initiative for the 
administration. The Department of Justice had thus provided the corporate 'London 
Policy Group' with anti-trust inimunity dispensation, and on January 16,1971, Under 
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Secretary of State John Irwin was dispatched to Tehran as a Presidential special envoy, 
to 'place the power and prestige of the U. S. govermnent"I behind the terms for a 
settlement. 
In the event, the opportunity to consolidate U. S. links with Iran was not otherwise 
unwelcome for the Nixon administration, particularly given the sometimes uneasy 
relationship obtaining under Kennedy, Johnson and the State Department of Dean Rusk. 
Here, if the United States had ceased to promote 'more modem groups' amongst the 
Shah's political opponents, Iran had in turn accepted the restrictions on Consortium oil 
production established under the oil 'majors' global allocation agreements from 1954 
and, faute de mieux, U. S. assessments on the correct 'balance"' between civil 
development and military expenditure. Such provisions had, indeed, been formally 
incorporated in the Kennedy administration's 'memorandum on military assistance' of 
1962.20 Whilst the Shah's more expansive threat assessments continued to be discounted 
in Washington, lobbying from successive U. S. ambassadors and Iran's evident economic 
growth had led to a revised memorandum of understanding of July 4,1964. This 
had provided the first instance of FMS credits to Iran ($200m. for FY 1965-69) and a 
further $50m. of military cash sales. 21 The terms of U. S. -Iran military relations were 
again revised, in an additional $200m. FMS agreement of August, 1966, to include F-4 
aircraft and a radar air-defence system. " The latter agreement was strongly influenced 
by the Shah's negative appraisal of U. S. 'neutralism' during the 1965 India-Pakistan 
war . 
23 Iran would, non-the-less, reinforce the diplomatic representations and still 
outstanding differences over arms procurement with the U. S. by concluding a $11 Om. 
agreement for Soviet arms in February, 1967.24 
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Iran's growing leeway in international affairs was symbolized, in November, 1967, by 
the termination of U. S. economic assistance and, in 1969, the similar end to U. S. grant 
aid to the Iranian military. Tehran's move from MAP, through FMS credits to FMS cash 
sales was matched by a corresponding loss of U. S. influence on the Shah's procurement 
programme. Whilst U. S. analysts would continue to emphasize the 'restraint' on 
'excessive purchases' still extant within the 'careful technical advice and persuasion of 
the ARMISH-MAAG, "I the agencies were also aware that, 'The Soviet Union has kept 
constant pressure on the Shah to buy ahnost anydiing he wants' at 'attractive prices', and 
that, 'The Western European countries and the LJK appear ready to sell without restraint 
their military products. "I Overall, reflecting on the several dimensions to 'the military 
problem', a September, 1969 State (Tehran embassy) report was to voice the widespread 
view of the concerned agencies that, 'The Shah's appetite for equipment keeps us 
constantly uneasy - "I 
An economic counterpoint to the Shah's 'decreasing tolerance of foreign restraints 
128 in 
the Iranian military programme was provided by the operation of global quota allocations 
within the Iranian National Oil Company. Here, opposition to the level of corporate 
stricture on the NIOC itself was compounded by Iranian perceptions of an 
29 institutionalized oil company preference for Arab producers. Iran had not participated 
in the inconclusive 1967 OPEC embargo and had secured a temporary 22% liftings 
increase above quota. 30 This, however had been contested in the following year by the 
Consortium,, who wished to restore quotas to the previous levels of (global) distribution. 
Given the oil industry Is projection o 'a growing world-wide surplus in oil production 
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over the next five years, "' any increase in Iran's liftings would have to come at the 
expense of other producers in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. " Although pressure from the 
Shah had secured a further $865m. revenue 'stopgap"' toward fulfilling the 'Fourth (five- 
year) Development Plan', the 'almost constant negotiations' between Iran and the 
Consortim0were, by 1969, imposing increasing strain across the spectrum of U. S. -Iran 
relations in general. 
For the Nixon administration, the existing structure of the world oil market was, in 
immediate terms, of less direct concern than the creation of a stable security structure in 
the Gulf and South Asia. In this, the consistent area of disagreement between Iran and 
previous U. S. policy - the Shah's conception of military predominance in the region - 
would, rather, form the basis for a new U. S. -Iranian accord. The foundations for Iran's 
renascent role in the 'natural alliance"' were laid during the Shah's two state visits to 
Washington of March and October, 1969. Here, discussions with Nixon had focused on 
the Gulf security position after Britain's withdrawal and provided for the wider 
considerations of NSSM 66. Despite Nixon's support, the Shah's efforts to negotiate 
either an ambitious 'arms for oil' barter arrangement" or a more modest ($155m. ) 
increase in Iran's U. S. oil import quota to provide procurement funding had foundered 
on the opposition of the oil Consortium. 'This event' as Kissinger records, '... merely 
served to teach Nixon how was negligible the influence of the President of the United 
States over oil import allocations. 37And thus, on July 30,1970, 'Nixon was obliged to 
write to the Shah in effect that he could not deliver. "I What the President would be able 
to deliver, however, was to become clear in the course of the oil companies' January, 
1971 confrontation with the Shah and OPEC in Tehran. 
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Notwithstanding the uncertain bureaucratic relationship obtaining between the Nixon 
administration and the institutional agencies of government, there was broad agreement 
on the statistical breakdown of Iran's political economy found in successive 'National 
intelligence Estimates' (NIE's) provided by the CIA and the parallel studies conducted 
by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the State Department. Here, a 
January 1969 NEE suggests that 'Iran will probably be able to sustain an average annual 
increase in GNP of about eight percent over the remainder of the (1968-73) Plan period' 
and that, 'for some years to come Iran can continue without significant strain to finance 
both its military and economic programs at currently planned levels. '19 By September, 
1970 however, a reappraisal of the same economic indicators by the Agency had 
concluded that Iran's 'rapid economic expansion ... has been achieved at the cost of 
serious balance of payments difficulties. '40 These, in concrete tenns, were costed at the 
'about $150m. ' figure (for 1969-70) of the Shah's unsuccessful quota submission of 
October, 1969, and due to reach $350m. by 1973 on present forecasting . 
41 Thus, 
assuming the continuation of 10 % ($2. lbn. ) levels of annual foreign exchange outlay for 
military purposes, Iran, 'cannot pay for both military procurement and civilian imports 
at levels specified in existing programs without significantly increasing its already heavy 
dept burden. '42For the State Department, INR research, conducted in June, 1970 was 
equally clear that, 'Iran can not finance the additional weapons purchases the Shah 
seems to have in mind ... unless Iran obtains concessionary 
finanCing. '43 Moreover, in the 
CIA's view, although 'A windfall of several hundred million dollars from new oil 
agreements' could reduce Iran's dept differential, 'it would not close the gap. I 
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As will be shown, precisely such a 'windfall' - amounting to an immediate $1.4bn. 
extra revenue for the Gulf members of OPEC" - would attend the Nixon 
administration's laissezfaire approach to the oil negotiations at Tehran. Despite a degree 
of confusion attending the Tehran negotiations themselves, 46 the stance taken by the 
administration was to soon become apparent to the several contending parties. Thus, in 
the course of regional consultations, Under Secretary Irwin was assured that potential 
OPEC sanctions were directed 'solely against the (oil) companies, ' and that oil would 
remain available to consumers 'even if negotiations with the companies broke down. 
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For the latter, 'It was perfectly clear', an internal LPG memorandum records, '... that 
(Iranian Finance Minister) Amouzegar believes that he and H. I. M. (the Shah) have 
convinced [the] American government in recent discussions of the correctness of their 
position. '" In a rare display of intra-govermnental accord, the White House' preference 
for accommodating the regional powers was backed by State Department concerns to 
demonstrably 'recognize the realities' Of 'nationalization and participation' in the Gulf 
oil industry49and move toward 'new forms of relationship '10 with the producer nations. 
In Kissinger's more pragmatic view, the terms on offer at Tehran would, in aggregate, 
'affect primarily Europe and Japan and probably improve our competitive position. " I 
Precisely this analysis was also in circulation amongst the European (EEC) 
govenunents, " prompting efforts to exploit the millstone, of U. S. support for Israel to 
effect advantageous bilateral terms with the Arab members of OPEC. " The perceived 
need to frustrate such 'linkage' between U-S political particularism in the Middle East 
and wider foreign economic policy-14had also weighed strongly in the NSC's strategy for 
finessing the demands of the oil companies. 55 Finally, as Kissinger recalls, 'our hands-off 
policy ordained the result: the companies yielded. 
151 The Tehran agreement of February 
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14,1971, thus conceded an average 30c. per barrel inunediate increase for the Gulf 
producers, rising to 50c. by 1975 and would amount to a projected $11.7bn. extra 
revenue during that period. 
57 
For the Shah, the prospect of further oil company concessions, and the clear support 
of the administration would encourage a further expansion of military procurement, 
extending to a range of weapons systems (F-14/15 aircraft, 'Phoenix' and 'Maverick' 
missiles), some of which were not yet in service with U. S. forces. If, for some in the 
agencies, 'There is no immediate threat to Iran that would justify new inputs of military 
equipment, "I it was the increasing capability for deterrence from Iran itself that 
provided the focus for the Kissinger NSC. Such considerations had become sharpened, 
moreover, by the deteriorating security position elsewhere in the Middle East. By mid- 
1970, the Soviet Union had installed some 10-15,000 military personnel in Egypt, 
supported by air and naval units and a comprehensive air defence system. " The Soviet 
presence was actively employed in providing logistics and reserve air combat support for 
the Cairo regime's 'war of attrition' with Israel along the Suez Canal-' In September, 
the administration had become involved in an extended effort to secure the pro-Western 
government of King Hussein in Jordan from assault by Syria and an alliance of 
Palestinian guerrillas under the umbrella of the PLO-" The review of options for possible 
U. S. military intervention had, as we have seen, also brought out serious shortcomings 
in 'rapid deployment' capability for regional contingencies in general-' These, as the 
administration was well aware, were unlikely to be addressed in the short term by a 
Congress concerned rather to cut U. S. military spending. Under such conditions, the 
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Shah's 'appetite for equipment' had begun to look less than 'excessive' to the main 
shapers of U. S. policy in the Oval Office and the West Basement offices of the NSC. 63 
A further expression of the 'linkage' between oil, regional security and the pivotal 
role of Iran in administration decision-making was to be found in Tehran's established 
oil supply relationship with Israel - Although formal diplomatic relations had never been 
established, Iran had also developed a close level of technical and security co-operation 
with Tel Aviv from the early 1950's. 64 The most tangible manifestation of relations 
between Washington's principal allies in the Middle East was, however, economic. By 
1967, the movements of four tankers 'all flying the Liberian flag' were the subject of 
regular comment in classified CIA/INR cable traffic65monitoring shipping movements 
between Eilat (Israel) and the Kharg Island oil terminal. Trade had, by April, 1968, 
justified the construction of a Mediterranean oil pipeline (with a capacity of 500,000 
bpd. )" to enable Israeli resale of its surplus on the world market. Thus, by 1976, a 
confidential State Department memorandum records, 'at least 75 % of Israeli domestic 
(OR) consumption ... is supplied by Iran. 
'17 
Viewed in the overall context of an administration determined to reestablish 'a rational 
conception of America's interest' and against a domestic climate coloured by perceptions 
of protectionism from Japan and the enlarging (from 197 1) EEC, " the rise of new centres 
of national economic power in the Gulf was not disadvantageous to the objectives of 
Nixon's 'new framework for international relations'. On August, 15,1971, the U. S. 
Treasury had announced a range of 'strong unilateral measures' - including a 10% 
import surcharge and suspending the convertibility of the dollar - in order to address the 
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severe U. S. balance of payments positio& and what were further perceived as the 
'fundamental structural problems of the system. '70 Given that the existing international 
trade and monetary regime was, from the U. S. perspective, viewed as admitting undue 
scope for foreign comparative advantage, the Tehran and subsequent oil agreements did 
indeed contribute to redressing the 'disequilibrium on the surplus side"' of Washington's 
economic competitors. The 'affirmative contribution' to balance of payments gain in the 
United States itself stood at $2bn. in some estimates by 1972.72 
The administration's 'New Economic Policy' and effective ending of the 'Bretton 
Woods' system of exchange rate parities provided further expression of Nixon's 
determination to utilize 'the end of the post-war era' of American strategic and economic 
singularity to forge new advantage. In the Gulf, these ends would be served by increased 
scope for manoeuvre with the individual states following the disestablishment of the 
'Seven Sisters' corporate hegemony - The breakdown of the corporate oil structure had 
not lessened the strategic dependence of the regional powers on Washington. Similarly, 
a critical component of U. S. global influence - and in particular, influence on the 
Western alliance - remained dependent on Washington's position in the Middle East. 
Given the increasing constriction on U. S. political and economic Options internationally, 
underscored by the NEP, it was in the strategic and military sphere in the Middle 
East and Indian Ocean that U. S. policy would seek the initiative. Here, if the U. S. 
response to the oil price conflicts had a certain incremental and ad hoc quality, the 
administration's strategic aims were more fumfly established. As developed operationally, 
however, the scope accorded U. S. strategic engagement with the Gulf powers, Saudi 
Arabia and, perhaps most fundamentally, Iran was such as to mark an historical 
156 
departure equal to the dissolution of the oil companies' erstwhile role as 'third 
goverment' in the region. 
Global Contingency in a Regional Context: The I Tilt', The 'Zone of Peace' and 
the India-Pakistan War. 
During 197 1, both the conceptual and operational framework for the Nixon Doctrine had 
become established. If the administration's New Economic Policy had demonstrated the 
ability to conduct 'drastic unilateral steps' toward the principals of the Western alliance, 
the position of lesser allies had been, rather, enhanced and particularly so in the Middle 
East. In this context, as NSSM 66 had begun providing a fresh focus to traditional U. S. 
interests in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, the outbreak of the third India-Pakistan war 
elsewhere in South Asia would also underscore the changing status of the wider Indian 
Ocean region in the administration's 'geopolitical design'. 
Above the clear affective preferences of Nixon himself between the respective 
leaderships of India and Pakistan, 73U. S. policy during the March -December Bangladesh 
secession crisis was entirely consistent with the 'Twin Pillars' approach to security in the 
Gulf. In a fashion parallel to the case of Iran, U. S. -Pakistan relations had remained 
correct, if restricted, during the Kennedy/Johnson era. Similarly, obtaining Pakistan's 
I active participation' in the regional mobilization of the Nixon Doctrine would require 
r__ - fresh initiative from Washington. Since the Johnson administration's curtailment of arm 
shipments to both belligerents in the 1965 war with India, U. S. interests in Pakistan had 
been conventionally defined, in successive departmental position papers, as 
'humanitarian' rather than 'Strategic'. ' In July, 1969, the parameters of existing U. S. 
br, 
157 
policy throughout the sub-continent had been comprehensively reviewed in a report 
prepared for the U. S. Air Force. 75 Considering 'U. S. strategic alternatives' in South 
Asia, the review observes that, since the 1965 armistice - mediated by the Soviet 
Union - 'the Pakistanis have ... followed what has in fact amounted to a nonaligned 
policy' and 'Pakistan's defacto nonalignment has allowed it to receive military aid from 
the U. S., the USSR and China. ' With reference to the CENTO protocols and 1959 
'memorandum of understanding', the report further records that, given the above 
considerations, it is thus 'extremely unlikely that Pakistan will be subject to "communist 
aggression"', and moreover, 'there is no real U. S. interest in maintaining West 
Pakistan's control over East Pakistan. 
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For India, the USAF study notes the, 'infonnal' commitment of the Johnson 
administration to defend India against nuclear attack from China, albeit, 'we anticipate 
a decline in the credibility of any U. S. nuclear commitment to India. " In summation, 
it is thus clear to the study's authors that, 'American opinion ... will not be receptive to 
new commitments or deployments overseas. This is especially likely to effect the Indian 
Ocean area, with which Americans have traditionally had few contacts - "I 
However, if Pakistan's 'defacto nonaligmuent' had, here-to-fore, largely corresponded 
to Washington's own preference for disengagement from the ramified treaty 
commitments of the Dulles era, the Indian approach to even such readjusted U. S. 
regional involvement had sought a more rigorous definition of 'nonalignment' in both 
an organizational and political sense. This framework was joined with more traditional 
strategic and nationalist perspectives as New Delhi had moved to active opposition 
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to U. S. Indian Ocean policy. India had been a strong supporter of the 'Declaration of 
the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace' adopted at the third Conference of Non-Aligned 
nations meetmg at Lusaka in September, 1970. Here, the resolution for the exclusion of 
'bases conceived in the context of (great power) rivalries and competition 
'79 from the 
region had been identified, in practice, with the United States. India's particular 
condemnation of the Anglo-U. S. 'base' development on Diego Garcia'O stood in contrast 
to the 'normal international arrangement' obtaining for port 'facilities' depicted in New 
Delhi's appraisal of Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean. " On August 9,1971 the 
increasing level of Soviet-Indian rapproch6ment, begun in the mid-1960's, had become 
further institutionalized with the signature of a twenty year joint treaty of 'Peace, 
Friendship and Co-operation'. " 
If, therefore, there were compelling policy objectives to be served by support for 
Pakistan in terms of the regional framework of the Nixon Doctrine, it was the Soviet 
involvement with India that set the 'protocol level' for the administration. In Moscow's 
own regional diplomacy, the targeting of 'incumbent conservative and non-communist 
govermuents' had also extended to Iran and Pakistan itself as part of the co-ordinated 
initiative for 'Collective Security in Asia'. " The USSR could thus prospectively attempt 
a repetition of the earlier mediation on the sub-continent achieved at Tashkent in 
1965/6.114This possibility would, in itself, suggest sufficient reason for engaging a close 
politico-military bidding from the Nixon White House. There was, though, yet a third 
aspect to the high profile of U. S. commitment to Pakistan, proceeding from the Yahya 
Khan government's role in the administration's opening to China. " Pakistan's We facto 
nonalignment' had, over the 1960's, engendered an active diplomatic and security 
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relationship with Beijing - concomitant with the latter's enmity to India. If the PRC was 
perhaps less committed to the survival of the specific regime in Islamabad, " U. S. actions 
in support of a Chinese ally were, regardless, considered essential to avoid a 
'demonstration of American irrelevance', which, in Kissinger's view, 'would severely 
strain our precarious new relationship With 
China. 187 
The administration's vigorous engagement on behalf of Pakistan was made clear as 
successive diplomatic communications to India" were buttressed by the suspension of 
$72m. PL-480 assistance (December, 3) and $87.6m. in development loans (December, 
6). " In parallel, the White House had itself made plain the personal commitment of 
President Nixon in a series of public and confidential demarches to the Soviet Union 
(October 18, November 15,18, December, 6,10,12). 10 Were Moscow's 'undoubted 
influence' on India not brought into play, Kissinger had informed news reporters, a 'new 
look' might have to be taken at plans for the forthcoming U. S. -Soviet summit-91 At the 
UN Security Council, U. S. ambassador George Bush had charged India with 'armed 
attack on the very existence of a member-State of the United Nations '12and had concerted 
a series of motions for cease-fire and Indian withdrawal (December, 4,7,12). 11 These 
were to command widespread support (104-11) in the General Assembly. India's 
censure at both UN forums was only avoided by the exercise of three (Security Council) 
Soviet vetoes. 14More controversially, the U. S. had mobilized a naval task force - 'TF- 
741 - to assemble from PACOM on December, 10 and, on December 15, deploy 
in the Bay of Bengal. 
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The U. S. task force, consisting of an attack carrier (USS 'Enterprise'), a marine assault 
carrier and eight other combatants' would comprise the greatest concentration of naval 
power yet seen in the Indian Ocean. Its mission, in Kissinger's view, was to provide the 
'margin of uncertainty' to ensure that India would not follow its victory in the East by 
ftu-ther actions in West Pakistan, and in particular, the disputed territory of Kashmir. 91 
To this end, TF-74 was to also fulfil two ancillary objectives: firstly, given the level of 
domestic and inter-agency dissent in the U-S-I the task group would demonstrate to all 
actors, and particularly the Chinese, " that the White House was in 'control of the 
government process. '99 Secondly, by raising the prospect of (unqualified) U. S. military 
co-operation with China, the administration sought to 'raise the stakes for the Soviets ... to 
a level where Moscow would see larger interests jeopardized. '110 Whilst admittedly 
'unlikely', 101 a possible 'worst-case' contingency could be developed around threat co- 
ordination in the Assam/Bengal region - the site of earlier Chinese advances in the war 
of 1962. 
The strength of international support for U. S. diplomacy at the United Nations was 
presented as a vindication of administration policies by Nixon and Kissinger. 101 India 
had, furthermore, declared an unconditional cease-fire (on all battle fronts) on December, 
16. The precise correspondence between these sets of events, however, required, for 
many critics, considerable disaggregation. The widely publicised Pakistani repression in 
East Bengal before the final outbreak of hostilities with India had given the issues a wide 
domestic salience in the United States. 101 From the outset, the administration's clear 
partisan 'tilt' in favour of Pakistan had also run up against the 'traditional Indian bias 
'114 
of the State Department. If the level of the Executive's political and diplomatic support 
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for a regime acknowledged to be caught up... beyond their comprehension"O' had seemed 
excessive to the civilian agencies, the utility of the administration's military 'margin of 
uncertainty' was equally unclear to many in the Pentagon. Whilst aimed ostensibly at 
preventing the 'dismembennent' of Pakistan in the West, the disposition of TF-74 in the 
Bay of Bengal would limit its theatre of operations to the former East Pakistan where 
hostilities had, by this stage, effectively ceased. In the view of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Elmo R. Zumwalt, the 'futile' and 'untimely' deployment of U. S. forces 
would only serve to institutionalize the presence of Soviet naval deployments in the 
region; 101 given that the regular (two combatant) Soviet contingent had been fortuitously 
rpinforced by similar replacement units and further augmented by two (four combatant) 
'task groups' from the Russian Pacific fleet. 
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To be sure, CNO Zumwalt and CJCS Thomas Moorer were, under other 
circumstances, forceful advocates of an enhanced U. S. naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean. The strategic status of the region had been consistently advanced in support of 
such claims, and in opposition on both counts to those of State and ACDA, in successive 
inWr-agency policy debates on the issues (NSSM's 104,109,110,118,133 of November 
1970 - June, 197 1). 101 However, the emphasis in Zumwalt's planning - in line with the 
wider 'Project 60' strategy - was on the Navy's 'sea control' mission rather than on the 
role of 'force projection' represented, par excellence, by the carrier task group. 101 As sea 
control was, regardless, given priority in the Seventh Fleet's 'Outline Plan for Show of 
Force Operations in the India-Pakistan Area', the deployment of major surface 
combatants clearly configured for force projection represented, for the CNO, a critical 
'mismatch' between force structure and mission. 110 
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For Kissinger, though, if such ambiguity was - rather - contributory to 
combining the anti-Soviet sea control posture with suggesting 'even the minor risk that 
we might act irrationally"" against India, the main purpose of TF-74 was to emphasize 
the position of the United States as a regional military actor. The latter considerations 
had been otherwise brought into sharp relief by the - albeit, diplomatically couched - 
U. S. refusal to accede Pakistan's invocation of Article one of the 1959 'Bilateral 
Agreement'. 112 Here, the White House' sympathy for Pakistan would be weighed against 
the dangers of allowing prior 'commitments I to shape current U. S. 'interests I in a 
manner that could lose the initiative for the administration. The precept that existing U. S. 
treaty undertakings be viewed as a 'dynamic process"" was central to the expressed 
0 ves o the Nixon Doctrine. Moreover, like the wider body of legislation ste 
from the 1957 'Joint Declaration', the 1959 bilaterals were never formally registered in 
the U. S. Senate as (legally bounded) treaties. Congressional opposition to any U. S. 
action under these auspices would, therefore, have been formidable. However, if the 
construction of the 1959 agreement with Pakistan or the CENTO protocol was, in any 
event, 'explicitly excluded from planning against India', it was the impact of such 
disavowal on the other identically-worded agreements with Turkey, and in particular, 
Iran that was of uppermost concern for the administration. I" 
Approached in these terms, the deployment of TF-74 can be placed in the context of 
the five previous U. S. naval exercises in the Indian Ocean in 1971. These, as we have 
seen, had commenced in April with the ASW task group of the USS 'Ticonderorga'. 
They had then extended to CENTO air defence linkups with Turkey and Iran (June 20- 
30), U. S. Special Forces exercises with Iran (July 1-15) and earlier manoeuvres of the 
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USS 'Enterprise' and escorts in the vicinity of Indonesia (September 20-2). 111 Thus, if 
later (1972) DOD summation was not inaccurate in asserting that, 'the deployment of 
the U. S. naval task force to the Indian Ocean in December, 1971 did not represent 
a change in our Indian Ocean naval policy, "" the timing was clearly advantageous in the 
context of Britain's final withdrawal from the upper Gulf on December, 1. The entry of 
TF-74 would thus coincide with the departure of a British carrier task group from 
Singapore from October-December' 17 and add substance to the extension of PACOM 
responsibilities to the Indian Ocean, effective from the last week of December. The 
timing of TF-74 had also a further, albeit subsidiary application in terms of the recent 
independence of Bahrain and the prevailing climate of tension between Iraq and Iran. 
A demonstration of 'visible U. S. power"19 could have similar significance for U. S. 
relations with both Saudi Arabia and the 'tenuous' Union of Arab Emirates, whose 
propensity, noted in one Congressional report, to, 'not stay cohesive"21 had been 
exacerbated by the Shah's November, 29 seizure of the three strategic islands in the Gulf. 
Overall, as subsequent Congressional hearings were to be told, U. S. policy thus sought 
recognition as a 'regional power ... with a continuing political and security 
dialogue with 
many of the parties involved. 
1121 
However, the White House' assertion of a 'geopolitical' primacy to- its own regional 
design - as opposed to the more parochial 'regional perspective' perceived 
in the State 
department 122 - was not without cost for later U. S. policy. If Kissinger was correct in 
observing that, following the successive U. S. diplomatic initiatives in the Security 
Council and UN General Assembly, 'we enjoyed more support in the world community 
than on any other (issue) in a decade, 
1123 the U. S. military activities had met a more 
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mixed reception. The Lusaka 'Zone of Peace' Declaration of 1970 had been introduced 
in an expanded form to the United Nations on October, 1. Sponsored by Sri Lanka, the 
resolution (2832) proscribed that the Indian Ocean 'together with the air space above and 
the ocean floor subjacent thereto' be, 'hereby designated for all time as a zone of 
peace"14and was passed substantially (61-0) on December, 16 by the General Assembly. 
Although many delegates had expressed doubts about the resolution's operational 
feasibility, recorded in the number (55) of abstentions, "' the absence of opposing votes 
had also, for the expanding nonaligned caucus at the UN, established a point of principle. 
Moreover, whilst the original Sri Lankan draft had extended to the armed forces of 
li4oral states, 
126 these terms were modified after, 'it became apparent that the members 
of the (UN First) committee were not ready for such a comprehensive scheme for 
demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. '117The resolution's sphere of competence was thus 
restricted to the 'escalation and expansion' of the military presence of the 'Great Powers' 
and called for the 'eliminating from the Indian Ocean [ofl all bases ... weapons of mass 
destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence conceived in the 
context of great power rivalry. "I' India's particularist interpretation of the conditions 
defining 'great power' bases has been noted: the 'Peace Zone' resolution's explicit 
requirement that 'warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any 
threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of 
any littoral. or hinterland state of the Indian Ocean"29would further reflect the recovery 
of India's diplomatic momentum in the aftermath of TF-74. 
There was to be a more material legacy for U. S. relations with the sub -continent, 
again proceeding from what one Indian view had characterized as 'atomic gun-boat 
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diplomacy. "" The 'margin of uncertainty' attending possible U. S. military action that 
had so persuaded the Pakistan General Staff to postpone surrender in the East"' was 
precisely the margin needed to impress India with this same possibility. The unwitting 
role played by Pakistan's Eastern command in the administration's threat-bargaining 
would take similar issue to Indian concerns that American forces could again be in a 
position to 'act irrationally' in the Indian Ocean. The existing provisions for nuclear 
weapons research were to undergo significant expansion in the military programmes of 
both powers. Pakistan's post-war Prime Minister, Ali Bhutto, was to declare in January, 
1972 that his country would 'eat grass' rather than forego nuclear weapons. "' India 
would, on May 18,1974, explode a purportedly 'peaceful' nuclear device derived from 
Canadian nuclear power technology. "' In Kissinger's view, however, the 'costs' of 
U. S. policy '-would prove as temporary as they were unavoidable - "I Withal, 'the basic 
structure of our foreign policy was intact', the then National Security Advisor records, 
'we could resume our course. 
1135 
Ill. The Unconditional Ally: the Tehran Summit and 'Blank Cheque'. 
If the Nixon administration was thus convinced that its great power focus had been 
vindicated in the 1971 war and that it was pressure from the Soviet Union that, in the 
final analysis, had compelled India to modify its presumed 'hegemonic' ambitions on the 
subcontinent, "I the conflict had also brought back security considerations of a more 
regional nature to the fore. For Pakistan itself, the diplomatic thrust of the 
administration's 'tilt toward peace' 
137 
was to be complemented by the release of 300 
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armoured personnel carriers (APC's) on order since 1970,111 $87m. in economic aid and 
a willingness to supply 'on a case by case basis the cash sale of spare parts for previously 
supplied lethal equipment. '119 Here, despite official insistence that the 1965 guidelines on 
'lethal military equipment' transfers to both India and Pakistan were to be retained, the 
criteria for 'lethality' were, as was also acknowledged, a 'grey area 
'140 
and would not 
preclude such items as ammunition and bomb racks for previously supplied F-86 and F- 
104 aircraft - 
141 The U. S. had supplied some $692m. of 'materiel hardware' to Pakistan 
between 1954-65, supplemented by $700m. of security supporting assistance (as opposed 
to $92m. of military and related aid to India between 1962-5). 
141 Thus, under this 
reading, the 'tilt', as administration spokesmen conceded, "" was to remain as the basis 
of U. S. South Asian policy. 
In addition to restoring Pakistan's endogenous military capability, the new civilian 
regime of Ali Bhutto was encouraged to consolidate its security links with the other U. S. 
allies in the region. Pakistan was thus, in November 1972, to take part in the annual 
CENTO exercises for the first time since 1965.1" If the Central Treaty Organization had 
long ceased to aspire to be a 'NATO for the Middle East', the administration would still 
recognize the utility of a 'loosely defined co-operative arrangement which gives Pakistan, 
Iran and Turkey ... some sense of potential co-operation', and 
that, 'as long as they 
believe there is a validity to CENTO in a political sense, in a quasi-military sense and 
in an economic sense ... we should welcome 
this. t 141 The main focus of regional 
support for Pakistan, as for other regional powers was, however, devolved to Iran. The 
pre-eminence of Iran in the administration's 'geopolitical design' was to be ostensively 
affirmed by Nixon's round of international summitry in early 1972. Following the 
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successful visits to Beijing (February, 21) and Moscow (May, 20) the Presidential 
entourage was to cap the 'emerging structure of peace' on May, 30 by arriving in 
Tehran. 
'The Shah', Nixon's May, 12 'Briefing Book' for the Tehran summit records, '... is 
highly gratified by your prospective visit ... and the recognition that it brings him as an 
important world figure ... Your visit will put both friends and adversaries in the region 
on notice that we have important interests in the Gulf area we intend to maintain. '146High 
on the Tehran agenda was, inevitably, the Shah's expanding military procurement 
programme. Here, administration policy was aiming to redress both the immediate 
issues of 'credibility' posed in public divisions over the India-Pakistan war and the 
longer legacy of U. S. questioning of Iranian security priorities. Summing up these 
perspectives, the briefing memoranda for the President's visit observes that, 'we have 
in the past ... sometimes conveyed the impression that we were unwilling to provide the 
Shah with military information or equipment because we did not agree with his 
assessment of his security requirements. "I To allay such 'suspicions about our 
reliability', the Shah should thus, 'be told that in view of Iran's major role in 
strengdiening the free world's security ... you have ordered that Iran 
is to receive our full 
and continued co-operation as has been reflected in our recent responses to his 
requests. '141 The resulting White House memorandum, circulated on June, 15, was later 
to assume some bureaucratic notoriety as the 'blank cheque'. In addition to being 
'forthcoming in response to the Shah's general request for continued U. S. support, ' the 
administration would make 'specific commitinents' in regard to: [1] F-14 and F-15 
168 
aircraft, [2] laser-guided bombs and [3] 'an increased number of uniformed military 
technicians ftom the U. S. services. 
1149 
The climate of U. S. -Iranian amity on security issues apparent during the Nixon visit 
was complemented by an outline economic agreement on Iranian oil production 
arrangements, negotiated by Exxon (for the oil consortium) and the National Iranian Oil 
Company in late May, 1972.1-50 Provisionally fixed for the next 20 years, the agreement 
involved, inter alia, the transfer of refineries in Abadan to the NIOC, the construction, 
at the consortium's expense, of a further refinery on Kharg Island and a progressive 51 
of equity transfer from the consortium to NIOC. "I Previous U. S. policy had, as we have 
seen, been driven by concerns that Iran's military budget would divert scarce resources 
from civilian development. After the above and earlier agreements in Tripoli and Tehran, 
this was perceived as a decreasing problem by the Nixon administration. As the May 
negotiations had progressed, the administration was confident that, 'the several oil price 
increases since 1970 which Iran was instrumental in negotiating have substantially eased 
Iran's fmancial difficulties' and moreover, that 'Iranian hard currency oil earnings will 
continue to rise dramatically over the coming years. "I' The full drama of Iran's market 
power in the economy of oil was, to be sure, yet to play before the administration. For 
the moment, though, Nixon's brief to 'express your satisfaction with the responsible 
attitude Iran has shown in negotiating new relationships with the foreign oil 
companies"" reflected an outcome perceived as entirely satisfactory - 
Of equal satisfaction to both the White House and the several agencies, some DOD 
dissent notwithstanding, 
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was the Shah's 'farsighted recognition' that, 'Iran must carry 
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a large share of the responsibility for the security of the Persian Gulf and the approaches 
to it. "I' The Iranian arms procurement programme was surely commensurate with this 
task After the tem 1*12C . -iination of grant military assistance (MAP) in 1969, Iran had acquired 
some $750m. worth of arms from then until 1971 - approximate to the total MAP/FmS 
programme for 1955-68.116 Following the Tehran summit, the further expansion of 
Iranian arms procurement was, in the words of a later (1979) State/Defense Department 
analysis, 'immediate and dramatic'. Outstanding contracts with U. S. companies grew 
from $500m. in 1972 to $2.5bn. in 1973. Amongst the inventory were, THawk' s/a 
missiles ($687), 332 Bell 214-A helicopters ($1.2bn. ), 'Phoenix' a/a missiles ($150m. ), 
80 F-14 aircraft ($2.497bn. ), four DD-693 destroyers ($1.466bn. ) and ancillary 
equipment, and precision guided Munitions. 157 
The ostensible locus of external threat identified in Iran's procurement schedules was, 
as in the past, the Soviet Union. Here, the Shah - widely accounted, in Admiral 
Zumwalt's observation - as 'one of the worlds most knowledgeable students of weapons 
systems. "I' was thus interested in the F-14 in order to offset the latest Soviet air- 
superiority inventory. The Shah's preference for the British 'Chieftain' tank (as opposed 
to U. S. models) was similarly derived from its capability against the Soviet T-62. Albeit, 
despite the massive influx of arms, repeated U. S. intelligence estimates were emphatic 
that 'the USSR could, of course, overwhelm Iran with ease', "' and that 'it would not be 
productive for Iran to plan for such a contingency except in the context of a general East- 
West war. '110 Such contingencies remained, to be sure, the subject of regular planning 
review in the still-extant CENTO 'Basic Assumptions'. In 1965 however, Iran had begun 
to withdraw significant sections of CENTO-aHocated forces from its Soviet border after 
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expressing public disillusion with alliance inactivity in the (second) India-Pakistan War. 161 
Iran's overwhelming reliance on U. S. training MAAG's and mat6riel would, though, 
necessarily provide for continuing interoperability options and a common strategic 
doctrine. Thus, whilst the DQD was to admit an unelaborated reference to 'certain 
countries in the Middle East' widiin the ambit of 'supplementary force planning',,, in the 
'Total Force' sliding scale, the precise level of possible integration of (respective) forces 
was to be left contingent widlin the framework of the 1959 executive agreement and the 
CENTO treaty itself 161 The spread of options informing the Shah's security perspectives 
was reflected in Iran's changing military posture. In this, the reconfiguration of force 
structures begun in 1965 had extended, by 1967, to the creation of a new Third army 
corps (air mobile) based in the Southern city of Shiraz and the redeployment of the 
Iranian Second corps from the Soviet border to Tehran. 11" 
The main secular thrust of Iran's military posture was thus not aimed primarily at 
passive defence against the Soviet Union but attaining the active capability to assume a 
'leading role in promoting and protecting area interest"61 at regional level. The Shah had, 
indeed, consistently voiced concern to his U. S. interlocutors over 'Soviet advances in 
Iraq' and, in a recurrent theme, 'what he regards as a grand USSR design to acquire 
warm water ports in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian sea. 
'166 In this context, though, a 
May, 1972, CIA intelligence Memorandum', 11 compiled to establish inter-agency 
implementation guidelines for Nixon's discussions in Tehran, again suggests an 
essentially political focus to Soviet aims in Iraq and the Middle East in general. Russia 
had, since 1967 given vigorous political and military support to Egypt - for State's 
INR, the 'first Soviet priority in the Middle East' 168 - and on May 27,1971 concluded 
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a twenty year 'Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation' with the regime of Anwar al-Sadat 
in Cairo. 
On April 9,1972 the Soviet Union was to sign a similar treaty with Iraq. Soviet 
political and military involvement in Iraq - pursued with varying intensity with the 
several military governments since 1958 - had, by 1972 extended to a $250m. defence 
package and a $170m. investment in the Iraqi oil industry. "' The Soviet Union had 
ftulherassisted in the expansion of Iraq's naval facilities at Um Qasr and the construction 
of six military airfields. 110 However, although the latter could, in the Agency's view, 'be 
used to support a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, 1171 such an option had yet 
to materialize, and overall, 'While the Soviets could use naval facilities in the Indian 
Ocean for their ships, they have not assigned a high priority to securing such facilities 
in the Gulf itself. '172 
The degree of potential Soviet military support for Baghdad was thus not unqualified 
in the view of CIA analysts - 
173 If the provisions to 'continue ... co-operation in the 
strengthening of [their] defence capabilities' of Article Nine in the 1972 Treaty were 
more explicit than those in similar treaties with Egypt and India, the text remained, as 
the CIA observes 'a careful formulation. '174Moscow had remained notably unresponsive 
to Iraqi requests for a joint protest over the Iranian seizure of the Tumbs islands. "' The 
Soviet Union was to similarly distance itself from an Iraqi border incursion in Kuwait of 
March 20,1973. "1 Moreover, 'According to a clandestine source' of the CIA, it was 
ftirther noted that, 'the Soviets rejected an Iraqi request that the friendship treaty include 
a guarantee [that] the USSR would intervene if Iraq were attacked by Iran. 
'177 
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Overall, far from seeking to sponsor Iraqi particularism at the expense of other 
regional states, the 'grand design' as presented by the CIA rather locates Soviet Iraq 
policy widiin an integrated strategy embracing the wider Gulf area and - notably - Iran 
itself. Observing that, 'Soviet policies in the Persian Gulf have followed a consistent 
course over the past five years', in this respect, the Agency notes that, 'Iran is now the 
fourth largest recipient of Soviet economic aid and the second largest recipient of East 
European aid' and that, following recent transactions of $350m. , 'the USSR has 
emerged as Iran's third largest anns supplier. 
1171 Furthennore, given that, 'the Soviet 
assistance programs in Iran ... are being implemented more rapidly than Soviet programs 
in other less developed countries, the analysis concludes that, 'The political and 
economic benefits that have accrued to the USSR from its trade and aid ties to Iran have 
become important policy considerations in 
MOSCOW. 1179 
For the rest of the Gulf, the Soviet Union had announced fonnal recognition of 
Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar in 197 1, and declared a 'willingness to establish diplomatic 
relations. ' The exchange of ambassadors had, however, been blocked on the Gulf side 
by Saudi pressure. 110 The U. S. view of a growing Soviet 'rapprochdment ... with 
conservative regimes' expressed in the more public Congressional arena is further born 
out in the CIA's assessment of the region's revolutionary potential. Whilst the Soviet 
Union had 'established contact' with the 'Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and 
the Arab Gulf' (PFLOAG) - currently waging a low-intensity conflict in the Dhofar 
province of Oman - and the 'Bahraini Liberation Front' and 'provided some small arms 
and limited funds' to the former via South Yemen, overall, 'the Soviets are being 
cautious about encouraging subversive activity' in the Gulf and Arabian peninsula-"' In 
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its public pronouncements. the Agency observes, 'Soviet propaganda has become less 
enthusiastic over the prospects for success of liberation movements in the area. 1182 
If Moscow was thus to display some circumspection regarding 'subversive activity' in 
the Gulf littoral, a more activist approach was envisaged for the U. S. and its allies, 
following on decisions taken by Nixon and Kissinger at the summit in Tehran. These 
involved, as Kissinger records, moves to 'encourage the Shah in supporting the autonomy 
of the Kurds in Iraq. "I' Iran's intermittent involvement in the Kurdish insurgency of 
Mullah Mustapha, Barzani had been expanded in 1965 in co-operation with Israel. 
114 In 
accordance with established CENTO protocol, a watching brief was also maintained by 
Turkish intelligence"' Britain"' and the CIA. However, whilst U. S. intelligence had long 
noted that 'Iran could, as it has in the past, interfere actively in Iraqi domestic politics', 
and that 'Iraq is politically and militarily very vulnerable"17 to such efforts, the 
commitment of active U. S. intelligence and training support and some $16m. of 'covert' 
funding"' was to mark a conscious departure from previous U. S. policy - notably in 
terms of the executive level of the decision making. 119 The administration's aims in 
Kurdistan, however, and those of the much greater Iranian programme, were clear. 
'[Iran], like ourselves, a March, 1974 CIA memorandum records, '... has seen the 
benefit in a stalemate situation ... in which [Iraq] 
is intrinsically weakened by [the Kurds] 
refusal to relinquish semi-autonomy. Neither [Iran] nor ourselves wish to see the matter 
resolved one way or the other. "' The return for the administration from support of such 
a 'uniquely useful tool for weakening [Iraq's] potential for international adventurism"91 
was to soon be forthcoming. 'Nixon's Kurdish decision', as Kissinger again observes, 
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had left 'Only one Iraqi division ... available to participate in the October, 1973 Middle 
East war. 
1192 
Conclusions. 
I 
At the outset of the Nixon administration, the principal threats to the U. S. position in the 
Gulf, South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean region were perceived in three 
interconnected dimensions. These were: firstly, local nationalisms directed against the 
West, secondly, rival nationalisms amongst local U. S. allies and finally, possible 
combinations of the above proceeding in conjunction with the emergent global capability 
of the Soviet Union. The objectives of U. S policy were equally clear; to retain, under 
changing conditions, the singular status of U. S. influence in a region which had, to signal 
extent, underpinned the global position of the United States since 1945. 
Thus, from the perspectives of the end of the first Nixon term, the aims for U. S. 
policy identified in the NSC's opening review of global strategy had, to significant 
extent, come to fruition for the administration. The restructuring of the British military 
presence had been successfully accomplished. The potentially unpredictable Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry had been contained within a framework of common security interests with 
Washington. In tandem, U. S. accession to restructured economic arrangements 
throughout the Gulf region had served to rather entrench the central position of the 
United States in the political economy of oil. And if the Tehran agreements had 
seemingly removed economic nationalism as a potential obstacle to U. S. political 
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influence in the Gulf and Middle East, the de facto removal of the Indian Ocean from 
strategic competition with the Soviet Union had displaced the broader terms of great 
power political and military competition to a terrain where U. S. allies were the better 
suited to assume the initiative in the region. The fostering of sympathetic regional 
nationalism had, again, enhanced the position of the U. S. in relation the wider 
Western alliance. If the U. S. oil companies were no longer able to act as intermediary 
executors of 'U. S. foreign policy objectives', their displacement by allied regional states 
was, pan passu, advantageous to U. S. objectives within the 'increasingly heterogeneous' 
intra-governmental dialogue -a development which would provide a useful foil to U. S. 
efforts at restructuring global economic regimes in a way which, as the administration 
was to acknowledge, 'our relations with our allies appeared ... to be somewhat out of 
phase with the innovations taken in our relations with our adversaries. "I' 
For the Middle East, the establishment of 'stability' in the Gulf and 'restraint' in U. S. - 
Soviet military engagement in the Indian Ocean would prepare the grounding to disperse 
the 'intractable' conflict between the conservative Arab states and Israel. Throughout, 
the role of Iran was central to administration strategy. By concerting economic and 
security links with Israel, increasing political dialogue with Washington's Arab allies and 
established military links with Pakistan and Turkey, the Shah's regime was, uniquely, 
the 'pillar' of U. S. interests across the hinterland of the Northern Indian Ocean. In 
considering the emerging pattern of regional alignments, Nixon could, with some 
plausibility, take up within the prepared talking points' for Tehran the observation that, 
'this was precisely what you had in mind when you enunciated the Nixon Doctrine -` 
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In the event, however, the momentum of 'creative forms of nationalism' so 
commended by the Nixon administration and materially advanced throughout 
Washington's regional security planning would emerge in ways not wholly accounted for 
in the NSC's strategy. Time was not entirely on the administration's side in the Middle 
East, as would be shown by the outbreak of war in October, 1973. Hereafter, faced 
with overt economic pressure from Arab allies and more elaborated forms of leverage 
from Israel, the faltering Nixon administration and its successor would seek more direct 
avenues to project U. S. influence in the region by consulting its strategic position 
in the Indian Ocean. This will be discussed in the next section. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FORCE AND DIPLOMACY AFTER NIXON. 
As the last chapter has shown, the realigmnent of U. S. foreign and security policy 
undertaken by the Nixon administration had found a component focus in reestablishing 
traditional U. S. alliances in South Asia and the Middle East. And if the retrenchment of 
British military power from the Indian Ocean region had, in any event, necessitated 
entering fresh considerations of policy, the evident willingness of the more significant 
regional powers to assume the 'burden' of local security functions had seemingly ' 
provided a classic vindication of the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine. In parallel, the 
administration's triangular diplomacy with the USSR and China had entered a systemic 
dimension to the process of restructuring U. S. global engagement, so envisaged to enable 
the United States to reduce military commitments without putting the central balance - 
or Kissinger's 'global equilibrium' - at risk. However, just as the administration had 
sought to extract complementary advantage from the several asymmetries of power and 
interest in the emergent 'multi-polar' international system, the scope for more 
unstructured manifestations of the 'diffusion of power' had also emerged, most 
dramatically in the Middle East war and oil crisis of October, 1973. 
In providing a simultaneous release for contradictions inherent in the economic, 
politico/diplomatic and strategic linkages composing the Nixon Doctrine, the events of 
the October war had opened an historical conjuncture whose impact was perhaps 
uniquely damaging for the administration across the broad spectrum of policy. In the 
Middle East itself, the administration's studied Fabianism between the rival claims of the 
Israeli and Arab powers had proceeded from a clear confidence about the outcome of 
future conflict, even as though reconciled to its coming. The breadth of strategic co- 
190 
ordination between the Arab states had thus signally exposed the administration's 
assumption that 'time is on our side' in the Middle East. The (387%) oil price rise, 'a 
pivotal event in the history of this century, " was orchestrated by the chief 'pillar' of 
U. S. interests in the region - Iran - and the massive Soviet supply effort to the Egyptian 
and Syrian belligerents - and closely fought outcome of the war itself - had provided 
telling demonstration of the new global reach of the Soviet Union. Such concerns had 
been further brought into sharp relief by the administration's 24 hour nuclear 'alert' of 
October 25. Moreover, for the wider Western alliance, the 'stampede of dissociation 12 
from U. S. policies of the NATO powers had compromised the administration's efforts 
to restore 'leadership' to the West, most recently attempted in the abortive 1973 'year 
of Europe I. 
Yet, if administration moves were to reawaken earlier antagonism to U. S. Middle East 
policies in Paris and London - 'I don't want to raise the issue of Suez', Edward Heath 
had observed, 'but its there for many people" - it was perceived ambivalence in U. S. 
support for Israel which would provide the focus for controversy in Washington itself. A. Z 
Such sentiment joined alienated bureaucratic opinion within the administration with 
those, such as ranking Democratic Senator Henry Jackson, with ambitions to succeed it. ' 
Perhaps more significantly for the Nixon White House, common cause would also be 
taken in opposition to detente with the Soviet Union. If, for many Democrats, a 
generalized concern at the 'Holy Alliance' aspects of det6nte, 6 pursued at the expense of 
more traditional U. S. links with Europe and Japan, had fused with the growing issue of 
Soviet domestic policies - underscored by the Jewish emigration controversy - the issue 
for many on the Goldwater wing of the Republican party was opposition to det6nte itself. 
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The final demise of the Nixon Presidency, on August 9,1974, would thus be effected by 
an alliance of what Kissinger was to term, 'conservatives who hated communists' (and 
thus any dealings therewith) and 'liberals ...... who hated Nixon. ' A 'rare convergence', 
in the Secretary of State's view, 'like an eclipse of the sun. 
17 
However, if elite opinion in the United States was to become increasingly polarized 
over the legacy of Nixon's 'new structure for peace', there was also a common 
perception, shared with the population as a whole, of increased U. S. vulnerability to 
leverage from regional powers. The oil crisis and attendant lobbying on Capitol Hill had 
given events in the Middle East a domestic resonance unseen in any foreign policy issue 
since Vietnam. For an administration increasingly abstracted from Presidential authority 
in domestic affairs, the strategic agenda was to focus on regaining the initiative for 
Washington with the several Middle East belligerents, and, pa7i passu, bestow a fresh 
significance to the United States' own capabilities in the Indian Ocean. This chapter will 
assess the impact of the Middle East war and the transfonned regional and strategic 
context for the development of Indian Ocean policy. To establish the grounding for 
discussion, it is useful to first consider some background concerning the course and 
antecedents of the October war, the oil embargo, and the strategic settmg. 
The Yom Kippur War: the Oil Crisis, the Nuclear Alert and the Battle of 
Logistics. 
In considering the background to the October war and oil embargo, it is clear that both 
events were widely rehearsed in the context of the admittedly 'intractable' conflicts of 
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interest between Israel and the Arab powers and, in this sense, anticipated by the Nixon 
administration. What, though, was clearly not anticipated was the efficiency with which 
both measures were brought to execution. From the at least the second year of 
administration Middle East policy, the course adopted by Egypt had closely corresponded 
to Kissinger's prognosis that 'only Washington' was in a position to underwrite the 
conflicting territorial claims in way commensurate with a stable outcome for the several 
Middle East govermuents, if not for the long-dispossessed Palestinian population. 
Accordingly, and particularly following its consolidation of power in Cairo in May, 
1971,1 the Sadat regime had begun an increasing process of diplomatic rapproch6ment 
widi the administration. In parallel, President Sadat's growing alliance with Saudi Arabia 
had opened up a further channel for U. S. diplomacy in the region. Riyadh was to mount 
a sustained campaign of representations to Washington, offering on September 1972, to 
open a economic 'special relationship' with the United States. ' However, Saudi Arabia 
had also, in common with the other OAPEC states, made clear that any future Middle 
East crisis would involve the 'oil weapon'. 10 Earlier, in July, 1972, the Saudis had 
encouraged Sadat in 'expelling' the Soviet presence in Egypt. " To be sure, the latter 
event was closely co-ordinated with both the Egyptian war planning schedule and the 
Soviet Union's own calculus of the possible return from renewed regional host . ities. I 
The USSR had also, though, indicated to the U. S. the limits of its engagement in possible 
Middle East military conflict at the Moscow sununit and other consultations with the 
administration. " Less amenable to U. S. diplomacy was Israel. From Nixon and 
Kissinger's perspective, a major obstacle to movement in the Middle East lay in the 
studied immobilism of Israel's negotiating posture. Here, administration leverage was 
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compromised by Israel's influence on U. S. domestic affairs and compounded by the 
volatility of Tel Aviv's own internal politiCS. 14 
Thus, if the evidence adduced by some critics for 'benign neglect' on the National 
Security Council of prior intelligence on Egyptian/Syrian war preparations is 
circumstantial, 11 it is also clear that after October 6,1973 the Secretary of State 
wholeheartedly approved a strategy of cutting the 'Gordian Knot '16 in the Middle East by 
force of arms and, in particular, of the actions of Egypt's President Sadat who, like 
Metternich in 1813, 'set out to demonstrate the necessity of war by demonstrating the 
iippossibflity of peace. 
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If, therefore, Secretary Kissinger was reconciled to there being a 'brutal episode of 
battle' before a serious movement could begin on realignment in the Middle East, the 
facility with which the OAPEC producers were able to conduct economic warfare was 
wholly underestimated. 11 The 1967 oil embargo had, as we have seen, been of linle 
consequence. Further discounted in 1973 were the structural changes in the world oil 
market which could facilitate the uncommitted OPEC states to exploit the attendant 
uncertainty over oil futures and impose a fresh pricing regime. After the 1971 Tehran 
agreement, the producers had moved decisively to secure, under the precepts of 
I participation, full operational control of all aspects of the oil industry, including such 
'downstream' activities (marketing, distribution), still under nominal corporate 
ownership. 11 The companies had, indeed, become actively partisan in Middle East policy 
on behalf of the producers, engaging in extensive lobbying activities and responding 
with 'complete co-operation' to implement the 1973 oil embargo'O - covering a total 
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ban on exports to the United States and the Netherlands - declared by OAPEC on 
October, 20. For the administration it became clear, as one Congressional mission was 
to discover, that 'the Saudis know more about oil imports into the United States am the 
U. S. government does. 
'21 The cost to the U. S. economy thus estimated stood at $48bn. 
for 1974, representing a 3.4 % decline in GNP. " 
In contrast to the pliancy of the U. S. oil corporations and the 'dissociation' of the 
Western alliance, the one arena where U. S. influence could be more predictably brought 
to bear was in relations with the Soviet Union. If Moscow had, since the 1967 war, been 
closely involved in developing the option of an Egyptian/Syrian assault on Israel as a 
complement to its own strategy in the region, 13the close diplomatic engagement between 
the great powers in bilateral contacts and at the United Nations during the October war 
had also seemingly demonstrated the enduring systemic basis of Nixon's 'stable 
structure'. Thus, whilst supporting opposing sides in the conflict, 'the United States and 
the Soviet Union' were, as Kissinger acknowledges, '-pursuing comparable strategies, 
each seeking to enable its friends to gain the upper hand on the battlefield. '14From 
October 11, the Soviet Union had airlifted some 15,000 tomes of military supplies in 
935 missions2l to the several Arab belligerents. The U. S. airlift to Israel, commencing 
officially on October 13, had exceeded Kissinger's guidelines for being '25 percent ahead 
of the Soviets, '21 delivering some 22,000 tonnes of equipment in 566 U. S. C-141 and C- 
5A missions, complemented by 5,000 tonnes of U. S. supplies transported by Israel 
itself. 27 Thus assessing the objective factors governing the 'correlation of forces' in the 
Middle East war zone, the Brezhnev Politburo would take the opporumity offered by a 
studied (DEFCON 3) U. S. nuclear alert of October, 24 to facilitate the Soviet Union's 
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withdrawal from active participation in hostilities. " In tandem, U. S. policy would be 
served by the one day DEFCON measures by avoiding a 'humiliation"' for Egypt and 
enabling the assertion of control over Israeli military operations. 30 
Whilst the air and sea lift to Israel had demonstrated the continuing United States 
superiority in logistics, the close outcome of the fighting in the Middle East and 
unpredictable factor of Israel's own nuclear capability" had, however, again brought 
attention to bear on U. S. abilities to conduct limited contingency operations. Despite the 
several structural reorganizations in the DOD, the U. S. was still, for many in the 
Pentagon, far from mounting a satisfactory 'half war' capability" without either 
mobilizing the reserves and/or a critical drawdown of stocks for the 'major contingency' 
in Europe. The 'lessons of the Middle East war' would thus be used by the Defense 
Department to advance a new procurement programme, particularly in the realm of 'high 
consumption items' like, 'modem munitions, Hobo, TOW, Maverick, Shrike"I which 
should, in the DOD's view be stockpiled in U. S. (CONUS) facilities and prepositioned 
near likely theatres of conflict. 34The ambivalent attitude of NATO allies during the 
conflicV5 - apart from the embattled Caetano regime in Portugal" - had also sharpened 
the need for 'secure bases, where, in the words of subsequent (1974) assessment by the 
Joint Chiefs, '... we can operate as free from foreign political constraints as possible. "' 
The U. S. 'Military Airlift Command' (MAC), as House (ASC) testimony records, had 
to avoid infringing sovereignty in Spain, France, Italy or Britain. " Turkey had prohibited 
the use of its Northern strategic air base at Incerlic for 'non-NATO contingencies'. " To 
the clear disquiet of some in the Pentagon, Britain had also ruled out the use of its 'air 
facility' at Masira island in Oman. 10 'Ultimately', the JCS' analysis again observes, 'the 
4; 
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issue is whether the United States can afford to rely solely on the good faith of others 
when it is believed that the vital interest of the United States or one of its allies are in 
iniment peril. I" I 
The central issue arising from the October War was thus not an immediate concern for 
failure in great power regional management, but the success of regional power leverage 
on Washington. The dilemma for the administration would arise in so implicating the 
very 'diffusion of power' strategy that the Nixon Doctrine sought to harness as a lever 
on the Soviet Union. The irony of such hubfis was perhaps not lost on Kissinger the 
historian. 42 If the OPEC states could threaten NATO's political unity and global 
economic disruption, Israel could mount a formidable domestic challenge to the 
administration. However, the parallel drama attending the DEFCON 3 alert, relayed with 
characteristic hyperbole by Nixon, 43 would, inevitably, serve to put in question the 
strategic centrepiece of U. S. relations with the Soviet Union. Accusations had begun to 
mount of Soviet 'cheating' in the SALT agreements . 
44 This would lead to the 
administration conceding Senator Jackson's own revisions to the ongoing negotiations for 
SALT H. 45 thus providing the 'linkage' behind the several liberal and conservative strands 
of domestic opposition to Nixon's 'Emerging Structure' for great power engagement m 
the international system. 
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Diego Garcia [1]: The Lessons of the Middle East War. 
For Indian Ocean policy, the 'lessons of the Middle East War' were to constitute two 
parallel and mutually reinforcing strands of departure - involving the strategic and local 
balance of forces - from the previously endorsed 'low profile' of U. S. involvement in 
the region. Here, the administration's change of emphasis had required Supplementals 
to the military procurement budget (for FY 1975)41 and was to appear as a distinct item 
in the corresponding DOD Annual Report. 47M a strategic level, the latter declared that, 
'Soviet actions during the October, 1973 Middle East War show that detente is not the 
only, and in certain circumstances not the primary, policy interest of the USSR'. 48 
Further, as the (February, 1974) Senate Arined Services Conu-nittee was to hear, 'the 
larger number of ships that the Soviets have been able to bring to bear in recent crises 
in the Indian Ocean and Eastern Mediterranean ... have given them significant leverage 
during these crises. "'9 The calculus for such leverage had been essayed in a range of 
strategic and tactical indicators within the Navy's 'Middle East Power Equation 
Capabilities Analysis' (MEPEC), commissioned and updated after the Jordan crisis of 
1970.11 In these terms, 'perhaps the most important point' for CNO Admiral Zumwalt, 
'.. -is that if it becomes quite clear to both the U. S. and the USSR that the 
Soviet Union 
has superior power to bring to bear in periods of crisis, the U. S. must accommodate to 
Soviet objectives in the crisis or risk losing a conventional war. "I At the level of 
'bringing to bear' the U. S. Navy's own purchase on regional events, Admiral Elmo 
Zumwalt would tell the Senate that - even disregarding Soviet activities - 'Maritime 
power is a relevant power factor in the mosaic of political economical, psychological and 
other factors necessary to assure our continued access to seabome resources in a 
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successful foreign poliCy. '52 Hence, as CJCS Admiral Moorer was to inform the 
concurrent Armed Services sitting in the House, the United States, 'must continue to 
develop and invest in secure bases where [it] can operate as free of foreign political 
constraints as possible. "' These objectives would, 'given the present situation in the 
Middle East, ' be further advanced in the DOD's Annual Report for FY 1975. 
Accordingly, for Defense Secretary Schlesinger, '. - -United States interests would be 
served by our presence in the Indian Ocean on a more regular basis' and, specifically, 
'we are recommending ... a budget supplement for $29 million for the expansion of our 
support facilities on ... Diego Garcia. 
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U. S. concern at, 'continuing increases in Soviet budgets, forces and forward 
deployments'55was genuine enough, albeit the administration would not resist hyperbole 
in using the growing 'Soviet threat' issue to garner support for its more immediate aims 
of 'continued access to seabome resources' in the Indian Ocean. For Kissinger, however, 
a proclivity to accept rising Soviet capability as a 'constant' factor in what was still 
hoped would be a 'stable' pattern of systemic engagement was to conflict with those 
such as Schlesinger, for whom Moscow's demonstration of strategic capability in the 
October war 'provided another lesson in Soviet willingness to take risks with world 
peace. "I Such a conflict would, as we shall see, eventually become insurmountable. 
Consideration of the changing pattern of U. S. Indian Ocean policy was to take place 
in a variety of contexts, notably before the House Sub-committee on the Near East and 
South Asia. 57 Perhaps the touchstone of debate was, though, the succession of hearings 
in both the House and the Senate on the expansion of U. S. facilities on Diego Garcia. 
I" 
The politico-military background to opening of the several hearings (in February/April, 
1974) was dominated by much media speculation on possible interventionist scenarios 
in the Middle East. On October 29,1973 the administration had committed a Carrier 
Task Group to the Indian Ocean, consisting of the Carrier USS 'Hancock', four 
destroyers and an oiler, seconded from the Pacific Fleet (PACOM). The force's 
ostensible mission was, the State Department observed, to serve as, 'reinforcement for 
the signally successful efforts of Secretary Kissinger to bring the parties in the (Middle 
Fast) conflict to the peace table. '-" The Task Group's later rotation with the Carrier USS 
'Kitty Hawk' gave substance Shlesinger's December, 1 announcement that the U. S. Navy 
mtended to 'reestablish the pattern of regular visits ... disrupted by the Vietnain War '19 and 
provided further evidence of U. S. 'interest' in the region by leading the November, 1974 
'MIIDLINK' exercises. These were the largest that CENTO had yet mounted in the 
Indian Ocean. 60 Whilst DOD officials were to argue that, 'Countries ... such as Pakistan, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia ... all feel a sense of security by our additional presence in the area"' 
and Kissinger had refused to 'speculate' on a Newsweek interviewer's suggestion of 
military intervention in the Middle East to secure oil that we can afford, "' Schlesinger 
had maintained a studied ambiguity. The Secretary of Defense observed that, although 
'only in the gravest emergency' would the U. S. recourse to military force, nevertheless, 
I we should recognize that the independent powers of sovereign states should not be 
used in such a way as would cripple the larger mass of the industrialized world. "I 
A counterpoint to such interventionist 'speculation' and the debate on U. S. forward 
strategy in general was provided in the ongoing struggle between the Executive and 
Congress for control of foreign policy. The 'War Powers' act of November 7,1973 had 
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sought to limit Executive discretion in military affairs, 'to fulfil the intent of the framers 
of the constitution' and provided for a 60 day limit on the deployment of U. S. forces 
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances. '61 Whilst ostensibly designed to avert another Vietnam, an omnibus clause 
would also apply to deployments, 'which substantially enlarge U. S. Armed forces 
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation. "I If the application of the latter 
proviso to Diego Garcia was perhaps pushing a legal point, the general principle was not 
lost on leading Senate 'doves' such as Frank Church and Edward Kennedy who were to 
introduce, on March 19,1974, a concurrent resolution to seek anms control negotiations 
in the Indian Ocean with the Soviet Union. The Resolution noted the 'deliberations' of 
the UN Ad Hoc committee, the precedent of the SALT talks and 'the prospects for peace 
in the Middle East. ' It also sought, inter alia, 'agreed limitations ... on the establishment 
of naval and other military facilities in the Indian Ocean and littoral states. '16AIthough 
not successful in its original form, amendments of a similar construction would, as we 
shall see, attend the progress of the Diego Garcia Bidl until 1976. Throughout, many 
Senators uncommitted to opposition to the base expansion programme were to express 
a general unease at the administration's tactics. Thus, although the - somewhat irregular 
- supplemental request was made ostensibly on the grounds of 'urgency', Senator Hubert 
Humphrey was to point out that, 'this business of going to the (Senate) Appropriations 
Committee after submitting an executive agreement (with the British Government) report 
to the Congress really irritates the Congress'. While Senator Jacob Javits (D-NY) was, 
in a similar vein, to 'Serve notice' of Congressional displeasure at any 'sneaked in 
executive agreement" which avoided the due process of debate. 
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The debate itself had begun in earnest before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on February 21,1974, with parallel testimony in the Senate Committees commencing 
on April, 11.11 The immediate matter for consideration was the administration's 
proposal to expand the island base from an 'austere communications facility' to a 'modest 
base support facility' - 
69 The communications facility, granted $20.45m. in funding for 
FY 1973, had been opened 'with the minimum of publicity' on March 23,1973.70 The 
revised construction schedule would now involve a lengthened runway (to 12,000 feet), 
extended POL storage and pier facilities, and dredging 'to accommodate the ships of a 
carrier task force'. Financially, the programme was to require an incremental $37.8m. 
until FY 1976.71 While the package would in some ways represent a return to the Navy's 
original desire to establish a large, multi-purpose base' in the Southern Hemisphere (the 
1968 'option "C"' proposals)-12 it was to be represented before the Congress as a reaction 
to 'recent events' such as, '... the Arab-Israeli war, the oil embargo, and the worldwide 
economic dislocations which flowed fTOM ffiat eMbargo. '73Here, in Admiral Zumwalt's 
view 'Our traditional, strategic view of the Indian Ocean has necessarily been changed. '74 
Moreover, in contrast to the 'low profile' approach to the region endorsed by the DOD 
the previous year, 'The Indian Ocean' had since, for the Navy, '... become an area with 
the potential to influence major shifts of the global power balance over the next decade. '71 
The factors informing this 'potential' - the local and strategic balance of forces - were 
presented to the Congress as analytically separate. The 'linkage' offered would be the 
utility of the Navy's expanded regional posture. In presenting the administration's case, 
three sets of complementary argument were to be thus set forth, concerning Soviet 
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politico mi itary capability, regional politico/economic significance and U. S. military 
instrumentality - These will be examined in turn. 
The analysis of Soviet strategy and capability put forth with varying degrees of stress 
by State, Defense and the Navy had focused on an internal dynamic. Soviet moves were 
thus exhibited as proceeding 'on perception of their own interests and objectives in the 
region and are not driven predominantly by U. S. activities. 
176 In purely military terms, 
the House was to hear of the, 'steady buildup ... in the Soviet naval presence, "" which 
would 'typically' consist of 'eight combatants and nine support vessels. '71 These had 
engaged in approximately 150 port visits in 1973 (compared to the U. S. Navy's 
184)79 
while accounting for 8,200 'ship days' (compared to a U. S. figure of 1,150). 11 Of wider 
concern, however was the apparent development of a Soviet (logistical) 'support system' 
in the area, '... that is substantially more extensive than that of the United States. "I This 
included a communications station and mobile dock widiin the 'expanding' complex of 
naval facilities at Berbera (Somalia), a 'new military airfield' near Mogadishu, 'access' 
to Iraqi naval facilities at Unun Qasr ('built with the assistance of Soviet technicians') 
and 'extended use of Port facilities at the former British base at Aden. 
'12 In addition, the 
Soviet Union had been establishing a network of mooring buoys and was 'embarked on 
a world-wide program to expand bunkering and visit rights for their naval, merchant and 
fishing fleets. ' This, the CNO would suggest, included a 'privileged' access to the 
Bangladeshi port of Chittagong and the large Indian naval base at Visakhapatnam. " 
Overall, the pattern of the Soviet naval and logistics posture was, in the Navy's view, 
consistent with I primary I strategic objectives relatmg to, 'the expansion of Soviet 
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influence with the countries of the region; the enhancement of the Soviet image as a 
great power; and the neutralization of the PRC's political influence and military power 
through the expansion of Soviet power on China's Southern flank. '14 In this sense, 
therefore, the existing number of Soviet combatant vessels in the region would be 
secondary to the potential of a 'military logistics infrastructure ... capable of supporting 
a much greater presence than now exists "I and, in general to the 'geopolitical 
asymmetries' flowing from land and air power in the metropolitan Soviet Union itself. 
This, for Zumwalt, constitutes the 'most important military fact. "I The latter was being 
complemented by, 'A strong political diplomatic thrust in both the Indian Ocean and 
Middle East zones. '17Here, for State's Seymore Weiss, a 'broad indication' of Soviet 
interest is provided by the '$3bn. of economic assistance, and $4bn. in military assistance 
(compared with U. S. figures of $13bn. and $2bn. respectively) in the period from 1962- 
72.11 
Such assertions of Soviet capability outlined above were not, however, to go 
uncontested before the House Near East and South Asia Sub-committee. Whilst not 
raising 'first order' questions of Soviet intention, administration critics, such as Rear 
Admiral (retd. ) Gene La Rocque and former Pentagon systems analyst Earl Ravenal, 
were to present a close technical critique of the Soviet 'sea control' scenarios put forward 
by the U. S. Navy, using the latter's own criteria. They were to similarly question the 
need for forward deployed logistics - Thus, 
La Rocque's assertion that, I in the highly 
bliProbable event of a conventional conflict between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, the 
Indian Ocean was a most unlikely area for confrontation '19 was supported by an account 
of Moscow's general 'weaknesses and vulnerabilities' which have 'a particular 
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significance in the Indian Ocean. ' These included the 'lack of sea-borne fixed wing 
aircraft to provide protection... and reconnaissance', and 'no nuclear powered surface 
combat ships' to support I extended distant deployments. ' The Soviet Navy also 'lacks 
reliable and secure shore based support facilities in the Indian Ocean' since existing 
arrangements, whatever their apparent scope, are entirely dependent on the host nation's 
'goodwill'. The volatility of such arrangements, La Rocque points out, was illustrated 
by the 1972 expulsion of Soviet forces from Egypt. Indeed, the explanation for the 
apparent rise in Soviet shipping - and hence in the itself 'misleading' measure of 'ship 
days' - lies in the need to 'rely primarily on its own auxiliaries for fuel, provisions and 
repairs'. Furdier, since 'Western powers control most of the egress and ingress points 
to the Indian Ocean ... the possibility of wartime reinforcement for Soviet ships ... seems 
virtually ruled out. ' In this way, the supposed vulnerability of the 'choke points' is 
also reversed to the Soviet Navy's disadvantage. The localized 'geopolitical' advantages 
enjoyed by Soviet land and air power on the 'Eurasian land-mass' are countered in turn 
by the wider 'asymmetry' of the global U. S. alliance system. 90 
Whilst the La Rocque testimony was to contest the Navy's claims of Soviet theatre 
logistical superiority, former Defense Department systems analyst (OSD/Asian Division) 
Earl Ravenal would further question the implications of creating the Navy's own in- 
theatre logistics capability. As a POL facility, Ravenal observes, 'it is not efficient in 
terms of pure utility', since '... to refuel transiting ships from Diego Garcia ... (the 
OR) ... has first to be moved from some other place ... so 
it represents a double expense. ' 
Moreover, given the existing ability for 'surge' deployment of forces - demonstrated by 
the recent 'Hancock' task group and in the annual 'MIDLINK' series of CENTO 
1.. A 
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exercises - the development of Diego Garcia would suggest a wider agenda than the 
logistical convenience offered by DOD. The Navy's plans, Ravenal correctly points out, 
were advanced in 'summer of 1967' with the aim of creating, 'an oiling station for 
carrier task forces transiting from Norfolk (Virginia) to battle stations off Viemm. "I As 
we have seen, these had failed to conform to the cost-benefit criteria established by the 
Clark Clifford DOD. The Joint Chief's modified development schedule - again contested 
by Ravenal's Office of Systems Analysis - was then taken up by the incoming Melvin 
Laird Defense Staff on the grounds of meeting the communications requirement between 
north-west Cape and Asmara. 'What is so striking', Ravenal concludes, '... is the 
kaleidoscopic change of rationales to support the same proposals. '91 
For the DOD, Assistant Secretary James Noyes was to contend that there was indeed 
a case for forward deployed logistics on the grounds that, 'the need to sustain a logistical 
tail from the Philippines over 4000 miles of ocean places severe strains on our naval 
forces. '91 Here, the Department's technical arguments were to also reflect the long- 
standing bureaucratic dispute surrounding the status of systems analysts in the 
Washington defence community. Systems methodology had itself become a controversial 
issue after its introduction within McNamara's DPPB reforms of 1962 and had since been 
downgraded in the Melvin Laird DOD. However, the wider implications of the 
administration's case - what, for Ravenal, had suggested the 
'kaleidoscopic change of 
rationales - represented more than a simple instance of 'bureaucratic 
longevity' within 
a renascent Department of the Navy. Of the Navy's 'four principal mission areas' 
(Overseas Presence, Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control and Projection of Forces), the 
Diego Garcia programme was presented ostensibly as facilitating the relatively 
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uncontroversial 'presence' role. This, as conventionally understood, 'exists as a purely 
peacetime concept. '14Hence, for the administration, 'Our military presence in the Indian 
ocean provides tangible evidence of our concern for peace and stability 195 with particular 
relevance to the 'oil production and distribution system' which is 'vulnerable to 
I 
instability and military uncertainty. '96 Historically, however, fixed installations have had 
a primary purpose more consistent with the more active mission areas. In Ravenal's 
view, 'bases are necessary only for one purpose, and that is to project military force. '97 
Thus, from the evidence of the earlier (option "C") proposals, 'it always been the 
ultimate intention of the JCS ... to create a major, complete, multi-purpose base ... capable 
of housing mobile projection forces ... and ... long range bombing planes. '91 In this, the 
12,000-foot runway extension would have a particular significance in terms of the 
aircraft types that could be accommodated. Given DOD's expressed desire to provide for 
P-3 naval patrol planes, 91 C-5A heavy air transport and KC-135 airborne tankers, " it can 
be recalled that the C-5 programme had emerged in conjunction with the DOD's 1963 
'Rapid Deployment' planning - as had Diego Garcia itself. The KC-135's, as the House 
was to hear, 'have no other function but to refuel B-52's. "Ol Whilst consistent 
administration denials concerning the strategic bombers themselves were, as Ravenal 
again observes, 'very carefully worded. "I 
The broad lines of the administration's argument were to come under further 
scrutmy as debate moved to the July Hearings of the Sub-committee on Military 
Construction of the Senate Armed Services Committee. 101 Here, however, administration 
critics such as Democratic Senator Stuart Symington were to find a more cautious 
appraisal of Soviet Indian Ocean capabilitY from the perhaps unexpected quarter of the 
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CIA. Overall, in the assessment of DCI William Colby, 'the Indian Ocean Area - as 
distinct from the Middle East - has a lower priority than the U. S. , China or Europe in 
the USSR's diplomatic, economic and military initiatives. ' Whilst within this order of 
priority, 'the roles of military, and particularly naval forces, have been secondary to 
diplomatic efforts and aid programs in promoting Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean 
area. 
1104 Hence, although a 'measured' increase in Soviet naval traffic had been apparent, 
this was accounted for by region's use as a "'Southern sea route" for the inter-fleet 
transfer of naval units', from Soviet Pacific, Black Sea and Northern Commands. Such 
forces that have remained in the Indian Ocean, Colby observes, 'have been relatively 
small and inactive. '101 Moreover, in terms of possible 'mission areas, the order of battle 
of even combined Soviet forces would seem suitable only for a para-diplomatic 
'presence' role as opposed to strategic deterrence, sea-control or projection of forces. 
Thus, despite Soviet concern for possible SSBN deployments, existing naval activities 
- in line with SALT I considerations - 'have not indicated an anti-Polaris mission. ' 
Further, the 'lack of a significant submarine capability' suggests that, 'interdiction of 
Western commerce, particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a 
major objective. ' Whilst finally, from the 'size and composition' of theatre Indian Ocean 
forces, '-direct military intervention does not appear to figure prominently in Soviet 
plans. 1106 
In considering the Soviet support capabilities, the 'expanding ... military logistics 
infrastructure' central to the U. S. Navy's own case for enhanced logistics, the assessment 
offered by the DCI would appear equally at variance to that of State, DOD or the Chief 
of Naval Operations - In Somalia, the Port of Berbera 
is characterized as, 'a small 
u 
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installation . ch will handle two or three ships'. Construction work had been observed 
on airfield facilities the previous year but has 'not gotten very far'. The 'gradual' build- 
up of a further airfield '30 or 40 miles North West of Mogadishu' is also noted, 'But 
there is not much progress on that either. '107At Umm Qasr, the 'so-called port' is 
actually, 'about four, five or six buildings here, a place where you can anchor', while 
'The Iraqis appear to be a little bit restrictive as to the degree to which they will allow 
the Soviets free use of this particular port. '101 In South Yemen (PDRY), although 'the 
former British base at Aden is a good base' the Soviet forces, 'have not used it very 
much', and furthermore, 'contrary to numerous reports about Socotra, the barren island 
has no port facilities or fuel storage and its airstrip is a small World War two gravel 
runway ... a major construction effort would have to precede any significant Soviet use 
of Socotra. ' India had also featured in the Navy's account of possible Soviet logistics 
I _. r__ nurastructure, and had indeed received significant Soviet assistance in its own naval 
expansion programme. 'Nevertheless', in the CIA's opinion, '... New Delhi has not 
granted the Soviets free access to Indian ports, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable 
future. ' In general, William Colby was to conclude, 'Moscow's prospects for naval 
facilities in other littoral countries are not very bright. '109 
However, while much of the Congressional debate was to revolve around technical 
questions of comparative U. S. /Soviet force structures and logistics, these were clearly 
posterior to what was held to be the strategic importance of the region itself. 'Soviet 
activity adds to the rationale for Diego Garcia', Zumwalt had observed, '... that rationale 
would exist independently of anything that the Soviets were doing. "10 The 
administration's submission was to detail what were recognizably a core of direct U. S. 
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concerns in the '$3.5 billion' of capital investments in the Persian Gulf" I and the 7.9% 
of imported 
Gulf Oil. 112 In a wider sense, moreover, testimony would also indicate 'a 
range of interests which stem from the sheer instability of the area ... involving about a 
Urd of the total population of the world. 
1113 The apparent truism of a generalized U. S. 
interest? in countering 'instability' had thus assumed a defining status for the 
administration's Indian Ocean policy. In this, the concern for the 'free flow of goods and 
raw materials' throughout the 'high seas' and the 'increasingly intricate web of mutual 
interdependence' 
114 is consistent with the pattern of 'infonnal obligations' so addressed 
in the DOD's 'Total Force' planning. "' If such an approach could yield a restricted 
mterpretation in terms of local military balance - one which much of the Navy's own 
case would exhibit - the wider concern was in the more intangible reahn of confidence. 
Here, considerations of an immediate impact on the market in oil futures were combined 
with the perennial issue of administration 'credibility'. 
Ill. Diego Garcia [2]: the Regional Dialogue. 
In terms of what, in recent events, had been a somewhat involuntary U. S. exposure to 
'mutual interdependence' with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, the administration 
was thus to reconcile the perceived strategic necessity proceeding from at least an 
expanded military 'presence' posture with the virtues of active international engagement, 
by presenting the expanded Diego Garcia programme as a contribution to regional 
stability. The United States had, in the State Department's view, so been able to 'play 
a vital interniediary role' in the concurrent Middle East peace negotiations, 'precisely 
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because we are a regional power with ... a continuing political and security dialogue with 
many of the parties involved. '116 In the expressed view of many of the parties however, 
the 'dialogue's' strategic grammar was to give rise to similarly ambivalent reactions to 
those greeting the 1957 'Eisenhower Declaration'. Whilst there had been no equivalent 
'Nixon Declaration', the deployment of the 'Hancock' task group in conjunction with 
the renewed expansion of Diego Garcia would be viewed in the context of Schlesinger's 
trenchant remarks concerning the limitations of 'the concept of national sovereignty'. 
KuWait had, on January 10 proclaimed that 'mines have planted (in the oilfields) ... and 
would be set off at a moments notice. 
1117 Bahrain had earlier (on October 20,1973) 
issued a years notice on MIDEASTFOR, although the administration had (not unjustified) 
hopes of a 'change of mind on this. "I' And at the OPEC Heads of Goverrument 
Conference of April 1,1975, the latter were to 'declare their readiness ... to counteract 
(U. S. /allied) threats with a unified response, notably in cases of aggression. '119 
In the wider Indian Ocean area, reactions of other powers to the new U. S. activism had 
also, as the administration admitted, 'been on the negative side - '110 New Zealand was, 
in 
an official statement of February, 12, to express support for the U. N. 'Zone of Peace' 
declaration. 121 While at a March, 20 press conference, Australian Prime Minister Gough 
Whitlam would claim that, 'there is no nation around the Indian Ocean which welcomes 
a buildup on this uninhabited ... group of 
islands - "" 
As might be expected, the administration was to pronounce such overt opposition as 
diplomatic 'cover'. 'The picture[s] that nations give you through the public channels', 
in Admiral Zumwalt's characterization, 'are really so very often far from the picture 
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one gets privately. 
' 123 To be sure, the position of the Gulf nations was, in particular, 
such as to require some ambiguity. However, in the case of India, the widespread 
opposition to U. S. moves was quite clear in its interpretation of the ultimate relation of 
, foreign policy to military force structure and mission'. India had concerted consistent 
opposition to U. S. military expansion in the 'Zone of Peace' motions at the UN. 
Although ostensibly aimed at, 'Eliminating ... all bases ... conceived in the context of great 
power rivalry, ' New Delhi was adamant that 'a (U. S. ) military base is certainly different 
from a (Soviet) naval presence. 
1124 Indian opposition would flow from a variety of 
motives. Diplomatically, India was seeking a leading role in the renascent Non-Aligned 
Movement - where much of the 'Peace Zone' diplomacy had originated - similar to that 
enjoyed under Nehru in the 1950's. Militarily, the extension of 'superpower' rivalry to 
the region could inhibit India's own ambitions for local ascendancy. In the aftermath of 
the 1971 war, vocal opposition to Washington was a significant component in the Gandhi 
government's domestic appeal. 121 The Times of India would, though, express what was 
perhaps the mainstream Indian view in noting that, 'Despite the aftermath of the Dulles 
era, the Americans do not seem to have learned that military bases are a source of 
tension and insecurity, not of security -" 
One quarter where the administration would not, however, be faced with adverse 
iliternational reaction was Britain. In view of the 'extremely close' relations obtai i 
on the course of joint arrangements to date, State correctly anticipated a similar response 
from the incoming (after February, 1974) Wilson Government which, it was noted, had 
reached the original 1966 'blanket agreement' and supported the 'communications' 
enhancement programme (although the recent agreement of October 24,1972 had been 
signed under the tenure of Edward Heath). The Heath Goverment had, in February 5, 
At, ". 
212 
1974, also accepted 'in principle' to expand the facilities to a 'Naval Support Base', 
which, as Foreign Office Minister Julian Amery explained, was 'in the general Western 
interest I in terms of the much discussed Soviet moves in the region. "' Also furthering 
such interest was British involvement in the Dhofar counter-insurgency which had 
received some 'third party' transfers of U. S. war material from Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
128 
The new Labour Goverment would indeed fonnally accede to Washington's request on 
April, 4111 albeit signalling, in the December 'Defence Review', a further strategic 
retrenchment by withdrawing - by April, 1976 - from Gan, Singapore and the military 
structure of CENTO. 
130 However, while London's direct military involvement in the 
region was limited, a regular pattern of joint 'consultations' at staff level would continue 
on a six-monthly basis in tandem with other meetings 'in a wide variety of bilateral and 
multilateral fora. "I' Of perhaps wider significance was the more intangible legacy of the 
'historically special relationship' , 
132 the body of shared strategic assumptions and 
methodology which had prompted Admiral La Rocque's observations on the 'dream' of 
the U. S. Navy '... to inherit the British imperial mantle "East of Suez. """ Here, the 
navalists were able to call upon a rising strand of British opinion, 'as repeatedly brought 
up in the editorials of the Economist magazine I. whose importance lay not so much in 
terms of specific policy recommendations as in the general terms of an agenda. 
In this, the categories of 19th and early 20th century 'geopolitics I- as advanced 
in the works of Sir Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan - were to be given a 
Z.. 
fresh currency in the contemporary debate concerning both the means and ends of U. S. 
global strategy. The effectiveness of the OPEC embargo had stimulated wider concerns 
for the outbreak of 'resource wars' prompted by other commodity producing countries 
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in the third world. In the context of Indian Ocean security policy, these prospects 
presented additional theatre disadvantages stemming from the 'geopolitical asymmetry' 
of the Soviet Union. For Admiral Zumwalt, the inference was clear: 
We are essentially a world island. We cannot survive without our allies, without being able to import oil 
or 69 of the 72 critical resources which must come in on the surface of the seas. Therefore ... We have got 
to have greater capability than the Soviets do, that is, be able to control the seas in order to prevent the 
cutting off of sea lines of communication. 134 
As can be recalled, the CNO had strongly advocated sea control as a strategy appropriate 
to a 'world island', although the full extent of 'Project 60' was not to be comprehensively 
realized. "' It was, however, the existence of Soviet maritime capabilities as such rather 
than the extent to which they could actually engage U. S. forces in any significant military 
sense which, for many in the defence establishment, had become the main issue. 
IV. Strategic 'Superiority', Theatre Sufficiency and the Central Balance. 
The wider Washington debate on the central balance - itself subject to much partisan 
representation - was finding a primary, and for some Pentagon interests, timely, outlet 
within the hitherto somewhat localized discourse of Indian Ocean policy by the summer 
of 1974. The immediate issue of (respective) theatre capability would, in this sense, 
function as a signifier for concerns that the achievement of Soviet strategic 'parity' could, 
as Kissinger had acknowledged, 'free' to some extent '. - -their capacity 
for regional 
intervention. '1161he relation between 'force' and 'diplomacy' in the nuclear age had been 
a central concern in Secretary Kissinger's academic writings and had achieved 
considerable empirical application in the structures of the Nixon Doctrine. However, the 
latter's apparent acceptance of a permanent loss of U. S. 'superiority' throughout 
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significant categories of military power had never been universally accepted in the 
defence and foreign policy community. By the middle 1970's, these concerns had 
surfaced in the 'counterforce' debate, wherein a new generation of nuclear delivery 
systems (Trident, Cruise, MX) were laid down in order to, as the DOD Annual Repon 
for FY 1975 put it, 'shore up deterrence across the entire spectrum of risk. 
1137 Thus, 
though acknowledging that, ' neither the USSR nor the United States has, or could hope 
to have, a capability to launch a disarming first strike against the other, ' what became 
known as the 'Schlesinger Doctrine' was to hold that the maintenance of continued 
'credibility' for the overall United States' strategic posture required 'a wider set of much 
more selective targeting options. "I' 
Whilst the Secretary of State did not gainsay his own role in procurement, "' the focus 
on counterforce systems was, for Kissinger, essentially 'a palliative ... for increased 
regional defense. '140 Again, however, the means as well as, increasingly, the strategic 
ends of the role of regional defence in the sufficiency vis a vis superiority debate were 
becoming subject to dispute within the administration. Secretary Schlesinger was to 
mcreasingly question the unchanged Nixon 'blank slate' arms sales policy in terms of the 
latitude so allowed to U. S. regional surrogates- This found support amongst much DOD 
opinion concerned at the prospect of an ever-growing need for United States' military 
advisors and technical staff in potentially volatile third world milieux . At the head of 
these concerns was Iran, where Shlesinger was, in September, 1975, to dispatch a 
Pentagon official to co-ordinate matters in the field-"" 
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Of more direct impact on Indian Ocean policy was the ongoing sea control /force 
projection issue, which had been disputed operationally at the time of the 1971 Indo- 
Pakistan war. During his tenure, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had backed Admiral 
Zumwalt's opposition to further 'Enterprise' class nuclear carriers142 and, in August 9 
1974 ordered a redeployment of existing carriers from the Pacific and Mediterranean 
fleets to the Indian Ocean. 143 Both the latter decisions were rescinded following 
Schlesinger's own departure from office on November 2,1975.144There was, though, to 
be broad agreement throughout the national security elite on the need to expand 
Washington's presence in the Indian Ocean as such. Kissinger would thus lobby for the 
consistently stalled FDL programme"' and condemn the 'tendency to reduce our capacity 
for foreign intervention [which] caused the Congress to prohibit ... the basing of B-52s 
at our ... facility of Diego Garcia. '146Given the backdrop of bureaucratic conflict on most 
other issues, some observers assumed that Kissinger had here simply 'conceded' to the 
Joint Chiefs wishes in order to 'secure agreement on the SALT negotiations. ""' The 
reality was, however, more complex. Underlying the 'sea control' debate was the thesis, 
advanced inter alia within the platform of the rising conservative caucus in Congress and 
the defence community, of a concerted drive toward 'sea denial' by the Soviet Union. 
The USSR was, in Zumwalt's view, 'in the process of developing a... maritirne 
capability, superior to our own. '141 This was, in turn read as a moment in overall Soviet 
ambitions toward 'hegemony,, whose manifestations were also apparent in Moscow's 
strategic weapons programme. Hence, as Paul Nitze , again 
in office as Defense 
Department SALT Representative, was to argue, 'the prospects for obtaining arms 
Control agreements ... are not good' since 'the Soviet view' 
is that 'the correlation of 
[significant] forces had been, and would continue to move in their favor' and indeed, 
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'they have reason for their stated belief. '141 For Kissinger, as for the departing President 
Nixon, considerations of Soviet intention - any more than those of the USSR's domestic 
structure - were, as we have seen, of less significance than the systemic engagement that 
detente would promote as a grounding for regional 'stability I. 
For Kissinger's conservative opponents - amongst whom Schlesinger, Zumwalt and 
(before June 14,1974) Paul Nitze were prominent from within the administration - 
d6tente had itself been a 'palliative' for managing unavoidable U. S. retrenchment after 
Viemm. '-'O In terms of naval policy, Zumwalt is clear that, 'The South Asian war ... cost 
us a generation of ships ... We were just going to have to gamble in the near term on the 
policy of d6tente getting us through the next few years... we were going to have to make 
the investments that would buy us back the capability which we elected to give up, 
temporarily, faced with that budgetary situation. "I' The admission of an earlier, 
expansive naval planning agenda, whose development in the Indian Ocean the DOD was 
wishing to 'reestablish', has been noted. Again, the broad agreement on enhanced 
conventional forces - in the Indian Ocean as elsewhere - between Kissinger and his 
critics on the renascent right should be stressed. Where the irreducible scission would 
be found was in the belief that not only was the Soviet Union striving for 'superiority, 
but that such a category had real strategic content to begin with - "' 
To be sure, the immediate impact of such concerns was most visible in the U. S. 
domestic arena. Nitze, Zumwalt and others were to mobilize a formidable and bi-partisan 
caucus to Promote the 'present danger' of Soviet power as a major issue in the 
Presidential elections of 1976. "1 The terms of the debate would, though, also increasingly 
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inform the making of regional policy: a focus of which, by 1974-5, had become the 
Indian Ocean. Overall, in the CNO's view, 'd6tente... was achieved because the U. S. had 
superior military strength ... we will only continue to maintain d6tente if we continue to 
maintain a superior military position to the Soviets. 
1154 However, the 'net assessment"51 
of the (proceeding) 'maritime balance' was, for Zumwalt, 'grim indeed. ' Hence, 'if 
present trends continue ... we will lack the capability to control and use the seas. 11: 56Such 
consequences would, for prominent naval advocate Senator Barry Goldwater, strike an 
authentic Mahanian note. 'He who controls the Indian Ocean' the 1975 Senate Armed 
Services Committee was to hear, 'is going to control the economy of the world. 
1157 
Moreover, 'now that we have lost Vietnam' and 'are about to lose Thailand ... to the 
enemy', there arises the prospect that, 'if the Straits of Malacca are closed to us, we have 
absolutely no control over our interests in the Indian Ocean. ' That 'the enemy' would 
include, in this instance, 'Red China and her allies' would not detract from the case of 
the Senator from Arizona, who had taken the Nixon administration's accommodation 
with Beijing as one more indication that 'the sun ... may be over the yard-arm ... 
for. the 
United States. "I' 
V. The 'Natural Alliance': Soviet Regional Diplomacyq the Non-Aligned 
Movement, and the 'New International Economic Order'. 
Whilst Senator Goldwater's 'geopolitical' arguments for expanding the U. S. Indian 
Ocean presence were to be widely endorsed by proponents in both the House and the 
administration, the latter were, however, to retain the Nixon Doctrine's premise of a 
I Multi-polar communism'. Indeed, some impetus for the thesis of a rising Soviet threat 
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(andcorrespo mg U. S. decline) had originated in Beijing itself. 119 For Schlesinger and 
the naval lobby, the ideological challenge posed by the Soviet Union was compounded 
by more traditional great power considerations, stemming from an expansionist 
I 
interpretation of Russian history. A possible motive for the latter's purportedly ambitious 
Indian Ocean programme - presented with much photographic and intelligence data to 
the 1975 Hearings - could thus be found in the, 'Wann water drive of the Czars... going 
back to Peter the Great. '110 Discussion of the Soviet 'warm water' imperative had, as we 
have seen, also been much in evidence in the more historically inclined circles of 
Whitehall and 'the Economist magazine'. More empirical evidence for a Soviet drive to 
establish a 'sphere of influence' in South Asia, complementary to an enhanced Indian 
Ocean naval posture, would be adduced by Schlesinger in the pattern of Soviet 
treaties for 'Peace, Friendship and Co-operation' with littoral states. The treaties, with 
Egypt (May, 1971), India (August, 1971), Iraq (April, 1972) and Somalia (July, 1974), 
provided for economic, political and - more ambiguously - military co-operation. For 
the former, Moscow had, for example, replaced Western technical personnel in the Iraqi 
OR industry, following the nationalization of June 1,1972.. 1" Of greater significance from 
the U. S. standpoint was a standard clause admitting 'mutual consultations' (amongst 
contracting parties) '... to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the 
security of their countries. "I' That Soviet Naval C. inC. Admiral Gorshkov had, in 
September 1974, paid a personal visit to Somalia was noted. "' For Admiral Zumwalt, 
Soviet arrangements with the Mogadishu regime provided 'a most ianpressive example' 
Of, '. . Ahe use of military-political techniques on their part to change 
Somalia from a non- 
aligned state and to bring her to the status of a client nation. "' 
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As we have argued earlier, the sequence of regional 'Friendship' treaties were indeed 
conceived in the context of a more extensive, multilateral agenda. 'The significance of 
the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with such large developing countries as India 
[and] Iraq', as relayed in one 1972 Moscow editorial '... goes far beyond the framework 
of the USSR's bilateral relations with those states. '165Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had 
earlier proposed arrangements for regional economic co-operation involving India, 
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan in the course of visits to the four states in February, 
1969.1116A speech of June the second that year by Leonid Brezhnev had outlined some 
more ambitious proposals, additionally involving Cambodia, Burma and Singapore, as 
part of an overall package for 'Collective Security in Asia'. 167Whilst not closely limited 
geographically, the extensively canvassed 'collective security' formula was intended to 
complement institutional Non-Aligned Movement programmes in, as one Soviet 
commentator put it, the 'spirit of Bandung' 
161 
and further establish Soviet credentials as 
a 'regional power'. The formulation was to thus be invoked to suggest Soviet 'sympathy' 
with such moves as the 1971 ASEAN 'Kuala Lumpur Declaration', 
169 the ongoing 'Law 
of the Sea' negotiations and, albeit carefully qualified, the UN 'Zone of Peace' 
declaration for the Indian Ocean. However, despite continued advocacy throughout the 
early 1970's, Soviet efforts to attach the 'principles [of] the renunciation of force 
between states ... and wide 
development of economic and other forms of co-operation on 
the basis of ... mutual benefit' 
170 
professed in the scheme to endogenous Asian and Non- 
Aligned initiatives would remain largely rhetorical. 
For more market-oriented 'nonaligned' littoral. states such as Malaysia, the unavoidable 
implication of the 'collective security' plan toward countering what Brezhnev's June 
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speech had termed 'the combination of the Chinese leader's political adventures and the 
atmosphere of war hysteria continually incited by them, 
1171 
were to be unacceptable to 
govenunents following Washington's lead to improve relations with Beijing. India would 
find considerable merit in the Soviet approach for precisely this reason. 'The Brezhnev 
collective security proposal', the 1970 Indian External Affairs Ministry Annual Repoli 
had observed, 'marked a new development of some significance in that it was a 
declaration that the Soviet Union was as much an Asian as a European power. '172The 
latter argument had, indeed, been taken up in another context by Admiral Zumwalt. 
Overall, however, Soviet efforts to stress an 'Asian' pedigree and identify with 
nonaligned aspirations were to inevitably run aground on the issue of relations with 
China. Soviet commentators had regularly attacked alleged Chinese influence in the 
NAM as trying to 'disfigure' the Movement by stressing North-South divisions rather 
d= a common ground with the 'socialist camp' in opposition to 'imperialism' 
173 In the 
Indian Ocean security context, Sino-Soviet rivalry had, as the DOD acknowledged, 
played a significant role in determining Moscow's entry to the region. For some analysts, 
it was a major causative factor in the development of the Soviet 'blue water' navy 
itself. 114For its part, China had, since 1971, consistently voted with the littoral states on 
the UN 'Zone of Peace' declaration and had been active in concerting the 15 member Ad 
T-T- 
116c committee, founded in 1972 to 'consider ... ways of 
implementation' of Resolution 
2832.171 
However, if Soviet efforts to present the 'Socialist states' as the 'natural and most 
reliable allies " of the NAM were encountering substantive problems beneath the 
rhetorical amity, the Movement had also become an item in U-S. policy considerations , 
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particularly after the Algiers Non-Aligned summit (September, 1973) and sixth Special 
Session of the UN of 1974. I'r' These developments were to have a particular resonance 
for Indian Ocean policy. Here, the overlap between member states of OPEC and the 
NAM - notably in the cases of Egypt and Algeria - would serve to present the oil cartel 
as an exemplar of the possibilities for united action amongst other commodity producers, 
thus giving concrete expression to the Special Session's programme for a 'New 
International Economic Order' (NIEO). The prospect of threats to the '69 of the 72 
critical resources' had, in their tum, been prominent in the U. S. Navy's rationale for an 
expanded theatre military capability in the Indian Ocean. 
Of further concern to the administration was the diplomatic impact of the growing 
nonaligned caucus at the UN in mobilizing successive votes on the 'Zone of Peace' 
platform. Following the increased 95 nation majority (with 35 abstentions) at the twenty- 
seventh regular session in 1972, a report was commissioned by the Secretary General to 
prepare the way for an international conference on the issue. The UN study - entitled 
'A Factual Statement of the Great Powers' Military Presence in all of its aspects, in 
the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their Naval Deployment, conceived in the 
context of Great Power Rivalry' 
178 
- appearing in May, 1974 became immediately 
controversial and was withdrawn by the Secretary General. 
179 Kissinger was, 
nevertheless, compelled to acknowledge the potential for some diplomatic leverage from 
the NAM on specific issue areas. Israel, for example, had become increasingly isolated 
the UN and in 1974 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were for the first 
time, allowed to address the General Assembly. At a conference in New Delhi in 
October, 1974, the Secretary of State affmned that 'our relations with the nonaligned 
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countries are another pillar of our foreign policy' albeit, that 'bloc diplomacy of any kind 
is anachronistic and self defeating. '110 
Thus, however ephemeral third world unity actually was on such issues as IOPZ and 
NIEO, the administration had been forced to recognize the threat of an emergent agenda. 
U'D 
Here, U. S. policies - in the Middle East and Indian Ocean in particular - would, ahnost 
automatically, come into question. Washington's reaction, both in government and the 
wider foreign policy community, was two-fold. In immediate terms, Kissinger was to 
promote a vigorous effort 'to respond to attack by counter attack"" spearheaded at the 
UN by new hard-line Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan. "" For Indian Ocean policy, such 
an approach would comport with the Navy's provisions for military unilateralism. An 
alternative approach, increasingly canvassed amongst Democratic Senators, middle- 
ranking officials at State and widiin the non-govenunental 'Trilateral Commission, was 
instead to address the 'threat from the Third World"" in term of, 'new policy 
instruments, including but going far beyond foreign aid. '114The latter would, for former 
NSC economic aide C. Fred Bergsten, take in 'joint fronts by countries which consume 
raw materials', explore 'explicit or implicit hands-off agreements among the major 
powers in the security sphere, and overall, 'bring the Third World itself into active co- 
oPeration. "I" 
The above positions - given institutional expression with the (1973) 
founding of the 
Trilateral Commission and earlier (1970) establishment of Foreign Policy magazine - 
represented a widespread reaction to the Nixon Doctrine's perceived tendency to, as 
Bergsten observes, promote 'war on our friends [and] concessions to our traditional 
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adversaries -"I' Kissinger had himself attempted, with mixed success, to co-ordinate a 
consumer's oil regime - the International Energy Agency"17 - following the Washington 
Energy Conference of February, 1974. "1 In the Senate, the initial I Kemedy Amendment, 
to the DOD's plans for Diego Garcia had stressed the need for regional arms control. It 
had also sought to bring the administration to 'active co-operation' with the UN Ad Hoc 
committee. Both of these themes were to receive extensive coverage as the 
administration's programme for an expanded Indian Ocean presence was debated before 
both Houses of Congress in 1975-6. 
VI. Diego Garcia [3]: The Washington Dimension; War Powers, the 'Case 
Amendment' and I Oil Fields as Aglitary Objectives'. 
Having set out above some broader strands of the Indian Ocean policy environment, 
attention will now focus on the more restricted setting of the passage of the Diego 
Garcia bill through the Congress. Here, reference will be made to associated technical 
studies of the issue, commissioned by the Legislature itself, which are illustrative of the 
local relevance of the wider aspects of strategy considered above. Attention will. then 
tum to the pattern of economic and strategic integration emerging overall in U. S. 
relations with the region, which was to become the foundation for policy under the 
Carter administration. 
For the House of Representatives, an amendment of similar arms control provision 
to that of Senator Kennedy - mounted by Robert L. Leggett 
(D-Cal. ) - was 
defeated by 94 votes to 255 (with 83 abstentions)"' on April 4,1974. A further 
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amendment, deleting the required $32.3m. from the current Military Construction 
Authorization Bill (for FY 1975), was also rejected on August, 9.190 The position taken 
by the Senate remained, however, uncommitted to accepting the administration's 
proposals in their entirety. The Foreign Relations Committee had, on April 24 
unanimously approved the 'Case Amendment' requiring specific Congressional authority 
for the base as opposed to 'this business of going to the Appropriations Committee 
Following the (July, 28) 'Armed Services Committee's own Report on the FY 1975 
M. C. A. Bill, the Senate was, on September, 11, to approve an initial $18.1m. for the 
project, "' subject to further arms control information. A concurrent (unanimous) Senate 
resolution, moved by Mike Mansfield (D-Mon. ) also required direct Presidential 
certification that the Diego Garcia facilities were 'in the national interest' and the 
approval of both Houses of Congress. 192 
Whilst the Senate's questioning of the Bill had owed much to wider, 'War Powers' 
concerns - evident in the unusual record of unanimity - it would also reflect on a 
general Congressional reluctance to accept any DOD budget item at face value. 
Defence had thus been reduced as a proportion of government expenditure from 
40.1 % in FY 1970 to 23.4 % for FY 1977.193 Congress was to support the Mansfield 
$14.2m. deletion as part of an overall $7bn. cut from the Schlesinger budgetary 
projections for FY 1975.194 In this way, concerns to link the Diego Garcia programme 
to further arms control were to encompass a broader Congressional constituency than 
those Senators, such as Mansfield and Kennedy, for whom such issues were of interest 
in their own right. Thus, while the House was to again approve the $18.1m. " funding 
tranche, following the 'House-Senate Conference Report' of December 10,1974, 
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Representatives had concurred with its deferral by the Senate until the arrival of the 
Presidential statement. The latter, in which Gerald Ford duly confirmed that he had 
indeed, 'evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications' of the Indian Ocean 
base was issued on May 12,1975196 and reinforced by White House Official's affumation 
of the undertaking's 'modest' financial outlay. The more immediately strategic aspects 
of the debate were, however, to reappear with the April 30,1975 fall of Saigon. 
Mansfield was to take the issue back to the Armed Services Committee on May, 19 by 
introducing a Resolution (S. Res/160) to 'Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island 
of Diego Garcia. '197 
For Senator Mansfield, the proposals suggested a wider expansion of U. S. defence 
posture, requiring a 'three ocean navy'. More immediately, the expressed opposition of 
littoral states'" should be weighed against any fresh attempts from Washington to assume 
a 'world policeman' role, particularly 'in the face of our bitter experience in Vietnam. 'I" 
Many supporters of the Diego Garcia programme would, however, draw the opposite 
conclusion from the latter 'experience'. Whilst the fmal collapse of the Thieu regime had 
not set off the sort of domestic recriminations accOmPanYing the 'who lost China' debate 
of the 1950's, an emerging pattern of retrenchment amongst other U. S. allies - including 
the (1974) 'downfall of Portugal' and the (June 9,1975) Philippines diplomatic 
agreement 'with Red China' - was, for such as Senator Barry Goldwater, all too Clear. 
Moreover, although not supportive of the more extreme scenarios of geopolitical 
I strangulation, many uncommitted Senators were to agree with Committee Chairman 
John Stennis that 'we ought to be so. mewhere around in that area of the world with some 
r 
force in order not to have an empty gasoline tank. '101 The Hearings would thus, on June 
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17,1975 vote down the Mansfield 'Disapprove' motion by a majority of ten to six. To 
release the further $13.8m. of the DOD's original funding schedule however, the 
administration would have to return to the House. Here, Secretary Schlesinger's graphic 
ret)resentation of the supposed Soviet 'missile handling' facility in Berbera had stimulated 
interest for a joint House-Senate fact finding mission to the Somalian port, which took 
place, on July, 4 1975, at the invitation of the government of Mohammed Said Barre. 202 
The willingness of the Somali regime to accommodate the eight-member House team 
Ged by the conservative Democrat Samuel Stratton) and a 13 member Senate delegation 
including Schlesinger's leading Indian Ocean spokesman, James Noyes was perhaps 
indicative of a general desire for rapproch6ment on the behalf of Mogadishu. President 
Siad Barre had consistently denied providing 'base' facilities to the Soviet Union and had 
offered 'equal' bunkering rights to the U. S. Navy on an official visit to Washington in 
October, 1974.20 The later (May, 1976) Senate Multinational 's Hearings were to disclose 
the existence of Somali negotiations with Saudi Arabia, in which the latter's offer to 
replace Soviet subsidies was apparently frustrated in Washington itself (see below). At 
this stage, however, the return of the joint delegation would serve to confmn existing 
positions on the Diego Garcia funding, the rema' . $13.8m. of which was released by 
the Senate (53-43) and House (voice vote) on July 28,1975.111 
The passage of Schlesinger's expansion bill did not, however, mark the conclusion of 
the debate. Senate opponents of the forward logistics base remained cautious of more 
ambitious plans underlying the relatively insignificant $31.9m. schedule, $6.9m. of 
which would require ftu-ther assent by the Military Construction Sub-committee for FY 
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1977.10 There had, in addition, been much media interest in the 'oil-grab scenario 1206 
following President Ford's 'hypothetical' remarks on the subject of January 21,1975.207 
Tbus, on August, 21, the Congressional Research Service issued a report on the military 
and legal aspects of such action. The CRS study, entitled Oil Fields as Military 
Objectives. " was compiled from unclassified sources and took up Congressional 'War 
Powers' concerns as a particular point of reference. Overall, after documenting U. S. 
deficiencies in assault air/sea-lift, 201 logistiCS, 210 merchant Shipping, 211 ASW Capability212 
and the 'significant prospects' for sabotage"' in the oil fields themselves, the report 
observes that, 'America's current capabilities are suspect on several counts. 
1214 Further, 
in the most credible 'sample option' for military action - the seizure of wells and 
terminals around Qatif/Dharhan in the 'Saudi core' - 'success' in any meaningful sense 
would depend on the key variables of undamaged production 'plant' and, 'Soviet 
abstinence from armed intervention. ' Here, perhaps understandably, the study concludes 
that, the 'prospects would be poor' with '... far-reaching political, economic, social, 
psychological, and perhaps military consequences the penalty for failure. 
1215 
In the eyes of some critics, such 'consequences' were foreordained in the 
premises of the CRS Report, 'whose evident purpose' observed defence analyst Edward 
Luttwak, I was to depict an intervention as undesirable and unfeasible - '211 However, while 
Luttwak is arguably correct in placing the Oil Fields study's intentional standing, "' the 
adinittedly 'impressive"" methodology would also lend itself to counter-argument by 
advocates of precisely such an 'intervention' capability as found lacking in the Report. 
Thus, the admission that 'sixteen ASW and attack carriers would be needed' to provide 
adequate convoy protection whereas 'the United States has just thirteen, '119 that 'seventy- 
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six percent of our 168 active cruisers and destroyers would be involved' and that, overall 
'Even modest combat losses would be catastrophic 1220 would echo much of Admiral 
Zumwalt's 'sea control' agenda. The lack of adequate air-based ASW facilities"' and 
forward logistics221 could equally argue the administration's case for Diego Garcia. 
Moreover, the stress on Soviet theatre capability would complement the position of such 
as Nitze in the wider debate surrounding nuclear 'superiority'; since, 'With a force 
posture based on (nuclear) parity, the Report had suggested, 'we would have to back 
down. "" Nevertheless, even granting the CRS's pessimistic account of U. S. capability, 
many would concur with Schlesinger's earlier (January 14,1975) observation that 'it is 
indeed feasible to conduct military operations (against Persian Gulf oil fields) if the 
necessity should arise. 
'121 Here, Luttwak's arguments concerning historic Soviet 'caution' 
would coexist with the equally plausible (albeit, usually unacknowledged) claim that, 'the 
local population (of Eastern Saudi Arabia) is largely hostile to the rulers ... or at least 
indifferent to their interests. '121 Thus, whilst not concluding the case against 'seizing Arab 
oil', the CRS had perhaps ensured a fresh round of debate when Indian Ocean policy 
again came before the Senate in September, 1975. 
Soon after the time of the CRS Report's publication, Secretary Schlesinger's departure 
r- -1 227 Irom the DOD had reportedly turned, inter alia, on the 'carrier issue . The latter 
concerned, as we have seen, the Defense Secretary's disagreements with Kissinger on 
the merits of upgrading the capability of PACOM's Carrier Task Group deployments in 
the Indian Ocean. Schlesinger would join Nitze and Zumwalt (who was not reappointed 
CNO) in trenchant opposition to Kissinger and 'detente', and campaign for U. S. 
rearmament at both conventional and strategic levels of capability. This general 
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argument was not, however, with administration plans for Diego Garcia. Here, 
the 'liberal' opposition led by Senators Culver (D-lowa), Church (D-Idaho) and Hart 
(D-Colorado) had gained a fresh impetus from press reports concerning the Island's 
former inhabitants. The accounts of the dispossession of some 1,100 'Ilois' as a 
deliberate act of policy had appeared on September 10 and 11 in the Washington post and 
London GlWrdian. 221 Also revealed were the existence of covert funding arrangements 
between Whitehall and the Pentagon concerning the establishment costs of 'British Indi 
Ocean Territory'. On September, 11, Culver was to thus introduce a new amendment to 
the current (FY 1976) M. C. A. Bill, requiring that the Executive report no later than 
November, 10 on the extent of U. S. involvement in the depopulation. The amendment 
was co-sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy, who noted the linkage with his own 
amendment to the concurrent Foreign Relations Authorization Bill which, 'expresses 
the sense of the Congress that the President seek direct negotiations with the Soviet 
Union to achieve agreement on the limitations of deployments of naval and other 
military forces in the Indian Ocean by outside powers. ' This, Kennedy asserted, had not 
been forthcoming on the occasion of the May 'certification' of Diego Garcia, 'despite 
a clear Congressional mandate to do so. " 
The response from the DOD, received by the Senate on September 30, would confirm 
that Washington had indeed, 'agreed in 1966 to provide half the total cost involved in the 
establishment of British Indian Ocean Territory' and that when 'the Diego Garcia 
Plantations were closed down' in 1971, '... the U. S. was advised of these developments. ' 
Moreover, the 'monetary arrangements' concluded with London had taken the form of 
a maximum $14m., 'by waiving to that extent research and development surcharges for 
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Ullited Kingdom purchase of the Polaris missile system. "I' The latter information was 
to prompt a request by Senator Gary Hart for a fuller account of the Anglo-American 
, monetary arrangements' from the U. S. Comptroller General. Thus, despite opposition 
from Barry Goldwater and fellow Armed Services Committee Republican Strom 
Thurmond'31 Culver was able, on November, 6, to submit a further amendment to the 
1976 M. C. A. deliberations which would defer all construction allocations from FY 1975 
and FY 1976 pending an administration report on regional arms control - to be submitted 
before June 1,1976.232This would, following some inconclusive debate in the House, 233 
and in the 'House-Senate Conference' on November 18, be brought back to April 15, 
1976.214 The amendment's acceptance by the Senate (51-44) was to again reflect bi- 
partisan concern that, as the subsequent Comptroller's report surmised, 'the method used 
(in transfer funding to the British Government) was a circumvention of the Congressional 
oversight role. "I' 
The January (1976) Government Accounting Office report was, in addition, to detail 
that the JCS had approached the British Goverment 'Early in 1962' and that 'by 1963 ý 
Defense had firm plans for Diego Garcia. ' It would imply that the initiative for 
establishing BIOT (and thus dispossessing the then inhabitants) had come through the 
State Department's desire to establish 'firm rights' to the island. The report would 
fLirdier criticize the 'offset' arrangements as 'a technique which masked real plans and 
costs I and confinn that, whidst the latter had been 'settled by State and Defense' by 1965, 
'it was not until 1969 that these arrangements were first disclosed to a Member of 
Congress. 1236 Such information I relating to the detachment' had, furthermore, been 
classified 'at the request of the British Goverment. 
1237 London had, with an equal lack 
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of publicity, concluded a diird Anglo-American agreement on February, 25 to admit the 
expansion of BIOT from a 'limited naval communications facility' to a 'support facility 
for the United States Navy'. 231 In addition to the allegations of financial 'circumvention', 
the Diego Garcia issue was to be further kept alive by the disclosure, on May 4,1976, 
that a Saudi Arabian offer to replace Soviet aid to Somalia had been 'stopped dead in 
Washington. 1239 The administration had previously (on April 15), submitted the 
requested statement on prospects for Naval Arms control negotiations in the Indian 
Ocean. The latter were, perhaps expectedly, deemed 'inappropriate' in the context of 
Soviet activities in Berbera and aid to the successful MPLA insurgency in Angola. 20 
The war in Angola had also, however, shown that Congress maintained - in 
President Ford's pejorative - an attitude of 'irresolution' toward foreign military 
involvements, illustrated by the substantive (323-99) House vote against continuing U. S. 
aid to the FNLA and UNITA . 
241 The $15m. Saudi aid proposal, revealed to the Senate 
by out-going U. S. Ambassador James Akins, was to thus prompt the final 'Culver 
Amendment' to the administration's funding schedule for Diego Garcia. 
The May, 6 Joint Resolution - co-sponsored by Claibourne Pell, Stuart Symington and 
Edward Kennedy - called for a further six months suspension of construction activities 
pending the outcome of 'reasonable diplomatic efforts' to again address regional arms 
control. It further required an overall Congressional assessment of the base's ultimate 
costs and posture implications. 
141 However, despite strong support from liberal Senators, 
the Culver resolution was not to achieve a majority when taken up in the Foreign 
Relations Committee. Whilst polls were showing a continuing support for U. S. /Soviet 
arms control amongst the public at large, 
243 the perceptions of Congressmen would, in 
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an election year, be closer attuned to the dangers of more localized political vulnerability. 
iR-nald Reagan had established 'national security' as a key issue in the spring Republican xv 
*i prmianes. For Democrats, charges equating 'detente' with 'appeasement 'I" would come 
as much from Senator Henry Jackson and the 'Coalition for a Democratic Majority' as 
from Nitze's ostensibly non-partisan 'Committee on the Present Danger'. 241 Thus, on 
August 9,1976 the Senate was to include the outstanding $13.8m. in construction 
funding for Diego Garcia in the overall $104bn. Defense Appropriations Bill for FY 
1977.246 
Whilst the DOD was subject to close Senate questioning in the May, 1977 Hearings for 
a $7.3m. funding supplemental (for FY 
1978)2A7 
- requested on the grounds of a loss of 
air facilities in Thailand - the FY 1977 appropriations had, essentially, marked the end 
of sustained opposition to Diego Garcia. As will be shown, the incoming Carter 
Dras 
A iv. idency would indeed open negotiations for Indian Ocean arms control, as were so 
Z-- - frequently called for in the successive Hearings from 1972. The correlative would, 
however, involve treating the Navy's I support facility' as part of the status quo - In the 
wider context of policy, the end of the Ford administration was to also confirm the 
establishment of the region as a permanent feature on the U-S- strategic agenda. In this . 
the Defense Department's increasingly comprehensive logistics and projection capability 
on Diego Garcia would provide a military counterpoint to the developing economic and 
political linkages with U. S. policy in the Middle East, the Gulf and South Asia. 
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VU. The Web of Dependence: Petrodollar 'Recycling' and the Joint 
Commissions. 
As the dramatic rise of new centres; of economic power in the Gulf threatened to redefine 
the Indian Ocean region as the nexus of a new third world coalition, the region had 
continued to receive sustained attention in the Congress and U. S. media. In the event, 
however, although the littoral states were to issue consistent rhetorical support for the 
'New International Economic Order' - particularly in the context of 'bloc diplomacy' at 
the UN - the clear reality was of increasing integration of the OPEC counties widiin the 
world market. In reviewing policy at the outset of the Ford administration, Treasury 
Secretary Simon was to thus assure the House Near East Sub-committee that while 'there 
was a general recognition that the private markets face a serious challenge', from the 
exponential growth in oil-based liquidity 'no one was taking about impending failure of 
fmancial markets generally. ' And, moreover, 'all our experience confirms that the 
fmancial authorities in the Arab countries intend to manage their oil revenues in a 
conservative and responsible manner. '241 Accordingly, Washington had earlier removed 
controls on foreign capital inflow, in the expectation, Secretary Simon would further tell 
the House, of 'substantial investments in U. S. Goverment securities -" In this context, 
a 'special' portfolio had been established for 'the OPEC nations' which would offer, 'the 
Opportunity of govermnent-to-govermnent transactions which enable the investor to 
transact very large sums without influencing the market against himself. "' 
Quantitatively, there was 'perhaps some 60% of total OPEC oil revenues available for 
investment' at this time, amounting to, 'roughly $60bn. at the present annual rate. ' Of 
this, Simon was confident that, 'The breadth and diversity of U. S. capital markets 
suggests we shall attract a substantial share. 
'151 
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In addition to restructuring the internal U-S. capital market, a further institutional 
accommodation to the OPEC nation's new market power was to be developed in bilateral 
U. S. arrangements with the principal U. S. allies amongst the Gulf oil producers, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. Although an evident general requirement existed to address the global 
framework of institutional dislocation still extant after Nixon's 'New Economic Policy', 
there were two more immediate threats to counter, specific to the administration's policy 
for the Middle East. Firstly, despite administration affirmations of OAPEC 
'responsibility', the exposure to economic interdependence was, for the Congress and the 
wider U-S. public, wholly unprecedented. As Secretary Simon acknowledged, 'if it were 
ten years ago... I suggest that the United states would not have tolerated a group of Arab 
countries that would do this to the rest of the world. '211 If the latter sentiments could 
undennine U. S. public confidence in the administration's Middle East policy, there was 
a fin-ther awareness of the possible long tenn effects of 'Tehran Two' on the unity of the 
Western alliance. Whilst OPEC had itself built upon existing Western politico/economic 
rivalry, the enduring factors of differentiated dependence on oil imports between the U. S. 
and other OECD nations had also effectively hamstrung Kissinger's efforts to establish 
a united forum of consumer states in the 'International Energy Agency' to counter the 
producer's cartel. "' As Secretary Simon again observes, 'the European Community is 
relying on financing their deficit from the Oil producers. It does not seem reasonable ... to 
expect that they would confront them or be willing to be very bold that this is going to 
be a problem. '254 
Kissinger had, in the light of these considerations, established 'Joint Commissions' with 
Saudi Arabia and Iran in June and November of 1974. The bilateral commissions, 
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Chaired in both instances by the Secretary of State himself, were to provide for 'co- 
operation in the fields of economics, technology, and industry, and, in the Saudi case, 
, the supply of the Kingdom's requirements for defensive purposes. '151 The 'U. S. -Iran 
joint Commission' would similarly span 'a broad spectrum of activities' and include a 
separate 'Committee on Defense and Security', Chaired by State's ISA bureau, and with 
representation from the CIA, the National Security Council and the Treasury . 
256 WhilSt 
both commissions had stemmed from administration initiatives of April, 1974,117 the 
arrangements with Iran were to assume a particular importance, stemming from the 
continuing primacy of Iran in the administration's regional design and the adverse 
reactions in the U. S. to the 'special relationship' following the Shah's leading role in the 
'Tehran Two' oil pricing structure. There were, indeed, many in Congress who were 
concerned about the 'lack of urgency' with which the administration was addressing the 
issue. 'I must say' House NESC Chair Lee Hamilton observed during Hearings on 'The 
Petrodollar Problem', 'I have the impression that nobody in the U. S. government is 
really taking the gloves off and talking to the Shah about this thing - "' The 
administration's first priority was thus, as briefing memoranda for Kissinger's 
November, 1974 visit to Tehran makes clear, to 'engage the Shah in the development of 
a common strategy for stabilizing the world economy and ... correcting the economic and 
fmancial dislocation caused by the rapid rise in oil prices. '211 To this end, Iran would be 
offered fresh opportunities in areas of the 'greatest personal interest to the Shah, ' 
concerning 'co-production of sophisticated military equipment' and an extensive 
technology transfer programme for nuclear energy 110 
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However, if Kissinger was to also warn the Shah that any ftu-ther fmancial 'dislocation' 
would create 'an impossible U. S. domestic political atmosphere for successful 
Irpidan/U. S. collaboration, 1261 the injunction to 'build upon his vanity, ambition, self 
interest and strategic vision' compiled by departmental (NEA) briefers"I was perhaps 
contributory to a satisfactory outcome for the Secretary of State's Iran initiative. The 
November 3, 'Joint Statement' issued in Tehran thus outlined 'a broad program of co- 
operation in the political, economic, cultural defense, scientific and technological 
fields. "" The differences within the alliance were clearly of practice rather than of 
principle. "' Despite the 'darkening political prospect for Europe, Japan and the western 
allies' advanced in Kissinger's summit discussions of global oil pricing policy'61 the 
sectoral prospects for U. S. business in Iran had materially gained by Iran's 'new 
affluence'. Some 200 U. S. companies were expanding their activities in Iran by October, 
1974, representing a total U. S. investment of 'well over half a billion dollars. 
1266 Other 
beneficiaries of Iran's increased $21bn. foreign exchange turnover included France 
($lbn. three-year investment loan) and the United Kingdom, recipient of a $1.2bn. 
three-year disbursal loaiff Further economic grounds for U. S. 'appreciation' of the 
Shah's 'statesmanlike role in world affairs' expressed in the November, 3 communique 
were to be found in Iran's programme of 'increasing economic co-operation among the 
countries on the Indian Ocean littoral. 
1268 
To be sure, a modest economic component had long accompanied Iran's predominantly 
military focus in the regional security arrangements promoted under the Nixon 
Doctrine. 169After December 1973, however, the 'dramatic' transformation of Iran's 
foreign exchange earnings noted in one CIA analysis had, 'switched the country 
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ovemight from a net borrower to the Middle East's largest lender for 1974. '270 Here, the 
Shah's regime was indeed engaged in an ambitious programme of Petro-dollar 'recycling, 
in a way wholly applauded by the administration. The Agency's account of 'the Shah's 
Lending Binge' details a comprehensive $6.3bn. financial outlay covering 17 major 
individual countries. 171 'The pace and variety of Iranian financial commitments', tile CIA 
records, 'contrast with the still largely traditional mode of investment by other Middle 
East countries. ' Iran's foreign loans, 'rival those of major industrial countries. ' In the 
Middle East, an 'invaluable' reinforcement to administration policy was found in loans 
to Egypt ($850m. ), Jordan ($58m. ) and Syria ($150m. ). Further afield, 'the loan policy 
of the Shah reflects a strong penchant for security and for influence beyond Iran's 
borders. ' India was thus in receipt of 'badly needed credits' of $1bn. 2'12and Pakistan, a 
$580m. package 'geared to projects improving economic conditions in Baluchistan. ' If 
the Shah's interest in Pakistan's Indian Ocean littoral province also extended to cross- 
border military aid against the insurgent 'Baluchi Peoples Liberation Front V71 Tehran's 
economic diplomacy had also a wider regional agenda. Thus, as the CIA further 
observes, 'the Shah ... hopes to influence decisions on the controversial 
(N. W. Frontier) 
border problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan' and, by 'holding out the prospect of 
huge project credits to Afghanistan, the Shah hopes to weaken the Soviet grip there. 
1274 
If, therefore, the somewhat involuntary acceleration of the 'diffusion' of world 
economic power had yielded compensatory benefits for the administration, an equally 
advantageous harnessing of the 'threat from the third world' for U. S. purposes was to 
be found in Iran's energetic pursuit of containment along the Soviet 'Northern Tier'. And 
if OAPEC's practical interpretation of the 'New International Economic Order' would 
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bear close comparison with older patterns of investment and exchange, security 
developments in the Gulf were to also belie a public regional attachment to Indian Ocean 
Peace Zone formulations. Of the list of reactions from 29 littoral countries to the Diego 
Garcia expansion, put before the Senate in the June, 1975 Hearings, 12 were deemed 
lunfavourable', 13 'unknown' and four (Iran, Kenya, Pakistan, Singapore) 'balanced'. 171 
The administration, however, had suggested that a clear majority favoured. the permanent 
U. S. military presence in the region. Here, Senate questioning was to draw Secretary 
Schlesinger's (well grounded) response that, 'It makes diplomatic sense ... it may not 
make sense logically. V 
276 Declassified CIA testimony had further revealed that 'The 
United States' could, if required, have access to facilities in '... Pakistan, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia'. 17 Pakistan had, in 1972, begun an active involvement in the CENTO command 
structure and had participated in the annual 'MIDLINK' exercises for 1973.171 
A further strand in what James Noyes had termed the 'increasingly intricate web of 
MuMal dependence271 was to be found in the level of U. S. amis transfers for the region. 
These were to reach a value of some $4,492m. by 1975.280 Concurrently, the Defense 
Department had established a special 'Middle East Task Group' (METG). Chaired by 
Assistant Secretary Noyes and with multi-agency representation, this aimed to provide 
'across the board review and control of all significant DOD actions relating to the Middle 
East' and 'Assess arms requests from selected Middle East countries - "" Overall, as the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee was to hear, 'there are 520 military men ... co- 
Ordinatmg foreign military sales in the Persian Gulf. "I' The extent of U. S. programmes 
was, moreover, expressly designed to reflect strategic rather than purely commercial 
imperatives. And, as summed up by one administration official '283 'provides a broader 
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base for our relationship and for our broader economic and political dialogue with the 
countries concemed. ' 
Conclusions. 
Although the Ford administration had, throughout, suffered the disadvantages of an 
mterim mandate and rising ideological controversy on all sides of the U. S. political 
spectrum, the course of Indian Ocean policy was to exhibit a considerable consistency. 
Here, Earl Ravenal's focus on the 'internal organizational necessities 
1284 
of the several 
agencies involved is persuasive. The developments of Diego Garcia sanctioned after 
1976 contain much continuity with planning schedules devised as early as 1963. Such 
factors, though, are not conclusive for a policy direction whose consequences clearly 
extend beyond the realm of 'bureaucratic logevity' was freely admitted by the 
administration, the decision to extend the relatively uncontroversial 'communications 
facility' to a much more disputed 'logistical support facility' was, in immediate terms, 
derivative of the 1973 war. If the conclusion of the conflict was to reflect the success of 
, ff;,, eat power regional co-management, it would, by the same token, mark the emergence 
of the Soviet Union as truly global power. The wider pattern of direct U. S. military 
engagement was, however, foreordained in the economic devolution of the Nixon 
Doctrine after 1971. If the October War had given a new 'urgency' to administration 
perceptions of the strategic importance of the region, it had perhaps also bestowed a 
level of controversy to a planning process which, in the first Nixon term, had been 
largely unremarkable. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REGIONAL IMPERATIVE. 
The Carter administration had assumed office on January 20,1977, with an ambitious 
foreign policy programme. This included the renovation of economic and institutional 
links with major trading partners in Europe and Japan, the pursuit of arms' reductions 
for both strategic and conventional systems with the Soviet Union, curbing conventional 
weapons sales and nuclear proliferation, consulting 'North-South' imbalances and 
throughout, a re-instatement of 'principle' into U. S. foreign affairs consistent with 
exercising 'leadership without hegemony' 
Fundamental to all the above concerns was the premise of regional disaggregation. The 
avowedly systemic and great power focus of the Kissinger 'apparat' would be redressed 
by 'a new sensitivity, awareness and priority' towards '... the vast complex of issues 
clustering around the relationships between the industrialized and unindustrialized world 
and the new sets of global issues that are emerging -" Local systems and 
dynamics were 
to receive a due attention divorced from the 'inordinate fear of communism' that, for the 
incoming Carter team, had distorted previous U. S. policy toward an over-concentration 
on relations with the Soviet Union. The focus of the administration's own concentration 
in foreign policy was to be on revitalizing the 'trilateral' linkages between the United 
States, Europe and Japan. 'The Indian ocean-Persian Gulf region', Carter's appointed 
National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski records, 'was to be addressed through 
arms control efforts with the Soviets. 12 In approaching these objectives, the course of 
Indian Ocean policy promised to be one of the administration's least controversial 
initiatives. This chapter will analyse the course and rationale of the policy process by 
way of a particular focus on the Carter administration's agenda for global and regional 
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arms control. It will then assess the influence of domestic and regional factors on the 
prospects for a formal Indian Ocean Arms Control regime in late 1978. 
'World Order Politics' in the Carter Administration: Multiple Advocacy and 
Regional Arms Control. 
If the stated policy platform of the Carter White House was designed to draw a clear 
distinction between a new 'world order politics" and what was described as the 'covert 
pessmusm I of the Nixon and Ford administrations toward such matters as human rights, 
arms control and nuclear proliferation, a similar hiatus was advanced in the revised 
organizational framework of the NSC bureaucracy. In this, the former structure of 
interlocking 'Interdepartmental Groups ' and centralized committees run from the 
National Security Advisor's office was replaced by a system of two (multi-function) 
committees. The first, the 'Policy Review Committee' (PRC), would consider Defence, 
International economic issues and general foreign policy. It was to be chaired rotationally 
by the appropriate Cabinet Secretary. For the second, 'Special Co-ordinating Committee' 
(SCQ - taking in Intelligence, arms control and 'crisis management' - the chair would 
devolve upon the Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski. 'The 
idea', Brzezinski relates, 'was to engage the Cabinet more fully in the national security 
decision making process and to accustom Cabinet members to working as a team. "' The 
new system was, from the outset, designed to be functional to the Carter administration's 
conscious conceptual pragmatism. Thus, as summarized by the State Department's 
incoming Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Leslie Gelb, 'the Carter approach to 
foreign policy rests on a belief that not only is the world far too complex to be reduced 
to a doctrine, but there is something inherently wrong with having a doctrine at all. " 
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However, in expressly abjuring the need for a 'doctrine' to relate the several policy 
areas in foreign and national security affairs, the Carter Cabinet was to similarly risk 
diffusmg the focus for its concerns in a way that could not be recovered by the somewhat 
elusive constructs of 'Trilateralism'. And in advancing what, in organizational tenns, 
was effectively an institutionalized 'multiple advocacy' model of decision making, the 
administration was to also lay the ground for an increasingly public rehearsal of inter- 
agency division. It would further, in giving the respective agencies considerable control 
over the selection of second and third-level appointees, serve more immediately to 
alienate sections of the wider Washington political community. 
The closing years of the Nixon and Ford administration's had, as we have seen, been 
marked by a growth of political lobbies concerned to advance a renascent American 
particu arism as much as the 'new sensitivity' to differentiated 'global issues' so 
identified in the Carter foreign policy agenda. Thus, of the 53 such nominations put 
forward by a joint conservative (CDM/CPD/AFL-CIO) platfonn, all had been rejected-' 
In contrast, the ranks of those accepted included many - such as (Policy Planning 
Director at State) Anthony Lake and Paul Warnke at the Amis Control and Disarmament 
Agency - who had resigned from previous administrations in opposition to U. S. military 
interventions in Vietnam and elsewhere .7 If the apparent progress of a 
'left-of-centre 
foreign policy network" had given general concern to some on the right of Washington 
politics, the mobilizing issue was that of arms control. Here, the Warnke appointment 
in particular would be strenuously contested. 9 Whilst this early surfacing of 'ideological 
controversy"O had not prevented Senate confirmation (by a 70-29 margin)" of the new 
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ACDA Director it would, however, give the latter's conduct of Indian Ocean anns 
control a domestic resonance that was to increasingly surround the making of policy. 
As statements by many in the Carter campaign team made clear, arms control was to 
receive a high priority for the new administration. An overall focus on politico-econornic, 
interdependence' had also been central to the Carter election platform. These concerns 
were to merge in addressing the United States' role in the burgeoning transformation of 
the world arms market. In a pre-election summary of future arms control perspectives, 
Leslie Gelb had noted that U. S. grant military aid (MAP) had fallen from $5.2bn. in 
1952 to under $600m. by 1975.12 Military sales (FMS) had correspondingly risen, to 
41-A PT. 2bn for the same year. The balance of these financial indicators suggested, for Gelb, 
an 'incipient revolution in supplier-recipient relationships' - in effect, a 'buyers market' - 
which was of particular significance for the Middle East. Here, 'instead of the United 
States dictating to others what they need ... others are telling us what they 
feel they need 
for their own purposes. "I To address this trend toward 'reverse dependency' in relations 
with its military clients, the United States should, in Gelb's view, 'approach arms sales 
as a foreign policy problem, not as an arms control problem. "" The organizational 
implications of this approach were to be taken up in Senate confirmation Hearings for 
Cyrus Vance. Agreeing the existence of 'a direct relationship between anns transfers, in 
terms of military sales, and arms control' the Secretary-designate was to thus propose 
that tile central 'focus' of responsibility for both activities be taken within the Department 
of State. 11 
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The arms control issue had also been a consistent reference point for Congressional 
'War Powers' concerns and the general attempts to re-invigorate the Congress, s own role 
in the making of foreign policY - It had, as we have seen, figured in the successive 
restrictions attached to the funding programme for Diego Garcia. These concerns had 
converged in the passage of the June 30,1976, International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act. In addition to the act broadly enjoining the United States 'to 
exert leadership in the world community, to bring about arrangements for reducing 
mternational trade in implements of war, "I a specific section declared that, 'the President 
should undertake ... negotiations with the Soviet Union ... to achieve an agreement limiting 
the deployment of naval, air, and land forces ... in the Indian Ocean and littoral countries. ' 
Designated categories for negotiation would thus include 'the establishment or use' of 
military facilities, overall force structures, and levels of naval forces, 'or the number of 
" shipdays " allowed therein. "I 
The latter undertaking had, it can be recalled, been indefinitely postponed under the 
Ford administration. For Carter, however, an early move on the Indian Ocean would 
demonstrate the increased commitment to 'consultation' with the Congress. It would 
further address complementary administration aims in the fields of arms control and a 
revived U. S. activism in the United Nations. Global institutional renovation was an 
integral part of the administration's declared focus on the 'architecture' of international 
affairs as opposed to the 'Lone Ranger' unilateralism seen at fault in the approach of 
Kissinger. In this context, naval arms limitation was complementary to a wider effort to 
advance confidence building measures for the region. Thus, Secretary-designate Vance 
was to assure Senators of the 'fundamental importance' placed upon the (forthcoming) 
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'Law of the Sea' Conference and of the need for 'new and constructive ideas in 
dealing ... with the demands for a new 
international economic order. ' The latter issues 
were linked in both conceptual and material terms to the Indian Ocean, given the 
expected seabed mineral wealth to be apportioned under the LOS convention, the 
preponderant nonaligned orientation of the littoral states and the organizational matrix 
provided by the NAM's Indian Ocean 'Peace Zone' co-ordinator, (Sri Lankan 
Ambassador) H. S. Amerasinge as President of the United Nations Committee on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS). " 
President Carter's first major speech on foreign policy was an address to the UN 
Ambassadors on March 18,1977. Here, in addition to affum3ing that the United States 
would play a 'strong and constructive role' in the forthcoming Special Session on 
Disarmament (SSOD), the President stated, 'We will seek... to establish Soviet 
willingness to reach agreement with us on mutual military restraint in the Indian 
Ocean. '19 The choice of both setting and subject matter reflected the greater emphasis on 
third world concerns promoted by Carter's designated Ambassador, Andrew Young. It 
should be noted, however, that despite the expressed rejection of the policy of 'counter- 
attack' adopted by the former UN representative, Daniel P. Moynihan, the 
administration had no intention of conceding any 'linkage' with the ongoing Zone of 
Peace proceedings -a vote on which was scheduled for December' - nor the recent 
(September, 1976) call for the dismantling of 'existing foreign bases' in the region 
adopted at the Fifth Summit of the Non -Aligned Movement at Colombo. " 
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The Carter initiative had, none-the-less, placed the Indian Ocean at the centre of an 
ambitious arms control agenda to be pursued both in the UN and bilaterally - In an initial 
press statement of March 9, the President had, indeed, proposed that, 'the Indian Ocean 
be completely demilitarized, that a comprehensive test ban be put into effect, [and] that 
prior notification of test missile launches be exchanged. '12Whilst the two latter measures 
had little precedent outside the academic arms control community, the subsequent, United 
Nations, proposals for 'mutual restraint' in the Indian Ocean could recall some official 
sanction for a return to the pre-1973 'low proffle' approach to U. S. interests in the 
region. Despite the widespread discussion of Soviet 'sea-control' ambitions in the Gulf 
and North Eastern littoral evident in the many Congressional Hearings and the literature, 
the Kissinger State Department had previously indicated that the U. S. would observe an 
informal 'zone of restraint' in the region, and would, 'keep [open] the matter of a 
possible future arms limdtation initiative as a potential contribution to regional stability. 
'13 
Moscow's own naval activity, as noted in the last (Ford administration) DOD Annual 
Report, 'appeared to have stabilized. 
t24 The thrust of the new administration's policy 
would, however, be altogether more positive. By designing an arms control 
initiative specific to the Indian Ocean, the Carter NSC was, at the same time, aiming to 
achieve what was believed to be a relatively simple arms control agreement, 'on which 
the Soviets can agree quickly 'I that could accelerate movement on the SALT process and 
give the U. S. an additional purchase on Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa. 
Complementary to the perceived bilateral advantages, the opening of U. .- oviet 
negotiations could also serve to foreclose the more comprehensive 'Zone of Peace' 
debate at the United Nations, whilst reinforcing administration diplomatic approaches to 
the leading protagonist, I ia. 
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H. Naval Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean. 
Despite the somewhat confused reaction from allies to the President's initial March, 9 
amouncement 26 - which also caught ACDA staff and Director Paul Warnke 'completely 
by surprise'21 - there had, in fact, been some circumstantial preparation for the initiative. 
The Soviet Union had itself indicated a willingness to, 'search for ways to reduce, on a 
mutual basis, the military activity of non-Indian Ocean states in that ocean and areas in 
... immediate proximity 
Ite t28 in a memorandum to the UN General Assembly of September, 
1976. Here, Moscow's consistent diplomatic association with the Non-Aligned position, 
restated at Colombo, is also evident. The 'Briefing Book' for the administration's 
transition agenda, prepared in January, 1977 by National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski had outlined arms control in the region as a possible area to 'publicly test 
Soviet intentions. "I Nor was the new director of Carter's Arms Control executive himself 
entirely unprepared for the undertaking. Warnke had, together with Cyrus Vance 
participated in a United Nations Association study of possible arms control moves for the 
Indian Ocean. The latter, published in November, 1976, was to preview much of the 
negotiating stance later taken up by the ACDA. 10 Much of the technical preparation in 
terms of means of measuring comparative U. S. /Soviet naval capability had been 
established in (1975) Congressional studies" and in the Ford administration's 1976 report 
to Congress for the hearings on Diego Garcia. " In addition, a move to regional 
disarmament would accord with the general ethos of the Cyrus Vance State Department 
and the ACDA on the desirability for, if need be, unilateral U. S. moves to curb the arms 
race 'treadmill 1.11 
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Unlike the controversy surrounding the administration's revised proposals for a 
I drastic' SALT build-down and the untried CTB treaty, however, the Indian Ocean Naval 
Arms Limitation proposals (NALT) had met with a positive response from the Soviet 
Union when introduced by Vance during the first Secretarial visit to Moscow in March, 
1977.14A working group under Wamke and Soviet negotiator 1, ev Mendelevitch was thus 
set up in May to prepare the opening of the first formal session, scheduled for June, 22 
in Moscow. In the interim, the U. S. team had worked to co-ordinate an inter-agency 
agreement on terms and tactics with the NSC and the Pentagon. This involved an initial 
circulation of position papers by State (Politico-Military Affairs), Defense (ISA and Joint 
Chiefs) and the CIA. Options would then be reviewed at a Special Co-ordinating 
Committee, convened at NSC Cabinet level, with participation from JCS Chairman 
General David Jones, DO Admiral Stansfield Turner and Paul Warnke as head of the 
ACDA. Throughout, the administration was concerned to avoid the bureaucratic 'end 
nins' - particularly concerning the Pentagon and civilian agencies - seen at fault in the 
Nixon arms control process. For the structure of negotiation itself, it was thus also 
agreed that the team be 'backstopped' by a parallel inter-agency body in Washington, . 
which would, 'rapidly assess negotiating problems and obtain decisions and guidance to 
pass to the negotiating team. 135 A further indication of the administration's intent in 
pursuing the talks was evident in the ultimate chain of command. Here, as a subsequent 
House Committee would be told, 'the instructions for the Indian Ocean negotiations 
come directly from the President. 136 
Whilst the administration would strive to obtain the maximum favourable publicity for 
its moves by - for the first time - admitting the press to view the 
base at Diego Garcia, 37 
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the terms for talks themselves were, by mutual agreement, to be strictly bilateral and 
'confidential'. " In this way, President Carter was to tell press reporters on June 21, there 
was indeed a possibility to, 'stabilize the status quo in the Indian Ocean and refrain from 
further escalation', with the 'later' prospect of, '-prior notification of any military 
movements there, and perhaps ... some reduction in the present level of military presence' 
that, the President acknowledged, was, in any event, 'pretty low at this time. 
Overafl, the U. S. and Soviet negotiators were to meet at four sessions, commencing 
in Moscow (June, 1977), Washington (September, 1977), and Berne (Switzerland) 
in December, 1977 and February, 1978. Despite the considerable airing of the issues in 
the media and U. S. Senate - and the recent Soviet submission to the UN 'Ad Hoc' 
committee (see above) - the setting of a precise practical agenda was, on both sides, 
fairly tentative. As Warnke recalls, 'Initially, we weren't quite sure what the President 
had in mind. Then it became quite clear that the idea of, quote "demilitarizing" the 
whole Indian Ocean area was quite unrealistic ... and the Soviets were a little uncertain 
too. '10 The opening (Moscow) session would thus establish a focus for the negotiations 
that was to exclude limits on the movement of aircraft in the regioiel and institutionalize 
the existing de facto understandings on the non-deployment of SSBN's. The latter 
prospect had, as we have seen, constituted a primary rationale for the original Soviet 
entry to the Indian Ocean in 1968 . 41 Further areas of Soviet concern were broached in 
addressing the 'allied factor' - notably the activities of France and Ira& - and a possible 
Chinese interdiction threat to lines of communication between the European and Asian 
regions of the USSR. 44As the second session assembled in Washington, it became clear 
that such 'third party' asymmetries could be accommodated in terms of overall 
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limitations on 'ship-ton-days'41 with sub-limits according to unit capability. 'Given' the 
former ACDA Director observes, 'that China is not a significant naval power. '41 For its 
part, the U. S. delegation had agreed to restrict the development of Diego Garcia to the 
ongoing (FY 1977-8) schedule, which would preclude the deployment of strategic 
bombers. " The outline of an agreement, restricted in its formal expression to surface 
shipping, was thus apparent by mid-1977. 
Thus, whilst clearly subordinate to the contemporaneous SALT and CTB negotiations, 
the establislunent of a 'modest' Indian Ocean arms control regime could, on both sides, 
serve objectives that were in several respects complementary. From Warnke's 
perspective, the negotiatmg process was in itself of some heuristic value. Throughout, 
'the fact that both sides had to t1link what the military utility of the Indian Ocean actually 
was' had, for the ACDA Director a positive outcome. Here, 'both sides concluded that 
it did not have any genuine military utility . 
148 Fur-ther ,a thorough examination of 
military posture could also strengthen the ACDA bureaucratically against the 'worst 
case' analyses favoured by the Department of the Navy, regarded by Warnke as, 'the last 
bastion of opposition to any arms control agreement. "' The Soviet Union would secure 
a moratorium on further development of Diego Garcia - whose progress towards being 
a 'large, multi-purpose base' had been closely followed in the Soviet media, 50 and give 
content to Moscow's declared position of 'respect' for the UN Zone of Peace proposals - 
For the Carter administration, a parallel diplomatic course is apparent in the programme 
of rapproch6ment with the incoming Janata government in India. By mid-1977, the 
Indian Ocean agreement appeared, as Warnke observes, 'a risk-free operation. "I 
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Arms Control and Strategy: PRM 10, PD 18 and 'Essential Equivalence'. 
Ambassador Warnke's early optimism for Indian Ocean anus control would be seemingly 
borne out as the strategic status of the region emerged in the context of the DOD's initial 
estimates for revised military posture. Here, the Carter administration had determined 
to make reductions in the proposed 157 unit (over five years) expansion programme for 
the Navy inherited from the Ford administration. This was to be reduced to 70 vessels, 
and although the commitment to a 'two ocean' navy was retained, the stress - as with 
other aspects of military posture - was to be placed on sea-borne reinforcement for 
NATO, 'rather than on a major anti-shipping capability. "I This, in practice, referred to 
the role of carrier task groups. The administration's opposition to fin-ther 'Enterprise' 
class nuclear carriers recalls the contention attending Secretary Schlesinger's attempted 
1974 reorganization of the Seventh Fleet, which upgraded one (of three) PACOM task 
groups from the Pacific to patrols in the Indian Ocean (see above). Whilst Kissinger had 
temporarily returned the third task group to Pacific duties, approaching obsolescence had 
required the inclusion of funding for a fin-ther nuclear carrier in the last (1976) estimates. 
This was resisted by the Carter administration on the grounds of economy - In the view 
of Defense Secretary Harold Brown, 'building more nuclear carriers' would yield, 
less defense (capability) than we could have had for the same number of dollars. "I 
Since without the proposed carrier, the problems of mounting an upgraded Indian Ocean 
presence would be compounded, the administration found in the proposed arms control 
regirne a useful reinforcement for avoiding both increased 'defense dollars' and further 
internecine controversy - 
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Yet, the apparent underpinning of arms control policy by the Carter administration's 
fiscal conservatism54 would, from the outset, confront what was in other ways an 
expanded U. S. strategic agenda; evident within the overall revision of United States' 
strategy undertaken in the planning review TRM 10'. Commissioned in January, 1977 
under the co-ordination. of Samuel Huntingdon, " the study was officially endorsed by 
Carter on August, 24 as 'Presidential Directive (PD) 18'. 56 For some observers, the PRM 
10 exercise represented, 'the most extensive ... strategic review since that prepared for 
President Truman in 1950. '17The analogy taken with the Truman administration was one 
encouraged by President Carter. However, unlike the - somewhat monist - construction 
of NSC 68, the Carter strategy team was hampered by conflicting priorities in terms of 
threat-assessment and budgetary goals. These were to have a particular effect on the 
focus given to the Soviet Union. The administration had come to office committed to a 
substantial cuts in defence, and the first (FY 1977) years' outlay at, $95.7bn., " was 
indeed lower than the $100. lbn. Estimate offered in the previous Annual Report of the 
Donald Rumsfeld DOD. " However, the prospect of further defence economies was 
complicated by the continuing controversy, evident in the last year of the Ford 
administration, surrounding the 'National Intelligence Estimates' of Soviet outlay and 
capability. This had led to the preparation of an alternative set of (upgraded) estimates 
by the outside 'Team "B"'. The resulting synthesis was incorporated into the final 
(December, 1976) official statement of the outgoing Presidency. Hence, as the 
Washington Post accurately surmised, 'Even if the Carter administration disagrees' with 
the substance of the new NEE, it would remain '... as a reference for policy makers across 
the top echelon of the government. '60 
6 
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The disputed factual status of the administration's intelligence data-base would reflect 
on wider considerations in the less tangible field of Soviet intentions. The early months 
of Carter's Presidency had seen the re-emergence of the 'strategic superiority' debate and 
associated organizations - such as the 'Committee on the Present Danger"' - which were 
to mount a powerful challenge to both SALT and conventional measures for anus 
control. In attempting a synthesis between the 'drastic' arms control aims of Carter's 
campaign platform and pressure for a more traditional containment, the administration 
had presented the perspectives of PD 18, published in the February, 1978 DOD Annual 
Report, as: 'Era Two -a period that embodies both the competition of the cold war era 
with the co-operation of the d6tente period. 620verall, the 'increasing dependence' of the 
United States on an 'international environment ... [with] ... no recognized and stable status 
quo' was noted, although 'the Soviet Union remains our principal national security 
problem. "I Here, whilst allowing that 'the Soviet defense effort... increased in real terms 
by about 36 percent between 1967 and 1977 ... [and] now exceeds that of the United States 
by 32 percent'64 and that, 'the (previous) intelligence estimates may understate the cost 
of the Soviet buildup ... substantially', 61 the DOD was, at the same time, to argue that, 
'We do not propose to plan against total irrationality. '66Defense Secretary Brown was 
to also maintain that, 'The United States has not been idle in this competition, '17a claim 
reinforced by the setting of a3% annual increase in outlay, amounting to an overall 
(Total Obligational, Authority) budgetary target of $126bn. for FY 1979.6' The 
influence of the domestic debate was, however, apparent throughout the administration's 
first published review of defence expenditure and military posture. And as Harold Brown 
was to further acknowledge, 'To those that are convinced that the Soviets are aiming at 
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meaningful strategic superiority ... the programs and options I have provided here may 
seem inadequate. 
Yet, despite the denial of 'excessive restraint 
170 in establishing the administration's 
defence programmes, the DOD's stated position on the central balance remained 
premised on the continuation of an 'essential equivalence' vis a vis even a worst case 
analysis of Soviet capability. " The practical implications of essential equivalence, as 
developed by Harold Brown, were to proceed from the assumption that, 'any advantages 
in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by other U. S. advantages, '72 
notably concerning the global U. S. alliance system. The factoring of 'prosperous and 
willing allies"I into considerations of Washington's own strategic aggregates will recall 
the terms of 'total force' planning developed in the Melvin Laird DOD. However, even 
in comparison with Laird and Schlesinger Annual Reports it is also clear that the Carter 
administration's scope for 'the conditions of U. S. security' had grown, almost 
imperceptibly, global. An overt 'interest' was, for the first time, declared in 'the political 
independence and territorial integrity of the Peoples' Republic of China and 
Yugoslavia. '74AIso of 'essential' concern was, 'the independence of such critical areas 
as ... the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Northeast Asia and Africa. '71 Moreover, 
'there 
is an important sense in which the U. S. frontier lies on a great arc that contains vital 
areas all the way from North Norway to Japan and the Aleutians -" 
Thus, whilst the administration was to make a pointed political reaffirmation of the 
global nature of its concerns, the results for military posture would not mark a return to 
the more broadly gauged containment of the Kennedy era. What had emerged, however, 
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was an approach not dissimilar to the latter's provisions for 'flexible response'. The 11/2 
wars I posture of the Nixon Doctrine would be retained. 
77 Yet, the force structures 
considered for a 'minor contingency' would be expanded to a demonstrable level of 
'credibility'. Here, for the DOD, 'we believe the Middle East qualifies as an important 
test on several grounds. We have vital interests in the area; it is an area that still lacks 
stability; and it is an area sufficiently distant from the United States to make exacting 
demands on some of our capabilities. 
178 
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IV. Arms Sales and Regional Security: the Dilemmas of PRM 12. 
As is apparent from the above, the Harold Brown DOD saw the Middle East and Gulf 
regions as more integrated than before within the purview of global posture. Brzezinski, 
amongst others, had begun to refer to a 'third strategic zone 1 complementary to 
established U. S. positions in Europe and the Far East. 79 In this, as with Whitehall's 
security planning of the 1950's, the reconciliation of expanded strategic ends with limited 
budgetary and material means was to suggest a reliance on strategic mobility. 'The 
geographical conditions' it was noted, '... that would permit the conduct of amphibious 
operations and air-support exist in the Middle East [and] Persian Gulf. '10 And to this end, 
I appropriateelements in our forces in the Continental United States (CONUS) must be 
rapidly deployable to Asia and the Middle East. "I As will be shown, the fully constituted 
'Rapid Deployment Force' would only arise in a concrete form after 1979, but the initial 
selection of, 'the several Army divisions, Marine Amphibious forces and Air Wings that 
would not be immediately required for an initial defense of NATO"' is of significance 
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as an indication of the strategic priorities of the administration, even if the prospective 
combat missions in the Middle East aroused no great enthusiasm from the Pentagon. " 
For the present, however, the administration's attempt to present a revitalized global 
engagement - which had in the first instance underpinned the commitment to regional 
arms control - was, as unfolding operationally, to threaten a departure from previous 
policy in clear conflict with the programme for 'restraint' in the Indian Ocean. 
Of further variance within the administration's regional policy framework was the 
continued reliance on arms sales to the 'prosperous and willing' littoral states as part of 
the overall strategic goal of 'essential equivalence'. The Carter administration had, as 
we have seen, placed a high priority on restricting U. S. arms transfers, and had 
announced, on May 19,1977 a comprehensive package of measures to ensure that, 
'henceforth' they be regarded as 'an exceptional instrument of national security policy. 
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These would include a reduction of FY 1978 dollar volume of new FMS and grant aid 
commitments from the baseline of FY 1977, restrictions on weapons co-production and 
prohibition on, 'the development ... of advanced. --systems solely 
for export'. Further 
provisions addressed questions of 'end user' transfers and stated that, 'The United States 
will not be the first to introduce into a region ... advanced weapons systems that would 
create -significantly greater combat capability. 
" 
Concern at the level of such transactions had been growing throughout 1976, as the 
Senate began considering a $4.5bn. amis package to Iran and one of $701.6. m. to Saudi 
Arabia'6Here, pre-election Hearings (from September 16 -24,1976) before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations had witnessed widespread disquiet at the prospect of 
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both promoting a regional arms race 97 and providing further incentive to the Shah in 
particular to look to the oil market for funding - Iran, it was noted, 'has taken the lead to 
raise annually the priceof oil. 
188 For the proposed Saudi programme, opposition would 
focus on the, 'almost transparent relationship to the military situation in the Arab -Israeli 
theatre"' of the requested 850 'Sidewinder' a/a, 650 'Maverick' a/g and 1000 TOW 
(anti-tank) missiles and, further, on the inherent hostility between the Arab states and 
Iran itself. 90 Saudi Arabia, one witness remarked, was becoming 'the arms warehouse of 
the Arab world. "' For both countries, the Senate voiced concern for the wider. ) 
sociological implications of such 'highly stratified societies ... being overwhelmed by 
twentieth century Western technology. '12 As, with some prescience, Senator Church was 
to observe, 'the fastest way you can radicalize the politics of an underdeveloped country 
is through a very large military buildup. '91 Overall, many in the Senate remained 
unconvinced by administration affirmations of the 'maturity' in U. S. -Iranian relations94 
as of the 'moderation' of Saudi Arabia. 'We cannot', Hubert Humphrey declared, 'get 
away [from] arms sales as if we were selling televisions and refrigerators. "' 
The above considerations had been instrumental in determining the administration's 
own revised arms transfer policy following the (April 1,1977) ratification of PRM 12.1'6 
Whilst somewhat qualified by the exception of 'major allies' and 'our commitments to 
Israel'97 
the new guidelines were to have immediate results in the cancellation of an 
$700m. order from Pakistan for 100 A-7 ground attack aircraft and of a proposed $4- 
5bn- follow on package for Iran, for 250 as yet unproduced F-18L advanced fighters. " 
However, the issues would again arise in Senate Hearings in May, 1978. 
Ir. 
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If the 1976 arms sales programme had been then criticized by Leslie Gelb for being, 
'open-ended' and, 'the functional equivalent of a treaty, '" the administration was now 
itself confronting the 'incipient revolution' in the regional terms of the anins trade as part 
of its overall diplomacy for the Middle East. As was often emphasized, the Carter policy 
agenda placed a considerable importance on securing a 'comprehensive' Arab-Israeli 
settlement. There was also much administration unanimity, evident in the early pla i 
schedule (the January 31,1977 TRM 3'), 101 that the process would have to be extended 
beyond the bilateral Kissinger approach to admit at least acquiescence from other 
regional actors. As previously, however, arms transfers would remain an 'essential' 
avenue for the U. S. 'retaining our close relationship '101 with the principals. For 
consideration in the 1978 progranune were the series of ongoing negotiations to sell F-15 
and F-16 systems to Israel, 50 (lower capability) F-5's to Egypt and a further 60 F-15's 
to Saudi Arabia. These, to emphasize the unitary nature of the administration's strategy, 
were presented to Congress as a single package. The Saudi component, following from 
the contested TOW/Maverick package of September, 1976, was to meet with particularly 
close questioning. Here, Harold Brown had argued that, 'I do not recommend this sale 
solely on military grounds ... [but] ... because it 
is important to. -. the American position 
in 
the Middle East'01 and commended the 'high statesmanship' of the Saudi regiane in 
I placing its own immediate economic self interest subordinate to the health of the world 
economy. 1103 The Defense Secretary's arguments were to find support from ACDA 
Director Paul Warnke. 104For Warnke, 'there are, indeed, certain positive arms control 
aspects to the sales' in obviating the purchase of more capable aircraft from elsewhere. 
'The final and compelling arms control argument' for the sales proceeding, however, was 
seen in 'Saudi support ... for progress toward an Arab-Israeli peace settlement', which will 
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be enhanced by, 'anything we can do to strengthen our ties with Saudi Arabia. '101 
overall, for the administration as for many in Congress, the transfers presumed a 
reciprocal dynamic concerning U. S. 'friends ... in their search for peace and in their 
policies of moderation. '106Thus, as one Senator observes, 'the best help the moderate 
Arab countries can have is the maintenance of a strong Israel. '107 
Yet, the complementary pattern of 'linkage' promoted by the Carter administration 
in its strengthening of regional allies was not self-evident in the perceptions of the 
powers themselves. Both Israel and the Arab states were active in lobbying against their 
respective regional protagonists on Capitol Hill. 101 Here, for one Senate witness, 'The 
American militarization of Saudi Arabia will lead to destabilization of the area, since 
'. - -the only way that Saudi [Arabia] can legitimize their medieval kingdom is to establish 
a positive linkage between pan-Arabism and Saudi legitimacy. '119 VAiilst for former 
Secretary Kissinger, the administration's unitary arms package 'links together the 
security concerns of Israel and the security concerns of Saudi Arabia which are not really 
commensurable. " 10 Throughout, discussion both in the Senate and elsewhere would 
return to this central dilemma, which was to ultimately disable the administration's hopes 
for an inclusive regional security policy. The flawed assumption was that a common 
pro-Western orientation within the respective actors could be advanced into acceptance 
of a common U-S- strategy for the region as a whole. However, as much Senate 
testimony would affmn, 111 a principal 'security concern' for both Israel and Saudi Arabia 
was with each other. 
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V. Beyond the 'Tar Baby Option': Ethiopia, Somalia, and the African 
Dimension to Indian Ocean Policy. 
If the Arab-Israeli military balance established one pole of contradiction in the Carter 
administration's regional security policy, the other was provided by the military 
imbalance in the Hom of Africa. Here, the unfolding crisis involving Soviet, Israeli, 
0 
Egyptian and Saudi interests - with some indirect input from Iran - would directly 
impact on U. S. Indian Ocean policy and, in turn, on U-S. -Soviet relations as a whole. 
As is apparent from the early Carter campaign speeches and the NSC's 'Briefing Book' 
and PRM schedule, African policy as such was to have a higher profile in the new 
administration's concerns. The political background in the Democrat's domestic power 
base was a clear factor here, as was the general 'Trilateral' concern for 'North-South' 
issues. Thus, PRM 4 on the South African and Rhodesian position was to -be 
completed by January 31 as was PRM 8 on 'North-South' strategy by March. I" At his 
confirmation hearings, Ambassador designate Andrew Young had declared that, 'we 
have the opportunity to restablish the credibility (in Africa) that we once had more than 
a decade ago"" -a stance designed, as in other matters, to establish a clear break with 
the perceived neglect of the Nixon administration and the 'tar baby option' of NSSM 39. 
However, as again with much elsewhere in the Carter administration's regional strategy, 
the rhetoric of innovation would surmount much continuity with its predecessor. 
Kissinger had himself become involved in African negotiations toward the end of the 
Ford Presidency. The Soviet/Cuban engagement in Angola had brought the region up in 
strategic importance, compounding existing U. S. concerns at the more gradual Soviet 
establishment in Somalia. This had, inter alia, produced a $300m. MAP/FMS 
commitment for Zaire, Kenya and Ethiopia, 114 announced in June, 1976. 
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For the Carter administration there were, though, two distinct - if related - departures 
from established U. S. policy in the local arena of the African Horn. Firstly, for the 
Vance State Department and the President himself, the East-West perspective had no 
longer the automatic primacy found in the approach of Kissinger. This meant that the 
simmering Somali-Ethiopian conflict in particular was no longer to be taken up in these 
terins as a strategic 'given' for U. S. policy; a change that would have consequences for 
what had been hitherto consistent (if diminishing) U. S. support for Ethiopia, despite the 
avowedly revolutionary programmes of the Addis Ababa regime. Second, and 
collaterally, the CarterNance regional focus was to be more responsive to the views of 
allies on the Somali question where, again despite an ostensive political orientation of 
'scientific socialism' and the 1974 treaty with Russia, the military government of Said 
Barre was receptive to approaches from conservative U. S. partners in Africa and the 
Middle East, notably, Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. 
The impact of Somalia's prospective defection from the Soviet alliance on the parallel 
Pentagon agenda for the 'sea lanes of communication' was a further aspect of the 
strategic Hom equation, whose effect on administration policy for the East African 
littoral and wider considerations of Indian Ocean security will be examined below. 
As we have seen, a main focus of attention in both the Ford administration and much 
of the Congress concerned with Indian Ocean matters had been the progress of the 
I steady buildup' of Soviet capabilities in Somalia. However, from 1974 onwards a 
ftu-ther 
dilemma for U. S- policy had been presented by the gathering momentum of the 
revolution in Ethiopia, following an uprising of January-September of that year. Here, 
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although the Empire had entered a U. S. Military Assistance agreement in May, 1953 
and between 1946-74 received $220m. in MAP and $350m. 111 in overall economic aid 
- the largest such amount in Africa - its perceived importance to U. S. policy had been 
in decline. The close identification of U. S. interests with the personality of the Emperor 
was viewed by many in the State Department as a disadvantage. The manifest decay of 
the institutions of state meant that the ability of Ethiopia to play a 'moderating' role in 
regional politics was reduced. The Emperor Haile Sellassie was, on the occasion of his 46.7 
last (1973) visit to Washington, refused additional military aid to sustain a long-standing 
counter-insurgency campaign in Eritrea. "' Sellassie's obduracy on the Eritrean question 
had increasingly constricted the usefulness of the (Asmara-based) Kagnew station. The 
direct U. S. security stake in Ethiopia was also greatly reduced for other reasons after the 
Melvin Laird DOD reorganization of 1970, which had transferred the Kagnew 
Communications base to the Navy (see chap. 2), and begun removing many of its 
functions to Diego Garcia. Kagnew had, by 1976 been reduced to 35 personnel from a 
peak of 3000 in 1971.1" 
However, whilst Washington's relations with the successive Ethiopian regimes had 
become increasingly distant, the net volume of MAP/FMS and other military transfers 
had actually grown-"' The June, 1976 package was to include two squadrons of F-5E 
aircraft, one of F-5A's, C-130 transports and M-60 tanks and APC's to the value of 
$175m. 111 There was also some bureaucratic momentum to maintaining a possible 
influence in Ethiopian affairs at the State Department. Some had argued that the pattern 
Of the emerging government in Addis Ababa was unclear and could yet be 
influenced to 
U. S. advantage. " In August, 1976 Senate Hearings, African Affairs desk officials were 
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to endorse the FMS proposals on the grounds that, 'although (the government) is trying 
to set up some kind of leftist or socialist system in Ethiopia ... it is not systematically or 
instinctively anti-United States. 1121 
A further factor in U. S. Ethiopia policy was the willingness of Israel to accommodate 
its long-standing 'peripheral' posture with the new Addis reginie. The central 
considerations were, though, strategic. Thus, as the Senate Foreign Relations Conunittee 
was to hear, 'the Russians - .. have engineered a huge military buildup in Somalia to the 
point where ... a very inferior force is now considered by some to have ... superiority over 
Ethiopia'. The Somali order of battle would, to date, consist of 'some 50 Mig 15-21's' 
a squadron of IL-28 medium bombers, 250 T34/T54 tanks, 10 artillery battalion's (as 
against four for Ethiopia) SA-2 SAM's, two 'Skiori' class destroyers, 10 MTB's, two 
ASW ships, 3W APC's and some 20W military advisors. 
122 The Soviet union had, in 
addition 'stationed Cuban Units in Somalia' and, 'are also, through Syria, allied to the 
(insurgent) Eritrean Liberation Front. '121 The perceived threat of a greatly enhanced 
Somali military capability was, furtherinore, compounded by the frequently expressed 
territorial aims of the Barre regime. The Somali (1960) constitution extended the state's 
notional sovereignty to not only the Ethiopian Ogaden province but to the North Frontier 
District (NFD) of Washington's ally, Kenya 
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and the French held territory of the Assars, 
and Iffars. Such claims had been reinforced with the refusal, at the (July, 1976) OAU 
meeting in Mauritius, to recognize the future independence of Djibouti, due after a 
referendum in January, 1977.12s 
IF 
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The event of a successful Somali incursion in either (or both) of the two Horn 
territories would, for one Senate witness, suggest that, 'the Soviets would have the full 
hypotenuse of control from Mogadishu right down to the straits of Bab al Mandab. "I' 
The latter prospect, as further testimony was to emphasize, also presented a strategic 
dilemma for Israel. 127 A previous Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran had been an 
(at least ostensible) casus belli in the 1967 wa r. 128The similar strategic sensitivity of the 
Mandab Straits, where 'every half-hour, Israeli tankers pass through', had in 
consequence, led Tel Aviv to have 'located its most important mission for all of Africa 
in Ethiopia. "" Although a formal offer of military aid had been declined by the 
Monarchy in 1972,110 a series of covert arrangements still obtained with the revolutionary 
Tergue', including interdiction of ELF/EPLF arms shipments off the Eritrean coast. "' 
Israel had also maintained its level of equally covert military and intelligence co- 
operation with Kenya - evident in the Entebbe raid of July 3,1976 
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_ whilst the 
imbrication of regional alliances was further evident in relations between Kenya and 
Ethiopia, "I wherein a 1964 mutual defence agreement had remained in force. An 
additional complication for U. S. policy was present in the support for both Eritrean 
independence and Somali territorial ambitions from Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; 
particularly following Somalia's accession to the Arab League in December, 1973. 
The August, 1976 Hearings had illustrated the complexity of the evolving regional 
dislocation in the Hom, and the breadth of implications for U. S. policy in Africa, the 
Middle East and the Indian Ocean. For the Carter administration, the established 
consensus amongst State officials to, 'not ... change our policy on economic aid and 
military assistance"14 to Ethiopia was outweighed by the Dergue's human rights record 
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and increasing military relationship with Moscow. Ethiopia's requests for Soviet aid had, 
in fact, been pending since September, 1974, but had to date only secured some limited 
economic support and a military training mission. However, following an internal power 
struggle in February, 1977111 the reconstituted 'Provisional Military Administrative 
Council' (PMAQ had sought Soviet mediation on the Ogaden question. With the 
prospect of a political and diplomatic settlement advancing Soviet interests throughout 
the 'Socialist Oriented' states of the Red Sea littoral, the USSR moved to organize a 
summit between PMAC Chairman Mengistu. and Siad Barre in Aden on the advent of 
Fidel Castro's March, 1977 tour of Africa. On the agenda was a proposed 'Federation 
of the Horn of Africa' to include Ethiopia, Somalia and South Yemen, with autonomy 
provided for the Ogaden and Eritrea. Whilst this had proved unacceptable to Somalia, 
the Dergue had also moved to consolidate bilateral Soviet-Ethiopian ties and had expelled 
all U. S. officials except embassy staff on April, 13.111 This was followed by an 
iinmediate termination of U. S. military assistance and the final withdrawal from Kagnew 
On May, 9a joint Soviet-Ethiopian communique announced the implementation of a 
substantial Soviet military aid programme, whose scope was emphasized by the arrival 
of 400 Cuban advisors in Addis Ababa. "' 
The growing involvement with the Dergue did not, at first, mean a diminution of Soviet 
aid to Somalia. However, whilst the PMAC had, effectively, no other option but the 
Soviet alliance, the Barre regime had been consolidating its links with Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. "I Riyadh, it can be recalled, had sought the removal of the Soviet presence from 
Berbera in 1974. From the beginning of 1977, as the Western Somalia Liberation Front 
increased its operations in the Ogaden, U. S. policy makers were also under increasing 
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pressure to detach Somalia from the Soviet camp by Iran and the Nimeiri regime in the 
Sudan. Khartoum had, in May, 1977 expelled 90 Soviet military advisors and ordered 
the closing of the military section of the Soviet embassy. 131 A common theme taken up 
here was to relate the Soviet advances in Ethiopia to a 'sinister grand strategy '110 as the 
Sudanese President was to put it. Such geopolitical speculation was to fall on fertile 
ground in Washington, and become regularly featured in public statements by National 
Security Advisor Brzezinski. 
VI. 'The Nominal Aggressors': the Ogaden Crisis and the Strategic Balance. 
The complex pattern of inter-state conflict in the Horn throughout 1977, culminating in 
a virtual 'reversal of alliances' between the great powers and their regional clients was, 
ceteris paribus, a product of local factors. As shall be argued, however, a critical 
external bearing on events was also to be provided by the inconsistencies in U. S. policy 
between the key months of April-September 1977. 
Here, moreover, the unravelling of bureaucratic consensus in the administration was 
to threaten both the prospects for Indian Ocean arms control and the influence of the 
'regionalist' perspectives of State and ACDA in detennining U. S. policy for the area. 
e ing of NALT had gone smoothly, and had, indeed been cited as a Heretofore, the op n 
success area in U. S. arms control, as opposed to the slow progress on the SALT and 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties. Referring to the several U. S. -Soviet negotiations in 
a July, 21 speech at Charleston, President Carter spoke of a 'yearning for peace' as 'the 
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invisible human reality that brings us both together. "" In a similar vein, official State 
Department comment following the September (Washington) NALT meeting had referred 
to the 'advanced stage' of the talks and 'finminence' of the signing of a fonnal 
agreement. "I However, 'then' as Paul Warnke observes, 'the Horn of Africa ... just 
chilled the negotiations totally. 1143 
As the postfacto account by Zbigniew Brzezinski makes clear, U. S. policy in the Horn 
was to be conducted from the NSC's standpoint as a direct function of the wider pattern 
of U. S. -Soviet competition in the region. From this perspective 'the situation between 
týe Ethiopians and the Somalis was more than a border conflict. Coupled with the 
expansion of Soviet influence and military presence to South Yemen, it posed a 
potentially grave threat to our position in the Middle East ... [and] ... it represented a 
serious setback to our attempts to develop with the Soviets some rules of the game in 
dealing with turbulence in the third world - 'I" Here, 
it can be recorded that the 
administration's own observance of the 'rules of the game' was far from clear cut - 
particularly in terms of restraint on regional allies. As Brzezinski acknowledges, 'Our 
ability to help the Somalis was not helped' by the fact that, 'they were the nominal 
aggressors. ""' What was also, though, of signal significance in assessing Moscow's 
regional policy was the apparent record of its realisation. 'The Soviets', it was noted, 
'had earlier succeeded in sustaining ... their Preferred solution 
in Angola. 1146 
There were indeed similarities between the course of Soviet policy on these opposite 
sides of the continent. In both cases, the goverment (or provisional government) had 
been recognized as legitimate by the bulk bf the international diplomatic community and 
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the Organization of African Unity in particular. In both cases the Soviets were thus seen 
as providing legitimate aid against outside aggression, and in both cases the balance had 
been decisively shifted by Soviet logistics. In the case of Ethiopia, this had rapidly 
reached a level of some 1,500 Soviet advisors, 2000 Warsaw Pact personnel and 13,000 
Cuban troops 147 by November/December, 1977 and would permit the PMAC to begin 
offensive operations in the new year. For Somalia itself, the increasing military pressure 
prompted the Barre regime to abrogate the 1974 'Friendship and Co-operation' treaty 
and, on November, 13 expel all Soviet military personnel and break off diplomatic 
relations with Cuba. 
The reaction from Washington following this move was, however, as mixed as that 
preceding it. The U. S. regional allies had, as we have seen, long been pressing for such 
an outcome. In the eyes of some observers, "" Barre had also received some covert 
encouragement from the NSC. Carter had himself declared an interest in 'moving in 
every way to get Somalia to be our friend' in a public interview of April, 1977.149A State 
Department announcement (later withdrawn) of July 29 had suggested willingness 
'in principle' to supply arms to the Mogadishu regime - "I Yet, for others in the 
administration, the case for 'aggressively challenging' the Soviet Union in the Ogaden 
- particularly in terms of military aid - was by no means self evident. 'For (Cyrus) 
Vance', Brzezinski observes, 'the African matter was largely a local issue, and he was * 
strongly backed by the State Department - "" Moreover, as a 
Congressional (H. I. R. C. ) 
mission to the region of December, 12-22 was to hear, the revolutionary government in 
Ethiopia was concerned to present itself as observing 'strict adherence to nonaligmnent' 
and would not, in the words of PMAC Chairman Mengistu, 'be the tool of anyone. "" 
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Despite considerable reservation on the Dergue's human tights record 153 the House 
Mission was to recommend that the U. S. 'respect Ethiopian nationaliSM 1 '54 and ,' avoid 
putting Mengistu and the Dergue in the position we put Castro and Cuba in ten years 
ago"" and overall, urge the 'fonnation of a regional approach to the Hom. "I' 
In terms of the arguments presented, there would seem considerable scope for such 
an approach. The difficulty for the administration, however, would lie in reconciling the 
order of equivalence for local priorities and relations with the Soviet Union. As 
developed in the findings of the House 'factfinding mission', these issues were to be 
resolved on the level of counterbalancing the 'regional' perspectives on U. S. Ethiopia 
policy with a recommendation that 'United States-Soviet talks on the superpowers 
presence in the Indian Ocean ... should not proceed until the Soviets display a more 
responsible attitude in the Hom. "I' Here, a return to some form of 'linkage' was 
strenuously resisted at the State Department and ACDA. The arguments, familiar from 
the Nixon administration, had been consistently opposed by Secretary Vance. For Vance, 
'By casting the complex Horn situation in East-West terms ... we were shooting ourselves 
in the foot, "I' whilst for Paul Warnke, 'we thought, if you can get a good arms control 
agreement, why should you pass it up just because of pique? '110 Yet, for the NSC and, 
mcreasingly, President Carter himself, the questions of an Indian Ocean treaty, as with 
those of regional policy in general and relations with the Soviet Union in particular, were 
becoming increasingly conditional on the further factor of the administration's agenda 
for a settlement in the Middle East. 
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Here, an October, 1 State Department initiative to reconvene the (U. S. /Soviet co- 
sponsored) Geneva Conference, initially endorsed by President Carter, had been 
withdrawn within three days after sustained domestic criticism. The Geneva opening, 
conceived by Cyrus Vance as part of established departmental policy on great power 
bilateralism, was in this instance, supported by Brzezinski in order to promote 
lunease ... for (Menachem) Begin. "61 The retraction was indicative of the divided cast of 
administration priorities toward the Soviet Union. "' These, again, would be placed on 
a level subaltern to relations with U. S. allies. The Geneva initiative did indeed cause 
unease in the Israeli leadership. It also, however, served to consolidate the incoming 
Likud coalition against U. S. pressure, and compound Tel Aviv's U. S. domestic support 
against the a ministration. It further engaged a fresh momentum in both Israel and Egypt 
toward a separate (bilateral) peace arrangement, apparent in Sadat's (November, 19) 
visit to Jerusalem. "' The overall result was thus a more complete exclusion of the Soviet 
Union from Middle East diplomacy than had been attained under Kissinger. This, in 
turn, would remove many incentives for Moscow to cooperate with the other aspects of 
administration's regional strategy in both conventional arms control and naval arms 
control for the Indian Ocean. 
The prospects for an early NALT agreement were also, from the Soviet viewpoint, to 
suffer from more local developments in the Horn of Africa. As has been noted, in 
November, 1977 the Soviet military and Naval presence, including air support facilities 
and a floating dry-dock, was withdrawn from Somalia to Aden. At the same time, the 
level of hostilities in the Ogaden war and Eritrea necessitated an actual increase in the 
levels of deployed Soviet Naval units, which were being used in a combat - albeit, 
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largely supportive - role for the first time. This would have parallel consequences for 
both the Soviet negotiating position and the aligrunents of the regional powers, 
particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Thus, at the December (Berne) sessions, Moscow 
had pressed for modifications to the September, 1977 draft protocol, which had ratified 
a 'stabilization' of forces at current levels. This was perceived to leave the Soviet fleet 
at a disadvantage after the loss of Berbera. 161 In compensation, the Soviet delegation had 
suggested formal restrictions on nuclear powered vessels - which, in a clear reference 
to U. S. 'Enterprise' class carriers and SSN's - were not acceptable to the increasingly 
trenchant arms control posture adopted by the NSC. Equally unacceptable were further 
suggestions that Washington cease the continuing upgrade programme for Diego 
Garcia. 161 For the Carter administration, a change of emphasis was also apparent. On 
January, 24,1978, the President had approved Brzezinski's recommendation that, 'the 
American side would deliver a protest to the Soviet Union'regarding the negative 
implications for our negotiations of the ongoing Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa 
and the related buildup of Soviet military presence '166at what was to be the final Berne 
session in February. 
The 'related buildup' of Soviet forces would, in other respects, serve to compound the 
regional balance in the eyes of Washington's principal local allies and hence directly 
engage on the administration's main concerns in the Middle East. These were to be 
found on both sides of the Red Sea. Firstly, the Soviet civilian and naval traffic to 
Ethiopia - staged through Massawa and the Dahlak Islands - was presented by Egypt 
as both threatening to its own shipping lanes and to any prospective support for 
Mogadishu. Sadat had, by December, 1977, transferred some $30m. of surplus Soviet 
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equipment to Somalia, 167 and suggestions of an Egyptian expeditionary force, of 'one 
annoured brigade 
'161 
were also under active consideration at this time. These moves were 
supported by Sudan. Here, the Nimeiri regime was advancing joint security arrangements 
with Egypt and also considering troops for Somalia. 169 
A perhaps more significant factor for Washington, however, was the - albeit, 
involuntary - Soviet move to Aden. Although regularly featured on the Russian naval 
itinerary since 1968, the level of traffic and shore-based support had been of a lesser 
order than the Soviet and Warsaw Pact activities in Berbera. The CIA's July, 1974 
Senate deposition, it can be recalled, had concluded that (the Soviet Navy) 'have not used 
it (Aden) very much. ' Following the Soviet move, the U. S. was to come under increas' 
pressure from the Saudi government to counter the 'threat' from South Yemen, which 
had been earlier argued in support of the contested Maverick/TOW sales programme of 
1976. Iran was, from a sinfflar standpoint, to reinforce the Saudi's approach. Following 
a regional tour of Aswan and Riyadh in October, 1977, the Shah reported that the Saudis 
were 'petrified' of a Soviet presence on the Arabian mainland. 
170 The Iranians had 
themselves retained both ground and air forces in Oman following the containment of the 
PUFULOAG insurgency, which had received some support from South Yemen. Such 
appeals would, at this juncture, meet a sympathetic reception from the NSC - 'The 
Soviets... operating in the Red Sea', Defense Secretary Harold Brown was to infonn the 
Senate, are 'a clear and present danger' to Saudi Arabia. 
1171 These considerations served 
to confirm the position on the merits of U. S. -Soviet arms control taken by the 
National Security Advisor. For the NALT, Brzezinski had long been sceptical about the 
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practicalities of the Indian Ocean talks and indeed, had been urging the deployment of 
a Carrier task group off the Horn from February, 1978.112 
VU. Regional Arms Control in a Global Context: the UN Special Session, 
India, and 'Proper Nonalignment'. 
In the light of the unfolding regional balance in the African Hom and the parallel internal 
struggle waged over the conduct of the administration's foreign policy, the February 
session of talks on Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation was to end on a somewhat 
inconclusive note. As Washington's regional allies, notably Egypt, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, laid stress on the Soviet threat in support of the several pending arms-sales 
packages, Brzezinski had warned that, 'linkages' throughout the spectrum of U. S. -Soviet 
arms control, '... may be imposed by unwarranted (Soviet) exploitation of local conflict 
for larger international purposes. '171 For the State Department, however, Cyrus Vance 
would issue an immediate rebuttal that 'There is no linkage' between the arms control 
programme and '... the situation in Ethiopia. "' Whilst for Carter himself, a speech of 
March, 17 had declared that, 'Arms control agreements are a major goal as instruments 
of our national security, but this will be possible only if we maintain adequate force 
levels. ' Moreover, the President had ftxther affinned U-S. interest in 'developing forces 
to counter any threats to our allies ... in Asia, the 
Middle East and other regions of the 
world' and, in a clear reference to PD-18, that, 'The Secretary of Defense, at my 
direction is improving and will maintain quickly deployable forces--air, land and sea--to 
defend our interests throughout the world. 
'171 This dichotomy was again pursued within 
June, 7 speech at Annapolis, in which Moscow was offered the choice between, 'either 
confrontation or co-operation. '176Throughout, the conflicting statements issuing from the 
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various agencies of government concerning the future of arms control seemed 
symptomatic of the wider contradictions that, in the eyes of many observers, had begun 
to characterize the Carter Presidency. 'His sense of conscious ambiguity is hard to 
discerni wrote Carnegie Endowment President Thomas L. Hughes, '... This fortifies the 
ill-starred politics of pushing ahead indiscrhninately on all fronts. '17 
Yet, despite the manifest disparities of 'language, truth and logic 1171 afflicting the 
administration's public presentation of its policies, the overall momentum for arms 
control would continue to enjoy Presidential sanction. Whilst the course of more specific 
4evelopments in the Indian Ocean region were also to lend renewed optimism to the 
ACDA in 'pushing ahead' the NALT process. Preparations were underway for the 
Special UN Session on Disarmament (SSOD), scheduled for May, 23,1978. In this, 
a number of arms control issues were being pursued that were of central importance to 
the Carter strategy. Thus, the utility of maintaining the talks was, in terms of 
reinforcement of the wider agenda, considerable. As indeed, would be the adverse effects 
of U. S. withdrawal from NALT on the 'Special Session' itself. Here, the ACDA was to 
argue that, 'this administration has tried to strengthen the U. S. role as a leader in the 
anns control field' and stress the, 'unprecedented range of negotiations, SALT 11, the 
Indian Ocean talks, the comprehensive test ban [and] the ban on anti-satellite warfare"' 
which could substantiate the claim before the UN General Assembly. The earlier 
I complete demilitarization' proposals of March, 1977 and opening of NALT had, 
moreover, produced an apparent success in assuaging what many in the administration 
believed was an I artificial anti-American ... majority' of third world states. 
" At the April, 
1977 meeting of the Political Committee of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned 
. 
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Nations, Bangladesh sought the removal of clauses specific to Diego Garcia in a joint 
Non-Aligned resolution on the 'Zone of Peace' issue. "I A further, and more 
substantive development had also served to unite the strands of administration policy to 
the region, with the election, in March, 1977 of a new government in India under Moraji 
Desai. 
Unlike the Gandhi government, whose 'cold blooded pursuit of national interest' had 
been so inimical to the Nixon administration, the Janata party Is platform had combined 
market economics with a declared policy of improved relations with Washington. This, 
the Carter administration and a State Department steeped, as Kissinger had mordantly 
observed, in 'three decades of sentimental attachment to India' was happy to reciprocate. 
India was a principal amongst the 'regional influentials' suggested as a focus for U. S. 
diplomacy within the initial the Carter briefing papers and meetings of the NSC. 
112 
Congress had also, in April, 1977 repealed a 1974 injunction on U. S. approval for 
World Bank/IDA loans to India, "' and further wrote in a $60m. AID authorization for 
FY 1978. The process of closer economic co-operation was formalized with the signing. ) 
in August, 1978, of the $58m. loans and $2m. grants package, with an additional $90m. 
AI 
to follow for FY 1979.114A further element in Indo-U. S. 'detente was provided by the 
administration's cancellation of the A-7 order for Pakistan and rejection of the Bhutto 
regfine's offer of naval support facilities at Gwadar. 185 
For New Delhi, Prime Minister Desai expressed his rejection of the 'anti-Western' 
policies of his predecessor and concern for, 'proper nonalignment ... with no suspicions 
of any alliance with anybody -" Wbilst this did not mean the abrogation of 
the 1971 
IL 
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Indo-Soviet treaty, nor of the complex of institutionalized bilateral linkages - developed 
since the 1960's - in such spheres as arms procurement and co-production, a change in 
India's foreign policy orientation was apparent in the approach to Indian Ocean affairs. 
Here, although stressing the continued UN 'Zone of Peace' commitment to, 'eliminate 
[the] foreign military presence' from the region, 
117 the previous distinction between a 
U. S. military 'base' and the Soviet military 'presence' was, significantly, omitted from 
Indian policy statements on the issue. 'It is wrong', Desai had told Congress T critics 
in the Lok Sabha, '... to say that the Soviet Union has no base whatsoever. It has spheres 
of influence in the Indian Ocean and this could not be denied. "I' Furthermore, as Foreign 
Minister Vajpayee was to affirm, the new government 'does not regard Diego Garcia as 
a bilateral problem between India and the U. S. " 19 
Given the frequent U. S. assertions that the Soviet navy enjoyed a 'privileged' access 
to India's Eastern Fleet Headquarters at Visakapatnam, the turn toward 'true 
nonalignment' from New Delhi had provided a distinct, if subsidiary moment to opening 
the NALT negotiations. India had, indeed, actively opposed Soviet moves to establish 
a lease on the former British facilities at Gan on the Maldives Islands. 190 Further grounds 
for sustaining the arms control process were provided in Carter's Presidential visit to 
India on January 3,1978. The latter, favourably compared to the successful 1956 
Eisenhower tour, included negotiations on the $60m. AID package"' and was 
reciprocated by a state visit to Washington in June by Desai. Here, a joint communique 
expressed optimism for a successful conclusion in the talks on the 'stabilization of (U -S 
Soviet) military presence in the Indian Ocean. 
'112 The possibilities for a wider 
engagement of the administration's strategy for 'regional influentials' had also become 
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apparent in the February, 1978 tour of India by the Shah of Iran. Whilst a strong 
supporter of Pakistan, the Shah also saw the opportunity to advance Iran's progranune 
for a 'common market' for South Asia. 191 Indian technical expertise was well established 
amongst Iran's substantial pool of expatriate labour and the Shah's February agenda 
aimed to expand Indo-Iranian economic relations to cover joint industrial ventures in 
iron ore, aluminium and oil refining. 
114 
Further indication of a change of U. S. priorities in South Asia was to appear in the 
attitude to the respective sub-continental powers' approach to nuclear proliferation. In 
contrast to the fatalism prevailing under the Nixon/Ford administrations, the Carter 
White House had identified the spread of nuclear weapons technology as a priority issue. 
The Nuclear Non -proliferation Act, signed by President Carter on March 10,1978 
provided for withdrawal of U. S. nuclear fuel supplies to 'those countries ... engaging in 
activities leading to ... the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
by a non-weapon state. '191 It 
was complemented by the 'Symington-Glen amendment', which imposed cut-offs of 
economic and military assistance to 'any country exporting or importing reprocessed or 
unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment materials ... or technology. 
' The spread of the latter 
technology - an essential prerequisite for military as opposed to civil usage - was of 
particular concern to the administration. In August, 1978, U. S. pressure succeeded in 
cancelling an order for France to build a reprocessing plant at Kahuta in Pakistan. " 
However, continuing evidence of Pakistan's covert nuclear programme would remain an 
obstacle to U. S. relations with Islamabad. Whilst Pakistan was itself to introduce a 
provision for 'the littoral. and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean' to reach agreement 
on '... the renunciation of nuclear weapons "I" at the May, 1978 SSOD proceedings, U. S. 
x"ll"I'l- 
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concern would result, in May, 1979, in the implementation of Symington-Glen on the 
new regime of General Zia al-Haq. "'In contrast, the administration had welcomed the 
fact that, 'India's Prime Minister Desai has publicly renounced any further 'peaceful' 
nuclear explosions and has pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. "I' 
This would pennit continuing support for U. S. nuclear fuel exports to India's own 
unregulated facilities in Rajastan. 201 
Thus far, in considering the mid-term of the Carter administration, it is perhaps worth 
restating the extent to which the inaugural, regionalist focus was - at least in the Middle 
East/Indian Ocean policy area - retaining a visible momentum. Carter had, inter alia, 
concerted the first (formal) bilateral negotiations between Egypt and Israel and had hopes 
to use the undoubted rapport with President Sadat"I to extend the process to include Syria 
and Saudi Arabia. Again, whilst a clear differentiation of administration opinion - 
apparent in the abortive Geneva initiative - existed on the possibilities for a more 
comprehensive U. S. -Soviet approach to the region, Vance and Brzezinski remained, as 
the latter relates, 'genuinely close allies on the (local dynamic of) the Middle East-'m To 
be sure, the 'genuine' State/NSC accord on the Camp David process was precisely a 
function of the extent to which the latter negotiations excluded the Soviet Union. 
However, despite the increasing tendency in the NSC and indeed, for the President 
personally, to focus on the 'imposed' linkage between regional and arms control Policy 
and 'actions by the Soviets', 101 progress was continuing on the SALT talks which had 
reached a point where, as Brzezinski observes, 'the end was in sight'21" by the September, 
1978 sessions in Washington. Hence, although the domestic perceptions of an 
administration 'irresolute' in its handling of foreign affairs205were, by mid-1978 perhaps 
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even more acute than at the height of the Ogaden crisis, the SALT opening and 
developments in, the Middle East/South Asia crescent represented a countervailing 
tendency such as to give encouragement for continuing overall with what one 
Congressional report had termed a 'regional partnership' approach as opposed to a 
reconstituted 'global contaimnent'. 1 The extent to which these hopes were to be realised. 
will provide the final sections of this chapter. 
VIII. Arms Control on Capitol Hill: the Conventional and Naval Arms 
Limitation Hearings of October, 1978. 
If the momenaim accompanying the SALT and SSOD negotiations had reaffirmed the 
possibilities for arms control as such, there were further, more local factors to support 
the ACDA position on an early resumption of the NALT agenda. The Soviet Union 
had, in June, 1978 withdrawn units of the naval task force sent to reinforce the 
campaign in the Ogaden. Iw Contrary to fears expressed on the NSC, the 'Cuban military 
proxy' had not pressed home their advantages to drive into Somalia proper. The 
administration had, indeed, received separate assurances from Moscow, Havana and 
Ethiopia itself that the parties would support 'a cease-fire in conjunction with Somali 
withdrawal (from the Ogaden), peace negotiations and the territorial integrity of both 
states. '101 Further, in the context of much public attention on the various pending arms 
sales to U. S. allies in the Middle East, a successful Indian Ocean arms limitation 
agreement could regain an overall positive image of administration programmes for the 
region. To the evident frustration of Cyrus Vance, the 'setting of impossible objectives 
for U. S. policy' represented by the trenchant advocacy of National Security Advisor 
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Brzezinski, and the latter's public 'linkage' of Soviet support for Ethiopia with progress 
on SALT and other arms control areas was, 'creating a perception that we were 
defeated(in the Horn conflict) when, in fact we were achieving a successful outcome. 1209 
Against this background, the State Department and ACDA were to review the progress 
on NALT and conventional arms transfers before the House Armed Services Committee. 
The Heuings, from Oct. 3-10,1978, which were the only such to be devoted to Indian 
Ocean arms control, were held in tandem with the review of the administration's efforts 
to produce a regime of limitations on the transfer of conventional arms (CAT). Here, 
despite an initial reaction from the Soviet Union that appeared 'totally negative' in 
December, 1977, the subsequent (May, 1978) sessions had moved, in State's perception, 
to one of '... agreement with the United States that unrestrained arms transfers are a 
serious problem' and a proper forum for bilateral discussion. A further session had thus 
been scheduled for December, 1978.110 
Opening the October proceedings for the State Department, Director of Politico- 
Military Affairs Leslie Gelb was to present the House with a comprehensive account of 
the negotiations to date, together with an assessment of future development. In this, 
although 'Soviet naval operations' (in support of Ethiopia) had 'called into question' the 
basis for mutual understanding on the stabilization of force levels, the administration, 
'remains committed to seeking a sensible and verifiable Indian Ocean agreement. '211 The 
advantages for U. S. policy for so continuing with the NALT process were two-fold. In 
the first instance, the absence of such an agreement could admit an area of initiative for 
further Soviet expansion, hence 'forcing us to match that increase in order to maintain 
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our position"" in the region. This would, as before, require either an unwelcome 
redeployment of existing U. S. forces or increased defence outlay. Whilst the latter course 
had been strongly argued by some in Congress and the defence community, most of 
the Carter Cabinet still remained, in Brzezinski's phrase, 'bitten by the Vietnam bug 
1213 
and refused to countenance the construction of a 'Fifth Fleet' for the Indian Ocean. 
Obversely, the existence of 'an arms limitation agreement of the type we are seeking' 
would, in State's view, 'prevent any significant increase in Soviet naval force 
levels ... such as that associated with recent events 
in the Hom of Africa' and, 
furdiermore, 'prohibit the proliferation of military facilities under the control or primary 
use of the Soviet Union in littoraI states. 
1214 
The latter considerations providing for an Indian Ocean arms control agreement were 
to be expanded upon by ISA Director (Policy Plans), General James Thomson, notably 
with regard to the channelling of great power competition into primarily 'economic and 
political means' rather than the military. 'In both these (former) areas' the ISA Director 
pomts out, 'the U. S. has a decided advantage over the Soviet Union. ' A NALT regime 
would thus 'work to the long term political advantage of the U. S. in its relations with the 
littoral states. '211 From a more restricted militarY standpoint, NALT would, 'inhibit the 
Soviet capability to interfere militarily in the affairs of the littoral states ... [and] ... 
from 
surging forces to ... carry out major naval operations against a 
littoral state'. This could, 
I provide concrete assurance to the littoral states that the military balance in the Indian 
Ocean would not swing in favour of the Soviet Union'. in terms of the current 
balance 
of forces, it is argued that, 'although the Soviets have numerically more ships 
in the 
Indian Ocean on a day to day basis', the Soviet forces in the region, 'are no match 
for 
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a U. S. carrier task force'. These, Washington had retained the right to maintain at the 
current level of three deployments per year. The recently (July 1,1977) renegotiated 
agreement with Bahrain to maintain the three-vessel MIDEASTFOR would remain 
unaffected. 
216 1 Moreover' the testimony affmns, '. - -the U. S. would be able to maintain 
its facility on Diego Garcia. ' Overall, the case presented by ISA thus places some stress 
on current U. S. advantages in the region which a 'stabilization agreement' could only 
institutionalize, 'while ensuring that the Soviets could not improve their military 
position. "I' 
The Soviet Union's own perceived motivation for conceding such a regime was, at 
least as admitted in open session, somewhat less clear cut. Aside from a generalized 
diplomatic interest in 'present[ing] themselves as great proponents of arms control"" the 
principal of these was stated as, 'to preclude any large-scale increase in the level or 
mture of U. S. forces. 
1219 Here, given the Carter administration's expressed interest - 
and, indeed, apparent success - in improving diplomatic relations with the littoral states 
and the recent opposition to further military expansion attending the debate on Diego 
Garcia, a potential Soviet leeway for enhancing its own force structures would seem 
substantial. At this point, it is useful to review the above State/ISA argument in the light 
of earlier concerns for Moscow's 'expanding ... military logistics 
infrastructure' and 
general Soviet 'sea denial' strategy voiced at the Diego Garcia Hearings. As has been 
noted, the Soviet naval presence had indeed risen, 'to its highest levels ever' - some 30 
ships - by March, 1978.220 Although this had then returned to the 'average' 1975-7 
level 
of 'about 18 ships', with, 'roughly half of these ships being combatants, 
1221 
an obvious 
scope for interdiction of off trans-shipment to Japan and the '40 percent' of Persian Gulf 
ý'W'V' 
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production for Europe had thus been demonstrated-" For Representatives familiar with 
the arguments from Admiral Zumwalt and latterly restated by the British navalist, Patrick 
Wall MY, ' the apparent European and Japanese insouciance that, 'the Russians ... could 
bring Europe to its knees in six MonthS'224 was thus worthy of comment. 
The ISA's assessment however, was that the question of 'how best these supplies might 
be interdicted', would - from Moscow's own perspective - suggest a range of 
potentially more attractive targeting options, 'one of which is the source itself, one might 
be the Persian Gulf; one might be at sea near to t4e Soviet Union, or Japan or Europe. '221 
Again, the Diego Garcia debate can be recalled. Here, 'Interdiction of Western ... oil 
shipments from the Persian Gulf' was, for the CIA, not viewed as 'a major (Soviet) 
objective. 1226 In the NALT Hearings 'executive session, further detail can be discerned. 
Thus, for interdiction 'at source, a likely vehicle could be the Soviet 'Echo' class cruise 
missile submarine, some of which had been identified in the Indian Ocean-221 However, 
on this point the closed session was told, 'if we are talking a world war situation with the 
Soviets ... in a short war context... priorities 
for their submarine deployment may be 
placed elsewhere. "I' Indeed, in the context of the wider debate on U. S- naval posture, 
the DOD had been censured for 'conceding' such areas 'elsewhere' as the Soviet home 
waters and the Sea of Japan in order to maintain an overall 'sea control' capability - 
229 
Moreover, in addressing the consequences of the (UnlikelY) adoption of the UN Zone of 
Peace resolution in its entirety, as, to be sure, some of the earlier Presidential comment 
seemed to suggest, the House was assured that 'it would not prohibit us ftom. oing 
operations ... [as] ... for example ... 
in the Indo-Pakistan war ... we had such 
limited facilities 
at Diego Garcia at that time that we got very little support from them. "' The sailing 
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time for a similar carrier task group was given as 'four and one half days' from Subic 
Bay, with an extra 48 hours if circumnavigating the 'choke point' at the Straits of 
Malacca. "' 
The State/ACDA case for an-ns control in general was to also be advanced as the joint 
Hearings considered Soviet willingness to cooperate with the proceeding Conventional 
Arms Treaty agenda. Whilst the latter process had, necessarily, a wider brief, the fact 
of the vast majority of arms transfers going to the Middle East was to suggest a natural 
linkage between the two sets of negotiations. Here, given that the significant local actors 
were, 'predominantly allied to the U. S. "31 an obvious ground for Soviet participation 
becomes apparent. The broad lines for such an agreement were, for the State 
Department, equally self-evident. The '$140bn. ' of arms delivered to the 'developi 
world' since 1970, PMA Director Leslie Gelb observed, '... is going to change world 
politics ... in fundamental ways, "I' notably 
in that, 'this is the first time in the history of 
world politics that there will be dozens of countries ... with military capability comparable 
to the major powers. ' Of particular impact on the Indian Ocean naval balance were the 
four DD-993 'Spruance' class destroyers, ordered for Iran in the context Of the Shah's 
$12bn. naval expansion programme . 
214As 
we have seen, the 'allied factor' had figured 
strongly in Soviet approaches to both NALT and the broader conventional arms 
sessions. The status of Middle East arms transfers were to thus provide the focus for the 
forthcoming CAT meeting, scheduled for December. 
Yet, for the administration, the requirements of 'essential equivalence' in general 
and of inter-agency support from the Joint Chiefs in particular were to also entail a 
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certain ambiguity in addressing Soviet concerns. 'Harmonized national arms transfer 
guidelines', the JCS representative Rear Admiral James A. Lyons had observed to the 
House, 'must be built on a clear recognition of current political and military reality. 
1235 
The latter considerations were, as it emerged, operative in the framework of both the 
DOD's own planning schedule and the more diverse needs of U. S. 'friends and allies'. 
TX- I 
Here, we will not allow restraint to freeze military imbalances amongst nations where 
those imbalances would threaten U. S. national interests. "I' Although not expressly 
placed on the record, the Joint Chief's approach was to also reflect the specific needs of 
the evolving 'rapid deployment' programme instituted with PD 18. This, it can be 
recalled, was of a particular relevance to the Middle East theatre. Rear Adml. Lyons 
was, though, clear that, 'We have to take into account ... if we are considering the 
projection of our forces ... the kinds of weapons systems various countries receive?. 
237 And 
testimony further records that, 'arms transfers can impact on (U. S. ) force readiness by 
enhancing standardization and interoperability objectives for friendly and allied forces, 
serving as a quid pro quo for overseas base rights and authorizations [and] facilitating 
commonalty of doctrine and combined operations among and with allies. '211 Thus, 
whilst the executive session was hearing how 'the Soviets ... have demanded that 
we ... factor into our own thinking in terms of levels' the degree of allied capability and 
infrastructure, it was also apparent that the focus of Moscow's concern was not with the 
allies' capability for independent action. 231 What was, however, of major significance to 
the Soviet approach were the possibilities for 'interoperabilitY objectives' represented in 
the scale of U. S. mat6riel transfer and military construction. In this, it can be noted that 
Of the $12.7bn. Saudi FMS commitments (to 1977), $8. lbn. was for infrastructure 
Projects employing the U. S. Corps of Engineers. 14OSimflarly, the projected Chah Banhar 
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naval complex in Iran would extend to 'crew training ... maintenance, base and logistics 
242 facilities. "" As the original schedule had included nuclear submarine pens, a further 
factor in Soviet 'worst case' analyses of possible direct U. S. deployment options would 
be reinforced. Moreover, as the JCS was to stress, 'Military construction is not included 
in the (1978) ums transfer ceiling. 1243 
The implications of contrasting levels of 'collateral' capability for U. S. and Soviet 
military posture were to be further explored as the Hearings considered the latter's 
engagement with regional powers in more detail. Again, the common geographical 
factors would admit a considerable overlap between the conventional arms agenda and 
the more restricted area of Indian Ocean arms control. Thus, for CAT - aside from the 
o servation that 'competitive arms transfers' have caused 'a great deal of difficulty in 
their (Soviet) bilateral relations with the U. 
S. '244 
- it was argued that, 'the Soviet Union 
has had a number of bad experiences ... in trying to build relationships on arms 
transfers' with the examples given of Egypt (which repudiated a $7bn. dept in 1976), 
Indonesia, Somalia and the Sudan. In terms of more directly constituted strategic 
alliances, the recent case of Somalia needed no elaboration. Moreover, the position of 
South Yemen in the Soviet military infrastructure was, the House was informed, subject 
to similar political ambiguitieS241 and 'pressure from (Saudi Arabia) next door'. Whilst 
for Massawa (Ethiopia), Adml. Lyons had suggested that access was confined to trans- 
shipment of supplies 'the way a commercial ship might stop' and precluded use 'for any 
kind of military operation. 'IA60verall, in considering the status of the respective U. S. and 
Soviet alliances, General Thompson observes, 'I would submit that ours are more 
politically reliable and stable than theirs. 
1247 
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Hence, if the proposed NALT accord was to reflect both U. S. and Soviet 'Past 
practice', the ISA was to argue that, 'we end up better off' than would otherwise be the 
case under unrestricted competition. Summing up, General Thompson could perhaps 
reflect with some justice that, 'I think there are more pluses for ourselves ... (the 
Soviets) ... have to cope with whatever they can get. 
1248 
IX. Era Two turns to Confrontation: the House Report, the Yemen Crisis and the 
End of Naval Arms Control. 
Although the case for both the NALT agreement and a more comprehensive accord on 
conventional arms transfers could still claim considerable merit at the beginning of 1979- 
clearly on the terms so far described - such remaining hopes were, in the event, 
unfulfilled. Indeed, as even Warnke was to admit, whilst the agreements were 'useful' 
in themselves, they were also clearly subaltern to the wider progress of SALT and 
perceptions of the overall strategic balance . 
249For the more specific regional balance, 
developments in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean littoral itself were again moving 
beyond the scope of the administration's policy agenda. And if dislocation in either 
policy area could, individually, threaten the realization of a regional accord, their 
combination was to prove conclusive - Thus, SALT 
11, regarded as the touchstone Of 
U. S. -Soviet relations had, as we have seen, been under attack since the end of the Nixon 
administration. Many in the defence community had opposed both the original 
formulation of Vladivostock and the modified version agreed in the Vance/Gromyko 
sessions of September, 1978. The issues, as before, drew much affective momentum 
from the standing debate concerning strategic 'superiority'. The revived CPD and 
305 
associated lobbies had dismissed the inter-agency antinomies of 'Era Two' and the 
apparent institutionalization of 'rough parity' contained in the administration's first DOD 
Annual ReporT. The Carter Presidency had, to be sure, proposed an annual 3% defence 
increase for the NATO alliance - For many critics however, only a5% increase (in real 
terms) could retrieve the United States from what Paul Nitze would contend was, 'a 
position of inherent inferiority. '210 
If the prospects of a Senate battle for SALT 11 ratification had engaged one moment 
of opposition to further arms control measures, the other would take effect from the 
upravelling of U. S. policies for the Middle East. This, again, would expose mounting 
Congressional antagonism. In the event, while the 'Camp David' process had, overall, 
restored much credibility to the administration's standing in foreign affairs, the degree 
of pressure required to induce Israel's compliance"' - and the evident personal animus 
between Carter and Menachem Begin - had also fed into the domestic AIPAC 
/conservative coalition which had proved so effective against Nixon and Kissinger. The 
organizing abilities of AEPAC and its associates had been recently revivified in the 
campaign against the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. To be sure, the component parties of the 
alliance between right wing Democrat 1 neoconservatives' and more traditional 
conservatives on the Goldwater Republican right - Kissinger's 'unique convergence f- 
had, in other respects, differing agendas, not least on the position of Israel itself in U. S. 
strategy. "' The administration's efforts to reconcile neoconservatives with the expanded 
strategic role envisaged for Israel's traditional OPPOnents in the Middle East had, 
however, led to conceding the ground thus held in common with the wider conservative 
caucus, viz., the thesis of a rising regional threat from the Soviet Union. 
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The progress of an Indian Ocean accord was further compromised through a more 
endogenous, dislocation in the administration's Middle East strategy. Saudi Arabia, whose 
support for the continuing peace process was seen as critical, had SUffered. a reverse in 
its attempts to gain influence in South Yemen. "' On June 26,1978, a complex local 
power struggle, with inputs from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and the Soviet 
Union, had resulted in the overthrow of the incumbent President, Salim Robea Ali254 by 
the head of the (NLF) party apparatus, Fatah Ismail. Salim Robea had himself earlier 
attempted to move against the Ismail faction with the. support of pro-Saudi forces in 
North Yemen and the country's President, Ahmet Gashmi. 251 
Hereafter, the new regime in Aden had ratified a 15 year co-operation agreement with 
the USSR, involving expanded air, logistics and intelligence facilities. The PDRY would, 
for its part, receive some 30 Mig-21 aircraft and missile patrol vessels. "' Symptomatic 
of the new regime's opposition to Saudi and U. S. policies in the region, Ismail renewed 
political support for the stalled PFLOAG campaign in Oman, reorganized as the 
NDFLOAG. 257 To be sure, the military capability of the PFLO had been comprehensively 
defeated by joint British, Iranian and SAF (Oman) counter-insurgency programmes by 
1976. " The Soviet Union had become established as the PDRY's leading provider of 
. itary and economic aid during Salim Robea's (eight year) tenure. "' However, for 
those in Saudi Arabia and, increasingly, in the Carter NSC desirous of a clear South 
Yemen 'threat' to facilitate the F- 15 and other arms transfer prograrmnes, the exemplary 
possibilities of the Aden goverment's revolutionary stance would not be neglected. 
" wiý 
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Moreover, for the Omani dimension, a renewed period of political tension with South 
Yemen could provide a similar focus to the developing U. S. security planning for the 
Gulf region. Iranian troops had partially withdrawn from Dhofar in January, 1977,110 
whilst remaining 'official' British forces had left in March. The former RAF base at 
Masira Island was, as will be shown, already under consideration for a logistics role in 
U. S. forward strategy. In the context of future Congressional funding proceedings, the 
impression offered by the reconstitution of the Soviet/PDRY alliance would have 
inevitably become diffused with a successful conclusion of the NALT agenda. The never 
overwhelming enthusiasm in the Pentagon for a naval arms accord had, by the end of 
1978, turned to outright opposition, 261 thus reinforcing the negative stress on Moscow's 
activities so used in canvassing the administration's Saudi policy. In the scale of U. S. 
priorities, the above considerations had clearly outweighed what sentiment remained in 
the Carter administration for a naval limitation treaty in the Indian Ocean. 
Finally, in a further regional setback for the administration, a coup had taken place in 
April, 1978 in Afghanistan. Whilst the latter territory had long been on the periphery of 
U. S. strategic concerns, the accession of the expressedly Marxist PDPA party marked 
a reversal for the Shah's regional ambitions, and would be so interpreted to 
Washington as further evidence of the Soviet 'grand design'. These events were 
compounded by a rising tide of civil unrest in Iran itself, leading to the instalment of a 
military government (under the Shah) on November 6,1978. This will be dealt with 
more fully in the next section. Despite the profound effects that the later overthrow of 
the Shah would have on U. S. policy, the reaction from Washington at this time was, in 
fact, fairly muted. The 'instability' in Iran was to feature, inter alia, in the concluding 
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(1979) House Armed Services Committee Report on the October, 1978 Indian Ocean 
Hearings, but the grounds for the Panel's somewhat pessimistic findings lay elsewhere 
in the regional - and, critically - the strategic balance. 
Thus, although the publication of the H. A. S. C. Report found members supportive 
overall of 'an agreement which would institutionalize a limit on forces in the (Indian) 
Ocean', the House Panel was to also consider the Soviet dispositions in the Hom as 
sufficient reason to 'slowdown' the negotiations and question the ACDA's view on the 
ameliorating effects of a possible naval arms control regime. 'The agreement as presently 
structured', would, on this reading, '... have only had a limited effect on the massive 
supply effort the Soviets carried out in Ethiopia. 
1262 Of perhaps greater significance for 
the Panel were the strategic implications that could issue from limiting the possible 
deployment of SSBN's. Given the low priority so far accorded such 'occasional' Indian 
Ocean transits, this option had, as we have seen, been conceded de facto in the 
provisional agreement reached with Moscow by the ACDA. Here, however, the House 
Committee's own scale of priorities would reflect the terms of the current 'Strategic 
superiority' debate on Capitol Hill rather than the actual 'past practice' of the U. S. Navy - 
'Any agreement that would prohibit U. S. ballistic missile submarines from using the 
Indian Ocean' was thus, in the Panel's view, liable to '... give the Soviets a strategic gain 
that could not be matched by the United States by simply limiting Soviet conventional 
forces in the area to their 1977 level. 
1263 Explicitly, the Panel was concerned that such 
bargaining leverage offered by the region as theatre for SSBN deployment not be set 
aside until after the conclusion of the SALT 11 treaty. 164The Panel was well aware of 
claims that the SALT 1 arrangements had ratified supposed 'imbalances' in respective 
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U. S. -Soviet nuclear force levels, particularly in the sphere of Moscow's own SLBM 
capability. "' More generally, though, the Panel's perspectives were to also defer to the 
doctrinal elision of nuclear with conventional capability much evident in the defence 
community's discourse on the status of deterrent effect - particularly given the present 
strategic focus on the Gulf and South Asia. And, accordingly, an increasing reluctance 
in Congress to become exposed to the charge of conceding, even in symbolic terms, an 
exclusion area for U. S. power. 
The administration was not, in legislative terms, bound by the findings of the H. I. R. C. 
Panel. To disregard them at this time, however, would have produced an unacceptable 
level of opposition from Congress and given ftu-ther scope for such as Nitze and Zumwalt 
to attack the 'implausibility's ' of SALT itself. Throughout, the Carter administration's 
attempt to construct a forinalized. arms control regime for the Indian Ocean was, 
necessarily, subject to developments removed from its expressedly limited terms of 
reference. Yet, of these, the internal factors attending the administration's own conduct 
of foreign policy had also become a significant variable. There had, to be sure, been 
close inter-agency agreement that regional affairs had been neglected by the previous 
administrations. There was an equal consensus that previous U. S. foreign policy had 
become overly driven by relations with the Soviet Union. Yet, operationally, a clear 
divergence of approach had become apparent from the outset. For the State Department, 
stress was laid on the need to remove regional issues from the matrix of East-West 
competition. The priority given to a 'rapid' conclusion of SALT would, though, also 
leave the improvement of other aspects of U. S. -Soviet relations at the top Of the 
agenda . 216For the NSC, however, the priority for Washington to, 'address itself to a 
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variety of third world problems 
'161 was precisely in order to 'challenge' the Soviet 
regional position. Whilst the previous 'excessive preoccupation' with U. S. -Soviet 
questions would be obviated by downgrading the need for good relations with Moscow 
itself. Thus, if Carter felt able to offer a choice of 'Confrontation or co-operation' to the 
Soviet Union at the mid-point of the Presidency, the balance toward its end would incline 
to the former - 
Conclusions. 
In the foregoing chapter, the outline assumptions of the Carter administration's 
'architectural' approach to the international system were set forth in relation to the 
perspectives of regional security policy and Indian Ocean arms control. The argument 
thereafter located the 1977 Naval Arms Limitation negotiations within the wider 
administration programme for confidence building in the third world, curbing 
conventional arms sales and the ambitious 'deep cuts' agenda for strategic arms initially 
proposed to tile Soviet Union. The effective abandonment of regional arms control at the 
end of 1978 was similarly analysed within broader considerations of the current of U. S. 
Power. The demonstration of Soviet projection capabilities in the Horn and Angola and 
increasingly negative perceptions of the central balance had fed into the mounting 
Washington debate on strategic 'superiority'. 
Yet, as has been argued, whilst U. S. concerns for the several categories of military 
balance were real enough, the domestic strategic discourse - vivified by increased 
Congressional prerogatives in decision making after the War Powers and International 
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Security acts - had also assumed an independent momentum. Here, if Carter's 
Washington opponents had found fresh anununition in the perceived 'Soviet threat' to the 
Northern Indian Ocean littoral for an attack on U. S. strategy begun during the Nixon era, 
the power of such assertions drew much from a wider, if inchoate, public sense of 
vulnerability - to pressure from allies, the third world and the Soviet Union alike. Under 
these conditions, the administration had itself come under pressure to demonstrate its 
commitment to the security aspects of U. S. engagement on the periphery. The Indian 
Ocean region had become increasingly prominent in the forefront of this debate. The 
confrontational approach to the Soviet Union offered to domestic critics would, by the 
same token, serve to diminish Soviet incentives to reach accommodation with the Carter 
Presidency. 
Moreover, for the associated but more centrally strategic arena of the Middle East, the 
administration had, as the preceding chapter's analysis makes clear, attempted similar 
circumlocution. The advancement of regional security accord and the Arab-Israeli peace 
process by anns transfers was pursued in direct contrast to the parallel efforts toward 
arms limitation conducted with the Soviet Union. The argument that an overriding 
common interest in containing possible Soviet capability would justify increased inputs 
of U. S. arms to - otherwise contending - local allies again sat ill with regional arms 
control, the antinomies of 'Era Two' notwithstanding - In the concluding three sections 
of this analysis, the loss of the central 'pillar' of U. S. regional strategy - Iran - will be 
examined in terms of impact on the existing current of U. S. security policy outlined 
above. The study will then assess the comprehensive restructuring Of U-S. global strategy 
outlined in the 'Carter Doctrine'. 
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CHAPTER SIX. THE CARTER DOCTRINE 0): THE KEYSTONE IN THE 
ARCH. 
In the previous chapter, the course of (1977-8) Indian Ocean arms control diplomacy was 
analysed within the context of the broader Carter administration foreign policy 
programme. I The pursuit of great power accord on levels of mutual military activity in 
the Indian Ocean region was presented as complementary to measures for limiting 
conventional arms sales, confidence-building initiatives toward littoral states and the 
expressed policy objective to disaggregate regional dynamics from the more narrowly 
strategic aspects of U. S. -Soviet competition. As has been shown, the administration 
could record some success in these areas. India had responded favourably to U. S. 
untiatives, and energetic U. S. diplomacy at the UN and bilaterally had done much to 
.. nfda mitip, the 'artificial' anti-American posture which had indeed become conventional for 
the wider caucus of nonaligned and third world countries. If the above moves had 
sigmlled a departure from some particulars of existing U. S. policy, there was also much 
in the overall policy context to provide continuity. The 'twin pillars' of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia remained at the foundation of the U. S. regional alliance system. From both, 
significant and complementary contributions were anticipated by Washington toward the 
administration's efforts to broker Arab-Israeli disengagement in the Middle East. Here, 
the prospect of a rising coalition of conservative states was apparent, with consequent 
beneficial results for the Western alliance in terms of oil price stability and the 
dumnished influence of the Soviet Union. 
As has also been argued, however, the cast of such U. S. foreign policies had been in 
question from the outset of the Carter administration. An alternative, strategic, emphasis 
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had been advanced from both domestic opponents and actors within government itself. 
By late 1978, the Gulf/Indian Ocean region had become the touchstone for this wider 
debate. ' The suspension of Indian Ocean anns control was indicative of the shifting 
consensus in Washington on the need to address more traditional U. S. concerns for 
strategic leverage and containment in the region. And widiin a ftu-ther year of the Carter 
Itesidency - to be considered below - the status of the Gulf, South Asia and the wider 
Indian Ocean area had become paramount in United States' global strategy, with the 
proclamation of the 'Carter Doctrine. 
If, though, the seeming emergence of a functional Soviet strategic alliance of third 
world states (Ethiopia, Cuba, South Yemen) in the Indian Ocean region had stimulated 
earlier U. S. concerns, it was the event of an entirely endogenous rupture widiin the U. S 
alliance - by revolution in Iran - which would, as will be shown, finally reverse both 
the regional and strategic components of a decade of U. S. policy. To be sure, the more 
far-reaching rupture with the Soviet Union, and the Carter Doctrine itself, were to follow 
directly from the December, 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. However, if the 
Central Asian extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine had provided the sufficient impetus to 
engage a new period of great power hostility - and the first formal restructuring of U. S. 
military posture since 1970 - the necessary conditions, for the wider mobilization of 
strategy, lay in the earlier transformation of Iran from 'unconditional ally' to virulent 
opponent of the United States. 
The argument to be pursued in this chapter will focus on the unique position which 
Iran had attained in securing U. S. policy for the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, the 
F 
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Soviet 'Northern tier' and the wider international system. The analysis will then address 
the material aspects of the 'loss' of Iran in engaging the redefinition of the Indian Ocean 
region within U. S. global strategy. The three final sections of this study will thus 
examine, respectively: the pattern and dynamics of policy organization toward the 
revolution in Iran; the strategic restructuring following from Afghanistan; the end of 
dA 6tente and the Carter Doctrine; and the some operational expressions of the revised 
strategic assumptions widiin the context of renewed great power confrontation and the 
Iran-Iraq war - the 'countervailing strategy'. As in previous sections, the format will . 
counterpose thematic and historical perspectives within the natural chronology of events. 
A concluding section will then consider the respective constituents of policy fonnation 
W1 . an overall analysis of the historical current of U. S. power. 
The Keystone in the Arch. 
To establish the context for assessing U. S. reactions to the revolution in Iran, it is useful 
to return to the beginning of the administration in 1977. If a certain expectation of 
reformism had been engendered by some in the Carter campaign team, ' the institutional 
cast of policy in both State and Defense would, in practice, exhibit a clear continuity 
with the final year of the Ford administration. In this respect, the following 
Summation of two decades of U. S. South Asian poliCy, 4 prepared for Secretary 
Kissinger's regional consultations of July, 1976, is worth citing at length. Overall, the 
c0lifidential DOS briefing perceives 'no immediate crisis pressing for attention" and 
notes that, 'you will be going to South Asia at a time when the interrelations of the 
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regional countries are in a more fluid and promising state than they have been for well 
over a decade. " Proximate cause for this state of affairs is attributed to Iran. Here, the 
Shah's 'singular' involvement in the 'self-conscious' South Asian 'sub-system' has been 
1miking'. The Shah has 'effectively prodded India and Pakistan and India to resume 
movement in the stalled Simla (disengagement) process; he has gotten Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to explore ways of defusing their dangerous quarrel (over the border status 
of Pashtunistan); and has paralleled our efforts to reduce the dangers of conflict between 
India and Bangladesh'. In tandem with the above, the paper further notes the 
I. mteresting ... lack of dynamism in the Soviet position. Observing that, 'in Southern 
Asia, as elsewhere in the LDC's, the Soviets have very little attractive to offer' and that, 
'the basis of their position ... in the arms supply field ... is a dwindling asset', the analysis 
concludes, 'Thus far, at least, Moscow does not appear to have any grand strategy in 
mind to reassert itself. 
t7 
The apparently 'promising' momentum attending the Shah's regional diplomacy 
observed by the Kissinger State Department was echoed in reports from the U. S. 
Embassy in Iran itself. An intra-departmental (NEA/IRN) study prepared for the Carter 
transition notes that, 'In the broadest geopolitical sense, there has developed since 1971 
a community of interest between China, Iran and the United States, with Pakistan a link 
in the chain' and, '... it is also clear that Iran is the keystone in this arch of 
it containment. " 'I However, whilst the U. S. derived a clear strategic benefit from such 
a 'geopolitical community', Iran's 'new confidence and assertiveness' was also viewed 
as a potential source of conflict with both other regional allies and Washington itself, 
I most obviously [on] the oil price issue. " Further, the admitted arms race in the Gulf, 
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, sparked as much by Iranian acquisitions as by any other factor', had also created a 
possible field for 'Iranian adventurism', particularly given the 'political fragility of some 
Arab peninsula states'. Thus, as seen by State's regional and intelligence analysts, the 
principal 'task for U. S. policy toward Iran' is, 'to restrain Iranian proclivities toward 
intervention'. 10 Throughout, the established institutional bias toward treating the (global) 
strategic balance as 'constant' would be retained from the Nixon Doctrine; the 'variable'. 
and main secular focus of policy was on the balance at regional level. 'Trends in the 
region are going in our direction', the analysis observes, '-we should not endanger this 
situation by giving Iran a blank check. "I 
Thus, given that the (non-nuclear) 'blank check' approach to Tehran - particularly 
in the arms sales field - had become a focus for much opposition amongst Democrats, 
it was this aspect of policy that would most come under scrutiny with the incoming 
Carter administration. It had been similar concerns, in this case from the Department of 
Defense, which had prompted the (October, 1975) commissioning of a comprehensive 
review of Gulf security policy, 'NSSM 238', " from the Scowcroft/Kissinger NSC. 
Although essentially complete by May, 1976, this had remained in abeyance at the end 
of the Ford administration. Accordingly, State's new Director of Policy Planning, Leslie 
Gelb, requested a summarized account of the findings in January, 1977 to be delivered 
tO Secretary Vance. After consideration by the (interim) Senior Review Group in early 
January, the resulting 'Executive Summary', commended to Zbigniew Brzezinski by his 
predecessor, Brent Scowcroft, 11 was circulated by State (NEA/HZN/PMA) on January, 
25 and presented assessments of security assistance relationships, lower Gulf arms sales, 
military presence and access to facilities. 14 Outstanding amongst the several 'time 
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sensitive I issues to be considered by the Carter SCC were the 250 'F-18L' fighters and 
nine 'E-3A' AWACS aircraft on order for Iran. Here, a clear confirmation of the 
grounds for bureaucratic delay of NSSM 238 becomes apparent; a 'fresh look' at Iran's 
amis procurement programmes had been strongly recommended by the DOD. " Such an 
amroach would be followed by the new administration, in accordance with the revised KI 
arms transfer guidelines announced in PRM 12/PD-13 (see above, chap. 5). 
Carter's decision to reduce the AWACS programme to seven and cancel the F-18's 
altogether was not well received by the Shah. The continuing U. S. media attention to 
human rights violations and the Iranian role in OPEC 16 were equally badly taken in 
Tehran. Thus, despite assurances by Secretary Vance of 'the administration's strong 
desire to continue very close ties' and '... that our solid relationship can be a buffer for 
future differences on specific issues'; and, indeed of recognition of the 'encouraging 
steps 1 17 taken in the field of human rights, delivered during the first cabinet level visit to 
Iran on May 13,1977, the Shah had on August, 1 informed U. S. Ambassador William 
Sullivan that a 'turning point' had been reached and that he would have to reconsider 'the 
whole question' of U. S. -Iran relations - 11 
However, despite some perceptions to the contrary - notably amongst the Shah's 
domestic opponents" - neither the arms sales programme nor the wider strategic 
I community' with Iran would be endangered by the declared 'world order politics"' of 
Carter's new administration. Whilst in other spheres, Zbigniew Brzezinski in particular 
had cautioned against applying a 'one-sidedly anti-rightist"' approach to human rights 
policy. On the AWACS debate, a July, 27 memorandum drafted for Secretary Vance - 
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in preparation for Congressional (H. I. R. C. ) Hearings the following day 22 _ so presents 
the case that 'improvements of air defense capability of this nature are inherently 
stabilizing' and that 'we must put Iran's defense expenditure in context' and ftu-ther argue 
that, 'to defer for some months a U. S. decision on the sale of AWACS would raise 
doubts about our intentions... with regard to our long-standing military relationship, and 
more finportantly our close and broadly-based strategic and economic ties. '21 The latter 
were, by the beginning of 1977, projected to a favourable U. S. balance-of-payments 
surplus for non-military sales of some $8-10bn. for the period of 1975-80.24When 
defence sector inputs were included, this would increase by a ftn-ther $10bn. In addition, 
U. S. direct investment in Iran had reached $500m., largely in the form of joint ventures2l 
and was underpinned by the presence of an estimated 1084 U. S. military personnel, 
5,489 civilian contractors which, with dependants, had reached an overall total of 16,201 
U. S. citizens in long term residence. " 
Of parallel significance in assuaging Congressional questioning of the administration's 
Iran policy was the Shah's longstanding strategic relationship with Israel. On the 
economic side, the existing 70% provision of Israel's oil supply was bolstered by the 
VUst joint signing of a new 17m. tonne agreement (at 120 days credit) in July, 1977.27 V 
military co-operation would extend, inter alia, to development projects such as a new 
155mm. artillery system and an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ORBM), codenamed 
'Flower', based on French and U. S. technology-" (Albeit, discussions here 
acknowledge, 'America's sensitivity to the introduction of the kind of missile 
envisaged. ')21 There was also a less tangible linkage between the two U. S. strategic 
Partners. As Iraman Defence Minister General Toufanian observed to his Israeli 
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counterpart, Ezer Weizman, 'I diink we are the only two countries in the region that can 
depend on each other. 
130 
Thus, given the smgular concentration in the Carter White house on securing a Middle 
East peace settlement, the Shah was assured of a successful state visit to Washington in 
November, 1977. 'His worries and insecuritY about this administration's attitude towards 
Iran', State's analysts were to minute the President, 1 ... were substantially allayed. '31 
Indeed, given the Soviet advances in the Horn following on the Ogaden war, the Shah's 
consistent aptitude, as remarked in one DOS briefing paper, 'to see Soviet 
actions... whether in South Asia, Africa or elsewhere as part of a "grand design" 
132 
was 
receiving an increasingly sympathetic reception in the Brzezinski NSC. Perhaps the 
apogee of the administration's engagement with the Pahlavi regime was reached -as 
Tehran was selected as the centrepiece of President Carter's seven nation tour of South 
A L, Asia in 1977-8. 'Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah', Carter had declared, 
'is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world'. Noting the 
presence of, 'thirty-thousand American's here' that, 'work in close harmony with the 
people of Iran to secure a better future' and that, 'the cause of human rights is one that 
is also shared deeply by our people and by the leaders of our two nations I. the President 
concluded that, 'We have no other nation on earth that is closer to us in planning for our 
mutual military security ... [and] ... there 
is no leader with whom I have a deeper sense of 
personal gratitude and personal friendship -"I Such 
hyperbole, perhaps not out of place 
in the public press of Iran itself, would, though overlay a more substantive discourse of 
shared expectations between the White House and the Niavaran Palace. However, whilst 
clearly not unprecedented in official U. S. discourse with the Shah, the president's public 
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encomia would, as in the past, again serve to marginalize any dissenting analysis of U. S. 
Iran policy in the governing administration. 
Thus, against a background of redrawn U. S. -Iranian strategic amity, a series of inter- 
agency studies were initiated to consider the further integration of Iranian defence 
procurement into the administration's developing 'regional security framework'. 
Commenting on Tehran's military posture, a February , 1978 position paper 
(DOS/DOD)-'Aobserves that, 'in the longer run, Iran wishes to be in a position to respond 
to military contingencies in the East, while maintaining a sufficient deterrent force 
against Iraq. "I Although tensions between the two countries had been reduced since the 
(March, 1975) 'Algiers Accord', 'Iraq', in terms of threat assessment, 'remains Iran's 
most likely military opponent. And if, 'a sustained conflict is unlikely during the next 
decade', a clear factor for stability was perceived in the regional balance. 'Neither state', 
for the DOD's analysts, 'is likely to be able ... to bring a war to a 
decisive conclusion. 116 
A fin-ther stability was perceived on Iran's 'Northern front'. Here, 'A military conflict 
between Iran and the Soviet Union is unlikely... Iran buys Soviet military equipment and 
the present and projected Iranian military deployments are not concentrated along the 
Soviet border. ' 37 In terms of the suitability of Iran's procurement programme to the 
(inter-agency) threat assessment schedule, the study notes that, 'Iran is compelled to 
adopt a strategy of counter-value (v/v Iraq) deterrence ... to follow this strategy, 
Iran will 
require an airforce capable of inflicting severe damage on the (widely dispersed) Iraqi 
facilities. "' In this, the proposed AWACS progranune would allow Iran to attain an 
'earlier' air advantage against Iraq and, perhaps more significantlY, 'permit Iran to 
mamtam a credible air posture along its Soviet border during a conflict with Iraq. 
"I The 
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latter consi erations were, it can be recalled, of much importance in any event to the 
DOD's overall strategic calculus of (U. S. /Soviet) 'essential equivalence'. 
Moreover, in addition to the maintenance of an adequate 'countervalue' posture against 
Iraq - and a 'credible' counter to the admittedly unlikely Soviet contingency - the 
Iranian defence establishment could also provide for perhaps more immediately gauged 
dislocations to the U. S. regional security system. These, the inter-agency report outlines 
as, ' sharp changes in the political orientation of (Iran's) neighbours'; and more 
specifically, 'a radical takeover in the Gulf or the fragmentation of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. '40 Thus, 'if given sufficient time to prepare' Iran at present, 'possesses the 
forces which would pennit the landing of one infantry brigade by sea and one by air on 
the Arabian peninsula in an initial assault ... supported by Iranian naval units and 150 
fighter aircraft'. 'A force of this size', the report observes, 'would exceed that of any of 
the smaller Gulf states'. And, given current trends, 'by 1985 Iran's capacity to project 
forces into the peninsula will have improved considerably'. Materially, 'the number of 
fighter aircraft could be raised to 250 or more, while leaving at least 300 to face Iraq and 
the Soviet Union'. Further to the East, 'Iran could move one infantry brigade by air and 
two by road to either (Afghanistan or Pakistan) border', whilst 'about 75' fighter aircraft 
could also be deployed to the area; which, 'would be quite valuable to Pakistan in a war 
with India'. By the 1980's, 'Iran should be able to move a reinforced armoured division 
and 150-200 fighter aircraft to Pakistan or Afghanistan with little notice. 
141 
For the critical area of sea control around the oil I lines of communication' (LOC's), the 
fOllow-up 'Security Assistance Report' (ARMISH-MAAG) notes that the procurement 
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of, 'two ASW support ships, four DG-993 ('Spruance') destroyers, four Vosper 
destroyer-escorts, up to a dozen each fast frigates and guided missile boats and six-to- 
nine diesel attack submarines will provide Iran with anti-air, anti-surface and an ASW 
capability for protection of the sea LOC's in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the 
Arabian Sea and the Northern reaches of the Indian Ocean. 142 However, whilst 
ARMISH-MAAG was to maintain that, 'In general terms, the Mission agrees with 
Iran's perception of the threat 
143 
and could thus justify the 25 % ($9bn. ) of Iranian GNP 
earmarked for military expenditure" there is also, in the several studies, a growing 
perception that, 'the country has experienced major structural problems in beginning the 
transition from a largely traditional society to a balanced and self-sustaining industrial 
state. '41 This, by early 1978 had led to inflation at 50%, continuous power blackouts, 
massive bottlenecks in the transportation/distribution of goods and widespread failure of 
the country's infrastructure. 41 At this stage of analysis, the balance of institutional opinion 
for State/DOD would, to be sure, hold the mounting economic crisis in Iran to be not 
I urananageable '- There is, though, perhaps some foreboding in the several agency's 
conclusions that, 'the GOI will face increasingly hard choices in allocating available 
funds between military and civilian sector ... the opportunity cost of continuing 
to spend 
one quarter of the public budget on military facilities could be large -" 
The Opportunity Cost: U. S. Crisis Management and 'Making the Best of the 
Change in Iran'. 
The full extent of the 'opportunity cost' that had accompanied two decades of wholesale 
military and economic expansion in Iran was becoming increasingly apparent throughout 
1978. Equally clear were the negative implications of the comprehensive involvement 
in 
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these processes, in terms of planning, investment and methodology, of the United States. 
And if the administration's 'Policy Review Committee', discussing the question on July, 
5, would decide that, 'continued anus transfers to Iran are in the national interest of the 
United States, " it had also accepted a probable cancellation of the 70 F-14's and 140 F- 
16 aircraft (additional to the 140 F-16's on order from September, 1976) agreed in 
November 1977, and concluded that, for the moment, 'a period of consolidation' was a 
more appropriate course for Iran's military establishment, 'rather than the acquisition of 
more hardware. 
141 By the autumn, the Shah's proclamation of a military government on 
November, 6 had prompted much public affirmation of U. S. -Iranian ties from the 
President and senior officials, 10 particularly in view of the developing Camp David 
process. " Secretary Vance, for example, had declared that, 'I think one can continue on 
the course which the Shah has charted for himself and his nation. 
152 
For the institutional strata of goverment, the consensus was perhaps more agnostic on 
the survival of the Shah personally, but positive that 'no sharp reorientation of Iranian 
policy vis a vis the superpowers is likely in the period through the mid 1980's. "I State 
Departnaent interest in the emergence of alternative regimes is marked by requests for 
CIA proffles of significant political actors, including Mehdi Bazargan, Ibrahim YazdP 4 
and notably, the Shah and the Imperial family. '-' Considering the 'Possibilities for 
D. 
Responsible Goverment' in the Agency's (classified) internal review, analysts observe 
that, 'the Shah has had increasing depression as he contemplates the ruins of his carefully 
constructed, if ineptly handled programs which he once hoped would produce by the end 
of the 1980's a country which would compare favourably with Western Europe. "' 
Moreover, though it was not until mid-November that the Tehran Embassy and the bulk 
r-, 
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of institutional opinion began 'diinking the undiinkable' '57 the increasing level of previous 
U. S.. contacts with the Iranian opposition had also prompted speculation by 'several 
highly placed (court) officials' that, 'the U. S. is somehow involved in the (anti-Shah) 
demonstrations. "I Whilst Carter personally was clearly supportive of the Shah until the 
end, " such 'thinly veiled accusations' served to further complicate the arrival of 
consensus on Iran policy from an administration which, as frequently demonstrated, was 
never at its strongest in unanimity. 
Despite the preceding lack of policy direction, however, an emergency meeting of the 
(NSQ Special Co-ordinating Committee on December, 28 was to present the Tehran 
Embassy (for the Shah) with the stark options of a 'moderate' civilian govermnent - 'the 
preferred alternative' -a 'firm military government' or resignation in favour of a 
regency council. In the SCC's view, it would be, in any event, 'impossible to restore his 
(the Shah's) absolute power' and, above all, 'it is essential, repeat essential to terminate 
the continuing uncertainty. '60 Following the U. S. demarche, the fmal departure of the 
Shah, on January 16,1979, had indeed prompted an uncertain reaction from 
Washington's other regional allies. Despite past differences, the Saudi govenunent feared 
that Iran would 'collapse' and that 'there is no real altemative to the Shah, 
161 
whilst for 
Israel, the Tel Aviv Embassy records that 'Israelis have watched with fascination Iran's 
progression to the lower depths'. Overall, the Israeli 'foreboding' about the turn of 
events would seem well substantiated. Such fears focused on both strategic and bilateral 
issues. 'Few doubt that the next goverment in Tehran will cut the Israeli-Iranian line' 
the Embassy observes, 'Israelis fear that ... the 
U. S. will become even more dependent 
on Saudi Arabia', and 'some point to Iran as an illustration that Israel cannot, in the last 
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analysis, depend on Washington. "I 
However, if Washington had been accused from many quarters of not moving more 
'energetically' to save the Shah, U. S. involvement in Iranian politics was bounded more 
by circumstance than lack of volition. An inter-agency 'National Intelligence Estimate' 
(NIE) of September, 1978 concludes that, 'no well organized political parties have 
developed that might provide obviously qualified or popular leadership as an alternative 
to the Shah and the Military. '61 Given the collapse of the monarchy, the clear focus for 
U. S. efforts would thus rest on the armed forces. Yet, for many administration analysts 
in Tehran and Washington, it was also apparent that the military lacked both the popular 
support and level of technical competence necessary to administer a complex industrial 
economy. 64 In the light of such constraints, a confidential DOS cable of December, 19 
outlines some possible conditions for 'designing a U. S. strategy'. 65 Here, the emphasis 
is on an enabling rather than executive role for the Iranian military, 'wherein we could 
influence military opinion to follow (or at least not block) U. S. policy initiatives. '66In 
contrast to the 'passivity' perceived by the administration's domestic critics, the conduct 
of U-S- policy in the field was, in fact, highly pro-active. Accordingly, the U. S. would 
be, 'seeking to identify those officers. - -who can command the respect of 
their 
subordinates in a post-Shah Iran' and to, I identify those hardline officers who would have 
to be dropped in order to produce a more tractable military establishment. " 
A 'Military solution' - actively canvassed by some Iranians and 
U. S. officials, such as 
Brzezinski and (NSC emissary) General Robert Huyser" - had been personally 
rejected by President Carter at the December, 28 SCC-1 Instead, the approach adopted 
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would focus on 'influencing military opinion ... by means of the levers we have. "I Given 
that, 'several billion dollars worth of military equipment is waiting to be delivered', " the 
latter course would seem to admit considerable scope for the administration. Intelligence 
estimates were to suggest that, ftu-thermore, 'Iran's airforce and air defense programme 
in particular are almost totally dependent on the U. S. ' and note that, 'in mid-1978, 
almost 9,500 Americans were in Iran working in the defense sector'. And whilst Iran had 
launched an 'ambitious' personnel substitution programme, 'the increasing sophistication 
of modem weaponry and the growing demand for trained manpower in the 
economy ... will ensure that these problems remain for at least several years as principal 
considerations in Iran's formulation of defense and foreign policy. '72 
Thus, despite 'assertions of non-alignment, non-interventionism and anti-Western 
rhetoric'71 by the provisional govenunent, the uncertain role of the returned Ayatollah 
Khomenn, and Tehran's (February 6,1979) departure from CENTO, 74administration 
observers saw a likely 'dominance of the military and nationalist conservative elements7' 
in 'post-Shah Iran' and were further encouraged by the seeming lack of 'coherence' 
displayed by 'independent Marxists' and the (communist) Tudeh party. 76 Some 45,000 
U. S. citizens had been safely evacuated. A brief takeover of the U. S. Tehran Embassy 
on February, 14 had been controlled by the Bazargan provisional government. ' U. S. 
Opinion polls had, moreover, backed (by 68 %) Carter's 'low profile' policy and, one 
DOS cable observes, 'Americans appear to have answered the question "who lost Iran? " 
to their satisfaction. The answer: the Shah. 
t7l At a February, 27 news conference, 
President Carter thus felt able to 'make the best of the change in Iran' and stated that, 
'the Khomeini government has made it clear.. -that they 
desire a close working and 
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friendly relationship with the United States. 
t79 Whilst perhaps not quite so sanguine, a 
confidential study conducted by academic Richard Cottam. had found 'Khomeini's 
circle ... ready to think 
in sophisticated tenns about future relations with the U. S. ', in 
that, 'they did not want a fonnal defensive relationship but did want U. S. backing against 
the Soviet threat. '10 The latter strategic consideration was viewed as the bedrock for U. S. 
relations with virtually any conceivable nationalist regime in Tehran. " In this respect, 
Moscow's refusal to abrogate the contentious 1921 Iran-Soviet treaty was noted, 12as was 
Khomeini's view of the 'absolute disagreement between Islam and Marxism. ' 83 
More concrete evidence for an underlying strategic continuity was perceived in the 
complex negotiations for readjustment in the U. S. -Iranian arms transfer progranune. 
While Tehran was clearly unwilling and, economically, unable to sustain the Shah's 
$10bn. procurement schedule, arrangements were made for the U. S. Navy to take on 
Iran's equity in two of the DG-993 destroyers, cancelled by Iran on February, 3. This 
permitted the continuing solvency (at $580m. ) of the Iranian FMS 'Trust Fund' for 
I resuming the flow of spare parts - '14The administration 
had also proposed establishing 
a further $5.5m. FMS facility for the Iranian airforce. " These moves, for administration 
officials, indicated overall 'our willingness to cooperate with Iran on defense matters"' 
and thus, in, the view of General Ernest Graves of the Defense Security Assistance 
Agency, anticipated the 'resumption of a mutually beneficial military supply 
relationship. 187 
A corollary to U. S. initiatives on military supply with the emergent Islamic Republic 
were moves aimed at resuming the intelligence relationship. Although the National 
Security Agency (NSA) surveillance facilities at Behrshahr and Kabkan in Northern Iran 
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had been closed to the U. S. on February, 2 1, negotiations had, by mid- 1979 apparently 
restored some common ground between the administration and the Iranian military -A 
September 5, NEA memo for Secretary Vance records that, 'we are working with 
contractors to restart the IBEX intelligence monitoring project on a reduced scale' and 
ftirther, that, 'the Iranians have not foreclosed the possibility of reopening the (former 
NSA) sites in the indefinite future. "I For the administration's part, whilst the full range 
of classified military information hitherto available to Iran had been 'suspended'q 
following a March, 12 directive of the DOD's National Disclosure Policy Committee 
(NDPQ, an instruction from Harold Brown's office also notes that, 'this suspension does 
not apply to the oral/visual disclosure of CMI previously authorized. '19 Indeed, for one 
such presentation, NEA analysts observe that 'A CIA briefing officer gave a well 
received intelligence briefmg to Barzargan, Yazdi, and Entzegarn on August 21. ' The 
latter were, 'most interested in Iraq, Palestinians, Afghans and Soviet dangers to the 
PGOF and 'asked for a repeat briefing in two months. '10 
Administration officials had, in particular, pursued a policy of cultivating close 
relations with Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi. " In this respect, a conscientious policy 
of avoiding U. S. involvement in the several regional insurgencies of Kurds and Azeri, S92 
was coupled with an awareness of increasing Iranian aid to the growing 'Mujahedeen' 
ilisurrection in Afghanistan. Here, although it was thought that, 'the USSR will probably 
I 
avoid plunging into what could well become a Vietnam-type trap' . 
93 theadministration 
would take the opportunity to 'encourage' the I intelligence dialogue' with Iran on the 
Afghan situation. 14 It was further hoped to use intelligence on Palestinian links with 
radicals in Iran to promote at least a muted criticism of the Camp David process and 
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other U-S. policies at the September Non-Aligned Movement sununit in Havana. 11 
The Anti-Amerkan Syndrome. 
Whilst such 'moderates' in the Tehran provisional government as Yazdi and Bazargan 
were (at least off the record) willing to take a 'favourable' view of ftu-ther co-operation 
. 
with Washington? 6 and remain agnostic on the Camp David issue, 91 the Middle East 
Treaty had, like the wider question of relations with the United States as such, become 
overwhelmingly an index of commitment in Iran's domestic power struggle. Follow' 
the (March, 26) formal signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Accords, demonstrators had 
occupied the Egyptian Embassy in Tehran and reports continued of crowds of 'hundreds 
of thousands' in the provincial capitals opposing the Treaty and demanding further 
Islamic measures in Iran itself. 91 In parallel, two diverging strands of U. S. analysis are 
also apparent throughout the spring and summer of 1979, as the various agencies 
extended their coverage of the developing revolution. For the State Department in 
Washington, stress was laid on the improving economic situation - particularly in oil 
supply" - which would lead NEA analysts to argue that, 'the (Shi-ite) clerics cannot 
themselves run a complex country and will be forced to seek help from Westernised 
officials', and overall, to, 'doubt that the hardline Mullahs will be able to score a 
decisive and lasting victory over the secular elements. '101 On the other hand, field 
intelligence and the Tehran Embassy were uncomfortably aware of a significant. increase 
in anti-Americanism' which 'goes beyond [the] ritual revolutionary strain' and which 
is vivified by 'Khomeini's anti-Western paranoia. ' 101 
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The latter phenomenon was not, indeed, of recent discovery. However, previous 
analysis had tended to focus on the structural implications of the Ayatollah's charismatic 
leadership rather than the ostensive tenms of its definition. Here, for the CIA's National 
Foreign Assessment Centre, 'Khomeini is a generalist and seems bored by political 
strategy' and, 'probably sees his role ... as that of a ... general moral councillor' and, 
overall, 'allows his aides to work out the details on specific foreign policy issues. 
'102 
Khomeini, in this interpretation, would thus, 'use anti-U. S. rhetoric but would not be 
indifferent to a continuing conununity of interests between Iran and the U. S. I lo3ofsome 
reinforcement to the foregoing analysis were perceptions of the role of the Iranian 'left'; 
both 'independent' and supportive of the Soviet Union. In this, although remarking on 
the 'extensive use of Soviet and other bloc materials on television and the other media' . 
1114 
analysts were also aware that, 'The Soviet Union's relations with Khomeini will be 
hampered by its 
... 
interest in encouraging radical elements in Iran. '105 A further essay 
toward a differentiation of Iranian polity is set out in a June, 14 'threat assessment' 
conducted for the Department of Defense. 106 Here, the DOD analysts observe, 'a 
pronounced proclivity for political fractionalization ... not simply vertical; 
Le. an 
ideological division between the Marxist left and the Islamic right, but multi- 
directional '107 and note that, 'Ayatollah Khomeini seems increasingly frustrated over 
opposition to his Islamic republic and continued terrorist attacks on his close 
associates'. 108 And moreover, that, 'A decision to allow the deposed Shah and/or his 
family to stay in the U. S. could have serious consequences ... such a 
decision would 
probably be the one cohesive factor in the entire Iranian political spectrum. "" 
For Washington, however, the fate of the deposed Shah had proved to be a far from 
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cohesive factor and rather, served to further sharpen existing divisions on the course of 
regional policy. As has been argued, for the State Department, and to an extent, Carter 
personally, some hopes were retained that, as the President observed, 'a genuinely 
nonaligned Iran need not be viewed as a U. S. setback. " 10 Such views were, though, 
strongly contested within both the administration and the wider policy community. In a 
series of syndicated articles, Henry Kissinger portrayed the revolution in Iran as 
demonstrative of an adverse 'geopolitical momentum' running against U. S. interests from 
Afghanistan to Angola. "' The seeming success of 'Soviet actions in Ethiopia, South 
Yemen [and] Afghanistan' had, for the former Secretary , 'the consequence of 
demoralizing those whose stock in trade was co-operation with the United States. 
1112 To 
address the immediate problems of 'the growing perception of the potential irrelevance 
of American power"" required, at the least, 'a visible presence of American power in 
the Indian Ocean. 1114 Although partisan considerations were not entirely absent from the 
Kissinger critique, its broad conclusions were very much those adopted by Harold Brown 
and National Security Advisor Brzezinski. In early February, 1979, the Defense 
Secretary undertook a 'consultative' mission to U. S. allies in the Gulf. The 
administration had, in January, dispatched a force of 12 F-15 aircraft to Dhahran. These 
were followed, on March 5, by the deployment of two AWACS aircraft and the parallel 
movement of a Carrier Task Group - headed by the USS 'Constellation' - from 
Subic 
Bay to the Arabian Sea. Although the Saudi's had re ected a long-term presence for the i 
F- 15 s and 'quickly turned down' 115 any formal establishment of U. S. bases, the 
administration had, it was confirmed, 'made a policy decision about a more active role 
in the area. 1116 
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The precise bounds of the administration's 'more active role' were, though, still under 
discussion at this time. The decision on AWACS and the 'Constellation', whilst 
prepared for (and prematurely leaked), 17 in late December, 1978, had only been 
fmalized by the President on March 2,1979.111 Although a small NSC planning group 
under Brzezinski's military aide, General William Odom, had been engaged in 
contingency studies since November, 1978,119 neither the JCS nor the State Department 
had settled on an agreed course of political or military policy. Thus whilst Harold Brown 
had stated, with reference to his recent Middle East mission, that, 'the U. S. is prepared 
to defend its vital interests with whatever means are appropriate, including military force 
where necessary, '120 and Secretary Vance would shortly after affirm that, 'there is no 
question that we have vital interests' in the Persian Gulf and that, 'We consider the 
terntonal integrity and security of Saudi Arabia a matter of fundamental interest to the 
United States, 1121 the practical implications in ten-ns of revised U. S. force structures and 
posture configuration were left open. Whilst such a regional presence could, Energy 
Secretary Schlesinger observed, involve 'military personnel as well as equipment 19 
whether it would also, 'involve ... combat arms of the ground 
forces, is another 
question. '112And again, for Defense Secretary Brown, 'less obvious and less intrusive 
forms of U. S. presence ... such as ship visits and so on' were, at 
this stage, '... clearly the 
right way to begin such activities. 
1123 
IV. Regional Reassurance and U. S. Resolution: the Yemen 'Crisis' of February, 
1979. 
As has been argued above, if broad consensus on the need for some level of enhanced 
Military preparation in the South Asian/Indian ocean region had been achieved 
by early 
0 
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1979, the administration's continuing divisions concerning the problems an 'obvious' 
U. S. presence might attract had been reinforced by the ambivalent reaction to U. S. 
planning amongst the regional powers themselves. 'I have explained to the U. S. 
(Defense) Secretary', the Saudi Foreign Minister had told interviewers on March, 2 
,... that we have nodiing to do with international strategies ... we believe that the Zionist 
(not the Soviet) danger is a threat to the Arab area and its Stability. '124 Here, whilst the 
administration was quick to observe that, as with the earlier regional caveats over Diego 
Garcia, such public statements were for diplomatic consumption and were, 'incompatible 
with the main current of our discourse with his govermnent"21 other analysts believed 
them to also reflect a genuine difference of views widiin the Saudi regime. "' In this, the 
Camp David agreement was a particularly contentious issue. Saudi Arabia had, indeed, 
concurred with the suspension of Egypt from the Arab League at the emergency 
(November, 1978) Baghdad summit - called to oppose Sadat's policies - and described 
the treaty itself as I an mvitation to war rather than peace. 
1127 U. S. domestic 
considerations would also dictate that the White House distance itself from what would 
clearly be a contested follow on to the Camp David process and allow a renewed 'focus' 
on the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. 121 The opportunity, to thus both address the needs of 
Riyadh's more localized security concerns and provide a timely demonstration of U. S. 
regional commitment, was to arise with the outbreak of renewed hostilities in North 
Yemen. 
Here, a border incursion of PDRY forces in support of local (YAR) insurgents, 
had 
commenced on February, 23. The U. S. response to what the administration presented 
as, 'a carefully planned, co-ordinated and amply supported campaign"" was to accelerate 
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the implementation of Foreign Military Sales programmes for North Yemen first agreed 
in 1976 (phase one) and in September, 1978 (phase two). These were to include 12 F-5E 
aircraft, 50 APCs, 64 M-60 tanks and assorted 155mm. and anti-aircraft artiffery, TOW 
systems and a further 50 APC's transferred from Saudi Arabia. 
130 The 'Phase two' FMS 
package, like much of the continuing instability in North Yemen itself, "' had originated 
in Riyadh's desire - following the 'coup' of June, 1978 - to bolster its own support in 
Sana'a in opposition to the South Yemen regime of Fatah Ismail (see, chap. 5). It would 
be entirely funded by Saudi Arabia. 
112 In this, as with similar programmes in Egypt and 
Somalia, the aim was to move North Yemen 'away from a Soviet inventory' and, as was 
claimed, had been 'very carefully studied by the United States and Saudi Arabia in the 
period two years, three years preceding the 1976 agreement on the first phase of 
assistance. "I' However, whilst officials were to stress the 'urgency' of the YAR position, 
considered sufficient to warrant, for the first time invoking the 'waiver' provisions in 
the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, 114and indeed, suggest that the crisis, 'may have been 
related to South Yemen's desire to exploit its current superiority in equipment before our 
announced military assistance reaches ... the North Yemen armed 
forces, "" a wider 
agenda was also put forward by the administration. The FMS transfer, it was stated, 
together with the AWACS and the 'Constellation' CTG deployments were develope in 
tandem with 'the recent visit of our Defense Secretary Harold Brown' as, '-part of a 
coherent long term strategy designed to combat instability in this area and allay the 
Concerns of our ftiends . 
1136 
At the seat of the ostensible hostilities on the YAR/PDRY border, a cease-fire, 
Mediated by the Arab League, had in fact been observed since March, 7- prior to the 
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commencement of Congressional Hearings on the administration's waiver request on 
March, 12. Some in the House Foreign Affairs Committee were to question the size of 
the $390m. package which, it was pointed out, was 'more than triple the annual state 
budget of North Yemen. 
1137 U. S. intelligence on the state Of the fighting was admittedly 
'poor'. "' It was further admitted that, as the YAR armed forces had hitherto used Soviet 
equipment, the 'full integration in terms of combat effectiveness ... (of the U. S. 
mat6riel) ... would be as much as two years away. '131 The 'anomalous situation' 
139 of 
successive military governments in Sanaa retaining not only a Soviet weapons inventory 
but some 200 Russian military instructors - despite the presence in South Yemen of 
'800-1,000 Soviets' and '500-700 Cuban advisors"40 - was ascribed to a presumed 
'helpful' Soviet influence toward, 'producing the withdrawal of the South's troops' . 
141 It 
was perhaps equally explicable in terms of North Yemen's resistance to Saudi 
domination. 142 The administration was, though, to stress that, '(our policies) are not 
dictated in any respect by the Saudis. They are dictated by our own national interest, 
which lies in addressing ourselves to the acute concern of a country we are as close to 
as Saudi Arabia. '141 Such bureaucratic non sequitur was, withal, not unusual at this stage 
of the Carter administration. For many in Congress however, the question as to, 
f whether or not the (FMS) particulars are suited to the situation in North Yemen', as 
with that of possible 'war powers' qualification on the deployment of AWACS, " was 
clearly subaltern that of, 'the need today ... for some sign of 
decisive leadership in the 
and, moreover, 'what really counts in this region is the perception. "' 
To be sure, the perceived need for the President to, 'stress [the] role as Commander- 
in-Chief' and promote the attendant image of 'resolve' had also been a continuing 
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preoccupation of National Security Advisor Brzezinski. 
141 If critics could accuse the 
admirdstration of, 'making a military decision affecting the Yemenis ... principally for 
political reasons affecting Saudi Arabia, 
1147 it was arguable that U. S. military capability 
was the most flexible policy instrument for engagement with the Saudi regime. Thus, 
while the precise framework for an overall strategy was still under discussion, moves 
would continue throughout 1979 toward strengthening the U. S. presence in the Indian 
Ocean. Here, in addition to the 'Constellation' CTG supplementing (from mid-April) 148 
the similar 'Midway' task group on regular triennial deployment, a further enhancement 
of Indian Ocean naval capability was provided by a five vessel 'Surface Combatant Task 
Force' seconded from the Seventh Fleet on July, 7; whilst the longstanding 
MIDEASTFOR in Bahrain was upgraded to five ships on October, 18.149 
These measures were, however, like the administration's activism over the Yemen, 
essentially a palliative for the wider dislocation in U. S. regional policy after the fall of 
the Shah. In addressing the altered theatre military balance, the adjustment costs in 
procurement and military posture could be ameliorated by the foundations laid for a more 
forward U. S. South Asian presence in PD-18. Less susceptible were displacements in the 
substratum of the Carter administration's foreign policy architecture. Here, the 
requirement for longer term policy reassessment for the Middle East, oil supply and the 
strategic balance would provide the grounding for the later redefinition of global strategy 
fOund in the 'Carter Doctrine'. These areas will be briefly examined in turn. 
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The Levers of Power: the Oil 'Shock', SALT 11, and the Return of 
'Linkage'. 
terms of the dislocation of U-S. regional strategy flowing from the Iranian revolution, 
it is clear that, if the Camp David accords had provided a focus for anti-American 
sentiment in Iran and the Middle East in general, the removal of Washington's 
funconditional ally' in Tehran had also greatly circumscribed the implementation of the 
Treaty itself. For Israel, the loss of two decades of carefully nurtured military co- 
operation had been compounded by the shortfall in 70 % of its (Iranian) oil. This, 
President Carter had promised to guarantee from U. S. stocks. 1-50 Less open to negotiation 
was the heightened strategic ýmportance of Israel as a U. S. regional ally. Such leverage 
had left Tel Aviv unforthcoming on the Palestinian question, whilst the more able to 
exert domestic pressure on the administration. For Saudi Arabia, the Iranian revolution 
had brought out a general sense of the vulnerability of the Saudi regime to insurgent and 
populist forces of precisely the sort which overthrew the Shah, whilst the issue of 
Palestinian rights had provided a likely catalyst. The Embassy occupations and hostility 
to Egypt in Iran had been closely followed in Riyadh, which had reacted by taking up its 
own leverage on U. S. policy through the world oil market. Although Saudi Arabia had, 
overall, increased its oil liftings to compensate for the dislocation (from 6m. to 3m. /bPd) 
in Iranian supplies, this had been carefully modulated - involving an actual (500,000 and 
1M. /bpd) decrease in the first and second quarters of 1979 
151 
- to emphasize Saudi 
concern over Camp David and the border conflict in the Yemen. This had contributed 
to a 65 % price increase (over that of December, 1978) sanctioned by OPEC on June, 
1979 at Geneva. 152 
WhilSt the Saudis correctly drew attention to the structural factors, 
concerning the 'voracious appetite for oil' 
151 in the West and in the U. S. in Particular, 
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Underlymg an eventual 150% increase by the end of the year, the immediate impression 
conveyed was of further 'disarray' 
154 in the Carter administration's strategy for the 
Middle East. 
On a broader international level, the effects of Khomeini's revolution were still more 
disruptive of U. S. standing. Carter had come to office promising greater integration with 
'Trilateral' allies in Europe and Japan. The essential correlatives for the administration's 
(domestic) economic programme were conditions of global reflation. These, following 
the second 'oil shock', were clearly untenable and such unilateral U. S. measures as were 
undertaken served to further dislocate allied unity in a manner reminiscent of Nixon's 
'New Economic Policy'. To be sure, the administration had attempted to introduce a 
stringent domestic energy policy, portrayed as 'the moral equivalent of war', "' and to 
co-ordinate tactics intemationafly at the Tokyo OECD sununit of June, 1979. "1 This was, 
however, overshadowed by the threat of a direct linkage of oil price stability with a more 
icomprehensive' Middle East peace at the parallel OPEC deliberations in Geneva. The 
U. S. unilateralism perceived in sanctioning a separate Egypt-Israel peace accord was 
widely - and in some measure, perhaps incorrectly 
157 
_ attributed to domestic pressures 
on tile administration. The European powers had, indeed, expressed open scepticism that 
Camp David only represented 'a partial step toward a comprehensive settlement and a 
solution of the Palestinian problem"" and were to further affmn a positive role for the 
PLO in the independent 'Euro-Arab dialogue' at the EEC's June, 1980 'Venice 
declaration'. 159 
If the Iranian revolution had engaged wide-ranging policy disputes with U. S. allies 
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in Europe and the Middle East, its effects were becoming equally apparent in 
exacerbating the Carter administration's domestic conflicts over the course of national 
security policy. This third strand of inter-relationship was concerned with U. S. 
perceptions of the overall strategic balance and would find a particular salience in the 
Senate Hearings on SALT 11 ratification of July, 1979. As we have seen, the 
administration had consistently sought to counter the continuing 'strategic superiority' 
debate by stressing the 'essential equivalence' with Soviet strategic capability conveyed 
by the 'willing and prosperous' U. S. alliance system. Iran, the 'keystone' of regional 
containnient, was clearly, after January, 1979, unable to fulfil either qualification. 
Moreover, despite some residual 'long term' administration hopes, the loss of the NSA 
surveillance sites in Azerbaijan had seriously compounded the technical problems of 
SALT verification without, as an NEA memorandum acknowledges, the possible 
'acquiescence' of Moscow itself. 
160 And if the administration had strenuously sought to 
disengage any systemic correspondence between these several aspects of national security 
policy, its critics were to reinstate 'linkage' with an equal vigour. 'To seek to separate 
U. S. -Soviet relations into discrete compartments', Henry Kissinger informed the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, '... runs the risk of encouraging Soviet leaders to believe 
that they can use East West co-operation in one area as a safety valve while striving for 
unilateral advantage elsewhere. '161 The Vienna (SALT) Summit, 'recorded no progress 
toward a clear understanding with the Soviet Union on the keY issue of political 
restraint'. "' Furthermore, the former Secretary asserted, the military balance is 
beginning to tilt ominously against the United States in too many significant categories 
Of weapons', 163particularly land-based 'heavy' ICBM's. This 'revolution in the strategic 
balance' suggested, in tum, that, 'our strategic forces will surely lose their ability to 
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offset the Soviet capacity for regional intervention'. 161 Such 'dangerous trends' in this 
direction were already apparent, in Kissinger's view, in the 'unprecedented Soviet use 
of proxy forces in Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia. "I' 
Thus, whilst avoiding tile charge of a direct Soviet involvement in the fall of the Shah 
- which, although favoured by some observers, 166had received no corroboration in the 
administration ,s own inte igence assessments'67 - Kissinger was to launch a potent effort 
to associate the Iranian revolution with the supposedly 'unfavourable' strategic balance 
in terms of, 'the demoralization of a pro-Western leadership group by the gradual and 
unopposed growth of Soviet power in the nearby areas. "I' 
The apparent repudiation by Henry Kissinger of an arms control programme essentially 
negotiated by himself in 1976 was seen by some as a direct result of the Carter 
administration's treatment of & deposed Shah. 10 The former Secretary's demonstration 
of, in the words of one observer, 'a fine sense of where power is shifting, '110 was, 
however, perhaps more significant as an index of the mounting opposition in Washington 
to anns negotiations with the USSR of any kind. Prominent as ever in such debate was 
the Policy Studies Chairman of the Committee on the Present Danger, Paul Nitze. Here, 
in a position paper circulated for the CPD - entitled, Is SALT 11 a Fair Deal for the 
United States? - Nitze had set out a clear aetiology between nuclear 'counterforce' 
capability and the exercise of politico-military power at regional level. For the latter, 'the 
focus of Soviet strategy has been on Western Europe. By achieving dominance on the 
Middle East, they hope to outflank Europe. They propose to outflank the Middle East 
by achieving controlling positions in Afghanistan Iran and Iraq on one side, South and 
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North Yemen, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Mozambique on the other, and by achieving the 
neutrality of Turkey to the North. "" To implement this strategy, the Soviet Union was, 
for Nitze, aiming to secure strategic superiority. 'The nuclear balance is, of course, only 
one element in the overall power balance', Nitze had argued in an earlier (March, 1978) 
address to the Foreign Policy Association"12 'But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum on 
which all other levers of influence - military, economic or political - rest'. And 
moreover, I can we be confident that there is not at least a measure of validity to that 
viewpointT 
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The latter question was, indeed, one which the Carter administration was finding 
difficult to answer. Whilst Brzezinski had, from the outset of PRM 10, sought to address 
the 'capability to manage a protracted nuclear conflict' to counter the 'doctrinal 
asymmetry"74presumed on these grounds within the Soviet nuclear strategy, President 
Carter himself had not, at this stage, entirely conceded the argument. Cyrus Vance had, 
moreover, retained some hopes of moving on toward a more ambitious 'SALT 111' 
agreement, which would again address the 'deep cuts' agenda unsuccessfully proposed 
at the outset of the administration. Yet, to ftu-ther complicate the case for the present 
SALT 11, much of the other 'grand design' aspects of Nitze's analysis had been taken on 
board by the administration in order to mobilize support for its arms packages to Egypt, 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The record of further seeming Soviet 'windfalls' in Iran and 
Afghanistan had lent a certain historical plausibility to the thesis which, it can be 
recalled, was nowhere more strongly held than by the recently departed Shah, 
MOhammed Reza Pahlavi. 
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VI. The Hostage Crisis. 
For all practical purposes, the question of whether a 'grand design' or merely 'tactical 
opportunism' provided the governing logic for Soviet strategy in the Northern Indian 
Ocean littoral was of lesser importance by 1979 than the clear diminution of the United 
States' ability to effect desired outcomes in the region. This state of affairs was brought 
mto a sharp relief by the seizure, on November, 4 of the U. S. Embassy in Tehran. The 
impact of the latter incident was both immediate and enduring for U. S. policy. Firstly, 
the holding of the 53 diplomatic personnel hostage would give the question of U. S. 
capability in the region a domestic salience which was to dominate the agenda of the 
Carter Presidency to the end. Secondly, the virulent anti-Americanism of the Khomeini 
regime would promote a similar immediacy to the military and - ceteris patibus - 'East- 
West' aspects of what Brzezinski was terming the 'regional security framework', further 
foreclosing the regionally specific and politico-diplomatic dimensions to policy making 
emphasized by Cyrus Vance and the State Department. 
Here, whilst Secretary Vance had himself proclaimed that, 'there is no question that we 
have vital interests' in the Persian Gulf, the continuing efforts to set U. S. -Iranian 
relations 'on a new foundation' set out - not disingenuously - in corresPOndence 
from 
Foreign Minister Yazdi, 175plus the expressed opposition of other regional actors to the 
'Constellation' and 'Midway' carrier deployments had sharpened existing reservations 
at State about the political utility of military reinforcement in South West Asia. Similar 
i worries were also repeatedly raised in the diplomatic traffic to Washington from the 
Tehran Embassy. Iran had formally lodged 'its concern with such plans', which, a 
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diplomatic note of July, 23 relates, 1 ... would undoubtedly have an undesirable effect on 
the two countries relations. 1176 The point had been well taken by the U. S. Embassy. The 
enhanced U. S. naval posture would clearly complicate Ongoing attempts to restore access 
to former U. S. military properties, notably involving the uncompleted IBEX 
communications network in, the Gulf military district of Iran. As these were apparently 
being handed over to the Prime Minister's Office, such requests, the Embassy believed, 
'might be worth anotlier try. 
'177 In any event, a September, 30 cable observes, 'It would 
be very useful if the Secretary (Vance) could discuss with Yazdi (the) disposition of our 
forces in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf so that he will have full understanding 
of our intentions in the area. '171 The importance of such discussions was underscored by 
mtelligence reports in September/October detailing the growing struggle for control of 
the Iranian military, and in particular, the threat from Khomeini to transfer advanced 
U. S. equipment, including F-14/16's with 'ground support and maintenance personnel' 
to Syria, 'or other Arab countries confronting Israel. " 
Against this background, initial hopes of procuring an early diplomatic resolution to the 
Embassy takeover - as indeed had happened in the earlier February occupation - 
would suffer from a growing realization of the critical role of the hostages in Iran's 
internal power struggle. This became immediately apparent with the resignation of 
Foreign Minister Yazdi on November 5, and Khomeini's endorsement of the occupation 
11 180 as a splendid Islamic act . Here, the U. S. dilemma was compounded 
by the seizure 
of confidential DOS, DOD and CIA files detailing U. S. contacts with virtually all the 
I moderate' political figures in Iran, including former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, 
Ibrahim Yazdi and the incoming President, Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr. "I In addition, some 
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of the principal U. S. proponents of such a 'measured' approach were themselves 
incommunicado in the Embassy compound on Takht-i Jamshid Avenue. 
To be sure, Cyrus Vance and many in the State Department still believed that a focus 
on military capability would only complicate U. S. political options in the region and 
had opposed the decision, taken at the November, 20 SCC meeting, to deploy a further 
Carrier Task Group (the USS 'Kitty Hawk') to the Arabian Sea and a covert AWACS 
flight to Egypt. "" By the follow up SCC session of December, 4, however, Defense 
Secretary Brown was to announce that, with the AWACS in place and the 'Kitty Hawk' 
supplementing the existing 'Midway' carrier group, the U. S. had, 'sufficient forces to 
carry out a retaliation or punitive strike against Iran if this should prove necessary. "I' 
The hostage crisis had prompted a thorough review of U. S. capability in the Northern 
Indian Ocean. This, as then NSC aide Gary Sick observes, had reached the 'sobering 
conclusion ... that U. S. ability to project military power in the region - beyond a show of 
naval force - was extremely limited. 
'114 The Saudi reactions to the February F-15 
deployment had served to highlight the political problems for U. S. defence planning that 
securing regional access would present. President Carter was to thus further authorize 
the dispatch, on December, 18, of a inter-agency mission to examine possible basing 
sites in Oman, Kenya and Somalia'15 (this will be considered in detail below) - 
VII. A Sobering Conclusion: 'Nifty Nugget', the Unilateral Corps and the 
Return of the Lesser Contingency. 
Although the earlier, (April) SCC meetings had considered a range of measures to 
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underwrite Brzezinski's 'regional security frainework, for the Gulf and South Asia, "" the 
accent had been on undertaking an essentially supportive role to Saudi policy in North 
Yemen. The November planning process thus marks a departure from previous 
administration policy in tenns of the urgency given to establishing a unilateral capability 
for the wider Indian Ocean region. Before such a capability could be in place, however, 
the NSC was to face opposition from the Joint Chiefs on organizational and budgetary 
grounds. This will be outlined below. 
As the previous chapter has shown, the administration's first DOD Annual Report had 
laid some stress on 'power projection' capability'17and identified, at least on paper, both 
a force structure - the 'appropriate elements' of U. S. (CONUS) based Army 
/Marine/TACAIR NATO reserves - and a likely theatre of operations in the Middle 
East. "' However, whilst the Pentagon's 'Office of Programme Analysis and Evaluation' 
(PA&E) had conducted preliminary studies of such deployments, 119 the DOD and the 
Services assigned a higher priority to European contingencies and NATO. This had also 
been the case with earlier planning. The European Command (EUCOM), had drawn 
up contingency plans for Middle East operations when allocated the region in the Melvin 
Laird DOD reorganization of 1972.110 Its predecessor, the Strike Command (STRICOM) 
had developed a methodological basis for the 'Rapid Deployment of Forces for Limited 
War' (see above, chap - 1) and conducted limited 
field exercises in the Persian Gulf 
region. "' The Johnson administration's 1963 programme for a specialized 'brushfire' 
strategic, air/sea lift capability had procured the C-5A aircraft, although the full 'Package 
Force Concept' of Fast Deployed Logistics (FDL) ships and a dedicated land/air force 
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structure had met consistent opposition from the service commands before being fmally 
rejected by Congress in 1967.1`2 
The worsening situation in Iran had, though, combined with a need to counter 
Congressional opposition to the forthcoming SALT 11 ratification, served to mobilize a 
more concrete framework to the PD-18 directives. Thus, by June 3,1979, a Washington 
Post report revealed the planning for a regional 'strike force' and speculated on a 
'Carter Doctrine for oil'. 191 Confirmation was provided by Army COS Bernard Rogers 
on June, 21 when the Pentagon released details of a 110,000 strong 'Unilateral Corps' 
composed of all four services which had been established following 'Consolidated 
Guidance' from the DOD the previous year. 194 
Despite the evident commitment of Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Brown, however, 
the proposed strike force was received with mixed enthusiasm by many in the Pentagon. 
Questions would arise concerning budgetary allocation, mission parameters and the 
particularly contentious area of inter-service command structure. Thus, whilst the early 
1978 (PD 18) Guidance had called for the assignment of 'light, mobile and flexible 
forces"' for deployment outside the NATO area, and indeed, identified the Gulf/Middle 
East region as the theatre of a possible 'brushfire' conflict occurring in parallel with 
hostilities in Western Europe, 196 the threat assessment had suggested that such lesser 
Contingencies would, 'initially involve U-S- but not Soviet forces. '191 The scenarios so 
developed by PA&E had thus focused on a possible Iraqi assault on Iran or Saudi 
Arabia-'" In terms of the assignment of mobile forces, the priorities of PD 18 were 
Placed on 'rapid reinforcement' for the Central Front rather than 'rapid deployment' to 
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a non-NATO theatre. 199 This ordering of mission priority had accorded with the 
established preferences of the services themselves. 
200 In acknowledging these 
perspectives, Secretary Brown had observed that, whilst 'events in the Persian Gulf could 
soften the glue that binds the (NATO) alliance', the DOD remained 'as yet unsure of the 
utility of U. S. military power in the Persian gulf contingencies. '101 
To be sure, the above considerations, expounded in 1978, were being modified under 
pressure from both Harold Brown and the events in Tehran. However, for all the 
services, the force projection role against likely 'Soviet-model client armies' (rather than 
the Red Army itself) in the Gulf had thus far taken similar issue to the earlier disputes 
over STRICOM. As before, a prime consideration was budgetary. As the JCS was well 
aware, the provisioning for the 'Unilateral Corps' would largely involve a reallocation 
of existing funds rather dm new appropriations. The proposed allocation of the mission 
to REDCOM - essentially a CONUS-based logistics command - would also suggest that 
such new funding as was available be diverted into lift assets and logistics, rather than 
the combat equipment preferred by the service chiefs. 
A further area of disagreement concerned the allocation of command structures and 
inter-service responsibility. An obvious option was that the whole mission be given to 
the U. S. Marine Corps. This was, though, resisted by the Corps itself on the grounds of 
10sing its status in the European theatre. 101 The latter, anti-Soviet mission was seen by all 
the services as central to both budgetary and career considerations. Hence, while the 
SCC had ordered Pentagon option papers on the command process for the 'Unilateral 
COTS' in April and June, the Joint Chiefs were, by August, 29 still unable to produce 
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an agreed recormnendation. 101 The increasingly public intra-agency dispute over the status 
of the Gulf in U. S. military posture had also fed into strategic relations with U. S. allies 
in East Asia, as it became clear that an enhancement of Indian Ocean capability would 
most probably take place at the expense of U. S. forces deployed in South Korea and 
Japan. 114Thus, following (October 16-20) talks on the security of Middle East oil, aimed 
at reassuring Seoul and Tokyo, Harold Brown then issued a directive to the JCS on 
October, 22 ordering that a Command for Persian Gulf operations be functioning by 
March 1,1980 - even though central questions of strategy, structure and inter-service 
responsibility were so far left unresolved. Here, the DOD's concern was underscored by 
an extensive 'command post' exercise, (from October, 2- November, 4) codenamed 
'Nifty Nugget'. This suggested that, theoretical provisions of '11/2 war' doctrine 
notwithstanding, the services were in practice unable to cope with more than one 'major 
contingency' at any one time. 101 
The coincidence of the pessimistic 'Nifty Nugget' findings with the Tehran hostage 
seizure was, for the NSC, 'sobering' indeed. Of longer term significance was the 
perception of a growing incommensurability between military posture and likely mission. 
The variegated nature of the challenge itself would further tax the administration's threat 
assessment schedules for what was popularly being termed the 'arc of crisis'. These 
would have to account for not only the inchoate currents of local revolution but more 
conventional politico-military formations at interstate level. 
rl 
VUL The 'Arc of Crisis'. 
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In parallel with the political isolation of Egypt, the Iran hostage crisis and the studied 
distance from U. S. policies being maintained by Saudi Arabia, the prospect of a more 
directly gauged regional dislocation of United States' interests in the Middle East/South 
Asian crescent was apparent by the end of 1979. In an event of clear political, if 
uncertain military significance for U. S. planners, the PDRY had on October 25, signed 
a 20 year 'Friendship and Co-operation' treaty with the Soviet Union. Here, while most 
of the text was pro fonna, a specific clause enjoined the two countries to, 'continue to 
develop co-operation in the military field in the interests of strengthening their defence 
capacity. '106Earlier, on September 7, press reports had suggested the formation of a 
40,000 man air-mobile brigade of South Yemeni, Ethiopian and Cuban troops with in- 
theatre logistics, so that airborne re-supply dependence on the Soviet Union, 'would not 
be necessary, at least at the beginning of a conflict in the Middle East. '207AIthough the 
precise extent of this development was unclear at the time (and subsequently seen as 
unfounded), the possibilities for such co-operation were highlighted by the signing of a 
ftirther treaty between South Yemen and Ethiopia on December, 2.201 Of further concern 
to the U. S., some 500 armed militants had, on November 20, occupied the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca and called for the overthrow of the Saudi regime. On the same day, 
violent protests involving Shi-ite oil workers were suppressed by the Saudi National 
fl.. 
Guard . 119 Later, on December 11, Tehran 
Radio broadcast a strong condemnation of 
Saudi treatment of the 125,000 Shi'a minority and described the monarchy as a 'corrupt 
and mercenaiy agent of the' United States. 
1210 
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If the Mecca insurgency exclusively concerned orthodox (Sunni) Wahabi sectarians, and 
was thus not directly related to the simultaneously erupting Shi-ite riots in the Saudi 
Eastern oil province, "' such theological distinctions appeared less than absolute to 
observers in Congress and the NSC. And to seemingly compound the former Shah's 
wamings of an anti-Western alliance between 'the Red and the Black', the responsibility 
for the Mecca takeover was also (albeit, spuriously) claimed by the left-wing, ex- 
Nasserist APPU based in Beirut. 212 A rumour that the occupation was the work of the 
U. S. and Israel had led to the burning of the U. S. Embassy in Islamabad on November 
21, further accentuating the prospect of a generalized 'anti-American syndrome' across 
the entire region - as well as the tenuous hold on power of the Pakistan military 
goverment of Zia al-Haq. From Washington's perspective, the gravity imputed to these 
events would lead Cyrus Vance to order an immediate evacuation of some 900 
dependants and non-essential diplomatic staff from other U. S. missions throughout the 
State Department's Near East and South Asia division. "' 
Thus, by the end of 1979, the Carter administration's position in the south-west Asia 
crescent was confronted by apparently escalating challenges to virtually every aspect of 
the 'vital U. S. interests' declared in the Defense Department's first overview of the 
region of 18 months before. And while such encompassing scope was then intended 
as a largely symbolic and political affirmation of U. S. globalism, the focus at the median 
of the 'great arc' had since assumed a more literal and military interpretation. For U. S. 
Indian Ocean policy, the debate had moved away from the largely naval focus of the 
early Carter administration to considerations of combined arms strategy and regional 
access. For the broader strategic frmnework, policy orientation had undergone a parallel 
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shift from arms cofitrol to arms transfers to remaining 'pillars' of the U. S. regional 
alliance in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Such circuition was underscored by changes 
within the foreign policy bureaucracy. Paul Wamke had departed from the ACDA in 
October, 1978 to be followed by the resignation of Leslie Gelb as Director of Politico 
-Military affairs at the State Department. 
The gradual departure of the 'left-of-centre foreign policy network' from the 
administration had also registered the effective cessation of any further efforts to secure 
a Naval Arms Limitation regime for the Indian Ocean; an objective to which, as 
Brzezinski observes, 'the State Department was still dedicated. 
1214 To be sure, U. S. 
statements at the time of the (June, 1979) signing of SALT 11 had affinmied that 'the 
United States remains committed to avoiding a U. S. -Soviet military competition in the 
Indian Ocean', and a new State Department co-ordinator, Ralph Earle, had met with 
Soviet ambassador Mendelevitch to 'review' the status of NALT on July, 23 . 
21-5 For 
Brzezinski, however, the successful appointment of former 'Coalition for Peace through 
Strength' and 'American Security Council' member"' General George M. Seignious as 
the new head of the ACDA would mark the end of the continuous disputes between the 
ACDA and the Defense Department 1217 on Indian Ocean policy, to the clear satisfaction 
of the latter. 
Conclusions. 
In contextualising tile changing patterns of U. S. Indian Ocean policy after the revolution 
in Iran, it is apparent that the dislocation so ensuing was of an entirely different 
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njagnitude to the earlier challenges posed by the war in Ethiopia and the several conflicts 
in the Yemen. The chapter above has argued that in three policy areas - the Middle East, 
the Soviet Northern tier and wider Western alliance system - the assumptions of two 
decades of U. S. strategy had been thrown into question. The inversion of Iran to not 
merely nonaligmnent but outright hostility to the United States had engaged, in contrast 
to the policies of the preceding decade, a move to establish credible direct capability for 
U. S. military intervention. It is clear, however, that such capability was, in the first 
instance, intended as a political reaffin-mation of U. S. commitment to the region, rather 
than a functioning military force. The material requirements for military intervention - 
in terms of force structures, budgetary allocations and forward access - were to be still 
unsettled at the time of the proclamation of the 'Carter Doctrine' itself. 
The contmumg internal debate throughout the areas of govenunent and the wider public 
arena was, though, reflective of the central dilemma of U. S. policy for the Gulf/Indian 
Afu% 
Ocean region during the 1970's: that is, the question of reconciling the rising importance 
of the region to the United States with the diminishing of U. S. leverage in an era of 
diffusion of power and strategic parity with the Soviet Union. It is the responses to this 
dilemma that form the concluding sections of this study - 
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THE CARTER DOCTRINE (11): THE THIRD STRATEGIC ZONE. 
The preceding section outlined the several dimensions of dislocation - economic , 
political, strategic - in United States' policy which had flowed from the Iranian 
revolution. U. S. reactions to the overthrow of the Shah were, as has also been shown, 
something of a composite. Military moves were set in train to upgrade U. S. intervention 
capability, but sustained attempts were also undertaken by the State Department, and by 
Secretary Vance in particular to reach accommodation with the provisional regime in 
Tehran. Again, if such diplomacy had derived a main impetus from the rema' ig 
'liberal' factions in the foreign policy establishment, there were also more pragmatic 
hopes that the Islamic cleric's well-rehearsed animosity to Marxism could yet provide for 
a common opposition to the Soviet Union. Whilst on all sides of the policy community, 
there was agreement on the need to maintain a continuing dialogue with the Iranian 
military. The immediate focus for such potential rapproch6ment was, particularly after 
the events of April, 1978, the increasing level of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. 
However, if U. S. policy-makers of all inclinations were to suffer mounting frustration 
in attempting to mobilize a strategic community of interest with Tehran, a new consensus 
had emerged after the November, 1979 hostage seizure. It had become clear that the 
captive U. S. embassy personnel occupied a central role in the Khomeini government's 
claims to political legitimacy. Indeed, the Carter administration's own legitimacy was 
becoming increasingly in question, as the NSC digested the 'sobering' results of the 
November strategic review and the 'Nifty Nugget' findings against a background of 
rising domestic calls for more forthright military action. 
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If the triumph of Islamic radicalism in Iran had presented the U. S. with a wholly new 
dilemma, whose impact on Washington's international and great power relations was as 
yet unquantifiable, the - always implicit - fusion of regional and strategic threat was to 
assume a dramatic and clear cut forin after the Russian entry into Afghanistan. However, 
as the argument will show, whilst there was virtually universal agreement, if mixed 
satisfaction, in Washington that these events had signalled a watershed in U. S. -Soviet 
relations, the ending of d6tente was, in other respects, not without compensations to the 
United States - not the least in tenns of the stipulative and organizational aspects of U. S. 
national security policy. It would remove institutionalized obstacles to unilateral U. S. 
imtiatives, present clear objectives for the military planning process and simplify the 
terms of reference in relations with regional allies. 
The following section will take up these perspectives in analysis of the comprehensive 
redefinition of the Gulf/Indian Ocean region in U. S- strategy following the Soviet 
mtervention in Afghanistan. In particular, the analysis will focus on the restructuring of 
strategic assumptions and military posture in the region consequent from the Carter 
Doctrine. 
I. 'A Militarization of Discourse': the Senate Hearings of March, 1980 and 
the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan. 
If the fall of the Shah had thus far produced a growing NSC pressure on the U. S. 
Military toward substantiating the option papers of PD-18, and the hostage crisis had 
seemingly demonstrated their inadequacy, the Gulf/Indian Ocean region was to take the 
.4 
382 
top of the Pentagon's agenda with the December 26,1979 Soviet occupation of Kabul 
and parts of Afghanistan. This imperative for the policy process was underscored in 
President Carter's January 23,1980 'State of the Union' address. 'Events in Iran and 
Afghanistan', Carter had declared, 'have dramatized for us the critical importance for 
American security and prosperity of the area running from the Middle East through the 
Persian Gulf to South Asia ... Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United 
States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force. " Whilst deliberately posed in such a way as to recall the 'Truman 
Doctrine' of 1947.1 the reference to 'outside forces', in what was immediately termed 
the 'Carter Doctrine' had acquired a somewhat different function. Truman had raised the 
prospect of a Soviet military threat to shore up U. S. support -for the Middle East holdings 
of America's principal ally - Britain - in the face of a still substantial domestic 
commitment to isolationism. Carter was responding to a gathering disengagement from 
U. S. policies by principal allies in the face of strong U. S. domestic and Congressional 
sentiment toward intervention. 
The domestic calculation behind the 'Carter Doctrine' was clear: the new policy 
orientation would 'draw a line' under what had been originally conceived as a desirable 
move toward a 'multiple advocacy' model of decision making in the areas of security 
and foreign affairs. However, in thus offering commendation to the President for, 
I reversing the process [ofl'matching our foreign policy to our military capabilities'4 as 
one Senator was to put it, the Congress was also giving expression to the widespread 
feeling that the executive branch had lost control of the agenda. 
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The extent of the administration's reversals, internal and international, were to become 
clear as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met to consider the issues in April and 
March, 1980. Given the multitude of dimensions to the crisis on the periphery, the 
Senate was to engage in a pu ic rev ew of U. S. regional policies of similar breadth to 
the earlier scrutiny of U. S. nuclear strategy at the hearings for SALT 11. The latter treaty 
had, indeed, been indefinitely postponed on January, 4. The administration would now 
be concerned to demonstrate a further range of measures adopted to address what 
President Carter had described as the 'greatest threat to peace since the Second World 
War. " Analogies with the inter-war period were also favoured by some Senate witnesses, 
particularly with regard to the 'appeasement' of Soviet actions perceived by Senators in 
the European alliance. Here, in responding to Senator Jacob Javits' depiction of the 
Tinlandization of Western Europe, 16 Carter administration special envoy Clark Clifford 
was to condenm the apparent willingness of 'some of our allies' to, 'go right ahead on 
a business-as-usual basis with the Soviet Union'; ' and for former Under Secretary Joseph 
Sisco, 'The reaction of our European allies ... has been short of what will be required 
in 
the 1980's in the common interest. " In the view of Senator George McGovern, the 
historical parallel concerned, 'not so much the Nazis going into the Rhineland as it is the 
unfortunate experience we had of stumbling into Vietnam. "' Whilst for veteran 
U. S. /Soviet relations analyst George Kennan, such analogies were indisputable in one 
respect, that 'never since the end of World War Two has there been such a far reaching 
militarization of thoughts and discourse in the capital. '10 
Such pervasive 'militarization' of the Washington foreign policy community was 
Perhaps rendered the more palpable by its seeming lack of differentiation. To be sure, 
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for the present focus of such 'discourse' in the Gulf/South-West Asia and Northern 
Indian Ocean, 'the task of devising a coherent and consistent U. S. policy', Senator Frank 
Church had observed, 'is especially difficult because of the diverse nature of possible 
threats to U. S. interests in the area. "I Albeit, the Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 
remained, 'troubled by the apparent lack of any clear administration assessment of the 
specific threats our military buildup is designed to counter. "I Perhaps fortuitously for 
those advocates of the pre -existing 'military buildup', at least since PD-18, in the 
administration, a firm basis for threat assessment was now inevitably focused by the six 
Soviet divisions in Afghanistan. In this for Defense Deputy Under Secretary Walter 
Slocombe, the 'Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not a surprise in the sense of being 
unexpected. We had already begun to shape our programmes and our diplomacy to 
improve our ability to deter and resist Soviet adventurism in remote areas and, 
specifically in that area of the world. "I And moreover, as one administration official 
remarked to press reporters, 'I think the Soviets have done us a big favour. "I 
Whilst the Soviet incursion represented, in the latter sense, a certain advantage to 
Concerting U. S. policy making, the motivation for Moscow itself was less clear. Here, 
former NSC aide Helmut Sonnenfeld was to speculate on whether the Soviet Union was 
entering an 'imperial phase' of evolution. 11 And again, for Joe Sisco, 'the Soviets did not 
miscalculate by going into Afghanistan ... [but rather] ... assessed correctly 
that we and our 
allies could not prevent the direct aggression in Afghanistan ... [and] ... took advantage of 
a strategic opportunity. "I This argument, as Somenfeld further observes, is suggestive 
that the, 'advance of Soviet influence and presence in many parts of the world... may not 
have been occurring in accordance with a fted pattern or original design, but it has 
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happened frequently enough that a pattern has in fact emerged whether intended or not. 117 
If the simple 'opportunist' hypothesis advanced by Sisco can be read as complementary 
to Hehnut Sonnenfeld's general observations on strategic voluntarism, the pattern, in 
Soviet strategy now emerging could, in the view of some analysts within the 
administration, be driven by a more compelling material motive on the behalf of the 
USSR - that of an accelerating demand for Middle East oil. Thus, in a declassified CIA 
study of Soviet energy requirements, " DO Stansfield Turner had predicted that Soviet 
oil production was set to peak (at 12m. /bpd) in 1980 and decline thereafter to an 
estimated 10m. /bpd by 1985.11 The significance here would not necessarily appear in 
drastic Soviet domestic shortages, but in a diminished Soviet ability to employ oil exports 
in concerting influence over the Comecon countries and in earning hard currency for the 
USSR economy. The 1979 Soviet proposal to convene a 'European Energy Conference '10 
had suggested an increased Soviet interest to assert its position in the wider political 
economy of oil. Of further U. S. concern was that the external political-strategic 
disorientation projected from falling oil returns would coincide with the internal 
discontinuity of Soviet succession politics. Here, noting that, 'President Brezhnev told 
President Carter at the (Vienna) summit that energy was Moscow's most pressing 
Problem"' the CIA was to argue that, 'these (coming) dislocations will put a great deal 
of strain on both the Kremlin leadership and the Warsaw Pact alliance. Relations within 
the Pact are also uneasy because of the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan. Given the 
advanced age of the Soviet leaders, the oil crunch is likely to occur during a large scale 
changeover in the Soviet Politburo. 122 
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If analysts were to differ over the likelihood of a Soviet 'oil crunch', with the CIA's 
1977/80 estimates in particular being strongly contested, 23 what was less open to question 
was the extent of Western (OECD) dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Here, the projected 
OECD aggregate would remain at some 62 % throughout 1979-85.14Divided up, the 
European (EEC) percentage import figure would display a slight reduction, from 63 
in 1979 to 62% gauged for 1985, whilst Japanese Gulf imports would, for the same 
period, remain constant at 73 %. For the U. S., the percentage figure would actually rise 
from 31 % (1979) to a projected 35 % for 1985 - 11 To compound such dependency, as oil 
economist Walter Levy had observed, 'there are fundamentally no acknowledged and 
accepted rules for conduct governing the (oil) trade. '21 These had fallen away with the 
erosion of the post-war corporate oil structure after the 1971 Tehran Agreement. The 
Intemational Energy Agency had been set up by Kissinger following the first (1973) oil 
crisis to address this problem. At the current (1980) sessions on February 18-19, 
however, the 19 members had resisted U. S. calls for a uniform percentage oil import cut 
and other moves toward a closer co-ordinated consumers oil regime. 27 Moreover, it was 
widely felt in Washington that, as SFRC panellist Joseph Binden was to tell the Senate, 
'the EEA just really could not cope with a Persian Gulf shutdown. "I It would thus follow, 
for the Senator from Delaware, that, 'We are faced with either developing the capability 
through diplomacy or military means to ensure a steady uninterrupted flow of oil from 
the Persian Gulf ... and these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
129 
It was thus not necessary to adopt a 'strong' version of the 'Soviet hegemony' thesis 
- of the kind advanced by Nitze - or otherwise, a 'weak' version which viewed Soviet 
POlicy as intent upon reducing the West to 'economic vassals '10 through less direct 
IF 
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intinudation' of the Middle East producers, for U. S. planners to see the danger in a i 
possible Soviet oil shortfall. To be sure, as Senator Pell had argued, 'there is no reason 
why (the Soviet Union) can't purchase energy from that area the way we do. "' This 
point was, however, well - if obliquely - taken in the CIA's approach to the 
'Geopolitics of Energy. In the Agency's view, 'the entrance of the Soviet Union into the 
free world's competition for oil will not only further squeeze supplies but entails major 
security risks. "I The latter would obtain perhaps especially if, 'the Soviets-hold out as 
a carrot the glimmer of a stable political atmosphere"' for the Gulf, by thus admitting an 
. mcreased 'nonaligned' leverage on U. S. policy amongst the producers themselves. 
Heretofore, while there had been much speculation on the evidence for an 'historical 
drive' to the Middle East on behalf of Soviet Union - and indeed, its Czarist 
predecessors - of which an imputed desire for oil was only the most recent 
manifestation, the clear historical fact was that, as George Kennan observed, 'the only 
interruption of this (oil) supply we have had to date came from the Arabs -" 
A Doctrine without a Strategy? - the Inventory of Rapid Deployment, 
Spring, 1980 - FY 1981-2. 
The obvious politico-diplomatic constraints on the administration entering a full account 
of the 'diverse nature of possible threats to U. S. interests' in the Gulf/Indian Ocean 
region had lead to some critics describing Carter's January, 23 pronouncement as 'a 
doctrine without being a strategy I- 35 The administration, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Chaimian Frank Church observed, '... is clearer about the specific actions it 
is undertaking to increase U. S. military strength in south-west Asia than it is about the 
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policies these actions are designed to support. 136 The administration's military moves to 
date, including the October 18,1979 MIDEASTFOR upgrade (bY two Sixth Fleet 
destroyers and a quadrennial carrier group deployment from PACOM)37 and Harold 
Brown's December, 14 announcement of the Rapid Deployment Force, had been - not 
surprisingly - recapitulated by the White House Press Office to ensure the maximum of 
publicity. Such an approach had, to be sure, positive utility in the sense that an 
unqualified military buildup would admit enhanced political flexibility to the 
administration, whilst allowing respective 'target' constituencies in the Middle East, 
Western Europe, the Soviet Union and U. S. domestic politics to draw their own 
conclusions. It would have the further merit of masking the still considerable policy 
differences within the Carter cabinet itself. " These, however, were to increasingly 
concern modalities rather than principle. Since Carter's own expressed 'conversion' to 
a more militant anti-Soviet approach after Afghanistan, " the centre of gravity for decision 
making had shifted decisively to the NSC. 40 Cyrus Vance had resigned on April 29, 
1980. His replacement as Secretary of State, Ed Muskie was, as Brzezinski relates, 
'much less informed (than Vance) about international affairs '41 and overall, for the 
National Security Advisor, the administration was by now geared toward 'a genuinely 
balanced and effective foreign policy - 
142 
If there was thus some clear momentum for a comprehensive, 'combined arms' 
enhancement of U. S. military presence in the N. W. Indian Ocean, toward a 'formal 
recognition ... that America's security had 
become interdependent with the security of 
three central and inter-related strategic zones' (Western Europe, the Far East and the 
Middle East/Indian Ocean) '41 questions would still remain concerning military posture, 
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likely mission, and allocation of resources. However, advantageously for the 
administration, the need to present a clear cut military mission for the proposed forces 
had been realized and, to an extent, addressed in the 'Consolidated Guidance' of June, 
1979. On June, 28 press reports confirmed that incoming Army COS General Edward 
C. Meyer had prepared force assigments for possible RDF contingencies. "And whilst 
in public, as Hubert Humphrey observed before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
'little discussion has been offered by the DOD about the actual scenarios under which the 
IRIDF would be employed, '41 the 'specific threat' emerging in the DOD planning process 
was that of a Soviet incursion into Northern Iran. 
It is proposed to take up a more detailed consideration of the grounds for such U. S. - 
Soviet and U. S. -regional contingencies below. It is first necessary to establish the force 
structures within which the administration could act to meet them. In terms of existing 
(March, 1980) U. S. capability in the North West Indian Ocean region, a DOD statement 
had placed this at two carrier task groups (two carriers, 120 combat aircraft, 15 other 
surface combatants, four amphibious ships transporting a Marine Amphibious Unit 
[1,800 troops] and six support vessels). In terms of possible reinforcements, the DOD 
could insert tactical aircraft in a 'few hours', and 'significant units' backed by AWACS 
within a few days. In addition, battalion sized units of airborne forces (82nd. /ab) could 
arrive within 48 hours and the entire division could 'close' (i. e., fully deploy) in two 
weeks. A self-contained 'Marine Amphibious Force' (one division plus one air wing) 
could be deployed within a month-46 The above force levels had been enhanced in 
accordance with the November 23,1979 (Camp David) NSC option schedule, which had 
included a naval blockade of Iran and the seizure of the Kharg Island oil terMinal. 47 On 
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january 14,1980, U. S. naval strength in the Indian Ocean was temporarily increased to 
25 ships with the addition of a third carrier group (the USS 'Nimitz'). Whilst the military 
option against Iran actually chosen - the failed April, 24 hostage rescue - reflected a 
perceived need for 'restraint' following the Soviet entry into Afghanistan, " wider 
contingencies for Iran and elsewhere were addressed in co-ordinated AWACS - Carrier 
Task Group exercises of January and February4l and the announcement, on March 5, that 
seven 'Near Term Prepositioning Ships' (NTPS) containing equipment sufficient to 
support a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) of about 12,000 men and to sustain several 
USAF fighter squadrons were to be deployed in June to Diego Garcia. 10 
In terms of future force levels envisaged in the FY 1981/2 procurement schedule, 
air and sea-lift assets were to figure prominently. For the latter, the Defense Department 
was requesting eight 'SL-7' fast container ships converted from civilian use. These 
could deliver a mechanized division, plus support, from the U. S. East Coast to Gulf 
Persian locations in 20-6 days5I and were costed at $341.5m. 52 For the long term, the 
administration sought construction of a new class of 12 'Maritime Prepositioning Ships' 
13 (MPS - T-AKR) sufficient to support three brigade sized NIAGTFs for 30 days by 1987. 
Increased air assets (for FY 1981) would include the C-5 wing modification programme 
($178.6m. ), C-141 in-flight refuelling modifications ($25.6m. ), KC-10A (aerial tanker) 
procurement ($309.7m. ) and a new strategic lift aircraft, the 'C-X' ($80.7m. ). ' Many 
of the above had, in fact, been programmed before the Afghanistan crisis and were 
reclassified as RDF capable, notably the ICXI. 11 Combat assets assigned to the RDF 
included four Army divisions (two a/b., one inf., one mech. ), one armoured. brigade, one 
air combat (helibome) brigade and a Marine Amphibious Force. For the Navy; three 
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carrier battle groups, one surface action group, five sq. /ASW, and six amphibious assault 
ships were assigned, whilst Airforce capability was extended to 12 tactical fighter 
squadrons, two tac/recon. squadrons, and two tac. /airlift wings. To enable in-theatre 
logistic support for these forces, the DOD was also requesting $367m. in military 
construction funding ('Milcon' )56 (this will be considered in more detail below). 
The Carter administration's upgraded defence estimates were not, to be sure, restricted 
to enhanced theatre capability for the 'third strategic zone. Much of the Army and 
USAF assets were also earmarked for NATO contingencies. 57 The overall Rapid 
Deployment 'concept' however, as envisaged by the appointed RDJTF Commander, Lt. 
Gen. (USMC) Kelly, was to consider such forces as a, 'reservoir of mainly CONUS 
based units from which forces can be drawn to cope with a specific contingency. "I The 
'task', is thus to, 'provide a capability for deploying force packages, of varying size and 
structure, to any region of the world. "I Initial, (1978-9) planning had proposed to retain 
the existing REDCOM designation of light, airmObile units uncommitted to either 
NATO or PACOM contingencies. 60 Here, the upgrading of the RDF force structure to 
include NATO-allocated armour and artillery reflects the growing strategic interest of the 
Harold Brown DOD in developing options for 'horizontal escalation' . 
61 'The Soviets, 
Defense Secretary Brown had declared, must consider the possibility that renewed 
aggression by them may lead to a much wider war, escalated in both intensity and 
geography. 162 
The concept of 'horizontal escalation', whilst endorsed by Brzezinski as a valid 
military option, 63was strongly resisted by some in the defence community. 6' Put shnply, 
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such objections revolved around the difficulties of establishing a calculus of strategic 
equ alence. What did, though, find a more general agreement within the administration 
was the political return perceived in establishing the prospect of a 'much wider war' as 
a possible threat. The RDF, as a unilateral U-S. enterprise, was clearly the touchstone 
of such 'resolve'. The earlier (1967) proposals for similar forces, as DOD Under 
Secretary Walter Slocombe reminded Senators, had been rejected, 'because of a belief 
(in the Congress) that if the United States had the ability to use military force, it would 
be tempted to use it unwisely. "' Such belief was no longer discouraged by the 
administration. The actual military mission of the RDJTF had, however, been arrived 
at perhaps as much by intra-bureaucratic, intra-service and intra-regional considerations 
as by calculation of likely actions by the Soviet Union. It is now proposed to take up the 
grounding for RDF strategy in more detail. 
M. The RDF: Strategy, Threat-assessment and Forward Defence. 
It is important to distinguish between the established provisions for counter-insurgency 
- which can be more properly taken up in the politico-military context of regional 
alliance diplomacy - and the development of the 'primary mission' for the RDF 
involving large scale deployment of regular U. S. forces for inter-state conflict. Here, 
with the fall of the Shah, the focus for U. S. contingency planning in South West Asia had 
shifted from a possible Iraqi threat to Khuzestan - and the lower probability of renewed 
India-Pakistan hostilities - to considerations of a Soviet advance into Iranian 
Azerbaijan. 
To be sure, the latter prospect had, particularly following Afghanistan, a certain surface 
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plausibility. The Soviet Union had occupied the province during World War 11. Moscow 
had, moreover, reaffinned the 'mutual security' provisions of the 1921 Iran-Soviet 
treaty, despite repeated disavowals by the Bazargan and Bani-Sadr governments in 
Tehran. The Soviet move in Afghanistan suggested, for many observers, a greater 
propensity toward military risk-taking. 66However, whilst intelligence of April, 1980 had 
detailed the presence of 125,000 troops on the Soviet Azeri border, and an enhanced, 28 
vessel naval presence in the Arabian sea, 67 this fell considerably short of the capability 
to mount a full scale invasion. The present likelihood of such a move would seem ftu-ther 
discounted by Soviet diplomatic rapproch6ment with the Tehran regime. The wider 
strategic issue - concerning possible Soviet cross-border actions in the event of a general 
outbreak of hostilities - would indeed require the assigmnent of U. S. forces. Yet, while 
such contingency was to comprise the main planning assignment for the RDF, it would 
also represent, in operational terms, the point of departure. 
In public session the administration was adamant that U. S. military action in the region 
was 'scenario dependent'" and that 'planning must consider abroad range of potential 
threats. '61 Not the least of these was perceived from Iran itself. Possible U. S. action in 
KhUzestan had, as we have seen, been under consideration at the November/December, 
1979 meetings of the SCC. The difficulties of mounting a large scale assault on the 
Southern oilfields, brought out in the 1975 CRS Report on 'Oilfields as Military 
Objectives', were again emphasized by the Pentagon. The adoption of a primary anti- 
Soviet mission - involving forward defence of Iran in the North - would, 
however, have 
the merit of incorporating the options of earlier planning whilst concerting a more 
favourable response from the JCS. In concrete terms, the revised strategy envisaged a 
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three phase, deployment wherein the attrition of Soviet advances through the two 
successive mountain chains (the Northern Qareh Dagh-Elburz-Golul Dagh and the 
Southern Zagros) would permit the establishment of a favourable terrain for combined 
operations in Khuzestan. The core contingency of a 'combined arms' defence South of 
the Zagros mountains had, though been arrived at against a background of intense inter- 
service bargaining. And whilst it is difficult to assign relative weight to such factors, it 
is also apparent that the need to engage service co-operation had figured strongly as a 
counterpoint to more abstract threat-assessment formation. 
As General Kelly made clear to the February, 1980 sessions of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, the development of force structures and strategic priorities 'has 
gone through an evolutionary process ... during this past year. '70 Here, against a 
background of the initial PD-18 focus on REDCOM of September, 1977 and the June, 
1979 formation of an Army-dominated 'Unilateral Corps', some analysts had argued 
strongly for the whole RDF mission to be allocated to the Marines. The latter had the 
advantage, as some Senators pointed out, of being designed for precisely such 
contingencies . 71 The drawbacks, though, were threefold. Firstly, as the Corps lacked 
heavy armour/artillery and the DOD was unwilling to upgrade its 'organic' tactical air 
(TACAIR) capability (the 'AV-8B'), actions would be confined to the seizure of a 
beachhead in Khuzestan. Secondly, whilst the administration was, in conclave, prepared 
to contemplate a divided Iran (see below), the public focus on such a strategy implied by 
a Corps-dominated RDF could complicate U. S. diplomatic initiatives in the region, and 
send the wrong 'signal' to the Soviet Union. Thirdly, a cornmitment to such a demanding 
Mission was received with mixed reactions in the Marine Corps itself. Although clearly 
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wishing a major mput to RDF strategy, it was also unwilling to abandon other roles in 
NATO and the Pacific which such a concentration would entail. 72 Confining the RDF to 
the Marines would also meet strong opposition from the Army - involving the probable 
dissolution of REDCOM - and from a U. S. Airforce reluctant to be restricted to an 
essentially logistics role. 
The NSC planning group's inclusion of options for the more demanding 'forward 
defence' mission was, thus pitched to elicit the greatest co-operation from the services. 
Army air assault and special forces were assigned an interdiction role in the 'choke 
points' of the Northem (Qareh/Golul Dagh) mountain chain, whilst the Airforce was to 
plan for tactical 'deep strike' missions on advancing Soviet columns and prevent the 
establislunent of Soviet airmobile forces beyond the mountain barrier. A key element in 
Airforce strategy was the assignment of 28 B-52H's (based in North Dakota) as a 
conventionally armed 'Strategic Projection Force' which could be deployed to Diego 
Garcia. 71 Concurrently, a beachhead in the Khuzestan oilfields would be occupied by the 
initial Marine Amphibious Brigade - in General Kelly's view, the 'smallest force capable 
of projecting itself against opposition'74 - which, within 90 days, could be supported by 
an additional two MAB's, three army divisions (including one armoured and one 
mechanized infantry) and ground-based tactical air-' 
The extent that inter-service considerations had influenced the setting of the 
administration's strategic priorities in Iran was further apparent in the bounds of the 
command structure. Whilst the unified (RDJTF) command, established on March 1, 
1980, had routine responsibility to 'train, exercise ... and employ 
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units assigned to the 
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RDJTF from the four services, the peacetime planning function was subordinate to the 
D,,, r, DCOM commander, General Volney Warner. However, on deployment, the 
assigiunent would shift to the appropriate regional command. This, for the Persian Gulf 
region was EUCOM. And while the division of responsibilities in the Army itself was, 
as Warner acknowledged, 'causing some difficulties, ", "I the need for inter-service co- 
ordination had led to a further link in the command chain being established (against 
Warner's advice) '78 'directly to the National Command Authority' (the JCS). 79 Here, 
given that any significant Gulf contingency - particularly involving the Soviet Union - 
would result in increased tension in other theatres, choices concerning the assigment 
of 'joint earmarked' NATO and PACOM assets would assume a critical importance. 
D- .. 
Restrictions on strategic lift capability would, moreover, lend a further criticality to the 
associated time factors which could detenmine inter-service and inter-theatre priority. 110 
Thus, although General Kelly was to (accurately) state that 'the real purpose behind the 
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is to harmonize the capabidities of all the 
services, "I it is also clear that involvement in the RDF mission was something none of 
the services themselves could afford to downgrade. 
IV. Non-Soviet Contingencies and Regional StrategY. 
The previous section has outlined the institutional background to U. S. 'Rapid 
Deployment, strategy, and indicated the facility of the focus on Soviet contingencies in 
securing the optimal inter-service response for joint planning. However, whilst the 
declared 'primary mission' of the RDF was to resist a 'possible large scale Soviet 
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invasion of the Persian Gulf region, '12 it was also apparent that the capability to conduct 
a 'high confidence' defence of the region would not be in place until at least 1986.11 In 
some estimates, a current (1980) airborne deployment of one light and one heavy division 
would, for example, require all of U. S. Military Airlift Command's 77 C-5A and 276 
C-141 aircraft and take up to five weeks. 14 Of more immediate application to the 
'regional security framework', the administration was also considering 'a number of 
potential non-Soviet contingencies' wherein a 'relatively small RDJTF would be 
adequate'. Here, the focus would be on 'advisory teams, special forces and logistics - "I 
In this, the 'apparent lack' of administration guidelines on the issues had a clear 
diplomatic utility: a specific concern was to avoid the political complications attending 
the 1975 'Oilflelds' Report and the contemporaneous speculation by President Ford and 
Secretary Schlesinger on the consequences of 'actual strangulation of the industrial 
world'. The obvious point of departure for 'non-Soviet contingencies' was, though, 
counter-insurgency in the lesser Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. 'Military aggression', as 
General Kelly's had acknowledged, '... is not the only - or even the most likely - threat 
that we might face. '"Thus, though officials were careful to stress that a full mobilization 
of the RDF would only occur in the event of aggression by 'outside powers', the routine 
subvention of 'security and stability' in the Gulf would be addressed, as Under Secretary 
Komer informed the Senate Armed Services Committee, through a scale of: [1] 'local 
forces' (security assistance), [21 military presence' Ooint exercises and periodic 
TACAIR and Marine deployments) and [31 surge capabilities, from PACOM or the U. S. 
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. 86 
Operationally, the main secular assigment of the RDJTF thus falls naturally into two 
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categories: firstly, that involving special forces in an essentially internal security role; 
secondly, a mission involving external threat, possibly in support of internal insurrection. 
In regard to the first, Senate testimony by Defense Intelligence (DIA) officials had 
answered (Armed Services Committee Chairman) Senator Henry Jackson's request to 
assess the 'real threats to security' in the Gulf by outlining the 'significant potential' for 
subversion by 'expatriates' - largely Palestinian - in Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE. 
Bahrain, continuing base to the upgraded MIDEASTFOR, had indeed undergone riots 
(from widiin the 60 % Shi'a community) at the time of the Iranian revolution. " Albeit, 
in the DIA's view, 'the govermnents of these three countries are confident that they can 
control any disturbances. '19 However, intelligence analysts were to also note that, 'the 
Mecca incident has made all regional states appreciate the possibility that an undetected 
or low proffle group can literally emerge from nowhere and cause major security 
Problems. '90 The latter prospect had also occurred to Zbigniew Brzezinski. On June 3, 
1980, the National Security Advisor received Presidential assent to set up 'a very small 
rapid intervention force ... for the purpose of helping a friendly government under 
subversive attack. "' 
If the first category of RDF mission was concerned with the provision of low 
visibility internal support, particularly in the lesser Gulf states, for the second a 
demonstrable U. S. profile was required. Here, the respective 'military presence' and 
I surge capability' roles represent passive and active responses to essentially external 
contingencies involving the larger regional actors. Albeit, it was widely recognized that 
local inter-state conflict could involve both an internal component, for example, an 
attempted coup, and the indirect involvement of the Soviet Union. Despite the heightened 
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focus on regional threats in Washington, however, the actual U. S. securitY position in 
the Middle East had, in some ways, improved since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
F-arlier contingency planning had focused on the possible Iraqi threat to Iran, Kuwait or 
Saudi Arabia - By mid-1980, though, the administration was confident that Iraq would not 
serve as a Soviet 'proxy' for exerting leverage or launching outright hostilities on either 
Kuwait or the Saudi regime. -92 Baghdad had, indeed, condemned the Soviet actions in 
Afghanistan at the (January, 1980) Islamic summit in Pakistan and was, in a broad sense, 
aliped with U. S. policy in North Yemen and Somalia. For the Iraqi threat to Iran, this, 
as will be shown, would now become, objectively, an asset to U. S. policy in the region. 
Of the remaining powers, Saudi Arabia was thought unlil-: ely to be subject to an 
mternal coup due to the diffused nature of the political process, dispersion of the armed 
services and the 'pervasiveness' of the al-Saud family-' Oman, central to RDF forward 
logistics co-ordination, was similarly thought to be internally stable; 'their society', in 
(DPP/JCS) General Richard Lawson's view, 'has a stronger fabric than the others in 
the area. '94Thus, the principal 'external' concern of RDF strategy was on North and 
South Yemen. Here, speculation in the Senate was focused on a PDRY takeover of the 
North, utilizing disaffected indigenous forces and graduated support from the Soviet 
Union. To be sure, such a development would, given historical precedent, seem the 
mOst likely of possible crisis scenarios. It had earlier provided a rationale for the 
administration's emergency $172m. MAP supplemental. In Senate executive session, 
Henry Jackson had recapitulated that, 'Can you think of an easier (strategy) for the 
'-wiets to employ? " In this instance, however, the administration would focus on the 
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actual local conditions in the Yemen Arab Republic itself, rather than on recent analogy 
and presumed Soviet strategy and capability. Whilst agreeing that 'Unification', between 
the Yemens, '. .. could constitute a serious threat to U. S. interests' 91 Robert Komer was 
to stress a perceived post-Afghanistan 'worry' at possible Soviet designs from the current 
North Yemen leadership (Col. Abdullah Saleh) and, critically, the extent of a 
substantially armed 'opposition ... to unification under a South Yemeni dominated 
regime', which could mount a 'strong factional resistance ... even to the point of civil 
war'. Under such conditions, Under Secretary Komer concludes that, even were a 
unitary state to be established, it would be 'unlikely, at least in the near term, to threaten 
or harass its moderate neighbours. '97 
Yet, the shifting locus of regional threat was of mixed utility to the administration's 
wider strategic ambitions. On the one hand, as Senator Frank Church had observed, 'the 
persistence of bitter regional quarrels, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Indo-Pakistan 
antagonism, pose continuing difficulties for U. S. attempts to organize even an informal 
security system. '91 Whilst on the other, the apparent lessening of tension in other areas 
- such as Saudi relations with Iraq - combined with the clear administration priority 
given to great power issues and a vigorous 'peace offensive'99 from Moscow itself, was 
admitting greater leverage to the respective regional allies to pursue their particularist 
claims. Thus, if the initial component of Indian Ocean strategy sought to address the 
immediate security position in the Gulf, the wider politico-military bounds of the 
Regional Security Framework would involve; firstly, the co-ordination. and expansion of 
existing intra-regional linkages and, secondly a more 'formal' provision for American 
bases and pre-positioning facilities - sanctioned by treaty - which could admit the 
Possibilities of a greater unilateral U. S. action. These will be considered in turn. 
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V. The Regional Security Framework: Third Party Co-ordination on the Soviet Northern Tier. 
In laying the ground for the proposed 'Regional Security Framework' for the Gulf and 
south-west Asia, the administration was aware, to again cite Senator Church's 
observations, that previous attempts to superimpose a great power strategic framework 
on regional subsystems - such as the Baghdad Pact and CENTO - 'never developed 
much indigenous strength' and that, 'many of the problems that have for a generation 
hampered U. S. efforts to create a barrier to the expansion of Soviet power still exist in 
the South West Asia-Persian Gulf region, sometimes in a more acute form than in the 
past. "' Underlying these vicissitudes, for the SFRC Chainnan, was the fact that, 'Few 
countries in this part of the world have created effective political systems. '101 Prominent 
amongst the latter stood the old linchpin of CENTO, Pakistan. 
Here, given that relations had been consistently strained throughout the Carter 
1)4-p 
I, esidency, the administration could avail the opportunity of the Afghan crisis to restore 
some measure of strategic consensus with Islamabad. President Carter had thus 
telephoned Pakistan's military leader, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq on December 28,1979 
to assure him of the continuing validity of the 1959 'executive agreement' on 
I appropriate Ooint) action (to specified external threats) ... including the use of armed 
fOrces'; this was publicly reaffmned by Brzezinski on December, 30. Carter was to also 
take the occasion of the first major policy speech on Afghanistan (on January, 4) to 
announce a $400m. military and economic aid package - bypassing Symington-Glenn. 
Provisions - to the Zia regime. 
102 It was further decided that National Security Advisor 
402 
Brzezinski would accompany Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Pakistan 
for joint consultations on February, 2. 
Though Brzezinski had expressed himself 'delighted' with the 'tangible results' of the 
February mission, 101 the restitution of a close U. S. strategic relationship with Pakistan 
was not without cost; notably, in the first instance, to Washington's own credibility. 
Thus, whilst the evolving U. S. provisions for a 'regional security framework' had 
necessarily contemplated a consonant role for Pakistan's (well regarded) military assets, 
the setting out of concrete MAP schedules represented a clear reversal of administration 
policy. Previous military aid had been cut off as recently as April, 1979. U. S. -Pakistan 
relations had further deteriorated with the execution of former President Bhutto later the 
same month. The Zia govermment's apparent indifference to U. S. opinion was again 
demonstrated in the U. S. embassy burning of December, 4. The administration's initial 
aid offer, which in Brzezinski's own view should perhaps, 'have been expressed more 
tangibly, '114was memorably dismissed by Zia as 'peanuts', and the Brzezinski mission 
of February, 2 deliberately rescheduled to succeed those of an Islamic delegation and the 
Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua. Moreover, as was made clear to the NSC/State 
delegation, the Zia regime's own security concerns were assigning the Soviet/Afghan 
threat a lower priority than that of securing the capability to conduct Pakistan's 
traditional military rivalry with India. 105 
Here, as South Asia analyst Selig Harrison observes, the established U. S. policy Ot 
'including Islamabad in a Middle East-Persian Gulf strategic consensus ... ignores the 
ethnic, cultwal, historical and geopolitical ties that orient Pakistan to South Asia. 
"I' The 
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Carter administration had, to be sure, attempted, and to an extent succeeded in reversing 
this pattern. Although the (July, 1979) return of Congress T to office in India 
suggested a possible departure from the 'true nonalignment, professed by the Desai 
govermuent, the administration had some hopes - buttressed by favourable trading 
relations and continuing U-S- uranium shipments to the Indian nuclear programme - that 
the earlier diplomatic gains could be preserved. Presidential special envoy Clark Clifford 
was thus dispatched to India in January, 1980 as a counterpoint to the 
Brzezinski/Christopher mission. 
107 This was to have limited impact, however, as New 
Delhi correctly perceived a return of U. S. policy to its traditional mould of subscribing 
Pakistani particularism in South Asia. 
With the fall of the Shah, the 'Peking-Tehran-Islamabad axis"" under -pinning three 
U. S. administration's South Asian strategy had indeed lost the 'keystone' of containment 
of the Soviet Northern tier. The linkage between Beijing and Islamabad - symbolized 
in the (1978) completion of the trans -Himalayan 'Karakorum highway "0' - remained, 
though, as active as in the era of Yahya Khan and Zhou Enlai. With the July, 1977 
overthrow of the Bhutto/PPP government, moreover, Saudi support for the new Zia 
regime's (Sunni) Islamic orthodoxy found Riyadh increasingly displacing secular or Shi- 
ite Iran as the focus of Pakistan's regional diplomacy - Saudi economic aid 
had 
amounted to some $7.5bn. by 1980,110 for its part, Pakistan was to service up to 90% of 
(incoming) Saudi foreign labour requirements"' and provide a 1,500 strong contingent 
of military advisors to the Saudi military and National Guard. 
112 Pakistan had also 
provided military missions to some 21 other countries, mainly in the Middle East, 
including Kuwait, the UAE, Oman and Jordan-"' For the administration's renascent 
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'Northern tier' strategy, Defense Secretary Harold Brown had visited Beijing 
immediately prior to the Brzezinski mission, to further advance a 'complementary' 
wolDrOach to the Soviet Union amongst the respective U. S. interlocutors. 114 Brzezinski was ril 
to return from Islamabad via Riyadh to facilitate Saudi participation in a more 
comprehensive Pakistan arms package unencumbered by U. S. 'budgetary stringency's'. I" 
Overall, if the initial phase of the Carter administration's diplomatic activism at the 
United Nations had dispersed much of the 'routine' hostility toward the U. S. 
amongst nonaligned and third world countries, the aims of Brzezinski's post-Afghanistan 
diplomacy further envisaged a growing community of interest with the Islamic 
nonaligned nations in actively resisting the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the CENTO 
alliance in April, 1979, had removed a residual barrier to concerting such ostensibly 
I third party' opposition to Soviet power in South Asia. Pakistan had capitalized its 
success in hosting the January, 1980 Islamic conference with attaining formal 
membership of the Non-Aligned Movement. I" 'The Pakistani leaders' Brzezinski relates, 
'... took the position that their security interest would be better served-with Pakistan 
publicly distancing itself from the United States and instead collaborating more closely 
with other Moslem countries in opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
1117 
While the administration could thus record some progress in concerting the politico- 
diplomatic linkages of the 'regional security' strategy the politico-military aspects would 
require an established forward logistics infrastructure. Planning for the Iran hostage 
mission had indicated the difficulties of deploying even existing U. S. forces using current 
base assets and 'surge capability'. To be sure, DOD planning had implicitly assumed 
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a right of access to the substantial Saudi infrastructure under crisis conditions, as it 
had with former U. S. facilities in Pakistan. Riyadh had, however, consistently made 
clear its opposition to a formal military agreement with the U. S., whilst for Pakistan, 
General Zia had not renewed the offer of the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar - favoured 
by some in the U. S. Navy"' - made by the late President Bhutto. The U. S. tenure on the 
existing MIDEASTFOR facilities in Bahrain was also, as had been demonstrated 
in 1973, conditional upon local factors. The provision for 'base redundancy' thus 
assumed a critical importance for the DOD. For securing Congressional funding, such 
bases would further require the sanction of a formal treaty. Accordingly, the task of 
negotiating regional access, undertaken after the December 4,1979 NSC meetings, 
would assume a new urgency with the three Indian Ocean states which were more 
wifling to formally participate in the administration's forward strategy. The countries in 
question were Oman, Somalia and Kenya. 119 
VI. The Regional Security Framework 01): Regional Access, Base Redundancy and 
Forward Deployed Logistics. 
Although the locations of the respective littoral states were, in some respects, fortuitous, 
their selection was also indicative of the new U. S. scope in defining the Indian Ocean 
as a unitary theatre of operations. For Oman, the negotiations, conducted by the joint 
DOD/State delegation under (DOS Director of Politico-Military Affairs) Reginald 
Bartholomew, were to result in the signing of a formal treaty on June 4,1980. "0 
Overall, the terms would permit U. S. access to facilities in Seeb (airfield/port), Thunirait 
(airfield), Muscat (airfield/port), Salalah (airfield) and Masira Island (airfield), 'in 
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circumstances where both counties would benefit from this use' . 121 Oman, given its 
strategic location on the Straits of Hormuz, had attracted the interest of earlier U. S. 
-. *I military planning. The Sultanate had been granted FMS eligibility status in January, 1973 
and in January, 1975, was considering a request for landing and airspace access to 
Masira Island from the Ford administration. 122The strategic and geographical advantages 
of Oman were reinforced by the Sultanate's political orientation. Oman had, alone 
amongst the (other) Arab League states, publicly supported the Camp David accords. It 
was also, moreover, party to a 'deep and long-standing' security relationship with 
Britain. Here, an HCFA Staff Report notes that, 'The three service chiefs and many of 
the Sultan's (Qabus) advisers are British citizens. 
1123 Oman was thus the only U. S. 
forward position in the Gulf where the Pentagon could expect more or less automatic 
military commitment from a NATO ally. 
The possible disadvantages were twofold. For the proposed centre of U. S. operations 
- the former RAF base at Masira Island - the Congressional staff analysts note a 
vulnerability to air-attack and that, 'monsoons make Masira unreachable by ship [for] 
four months of the year 
'121 
and add some difficulty to the conduct of air operations - 
Furthermore, 'Oman regards this (U. S. /Omani) agreement as tantamount to a U. S. 
commitment to its security. In this, however, Washington would itself be forthcoming, 
in the light of he most likely threat emanating from the PDRY. The 1980 'Defense 
Requirements Survey' thus recommended a $25m. FMS package (with a farther $25m. 
follow on for FY 198 1), including M-60 tanks and TOW and Sidewinder missiles. "' For 
the United States' own requirements, the administration would request an initial 
$13m. 
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(for FY 1981) in naval construction funding, with a future $38m. tranche for, 'fuel 
storage, personnel support and airfield facilities'. 
127 
If the Oman facilities were useful as a forward base for possible combat operations, the 
routine deployments of the enhanced U. S. naval presence - the two carrier task groups 
assigned from PACOM - would benefit from the signing of the T. S/Kenyan Access 
Agreement' of June 26,1980. This was to encompass overflight and landing rights 
at airports at Nairobi and Nanyuki, and ship replenishment/repair facilities at Mombasa 
harbour. 121 Here, the 'unique assets Mombasa offers as an R&R port are not available 
elsewhere in the region'. For more direct military purposes, a four lun. paved road 
would be constructed to the (Kenyan) naval base, as would communication facilities and 
an ammunition magazine. "' The main harbour would also be dredged to accommodate 
a 3,000 yard wide turning basin for aircraft carriers, and additional access channels 
provided at a cost of $40m. (a $60in. total through to FY 1983). Other U. S. funding for 
Kenya itself included $50m. economic aid (ADD and PL 480) and $27m. in FMS credits 
over 1981-2. "1 
In contrast to the conditions attending both the Oman and Kenya facilities, the implicit 
requirement for, 'an extremely limited U-S- military presence and low profile on 
implementation of access agreements '110 was reversed for the administration's third 
regional treaty with Somalia. Indeed, as the HCFA Report observes, 'they (Somalia) 
would clearly welcome large numbers of American Armed Forces, and would allow 
extensive, high visibility use of Somali facilities. "" For the facilities themselves, the 
agreement, signed on August 22,1980, was centred around the port and airstrip complex 
at Berbera. Here, bellying the graphic descriptions previously offered to Congressional 
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Committees, Defense Department testimony before SASC appropriations Hearings (for 
FY 1982) was to acknowledge that 'both were constructed by Soviet forces to a very low 
degree of quality. "" Although some 600 miles closer to the Persian Gulf than 
Mombasa, the Berbera port facilities were viewed as 'extremely limited' 133 and the four 
km. airstrip, although possessing 12 hardened shelters and POL storage, was lacking in 
water or electricity. 114The DOD would thus request $75m. (for FY 1982) 135 to provide 
an extended wharf at Berbera port and a 75,000 barrel POL facility for exclusive USN 
use, and upgrade the airfield to permit P-3 (aerial surveillance) flights. 
The 'high visibility' U. S. presence envisaged by the Mogadishu regime was matched 
by 'extremely high expectations"" of military aid from Washington. The terms finally 
agreed, however would be limited to a total of $53m. in economic aid and $40m. FMS 
credits over two years. From the Pentagon's perspective, the actual military rationale 
for the Somali facilities lay in contingency planning, supplemented by 'occasional 
support of fleet activities out of Berbera. 
1137 Perhaps more significant for the 
administration, was the political return that could accrue from, 'eliminating [the] Soviet 
presence and influence and otherwise fostering regional stability in the Horn. "I' Here, 
the acceptance of a formal U. S. presence in a second Arab League state (the other being 
Oman) could establish further precedent for U. S. forward planning. An added 
0 
consideration was that of increased U. S. purchase on the dangers to 'regional stability 
in the Horn' from Somalia itself. The August 21,1980 sessions of the House Foreign 
Affairs Africa Sub-committee had received classified CIA testimony that Somali regular 
forces and some 300 'volunteers' were supporting the continuing Western Somalia 
Liberation Front (WSLF) campaign in the Ogaden. 
131 There was here an evident 
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concern to avoid the sort of inter-agency confusion attending the earlier U. S. approaches 
to Somalia of June, 1977. Administration officials were to thus stress that, 'any use of 
United States arms in the Ogaden or Kenya would cause an immediate cutoff of United 
States' military assistance. 
'140 
However, whilst the treaties with Kenya, Oman and Somalia provided respectively 
for routine U. S. fleet deployment, a foundation for actual forward combat deployment 
and a reserve 'base redundancy' capability, the strategic grounding for U. S. Indian 
Ocean policy was to find an inevitable focus on Saudi Arabia. In the view of HFAC 
regional analysts, 'Saudi Arabia, despite its limited military capability, remains the key 
country in the Arabian peninsula in the sense [that] Saudi views ... are usually followed 
by other ... Gulf states. '141 Aside from Saudi Arabia's central political importance, 
strategic location and substantive strategic infra-structure (to be considered below), the 
U. S. had a direct stake in the Kingdom unmatched by that in any other regional ally - 
The extent of Saudi economic integration with the United States bears recapitulating. 
Since diplomatic relations were established in 1947, the Kingdom had purchased some 
$56bn. worth of U. S. products, $31bn. of this for arins and related services-141 
Investments in U. S. stocks and government securities would approach a level of 
$70bn. by 1980.141 The trend in U. S. /Saudi trade was, moreover, upward. By 1980 
the Kingdom had become the seventh largest market for U. S. goods and services and the 
most rapidly expanding export market. The value of U. S. Exports to Saudi Arabia 
in 1980 was estimated at $5.76bn. -a 20 % increase - and represented one 
fifth of total 
Saudi finports and 21/2 % of total U. S. exports for that year. 
144 In addition, some 35,000 
U. S. citizens were employed to maintain defence hardware and in the oil industry; 
145 
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whilst the U. S. /Saudi 'Joint Commission', established in 1975, was engaged in 19 
ongoing projects by March, 1980.146 Of perhaps equal significance to the scale of 
U. S. /Saudi economic traffic was its sectoral distribution. As is apparent from the above, 
this was overwhehningly concentrated in three areas - oil, defence-related products and 
financial services - of a particular salience to national security policy. 
Thus, given the above, 'Decisions on the part of the Saudi Arabian govermuent', 
the 1980 HFAC Report accurately observes, '. --potentially affect the U. S. balance of 
payments, the future of the dollar, the U. S. and world energy equation, the rate of world 
economic recovery, U. S. interests in the Middle East and ... the objective of an overall 
resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. '147However, if the Riyadh government - as U. S. 
analysts suggested - did indeed, 'perceive the military relationship with the United 
States to be the principal test of U. S. reliability and political commitment toward the 
Kingdom 1141 attempts by Washington to translate this perception into overt forms of C7 9 
military co-operation had previously foundered. Whilst it was always believed, and on 
occasion, publicly stated by U. S. officials, that Washington would enjoy 'access ... to 
Saudi facilities' - notably the (U. S. built) Dhahran complex - in conditions of 'national 
emergency' 149 this was consistently denied by Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Middle East tour 
of February, 1979 by Harold Brown had produced little in the Way Of Concrete 
commitments and much in the way of regional dissociation from overt co-operation with 
U. S. planning. In February, 1980 Brzezinski had, as we have seen, held renewed 
discussions with the 'very pro-American"" Saudi head of government, Crown Prince 
Fahd. This had resulted in provisional agreement for an enhancement package for the F- 
15's ýprogramrned in 1978) and the sale of five AWACS, which was announced by 
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the administration in June, 17. "1 What was not placed on the Public record, however, 
was a further agreement from Riyadh to fund considerable 'overbuilding' of base 
facHities and a communication centre for a future Gulf air defence system. "' Later (1981) 
testimony on the AWACS sale would reveal that, '(the agreement would) increase our 
own capabilities if we were ever called upon to deploy in the area"" and was to 
include 'three years of spares for AWACS and F- 15's which would be compatible with 
U. S. equipment' 
154 
and additionally provide for, 'the extensive logistics base and 
support infrastructure that will be a necessary part of this equipment will be fully 
compatible with the defense needs of this whole vital area. 
'151 
If the Oman facilities and more covert preparations in Saudi Arabia represented the 
'front' for the Gulf theatre of operations, the functions providing for the 'rear' would be 
found in Egypt. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Egypt possessed substantial armed forces which 
could bestow a regional legitimacy on any multi-national defence of other U. S. allies in 
the Middle East. Perhaps more significant for routine planning, was the strategic 
geographical linkage between EUCOM and PACOM responsibilities in the 
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. This could permit the staging of air/sea-borne logistical 
support and long range AWACS/B-52 operation - such deployments as had initially 
taken place in January, 1980.156 Egypt's facilities would also present a clear advantage 
in mounting operations in the African Horn and North Yemen. 
The administration had, as we have seen, already inaugurated a 'modest' arnis supply 
relationship with the Sadat regime centring on the F-5 sale of 1978. In the light of the 
I constructive role Egypt now plays in regional affairs, "" Cairo was in receipt of some 
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$lbn. econonuc and food assistance, "' and, as Congressional Staff analysts record, the 
, demonstrated success of its (Egypt's) moderate policies and ... economic well being' had 
become a 'priority interest[s] of the United States. "" Egypt had also, by 1980, become 
the, 'second largest United States FMS financing recipient in the world' (the largest 
being Israel), with $1.5bn. allocations for FY 1979, $lbn. for FY 1980 and $550m. 
scheduled for FY 1981. Proceeding FMS programmes included the existing F-5 aircraft 
with a provision for 20 F-16's for 1982.110 Aside from the F-5 training programme, 
active U. S. -Egypt military co-operation had, by mid-1980 extended to a joint desert 
training exercise (Tright Star' 1). For possible basing facilities, although suggestions 
of U. S. usage of the fonner Israeli bases (Etzion and Ophira) in the Sinai were made 
by some analysts, these were consistently dismissed by Egypt. Cairo was, however, 
willing to consider further joint exercises, transit of the Suez canal, overflight without 
airspace restrictions and, 'regular U. S. access to Egypt's military facilities' 161 including 
former Soviet facilities at Cairo West airport. 
161 Significant for possible RDF 
considerations were the discussions for use of the Red Sea Port of Ras Banas as a 
'rearward logistics support base for contingencies in the Persian Gulf. Here, the 
'rudimentary' existing facilities would require extensive dredging and construction to an 
initial cost of $250m. 
163 Overall, Egypt was to present a valuable complement to U. S. 
forward strategy in the Indian Ocean. The potential political and diplomatic costs - 
emphasized by Cairo's suspension from the Arab League after Camp David - would, 
though, preclude the establishment of a formal treaty. 
161 
Also excluded, this time on the U. S. side, from formal military relations was Israel - 
There had, to be sure, been suggestions from some analysts that a compelling strategic 
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case for - at least -aU. S. military presence in the 'two great bases in the Sinai"" was 
provided by the 'national emergency under present conditions 1; 166 a view supported by 
some in the Senate. 117Again, a 'strong' version of what might be termed the South Asian 
'domino' thesis, proposed to the SFRC on this occasion by Stanford analyst Richard B. 
Foster, had placed Israel at the focal point of contaimment in South Asia. Without such 
a U. S. commitment - suggested at two divisionsJ68 - Moscow could thus 'outflank 
Egypt ... and isolate Sadat', further 'outflank Pakistan ... creating a separate Baluchistani 
state and ... gain access to Arabian Sea ports', 'outflank and divide up Iran', 'effectively 
dominate the Saudi government ... and replace other pro-Western regimes ... including 
Kuwait, Dubai, North Yemen' and, overall, 'complete the geopolitical link with the 
pro-Soviet regimes in Ethiopia, East Africa and on the North African littoral. "I' 
Although the detail informing Dr. Foster's presentation, notably concerning an imminent 
Soviet threat to 'the Saudi Arabian goverment ... [which] ... may only have a few 
months of life left"70 would be questioned by most in the administration, the analyst's 
positive correlation of such Soviet strategic opportunity with the supposed 'unilateral' 
U. S. nuclear concessions in the SALT process 
171 had, at this stage in the debate, 
become near-conventional. Whilst the assertion that 'the radical conservative Islamic 
movement and the Marxist Socialism of the USSR have much in common"' could also 
identify with a more intangible feeling in the wider public arena that the U. S. was beset 
in the Middle East by a growing range of opponents, old and new. 
There was also, in what might be viewed as an inverted or 'weak' version of the 
domino thesis, a positive argument for the utility of overt U. S. military commitment 
to the Israeli/Sinai theatre. Here, as put before Senators by former INR Director Ray 
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Cline and former Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, the focus was on the removal 
of hostile Egyptian capability from the ranks Of 'cOnfrontation' states in the Middle East. 
In consequence, 'war is not a viable Arab option today. 1173 This strategic fact could, in 
tum, ameliorate Israeli opposition to progress on the development of a Palestinian 
'entity' as envisaged at Camp David, and further, increase U. S., Egyptian and Israeli 
'leverage' on the 'Palestinian Arabs and the PLO'; whose 'overriding fear' in Sisco's 
view, had become that of 'being left out of the action'. 174And similarly, for Ray Cline, 
'all of these very intransigent problems will become ... a little easier if we do reestablish 
the credibility of our guarantees of military presence in the area. 
'171 
To be sure, if purely military factors were taken in isolation, there would indeed seem 
a strong case for considering Israeli bases, if not necessarily in the Sinai, for at least a 
prepositioning role in U. S. forward strategy. There was a close affnifty, in terms of 
mteroperability, training and military doctrine, between the U. S. and Israeli armed 
services. Considerations of base security and the dangers of internal opposition, 
prominent in other designated regional powers, would not apply. The geographical 
location of Israeli bases, in the Sinai and elsewhere, could provide for considerable 
strategic flexibility in access to the likely theatre of operations. Such military advantages 
were, however, outweighed by the unpredictable political impact on regional volatility. 
In the first instance moreover, as a CRS paper prepared for the Senate points out, Israel 
itself has to date, 'preferred to retain control of its own defenses and ... not to seriously 
consider accepting the constraints on its freedom of action that would result from an 
American base on its territoryl. 
176 From an Arab perspective, such a presence would 
inevitably be viewed as a threat to neighbouring regimes - particularly in terms of oil 
iýl 
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fields - and could thus, ' end the U-S. role as a peace arbiter. " 77 It would become a 
focus for anti-Americanism in the region, risk direct U. S. involvement in a future 
Arab/Israel war and further provide a compelling rationale for hitherto neutral Arab 
states to 'grant Soviet base rights - .. in retaliation for an Israeli base. 
'171 Finally, given the 
'unique' nature of the strategic relationship and the numerous public U. S. commitments 
to Israel's security 
179 it was also apparent that Israeli bases and facilities would, in any 
event, be automatically available to Washington in a major crisis. 
VU. Regional Security in a Global Context: Japan, NATO and the Western 
Alliance. 
In the broader span of the U. S. alliance system, the Afghanistan crisis also served to 
focus attention on adapting NATO forces and possibly those of Australia and Japan to 
military contingencies in the Gulf. For the Japanese, whilst the administration had 
dismissed calls for a direct military involvement - observing inter alia, that 'the 
(proscriptive) self defense clauses of the (Japanese) constitution ... were put in largely at 
U. S. insistence"'* - there were hopes for, 'a very substantial Japanese financial 
contribution to the economic recovery of countries like Pakistan' which, it was further 
suggested, could thus, '-free up some Pakistani foreign exchange to purchase (military) 
equipment. "" From Australia, a more formal contribution could be expected. The 
Australian Navy had long participated in joint Indian Ocean exercises with U. S. forces, 
under the auspices of ANZUS and SEATO, and had committed a Carrier Task Group 
to the Arabian Sea in February, 1980.182 The Canberra government had also 
reaffn-med its willingness to expand the Indian Ocean naval base at Cockburn Sound 
and the VLF (submarine) communications facility at N. W. Cape. Additionally, plans 
L 
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were under consideration to obtain basing rights in Australia for B-52's. 183 The main 
focus for U-S. diplomacy was, however, upon European NATO. Thus, on January 8, 
1980, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher had convened an emergency 
meeting of the NATO political forum, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). "I The basis 
for a unified NATO response, as conceived by Washington, envisaged a two-phase 
process of, firstly immediate diplomatic and economic measures to be followed by more 
long-term military co-ordination. This was formally broached before the April 'Defence 
Planning Committee' (DPQ sessions of NATO by Under Secretary Robert Komer. 
The response from NATO was, though, on both counts, somewhat less than was hoped 
for by the administration. A formal NAC communique, issued on January, 15, 
committing NATO members to take 'appropriate individual steps""' on enhancing Gulf 
security had only underlined the difficulties of co-ordinating a unified policy platform in 
an alliance simultaneously strained by disagreements on Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) 
modernization and on adopting other sanctions on Iran. "' In the more restricted arena 
of joint military planning, the suggestion of a NATO 'out of area' complement to the 
Rapid Deployment Force was not encouraged by the Defence Planning Committee. The 
RDF had been presented to NATO as a U. S. initiative, whose unilateral status had, 
indeed, been stressed to domestic opinion by the administration. 
The nub of the question, however, would not necessarily concern the assignment of 
existing NATO combat assets to the Gulf -a capability in any case lacking 
in most 
inember's inventories, with the limited exception of France and Britain - but a renewed 
stress on the established administration policy of encouraging increased NATO-area 
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expenditure to release committed U. S. defence assets to RDF contingencies. Although 
NATO had, as we have seen, agreed in principle to expand defence expenditure by 3% 
p/a (in real terms) in 1977, the bulk of air/sea-lift capability was still overwhelmingly 
provided by the U. S. "' With the revision of U. S. military posture to address 
'simultaneous contingencies', with the eventual aim of containing a 'three-theatre 
conflict' signalled in the DOD Annual Report for FY 1982 (see below), it was clear that 
much of the three-percent programme would be absorbed in logistics and mobility 
enhancement (as opposed to combat capability) -a prospect as unwelcome in the armed 
forces of European NATO as in the Pentagon. 
The issue of 'compensatory deployments' was thus, on several levels, a contentious 
one widiin NATO. Some analysts would agree with Senator Jacob Javit's argument that, 
'the United States renegotiate the NATO treaty to extend NATO's responsibilities to the 
Persian Gulf', because, '... that is where the real threat lies. "" This view was also 
supported by the Ford administration's Indian Ocean spokesman, Joseph Sisco, who 
warned of the possible 'dissolution' of NATO on the 'out of area' question. "' There 
had, to be sure, been some military support for the administration from Britain; 
involving the assigmnent of a three frigate force to the Mediterranean (relieving units of 
the U. S. Sixth Fleet) and a further dispatch of one frigate to the Gulf theatre itself. " 
France was to also mount an increased naval presence (to 14 warships) in the Indian 
Ocean. Paris had, however, made it clear at the January North Atlantic Council meeting 
that it was opposed to any co-ordinated NATO military response to the Soviet 
intervention. 191 Thus, whilst applauding Under Secretary Komer's' tough talk' 192 at the 
January NAC sessions, many in the Senate expressed concern at the apparent 'free 
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ride' of NATO states on the U. S. defence burden in the Indian Ocean. The increased cost 
to the 'American taxpayer', it was pointed out, of the current U. S. deployment of two 
carrier task groups, was $282m. for FY 1980.193 
However, whilst there had been much Congressional and press speculation in the U. S. 
on the question of a formal revision of the NATO treaty, the evident functional 
complexities - involving such matters as the credibility of nuclear guarantees (see below) 
and the 'very weakened condition"94 of Turkey - on top of the structural difficulties 
involved in overcoming opposition in European NATO itself, had never made this a 
serious option . "'Here, as Robert Komer acknowledges, 'it would probably not be 
very beneficial to try to extend the NATO boundaries, and have a big political 
argument with no particular military gain. "I' 
Not the least of the barriers to such an 'out of area' expansion for NATO was the 
outright opposition of the Gulf powers themselves. Public statements from Saudi Arabia 
had consistently stressed the need 'to prevent the gulf region from becoming an arena 
for rivalry among the foreign powers. '191 Following the February, 1980 discussions 
in Riyadh with Brzezinski and Warren Christopher, Crown Prince Fahd was to deny that 
possible U. S. forward bases were on the agenda, emphasizmg instead the prospects for 
'friendly countries' to supply adequate amis to the Gulf states to facilitate a credible self 
defence. "' In April, the Saudi Foreign Minister had stated that, 'accepting foreign bases 
or granting military facilities to others would undermine their (Saudi) independence. 
Indeed, these reservations were brought to a head following the failed April, 24 Tehran 
hostage mission. Here, Riyadh promptly issued a statement expressing, 'extreme 
ZK, ý 
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concern ... over the action by the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran' and 
its view that such military force went, 'beyond accepted limits of international 
conduct. "' 
The foregoing considerations, concerning U. S. allies in NATO, the Gulf and 
elsewhere, served to underline the politico-diplomatic difficulties facing the 
administration in concerting an international (politico-military) counterpoint to the 
Carter Doctrine. 'I don't think it would be accurate', a Presidential press briefing of 
January, 29 had conceded '... to claim that at this time or in the future we expect to have 
enough military strength ... to defend the (Gulf) region unilaterally. 
1211 For NATO, the 
administration could record some diplomatic progress in placing the out-of-area question 
on the Defence Planning Committee's formal agenda. However, though Defence 
Ministers had 'agreed ... to use their best efforts to achieve peace and stability in South 
West Asia 12111 at a further (May, 1980) DPC meeting, it was also made clear that the 
military responsibility, 'falls largely upon the United States. '211 This would, accordingly, 
lend a greater significance to the one indisputably secure U. S. land facility in the Indian 
Ocean region, the base on Diego Garcia. 
Vill. 'The Hub of the Wheel I: the Re-emergence of Diego Garcia. 
On January 12,1980, the Carter administration had informed the United Kingdom of its 
intentions to mount a substantial development of the facilities on 'British Indian Ocean 
Territory'. By April 5, press reports suggested that the JCS were studying a $1bn. 
. Lo& 
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upgrade plan for the island base which would involve pre-positioning supplies, harbour 
construction, transit facilities for ground troops and a capability to stage B-52 flights 
from an expanded runway complex. 114 The administration's original FY 1981 budget 
submission had requested $17.9m. in construction funding, additional to the 
programmed. 'Phase Four' ($72.5m. ) construction schedule, due for completion by July, 
1982,10 to accommodate the MPS programme; with a ftuther $86m. to follow for FY's 
1982-4.101 On March, 3 1, however, the DOD issued supplemental requests for FY 
1980 and FY 1981. For the first, an additional $23.5m. was required for expanded 
naval facilities, with a further $8.6m. reallocated from other DOD funding for 
construction infrastructure itself. For the FY 1981 budget amendment, the DOD was 
requesting a supplemental $128m. 207Whilst the bulk of development would come to 
fruition during the Reagan administration, the programme put before Congress at this 
stage called for: additional dredging, a 1,000 foot deep-water wharf, airfield support and 
lighting, a supply warehouse complex and temporary accommodation for 1500 
personnel . 201 Though the latter would provide for construction staff, it could also have 
an obvious utility in staging a Marine Amphibious Unit (of 1800 combatants) should this 
be necessary. Also of possible operational significance was the deployment, announced 
on March, 5, of the seven I near term' pre-positioning ships to be on station by June - This 
capability would be comprised of three roll-on roll-off ships, two break-bulk ships and 
a tanker. Although the DOD plans called for an eventual 15 purpose-built vessels - to 
support three marine brigades - the former (NTP's) would be sufficient to supply one 
Marine Amphibious Brigade (some 16,000 personnel) with 'organic' air support from 
appropriate USMC TACAIR squadrons, 109 for a two week period-"' 
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The advantage of the Diego Garcia facilities in the DOD's planning was, though, not 
necessarily to be found in the amount of mat6riel that could be prepositioned - the 
true 'forward' role could be perfonned by Masira island and, as was hoped, Dharhan - 
but in its central geographical location. In global terms, this was viewed as mounting an 
axis running from the expanded Lajes Naval/Air base in the Azores to Subic Bay in the 
Philippines. From a regional perspective; 'Diego Garcia', as Robert Komer observes, 
'can be viewed as the hub of the wheel with spokes extending to other areas on the Indian 
Ocean littoral. "'I 
Conclusions. 
In historical perspective, a certain inevitability attends the transition of Diego Garcia 
from the 'austere communications facility' presented in the DOD's 1970 estimates, 
through the 1974 'limited logistical support' schedule of the Nixon Doctrine to the 
fulfflment of plans for a 'major, complete, multi-purpose base' then predicted in the 
extended Hearings of 1974-5. There is also, however, a sense of historical recurrence, 
in that the island base, like the somewhat stillborn regional intervention planning of 
STRICOM, was first envisaged at the high-water mark of U. S. power in the Kennedy 
administration. In a ftuther parallel with the perceptions of an emergent 'power vacuum' 
in the Indian Ocean debated widiin the McNamara DOD, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the 
diminishing British presence were not then viewed as substitutes for direct U. S. 
capability in the region. To be sure, the circumstances facing the Carter administration 
were far more straitened. The Kennedy/Johnson regional intervention programme 
k, 
envisaged continuing U. S. strategic superiority. The Carter administration's strategic 
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options, even given the quantum increases in military expenditure, could not extend to 
return to such conditions. 
Yet, in some respects, the United States had retained, and even increased, its lead in 
military capability over both the regional powers and the Western alliance. And again, 
it was military capability which would provide the critical U. S. edge in relations with 
allies. For the concluding section, the analysis will extend these perspectives to consider 
parallel military developments in the strategic nuclear arena, the dilemmas of 'extended 
deterrence' and, in a further echo of the Kennedy era, the return of 'rollback', 
strategically conceptualized and, at a tactical level, operationalized, in the 
administration's lcountervailing strategyl. 
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THE CARTER DOCTRINE (111): THE COUNTERVAILING STRATEGY. 
The preceding two sections of this study have treated with, respectively, the overall 
redefinition of the regional policy environment following the revolution in Iran and the 
more restricted counterpoint of redefinition in national security policy following the end 
of detente and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Clearly profound in themselves, 
it is the combination and synthetic character of the impact of these events that will form 
the concluding section in this analysis. Accordingly, the argument will now broaden. 
These perspectives will be pursued in terms of the restructuring of nuclear strategy in 
U. S. -Soviet engagement, the concomitant reappraisal of regional strategy in U. S. 
engagement with the Western alliance and the strategic integration of the Indian Ocean 
region widiin the current of U. S. power in general. 
If the previous analysis has focused on some of the difficulties perceived by the 
administration in securing internatioml collaboration for the Carter Doctrine, it should 
be stressed that these were largely operative in the sphere of U. S. domestic and formal 
alliance politics and - as such - would revolve around means rather than ends. 
Despite 
much Congressional and U. S. media criticism of supposed 'indifference', the European 
NATO powers and Japan were acutely sensitive to developments in the Gulf and had 
commenced an increasing institutionalization of both bilateral and multi-lateral contacts 
with the region through such instruments as the (EEC sponsored) 'Euro-Arab Dialogue'. 
This will be taken up below. It should further be stressed that, despite the avoidance of 
fonnal ties, the increasing de facto security involvement of principal European powers 
in the Gulf through the medium of arms trading would provide a basis for an informal 
, regional security ftamework' of arguably greater utility than had been the more 
juridical 
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structures (Baghdad Pact, CENTO) of the past. At the same time, however, the 
administration was aware that such public divergence of approach by the Western 
alliance could entail, at the least, severe politico-diplomatic 'transaction costs' for crisis 
management in the event of further regional tension. 
The policy implications, to be studied hereafter, were twofold. In the first instance, the 
uncertainty attending regional affairs after Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution was 
also a basis for initiative by the United States. Given the heightened awareness of 
security issues amongst the Gulf powers, the opportunity would be taken to encourage 
a closer political aligrument of regional states - and particularly, the realigmnent of Iraq - 
towards the Western alliance. The more material underpinning for regional security 
policy would be taken up through further U. S. arms and military construction provision 
for endogenous intra-regional groupings. The new concretness to the 'regional security 
framework' will be examined operationally in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. The 
second implication will concern U. S. policy alone. For an administration pl i 
requirement focusing on 'scenario-specific' outcomes in the region, the probable political 
complications attending the mobilization of a variegated and informal security network 
within a crisis time-frame would be offset militarily', by developing options for 
preemptive action. 
Europe and the Nfiddle East: the 'Euro-Arab Dialogue'. 
For the European (EEC) powers, the basis for a distinctive 'European' position on 
Middle East affairs had been established in a report to the Committee on European 
L, -% 
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Political Co-operation (EPQ of May, 1971. Whilst initially mirroring the broad United 
Nations' approach to Israeli 'withdrawal' from occupied territories on the basis of UN 
resolution 242, the EEC had moved through successive statements of 1975,1 1977,2 and 
19791 toward a de facto recognition of the PLO. Finally, in the 'Venice Declaration' of 
June 13,1980, Israel was called upon to 'recognize' the PLO as a legitimate partner 
in negotiation. The Middle East peace negotiations were not, though, the sole pre- 
occupation of EEC diplomacy. The central issues were concerned with trade, and 
accordingly, a formally constituted 'General Commission' was established in February, 
1975 to conduct annual sessions of the related 'Euro-Arab Dialogue' in European and 
Arab capitals respectively. The Palestine question would, however, serve as the 
touchstone to identify European interests in the region and, as an August, 1980 Report 
for the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the (British) House of Commons makes 
clear, enable Europeans to 'distance themselves from United States Diplomacy. 14 
For the more material aspects of the 'Euro-Arab Dialogue', Saudi Arabia had developed 
a considerable military trading relationship with states of the EEC - Consideration was 
being given to a package of 400 'Leopard 11' tanks and 1000 APC 's from West Germany 
and the multi-role 'Tornado' aircraft from the Panavia, (UK/Gerinany/Italy) European 
consortium-' The European power most deeply involved in arms supply to both Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq and throughout the Gulf states in general was France. By 1980, France had 
supplied Riyadh with some 400 AMX-30 tanks, a training mission and further 
equipment to outfit an armoured brigade. In October, 1980, a ftirther $3.35bn. contract 
was signed to modernize the Saudi navy' whilst in September, a preliminary 
agreement had been reached for Saudi investment of $968m. in the development of the 
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7 Mirage '4000' aircraft. Iraq, a significant trading partner with Italy and West Gennany 
and focus of French oil and arms diplomacy since 1974, had received more than 
$2bn. of French military exports by 1979.1 Paris had earlier agreed, in September, 1975 
to supply 'research' reactors and ancillary equipment to the Iraqi nuclear programme. 
Thus, given the increasing avenues outside of the 'special relationship' with 
Washington for political, and to some extent, security support, the well-rehearsed Saudi 
dissociation from the Carter Doctrine could admit some substance beneath the 
conventional diplomatic 'cover'. ' The Riyadh government and other Gulf regimes were, 
up to a point, entirely consistent in desiring a regional approach to the 
containinent of Islamic revolution in Tehran, In June, 1978, talks had been held 
between Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and (pre-Revolutionary) Iran, on the foundation of a possible 
Gulf security system. 10 As these were resumed in January, 1979 between Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia, the Iraq Foreign Minister, Sa'adun Hamadi, expressed the hope that a common 
Gulf security policy might emerge through 'Arab co-ordination and solidarity', adding 
that, for the Gulf, 'dependence on the big powers is ultimately a futile policy - "I The 
Iraqi's were, on these grounds, unwilling to join the preparatory sessions which would, 
by February, 1981, involve Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE 
in the fonnation of the 'Gulf Co-operation Council'. However, though endeavouring to 
move the Gulf security debate to the fonim of the Arab League - which, it can be 
recalled, had suspended Iraq's rival, Egypt, from its proceedings after Camp David - 
Baghdad was not indifferent to the strategic advantage conveyed by a regional security 
network clearly concerted against Iran for its own designs on the region. The outcome 
of these considerations was to become apparent in the opening of the Iran-Iraq war. 
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11. A Reversal of Alliances: the Iran-Iraq War of 1980. 
Throughout 1980, there had been a growing awareness by both Washington and its 
regional allies of, on the one hand, the possibilities for revolutionary upheaval 
represented by Iran toward the 'moderates' in the Gulf - notably, the 'mercenary' 
Saudi monarchy - and on the other, the efforts by former officials of the Shah to 
destabilize the Shi-ite coalition in Tehran. The final connecting factor in this pattern was 
provided by another potentially fertile field for the Iranian exemplar, Iraq. Following the 
'Ashura' (November, 20) riots amongst the Saudi Shi'a minority of 1979, Tehran radio 
had intensified its propaganda assault on the Saudi Goverment and, on January 7,1980 
called for its overthrow. 11 Also targeted by hostile Iranian propaganda, albeit 
accompanied by more substantive instruments of subversion, was the 'infidel Ba'athist' 
regime in Baghdad. Here, a low-level insurgency conducted by the Shi-ite 'al-Da'wa' 
movement in Iraq had resulted in the expulsion, in April, 1980, of some 35,000 Shi- 
a's of supposedly Iranian descent and the bombing of Iranian border towns by the Iraqi 
airforce. 11 In Iran itself, dissidents supported by deposed Prime Minister Shahpour 
Bakhtiar and the former martial law administrator, General Oveissi, had organized 
unsuccessful military uprisings on May, 25 and July 9/10,1980.14 Although the latter, 
'Nequab', conspiracy had involved some intelligence 'assets' of the CIA that had earlier 
participated in the abortive hostage rescue, President Carter and DO Stansfield Turner 
were opposed to direct U. S. involvement in covert operations in Iran as a matter of 
Policy - 11 Washington was, however, kept aware of the extent of collaboration 
between 
the group of Bakhtiar - whose 'witting contact' with the CIA's Tehran station had begun 
in the 1960's - and the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. " 
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Washington's own relations with Iraq, which it can be recalled, was early designated 
as one of the key 'regional influentials', were becoming closer as the Baghdad 
'Revolutionary Command Council' sought to expand its political options in the Middle 
East and diminish the influence of the Soviet Union (and the Iraqi Communist Party) 
in Iraq itself. " Clandestine contacts between NSC officials and the Saddam regime had 
been established in Jordan in April, 1980, whilst in public, Zbigniew Brzezinski was to 
state that, 'We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States 
and Iraq and we do not feel that American-Iraq relations need to be frozen in 
antagonism. "' Such moves were to be encouraged by U. S. perception of the 'gradual 
normalization' of Iraq-Saudi relations. This dynamic, in the view of one Senate (FRC) 
report, was proceeding from the 'increasing alienation of the majority (Iraqi) Shi'a 
population from the Iraqi Sunni ruling elite. '19 'Such factors' the Report observes, 
I appear to have convinced the Iraqi leaders that the pursuit of revolutionary policies 
in the Gulf region ... could ultimately affect their turbulent 
domestic situation. '10 The 
latter combination of domestic 'turbulence', regional (intra. -Arab) accord and 
rapprochdment with Washington would also have appeared to have convinced the Iraqi 
leaders of the strategic opportunity offered to realize long-standing Ba'athist policy on 
the 'liberation' of Iranian Khuzestan CArabistan') and redress the more recent (1975) 
imposition of Iran's suzerainty on the Shatt al-Arab waterway. " 
Here, whilst the September, 22 move by eight Iraqi divisions into Iran across a 200 
mile front would be publicly condemned by the U. S. -as a violation of the 'national 
integrity I of Iran, 22 the Iraqi threat was also perceived as an opportunity for Washington 
to fmally resolve the hostage issue and restore some measure of strategic accord (if not 
ib ý 
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cordiality) with the Islamic Republic. " The failure of the April rescue mission had left 
the U. S. with few realistic options for further pressure on the Tehran regime. Although 
planning had immediately begun on more ambitious military contingencies - including 
24 
the mining of Iranian ports, selective air strikes on 'high value' Iranian defence assets 
and seizure of the Kharg Island oil tenninal - the level of uncertainty concerning 
possible Soviet response was such that they could only be activated in the event of actual 
harm to the hostages or a general outbreak of hostilities. ' From a U. S. perspective, a 
successful conclusion to the Iraqi campaign could leave Shahpour Bakhtiar installed as 
the Premier of a proposed 'Free Republic of Iran, in the Eastern Khuzes= province 26 
and produce a possible military coup across all Iran against Khomeini. At the least, there 
was expected to be a greater flexibility from Tehran stemming from the military supply 
situation. A considerable body of data was available to U. S. analysts from the extensive 
'threat assessments' conducted under the Shah for precisely this contingency. Repeated 
intelligence studies had concluded that the 'disposition of ground forces and the greater 
mobility of Iraqi forces could in fact give Baghdad a substantial numerical advantage 
along the border during the initial stages of an attack. '21 Moreover, the 'critical' 
dependence of Iran on U. S. military spares was such that, 'the Iranian armed forces 
probably could not sustain full scale hostilities for longer than two weeks. 
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If the above assumptions were predicated on an indeterminate level of Soviet 
support for Iraq - with the latter posited in some 'worst case' scenarios as a 
'(Soviet) 
land-bridge to Africa and the Indian Ocean basin'19 - the response from Moscow to the 
actual conditions of war had combined a studied neutrality with reassurances to 
Iran on 
the security of its Northern border. " The Soviet Union was, furthermore, to conclude a 
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20 year 'Friendship and Co-operation' treaty with Iraq's Ba'athist rival (and Iran's ally), 
Syria on October, 10, and to take the occasion to, 'support the inalienable right of Iran 
to decide its own destiny... without ... interference from outside, in a joint communiqu6 
issued in Moscow by Leonid Brezhnev and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. 31 
However, though the Soviet Union might anticipate some political and diplomatic gain 
from its median position in the Gulf conflict, the main strategic beneficiary would be the 
United States. 
HI. The Gulf Conflict and Regional Co-ordination: the Gains of War. 
In thus far considering that the full scope of the Carter Doctrine's ambit in South West 
Asia was to extend from the Soviet border to the Straits of Hormuz, the analysis has also 
identified the further geographical sub-division between Northern and Southern theatres 
These correspond to military contingencies emphasizing direct U. S. -Soviet engagement 
and lower level (regional) engagement respectively. For the first, U. S. strategy was, for 
reasons outlined above, to focus on a forward defence of Iran extending from U. S. 
beachheads South of the Zagros mountains. For the second, provisions for 'coups, 
subversion and counter-insurgency' in the lower Gulf were centred on sea power in the 
Northern Indian ocean, with the primary ground role performed by local forces backed 
by U. S. COIN units and sea-based TACAIR. However, though theatre force-structure 
requirements would clearly vary according to mission, the unifying factor throughout the 
'third strategic zone' was airpower; and in. this the key to U-S- flexibility was the 
deployment of AWACS. The wartime advantages of the 'Airborne Warning and Control 
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System' as a 'force multiplier' had been stressed in DOD studies concerning the (1978) 
sale of the aircraft to Iran. " They would clearly apply in offsetting any initial U. S. 
theatre inferiority in Khuzestan. The utility of AWACS in providing a peacetime 
i surveillance capability over the oil fields and strategic waterwaYs of the Gulf would have 
an equally clear application to the 'regional security framework. The latter 
considerations had provided a strong, if publicly understated, rationale for the proposed 
1978 AWACS sale to the Shah. Accordingly, a request from Saudi Arabia to redeploy 
AWACS, which had followed the outbreak of the Gulf War, would thus also allow the 
DOD to reinstate elements of earlier (PD-18) strategic planning. 
The Saudi request, relayed to CJCS David Jones in Riyadh on September, 28, was 
for four AWACS and some 300 USAF personnel. These were reinforced by a further 
100 support staff accompanying ground radar/communications equipment deployed on 
October, 5 -1 On October, 22, Riyadh announced 
its intention to buy the AWACS system 
in conjunction with an enhancement package (including ground attack munitions and 
long-range 'conformal' fuel tanks) for the F-15's ordered in 1978.31 Although the 
AWACS/F-15 package would, in the light of trenchant Senate opposition, 15 be ostensibly 
subject to a fresh Defense Department study, 'to guide further policy determination, "' 
agreement on essentials had, in fact, been reached during Zbigniew Brzezinski's round 
of regional security consultation of February, 1980. " 
Here, as with other defence aspects of, the U. S. /Saudi 'special relationship', the 
advantage for the DOD lay in Saudi finance and political 'cover' providing a material 
basis for the possible deployment of U. S. forces themselves. As DOD briefings for the 
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later (Reagan administration) Hearings on the sale were to make clear, the presence of 
such an 'air superiority network' was an essential pre-requisite to deploying the RDF38 
and could provide for a surveillance capability extending to the Soviet border. 39 
Intelligence data from the AWACS - collated by U. S. aircrew - would be made 
available to the Pentagon 'on a joint basis', whilst the complexities of operating the 
system would ensure an active U. S- involvement for an indefinite period to come. 40 Thus, 
whilst electoral considerations would delay the final implementation of the $2bn. 
programme until the succession of the Reagan administration '41 the Gulf conflict had - 
in similar fashion to the crisis in Afghanistan - provided a fortuitous case of 'changes 
in the regional security atmosphere'42 to facilitate the activation of pre-existing defence 
planning provisions for South West Asia. 
Equally advantageous, from the administration's perspective, was the momentum 
afforded by the Gulf hostilities toward co-ordinated 'out of area' military plaming with 
the Western alliance. Whilst similar efforts in April and May 1980, had been complicated 
by the ongoing TNF controversy and French resistance to perceived U. S. particularism, 
the '61 percent' of EEC oil imports from the Gulf was viewed as a more direct European 
security interest than the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Gulf war would thus 
provide a concrete focus for the NATO 'out of area, debate and, additionally, diffuse 
diplomatic attention from the unilateral U. S. naval moves in the region. Thus , 
following guidelines agreed at the September, 28 Joint Chief s consultations in Riyadh, 41 
the 31 vessel (18 combatants and 13 support) I Midway' and 'Eisenhower' Carrier 
Task 
Groups were reinforced by a 14 ship French task force (albeit, under separate command 
and control arrangements). 44By October, 20, the number of allied warships on station 
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in the Arabian sea had risen to 60, with the addition of units from Britain and Australia. 41 
If the display of allied military co-ordination in the Gulf had gone some way to restore 
domestic perceptions of foreign policy competence for the Carter administration, a more 
material domestic benefit from the Gulf war was found in the stabilization of the world 
oil market. Whilst the threat of conflict in the Gulf had, in conjunction with the loss 
of Iranian liftings, produced an inflation (reaching $40 p/b. )46of the oil 'spot' market, 
the outbreak of actual hostilities had enabled Saudi Arabia to concert a freeze in OPEC 
prices to a benchmark $32 per barrel until the end of the year . 
41 The agreement on 
OPEC price stabilization - resolving a prolonged internal conflict on pricing policy - 
was underpinned by the announcement of a unilateral one million bpd. production 
increase to bring up Saudi output to a total of 10.3 million bpd. (out of a 26.891 m/bpd. 
OPEC total for 1980). 48 It would also mark the advent of Saudi ascendancy within the 
oil cartel. The engagement of political conditions for such an assertion of Saudi 
t power was indicative of the extent of consultation between Riyadh, the Gulf 
states and Iraq undertaken in the months preceding the Gulf war" - notably regarding 
the modification of Iraq's own position as an oil price 'hawk'. Baghdad had, by 
August, 1980 received pledges of up to $7bn- in loans from Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia, 10 some of the latter in the form of a $4 p/b. surcharge on the one million bpd. 
extra Saudi liftings announced in September. " In addition, Riyadh was to facilitate the 
construction of a new oil pipeline from Iraq's Southern fields to the Red Sea. 52 A more 
active Gulf collaboration with the Iraqi war effort, involving the seizure of the disputed 
Tumbs Islands from bases in Oman was, though, vetoed by the U. S. and Britain. " 
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To be sure, the prospect of a total victory by Iraq was as unwelcome to the Gulf states 
as it was in Washington. 54 After the failure of the initial Iraqi assault on Khuzestan, 
however, it was clear that the hopes of the informal U. S. /Saudi coalition for a more 
limited Iraqi battlefield pressure on the Khomeini government had been reversed by a 
combination of the extensive mat6riel base accumulated by the Shah55 and the 'downright 
incompetence 156 of the Iraqi war machine. And whilst negotiations were indeed 
proceeding to release the U. S. hostages in tandem with the $240m. of U. S. military 
supplies embargoed within the Shah's FMS 'trust fund"57 it had also become clear that 
the war - like the hostage crisis itself - was secondary to the domestic aims of the Tehran 
regime. It would further appear that the Gulf war had, moreover, a distinct political 
utility in this regard, in both providing a focus for the armed forces and displacement of 
the rising domestic discontent against the ruling 'Islamic Republican Party'. Ancient 
Arab/Iranian antagonisms were redrawn. The regime also, and not incorrectly, 'saw the 
U. S. hand emerging from Saddam's sleeve"' and had gained an enhanced legitimacy 
from the conflict. 
The U. S. had not been able to concert the NATO powers into adopting formalized 
security commitments for the Gulf region. This prospect had, though, always been 
viewed as somewhat remote by the administration, 'tough talk' by officials and 
Congressional leaders notwithstanding. The more concrete benefits for Washington lay 
in the increasing integration of Iraq within a looser axis of the lesser Gulf states and 
Saudi Arabia. The further association with the former CENTO powers - Turkey and 
Pakistan" - would provide a grounding for the defacto redefmition of contaimnent along 
the Soviet Northern tier. The geopolitical proximity of Iran with the Soviet Union could 
445 
admit a certain functional elision of strategic and regional threat of clear advantage to 
strategic co-ordination. Thus, the continuing stalemate of the Gulf war was, in these 
terms, to contribute a mobilizing logic to facilitate the wider aims of what was being 
termed the administration's 'Countervailing Strategy'. 
IV. Counterforce, PD-59 and 'The Case for a Theory of Victory'. 
As has been argued above, the U. S. security position in the Gulf and South Asia had, in 
terms of the regional balance, undergone some measure of improvement after the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. A 'steady state' of regional conflict had underscored the 
ultimate military dependence on Washington of local allies and, more indirectly, of the 
wider Western alliance system. The administration's own perception of a 'genuinely 
balanced and effective'61 conduct of strategic affairs had not, though, gathered sufficient 
momentum to reclaim the Carter Presidency. In a campaign dominated by the twin 
foreign policy themes of revived cold war and the importance of the U. S. position in the 
Middle East, the resolution of the touchstone Iran hostage issue was to not be finalized 
until after the November, 3 elections had returned Ronald Reagan. Perhaps unusuallY for 
a post-election 'caretaker' transition, arrangements would continue for a 'long-range 
military plan for the Persian Gulf"' formalized in the final Carter administration 
directives, PD-62 and PD-63, of December, 1980.62Whilst much of the latter had clearly 
been oriented toward the Carter re-election platfonn, an outline account Of the 'regional 
security framework' would be incorporated in the final Defense Department Annual 
Report for FY 1982. The Carter defence legacy for the Indian Ocean region was 
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substantial. Before considering the theatre implications in detail, it is useful to take up 
the enhanced U. S. Indian Ocean posture in the overall context of the DOD's revision of 
global strategy and doctrine. Prominent here was the departure in nuclear strategy from 
the maintenance of 'rough strategic nuclear equilibrium' sought in the first (February, 
1978) administration defence review toward an accelerated development of new strategic 
systems, to enable more selective, 'counterforce' nuclear targeting. 
Throughout the Annual Report and other public discussion, Secretary Brown was to 
contend that the administration's 'countervailing strategy' is 'not a new strategic 
doctrine' 9 11 rather a, 'natural evolution of the conceptual foundations ... built by men like 
Robert McNamara and James Schlesinger. '64 However, whilst it is correct to assign a 
certain technological inevitability to the 'evolution' of counterforce6l strategy as 
stemming, to some extent, from the 1962 decision to develop multiple re-entry systems 
(MRV) and provision for the launch vehicles - notably Trident and MX61 - in the 1975 
Schlesinger procurement schedule, the final decision on MX in particular owed much 
to the need to secure the assent of the Joint Chief's for SALT 11.1 With the indefinite 
suspension of the Treaty after Afghanistan, the administration had also moved to exploit 
the capabilities inherent in MX for a more conceptually refined counterforce posture, 
which was codified in the revised (July, 1980) statement of strategic doctrine, PD-59-11 
The restructured U. S. doctrine had not, to be sure, explicitly conceded the argument 
for strategic 'superiority'. Harold Brown was to stress the I indescribable' consequences 
of actual nuclear exchange and deny that lower levels of nuclear conflict 'would remain 
"Innited" '. 69The PD-59 formulation would, though, grant considerable scope for, 'the ii 
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political advantages of being seen as the superior strategic power'70 on the presumptive 
grounds of incorporating, 'evolving elements of Soviet tilillICingl7l on the question. 
Here, given that - in the DOD's reading - the Soviet strategists 'seem to consider 
victory in a nuclear war at least a theoretical possibility, "I the distinction between such 
'perceptions' and, 'the military advantages of in fact being superior"' was thus a fine 
one. President Carter had declared that, 'I am detennined that the United States will 
remain the strongest of all nations. '74CIearly, if the U. S. capability would, at present, 
run to, 'the ability to devastate the entire target system of the Soviet Union', 71 the force 
expansion sought in PD-59 would seem to admit the substance of Paul Nitze's familiar 
contention that, 'to have the advantage at the utmost level of violence' has, historically, 
had an apparent utility at lesser levels of (politico/military) engagement. It is this logic 
that was finding a particular relevance to the emerging strategic locus of U. S. global 
engagement. ) in the Gulf and Indian Ocean. 
In the latter context, a July, 1979 Pentagon study - the 'Wolfowitz Report"' - had 
considered a range of possible threat scenarios in the Gulf/South Asia region. Although 
proposing a series of U. S. options for 'Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the 
Persian Gulf' the thrust of the analysis had focused on the likelihood of Soviet 
intervention and particularly, the prospect of a Soviet incursion in Iran. It had thus 
concluded that the sheer weight of Soviet forces in Central Asia could necessitate a U. S. 
(tactical) nuclear escalation. It is worth emphasizing that the report was completed before 
the Soviet move into Afghanistan. The utility of a primary anti-Soviet mission focus in 
eliciting a positive response from the JCS can also be recalled, as can the division of 
views - apparent from the outset of the Carter administration - which 
had characterized 
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'Era Two' and the 'net assessment' and 'force planning' sections of PRM-10, and the 
predilection of the NSC planning group for 'net assessment' in focusing such 
contingencies. ' Other (PA&E) contingency planning had also focused on an early 
exercise of the nuclear option. 78 Moreover, whilst given a clear contemporanity by the 
events in Iran, the Wolfowitz Report itself had been commissioned in response to the 
'Consolidated Guidance' for U. S. military posture outlined in PD-18.79 
The background of doctrinal revision in nuclear planning was to find a more visible 
expression in regional military posture. Within ten days of the announcement of the 
'Carter Doctrine', suggestions - subsequently rescinded - of possible theatre nuclear 
preparation in the Persian Gulf were expressed by U. S. defence officials. 10 These were 
reinforced by B-52 over-flights of Soviet vessels on station in the Arabian Sea. " 
Moreover, as Robert Komer had acknowledged, as a corollary to the administration's 
January, 1979 decision to upgrade TNF in Europe, 'we are looking at long range theatre 
nuclear forces in other areas than NATO. "I To be sure, it was widely recognized that, 
in terms of a likely Soviet reading of the cost/benefit relation of Persian Gulf nuclear 
posture to securing the central strategic balance, the region clearly lacked credibility as 
an arena for 'extended deterrence'. "Yet, as former OSD analyst Earl Ravenal observes, 
any necessary condition for adopting extended deterrence itself will, in an era of nuclear 
parity, stand or fall on the prospective viability of counterforce. "I And further, if a viable 
repertoire of counterforce options was indeed successful in its expressed aim of securing 
I crisis stability' - in terms of a mutual deferral of nuclear escalation - 'an adversary 
might more readily seek, and the U. S. would have to accept, the verdict of a 
conventional war. "' This, as we have seen, was precisely the perspective informing the 
L. 
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gpidance of PD-18.11 
Thus, if counterforce, under present conditions, would still suggest an insufficient 
grounding for extended conventional deterrence, the logic indicates pursuing further 
escalatory options at both strategic and conventional ends of the deterrence spectrum. 
However, whilst Harold Brown was to stress that the proposed $14,529bn. strategIc 
forces programme (out of a gross (TOA) $196.4bn defence outlay), 17 'does not assume 
that we can "win" a limited nuclear war"' and that, 'it is not a first strike strategy'89 the 
establishment of a 'survivable' mobile basing mode for the programmed MX system, a 
'more flexible targeting of the full range of (Soviet conventional) military capabilities' 
and a 'clear U. S. ability' to target 'organs of Soviet political and military leadership and 
control'90 would appear to concede at least a notional provision for, in the phrase of one 
analyst, 'the case for a theory of victory. '91 
Here, it should perhaps be restated that, despite an assessment of the central balance 
and 'the momentum of Soviet strategic growth'92 which, 'will combine to make the world 
of the 1980's more dangerous than any we have yet known, "I the administration 
emphatically considered nuclear war an 'unlikely possibility'. 94 The utility of adopting 
counterforce, instead of, as some critics had suggested, surmounting the 'theoretical' 
possibility of Minuteman vulnerability by simply abolishing land based systems 
altogether" was however, perceived in promoting greater 'cohesion' in theU. S. alliance 
system. Relying on an assured sea and air based 'second strike' capability would indeed 
fulfil one expressed U. S. aim for a 'non-provocative'16 strategic posture. Yet this could, 
by the same token, weaken the integration of alliance defence capability within the U. S. 
450 
global framework, perceived - as before - as underp inning 'essential equivalencel. 97 As 
Earl Ravenal. succinctly observes, 'it takes more credibility to keep an ally than to deter 
an enemy - 198 Again, a consistent strain of U. S. concern becomes apparent. 'Our allies, 
in Secretary Brown's view, '. - -are not yet fully facing up to a well documented Warsaw 
Pact military build-up' and furthermore, 'Even at a time of new threats to Western 
Europe's ... and Japan's oil lifeline to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, many of our 
allies appear untroubled by the threats or unwilling to assume the common defense 
burden. '99 Pointing out that the U. S. defence budget consumes a higher proportion of 
GNP than any other NATO country and 'five times that of Japan, '110 Brown declares that 
the American people, 'will not long tolerate' a position where 'the security of our allies 
is ... thus allowed to be more costly to Americans than it is to our allies themselves. '101 
The concern for greater 'burden sharing' in the Western alliance was, to be sure, a 
perennial one for U. S. Secretaries of Defense. For Harold Brown, however, the present 
'adverse trend' in the momentum of the central balance would require that these matters 
be addressed with a fresh 'urgency'. Brown is thus emphatic that, 'in the forefront of my 
concerns as Defense Secretary' has been the pursuit of 'a proper division of labour 
between our allies and us - "What this would mean 
in practice was made clear. Thus, 
as the United States invests more heavily in capabilities to project military power ... in 
South West Asia ... a reallocation of labour among 
NATO nations, in Particular the 
European member's willingness to contribute more to shared security commitments in 
Europe, takes on a new significance. '101 The administration had, as we have seen, failed 
to secure any formal endorsement of a NATO 'out of area' capability. However, it was 
also apparent that a net increment of capability for SW. Asia could also be secured by 
NNW 
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'freeing up' existing U. S. assets in Europe. Such an outcome was, for the administration, 
perhaps more optimal in being both a unilateral - and thus more flexible - force 
increment and avoiding the inevitable political complications attending any formal NATO 
extension. Again, as Robert Komer had observed, 'extending the NATO boundaries to 
cover the Middle East would not buy us very much. '104By placing such issues on the 
NATO agenda, the administration could, though, find an additional lever to concert 
existing U. S. policy on increased conventional capabidity (the May, 1977, '3 %' formula) 
in the NATO area itself. Of further significance for the revised global posture was the 
explicit incorporation of non-NATO forces in the DOD's augmented 'countervailing 
strategy'. By encouraging allies, 'especially the Japanese '101 to, 'make steady and 
significant increases in their own defense efforts'. Furthennore, the U. S. would, 'seek 
to widen and deepen our military contacts with the People's Republic of China. '101 
Clearly, a posture of global containment was nothing new for U. S. strategy. Nixon and 
Kissinger had made some gestures toward exacting an increased defence burden from 
Japan. 107Tbe Carter administration's first defence review had perceived a U. S. security 
perimeter on a 'great arc ... all the way 
from North Norway to Japan and the Aleutians'. 
However, the overt allowance for PRC assets in U. S. defence planning was, even in 
symbolic terms, a patent admission that United States' strategy was entering a new era. 
Stated practical moves here included export licensing for 'dual use' (civilian/military) 
technology, 'non weapons system military equipment' and 'a gradual expansion of 
military to military contacts. '101 Unstated was the establishment of U-S. surveillance and 
intelligence facilities on the Soviet border in the Chinese province of Sinkiang. " 
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V. The Soviet Dimension to the 'Soviet Threat 1 (1): the 'Domino Theory I in 
South Asia - Iran and Baluchistan. 
If the perceived appearance of Soviet and regional threat in the hinterland of the Gulf had 
proved functional to concerting the administration's redrawn global strategy, the 
'countervailing strategy' itself would provide for a further continuum of options for 
offsetting any localized force inferiorities in the lower Gulf and Indian Ocean. Despite 
the establishment of Rapid Deployment capability, the 'geopolitical asymmetries' stressed 
in previous assessments of the respective U. S. and Soviet theatre positions had entailed 
specific planning (from January, 1980) for 'horizontal and vertical escalation'. 110 The 
administration, in 'emphasiz[ing]' that, '... our plans and programs for South West Asia 
serve the security interests of our European and Asian allies, "" was to similarly note 
'our capability for shifting the geography of the conflict. "" And if the concerns of U. S. 
allies were focused on the more immediate security problems posed by the Gulf war and 
the threat of indigenous revolution - as indeed, was the main secular thrust of RDF 
posture - it is from the underlying universalist premise that U. S. Indian Ocean policy 
must be assessed. Whilst a consistent (Republican) critic of the Carter administration, 
Johns Hopkins analyst Robert W. Tucker puts well what had become the governing (bi- 
partisan) strategic orthodoxy. Here, 'It is the Gulf that fornis the indispensable key to the 
defense of the American global position, just as it forms the indispensable key without 
which the Soviet Union cannot seriously aspire to global predominance - 
1113 
In attempting to turn such an 'indispensable key' to its own advantage, the Soviet 
Union was, in the view of CIA analysts, handicapped by having 'little, except arms, 
with which to tempt these nations. "" The U. S. assessment of the essentially 
'negative' 
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Soviet leverage on the Middle East was longstanding and bom out by events. It had 
underpinned the successful Kissinger diplomacy of 1973-5. The public focus on 'Western 
Europe's and Japan's oil lifeline' provided a clear platforin to link the generalized notion 
of Soviet threat to the signal shared foreign policy issue with a domestic resonance in the 
West. To be sure, the advent of, in the words of one observer, an 'unprecedented crisis' 
in the international order could conceivably persuade Moscow that a 'major blow against 
the Western alliance' might be 'marginally less risky I if taken in the Persian Gulf than 
in Europe. 111 Again, this argument had emerged in PD- 18 and was made publicly explicit 
in the Defense Department's 'Posture Statement' for FY 1980.116 Even the latter case 
was, however, by no means self-evident, given the demands of 'simultaneous 
contingencies' on other possible Soviet theatres of operations. These will be examined 
below. Firstly, though, it is useful to consider in detail the two principal variants of the 
South Asian 'domino thesis' - involving more 'opportunist' Soviet peacetime moves - 
in Iran and the Pakistani Indian Ocean province of Baluchistan. 
For the latter contingency, the presumed aim of a Soviet occupation of 
Baluchistan or political domination of a nominally independent Baluchi state would be 
to secure an entrenched geopolitical position in South Asia and 'warm water port' on the 
Indian Ocean littoral. 117 The imputed Soviet ambition to 'dismember' Pakistan, whilst a 
conventional 'worst case' prefixion to administration MAP programmes for Islamabad 
- and widely rehearsed in the U. S. media"' - was however, never seen as anything other 
than remote by CIA and DIA analysts of the region. In a post-Afghanistan 'Primer' 
prepared by the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center, the Agency observes that, 
while, 'many (Baluchis) would support independence' and 'resent the colonial style 
MWW'' 
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overlordship of the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani government', "' these aspirations have 
been diffused by the 'feudal' nature of Baluchi Political development. Here, 'rivalries 
within the province have always prevented any unified action in the past' and 'fears that 
independence could lead to dominance by rival tribes or by leftists ... have also tempered 
the views of politicians' 
120 toward full statehood for the future. The main nationalist 
opposition, the Baluchi Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF) was never, in either internal 
political organization or external orientation, the functional equivalent of the Afghan 
PDPA or the NLF of South Yemen. "' Moreover, since the military defeat of the BPLF 
in 1975,111 the apparent focus of 'leftist' support in Baluchistan had turned to the (all- 
Pakistan) PPP Party of the late Ali Bhutto. 1130verall, while noting that Afghanistan has, 
in the past, supported Pushtun and Baluch separatists, and that 'we have some evidence 
of Soviet contact with both Pushtun and Baluch tribal leaders', the CIA has, 'never been 
able to confirm Pakistani reports of Soviet material support for either "independence 
movement. " 
1124 
If the volatile nature of Baluchi internal politics presented a seemingly unpromising 
project for Soviet 'proxy' manipulation, the 'professional, disciplined 
'121 Pakistani armed 
forces, combined with the province's 'moonscape' topography would also, in the CIA's 
view, make unilateral military action a 'high risk' option. "' The prospect of Russian 
incursion into Iranian Azerbaijan would superficially seem more plausible, given a 
certain historical precedence from the Soviet Republic of Gilan' - briefly established on 
the Caspian coast in 1920 - the Soviet-backed 'Azerbaijan Autonomous Republic' 
(1945- 
6) and the occupation of the region from 1941-6 by Soviet forces. Moscow might also 
expect a measure of local support from Azeri nationalists, the established Iranian 
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communist party (the 'Tudeh) and elements of the nonaligned left grouped around the 
'People's Fedayeen'. 127 
Again, however, whilst conceding that, 'the Soviets do not consider the Khomeini 
government completely desirable, 
1128 the CIA observes that, 'Given their own minority 
sittlation.. -. outright Soviet support for the separatist objectives of such groups is 
unlikely. "I' And if the Agency was clear on Moscow's 'ambivalence' toward 
encouraging ethnic division in Iran - an analysis which accords with established Soviet 
policy on the 'nationalities' question - it would also suggest that the prospects for a 
nationally active 'leftist' opposition to Khomeini were, from the Soviet viewpoint, 
scarcely less promising. The People's Fedayeen, the 'principal Marxist group' had, to 
be sure, 'spearheaded' the overthrow of Shahpour Bakhtiar and had the 'nomimal 
allegiance of the majority of leftists. 
'130 The Fedayeen's capability to mount a concerted 
campaign was, though, compromised by an organizational structure which amounts to, 
'no more than a loose grouping of disaffected individuals"" and acute internal and 
external 'ideological differences' - not the least of which were with the pro-Soviet Tudeh 
party. The CIA's low estimation of the potential for Iran's left opposition was seemingly 
mirrored in Moscow itself. The Tudeh, 'severely reduced' under the Shah, had 
conspicuously avoided making common cause with the 'independent Marxists' and was, 
in return, allowed a degree of public tolerance by the Tehran regime. 
132 The Ira i an 
revolution, Leonid Brezhnev had declared, 'is an essentially anti-imperialist revolution'; 
the Soviet Union was thus prepared to, 'develop good relations with Iran on the 
principles of equality and ... reciprocity. "I' 
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perhaps more significant than internal factors as an influence on Soviet Iran policy were 
the likely consequences of either support for Azeri insurgents or direct military 
intervention on relations with Turkey. A military government had taken power in 
Ankara in September, 1980111 with a programme of suppression of, inter alia, leftist and 
Kurdish separatist forces in Turkey and could be expected to react forcibly to any 
turbulence in Iranian Azerbaijan. Turkish hostility would inevitably mean a closer 
involvement by NATO. Here, a consistent current in Soviet strategic thinking becomes 
apparent. On October 1,1980, Brezhnev had condemned the AWACS deployment to 
Saudi Arabia and warned that the Gulf war could provide a pretext for further U. S. 
military action in the region. "I The Soviet leader would return to the theme on 
December, 11, coupled with an appeal to Washington to conclude a treaty of mutual non- 
mtervention for the Gulf region. 116Such concerns were clearly self-serving for the Soviet 
leadership. Given the extent of U. S. military preparation, they were not, however, 
unreasonable. 
VII. The Soviet Dimension (2): 'Simultaneous Contingencies' - Strategy and 
Capability. 
Overafl, in considering Soviet strategic options for South Asia in the 1980-81 period, it 
is arguable that a unified but weakened Iran, remaining fiercely anti-American, was more 
in the Russian interest than a divided Iran, becoming fiercely anti-Soviet. 
137 While the 
Soviet Union had vetoed proposals for UN economic sanctions on Iran on January 14, 
1980, the impact of the war and unilateral U. S. sanctions had resulted in the bulk of 
Iran's trade transiting Soviet Central Asia"' -a situation which gave more scope 
for the 
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exercise of 'negative' leverage than the uncertain outcome of military occupation. 
Conversely, however, if a further Soviet military move would serve to circumscribe 
Moscow's political options and polarize the aligmnent of states in South Asia, this 
position could be turned to the U. S. advantage. Here, assertions of the Soviet 'dilemma' 
are consistent for inter-agency analyses of the region. Thus, in considering one example, 
the CIA observes that, 'while the perception (of Soviet threat) alone may tempt the 
Saudis to deal with the USSR, actual Soviet involvement in aggressive moves may drive 
the Saudis back to the United States. "I, 
Whether the policy rationale behind the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, assessed 
in terms of a range of static and dynamic strategic indicators, 110 would provide an 
exemplar for further Soviet expansion was though, in the final analysis, unclear to the 
administration. As Under Secretary Komer acknowledges, 'We are not assigning relative 
weights at this point to the amalgam of objectives the Soviets had in mind in invading 
Afghanistan. '141 For its part, President Carter had, to be sure, declared that, 'the carving 
out of a part of Iran to be separated from the rest would not be in our (U. S. ) interest. 
'142 
A careful reading of the RDF 'forward strategy' however, suggests that such a de facto 
partitioning of Iran would, under some circumstances, be far from a worst case outcome 
for the United States. It would further account for the explicit assumption in RDF 
configuration that U. S. forces on a possible beach-head in Khuzestan would not have to 
contend with a significant local resistance from Iran itself. Addressing the FebruarY, 
1980 sessions of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Robert Komer was clear that, 
'in most of the contingencies we regard as the kind of threat we ought to plan against, 
the local countries will be on our side ... therefore we can sail 
into ports like Dhahran or 
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the Southern Iranian (sic) ports of Karachi or Muscat et-cetera, and offload. 1143 The 
funding requests for RDF force structures thus make a minimal provision for any 
'contested entry' capability. 144Such planning perspectives would, after September, 1980, 
correspond with hopes for a successful installation of the Bakhtiar forces in Southern Iran 
following the Iraqi invasion. 
The question of Soviet intentions in Iran, was moreover, overlaid by the evident 
problems of capability. In a wide ranging RAND study of possible RDF missions in the 
Iran/Gulf theatre, analyst Joshua Epstein concludes that, 'The Soviets face the grave 
threat that the military cost of a move on Iran would vastly outweigh its potential 
benefits. '141 Here, conventional (static) planning factors alone would indicate the 
difficulties of assembling a sufficient Soviet 'lethality ratio' (crudely, a prevailing 3: 1 
offensive advantage)'46 for South Asia without critically reducing forces on either the 
European or East Asian theatre. 147And if such 'simultaneous contingencies' were, in the 
abstract a complication for Soviet planning, the existing strategic conditions - notably 
a possible revolt in Poland on the European flank and increasing Chinese militancy, 
apparent in the February, 1978 actions against Vietn=, - would ftu-ther caution against 
an offensive move in South Asia. Whilst U. S. planners could consider the difficulties of 
Harold Brown's 'three theatre contingency, 
1148 Iran or Baluchistan, as analysts pointed 
out, would represent the fifth (or sixth) such contingency for the Soviet Union. 14'Indeed, 
such action would seem perhaps more unlikely in the event of a general war, given the 
above logistical constraints and vulnerability of forward bases, in for example, Gwadar, 
to sea-based air power. 'Baluchistan', as the CIA's 'Primer' observes, '... has no good 
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natural harbours and there is only one modem road - in Iran - from the USSR to the 
coast. 1150 
Thus, although the ostensible focus of the RDF was on a 'large scale Soviet invasion 
of the Persian Gulf region, "I' such contingency was, in practical terms, viewed as 
perhaps the least likely of the range of Soviet options to exert power in the region. Of 
the 24 Soviet divisions in the Central Asia military district of the USSR, none were 
rated as 'combat ready. '152The massing of 125,000 troops on the Azeri border, reported 
by U. S. intelligence on April 16,1980, the presence of a Soviet amphibious assault ship 
in the Arabian Sea and an overall Indian Ocean naval presence by September of 28 
vessels"' were viewed as essentially 'para diplomatic' moves, taken in conjunction with 
the occasional Soviet references to clauses five and six of the 1921 Iran/Soviet treaty. 
154 
As Under Secretary Komer Observes, to mobilize, deploy and commence hostilities, 
'they would face a whole host of problems. "I' In a transit to the Gulf itself through Iran, 
'the most likely route, 'I-" Soviet forces would face over 300 'choke points 1157 vulnerable 
to the sort of U. S. air or ground action considered earlier. In addition, 'they would have 
to count on at least some resistance from the Iranians' 
151 themselves. The Khuzestan and 
Mosul (Iraq) oilfields were some 800 miles from the USSR border - and thus out of 
range of Soviet tactical air power - whilst the Kuwaiti fields were a further 150 miles. 
And the main Saudi fields 'a couple of hundred miles' further still. 
The Soviet Union indeed possessed seven airborne divisions and had demonstrated, in 
Angola and Ethiopia, an ability to mount substantial airlift capability. And, in the view 
of Pentagon analysts, 'Airlift is adequate to lift one (division) 1,000 miles in short order 
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with three days of supplies. '119 However, even local Soviet air operations in Northern 
Iran would, in the view of (JCS) General Richard Lawson, be subject to interdiction by 
'U. S. tactical fighters, supported by air refuelling and guided by the sophisticated E-3A 
AWACS ... [which] ... have demonstrated repeatedly the worlds foremost capacity for rapid 
world-wide deployment. '110 Again, the latter consideration was critical. to U. S. rapid 
deployment strategy. The - Soviet airforce lacked a comparable airborne battle 
management capability. This would leave the deployment of Soviet TACAIR dependent 
upon the prior introduction of a fixed 'Ground Controlled Intercept' (GCI) facility. The 
establishment of Soviet Ground control was, though, itself dependent on there being a 
safe air passage to the theatre of operations. 161 Overall, for the Pentagon's Director For 
Plans and Policy, whilst the Soviet Union had a capability to, 'deploy relatively small 
forces against light opposition, Moscow would be, 'taxed to deploy a large force 
thousands of miles in a contested situation. "I' 
VU. U. S. Strategy: Preemption, I Tiered Interdiction' and Third Party 
Perception. 
In tenns of U. S. strategy, the distinction - outlined above - between Soviet 'peripheral 
and distant capabilities"" was to underpin three key factors in determining the RDF 
posture. Firstly, it would mean a tactical approach based on fiered interdiction'. In 
Under Secretary Korner's exposition, 'one has to look at the threat to the oilfields in 
segments rather than in terms of the Soviets taking over the whole thing. 
1164 Politically 
this, as has been argued, encompasses the option of U. S. acceptance of a divided Iran. 
Secondly, given that any such Soviet action - aside from yielding uncertain strategic 
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dividends - would be 'an exceedingly low confidence affair' militarily, the focus of 
DOD threat assessment was, as Komer further observes, 'not an overt Russian attack, 
but rather internal instability, coups, subversion and so forth. "" Here, 'To offset the 
overall U. S. advantages in power projection the Soviets have adopted a style of operation 
which permits them to challenge Western interests at a relatively low risk. '116Such usage 
of, 'Soviet advisors', 'surrogates 1, 'friendship treaties' and 'foreign military sales' would 
be countered by Brzezinski's 'very small rapid intervention force'. The mission of 'rapid 
response' forces was, to be sure, conventionally viewed in tenns of providing a 
'tripwire' capability against Soviet incursions, and the current (1980) U. S. ability to 
deploy three battalions (by air) to the Gulf in 48 hours'17was publicly discussed as such 
by the administration. "' However, whilst the effectiveness of a 'tripwire' approach to the 
Soviets was contested by some in the Pentagon, 
169 the availability of such a 'rapid 
reaction' capability had a clear utility in the 'lesser contingencies' which as was admitted, 
were of the greatest likelihood in any event. 
The third strategic consequence of the theatre military balance in South Asia was 
concerned with the less tangible sphere of 'Perceptions', taken by Harold Brown to be 
'as important as realities in the international arena. '110 Such considerations, underlying 
the more generalized architecture of deterrence, would locate both the Soviet and local 
. ý1- - contingency implications of RDF posture within die global bounds of the administration's 
'countervailing strategy'. Here, the high profile accorded to inferential factors - 
attributed, in the first instance, to third party readings (of great Power intention) within 
the overall strategic discourse of the central balance - was reflective, for Secretary 
Brown of, 'what theorists of international politics have long held. "" It was also 
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indicative of the extent to which the Carter Cabinet's internal agenda had taken on the 
contours of the standing U. S. debate on strategic 'superiority' and the credibility of 
security guarantees at lower levels of threat. One prominent theorist who had consistently 
advanced such views was Henry Kissinger. For Kissinger, the apparent 'lack of 
enthusiasm' greeting the Carter Doctrine amongst its ostensible beneficiaries was, in 
direct proportion, a result of the administration 'Systematically deprecating the role of 
power'. 
172 The administration has given the impression that 'there are almost no 
circumstances in which America would employ its armed forces'. The Gulf nations, in 
the fonner Secretary of State's view, 'are ... concerned that the United States ... will accept 
adverse geopolitical changes provided they can be structured to appear in some way to 
result from internal upheavals' . 
171 And, overall, 'the principal obstacle' to local 
acceptance of the Carter Doctrine is, 'the pervasive conviction that we lack the means 
or perhaps the will to implement it. 
1174 
The views of Kissinger on the administration's seeming ambivalence toward the utility 
of arms were to receive a clear affirmation from Harold Brown. In a valedictory 
(December, 1980) New York Times interview, Brown regretted that '(former Secretary 
of State) Vance was persuaded that anything that involved the use of force was a 
mistake. '171 However, although still contested in terms of both quantity and force 
structure, 176 a clear statement of 'means 1 was now apparent in the administration's 
$17.4bn. RDF programme-"" The 'will' would be demonstrable in a strategy of 
preemption. Thus if, as General Kelly was to acknowledge, both the planned and existing 
RDF, 'would not be a force that would be capable of blunting a massive Soviet effort', 
it could, however, serve as a 'nucleus, as we put additional force into the area. 
t 171 The 
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relation between U. S. -Soviet 'geopolitical asymmetry' in South Asia, preemption, and 
extended deterrence was discussed in the following terms by DOD Deputy Under 
Secretary (Policy Planning) Walter Slocombe. Here, 'It is not necessary ... for the initial 
units to defeat the whole force an adversary might eventually have in place. It is also not 
necessary for a U. S. movement to await the firing of the first shot. Many of our forces 
can move upon strategic warning and some even upon the receipt of very early and 
tenuous warning 
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and, 'lacking (such a) capability ... would give a serious and 
dangerously wrong signal ... particularly to our friends in the area. '110 The latter point, 
reinforced by Harold Brown and other administration officials, "' would thus affirm 
'time-urgency' as the key variable in RDF strategy and preemption as the operative 
planning factor. Again, General Kelly's stress on the capability to, 'get forces into an 
area rapidly, irrespective of size"12was also viewed by some analysts as a means to avoid 
'contested entry' requirements which, as we have seen, were not programmed into the 
RDF. "I In the wider context, though, it was ftu-ther observed that, given the geographical 
disadvantages of the U. S., the shortfall in TACAIR capability of the Soviet Union, and 
the unpredictable political behaviour of the regional powers themselves, 'The Middle 
East is an area in which preemption is the only reasonable strategy for either of the 
pe sup rpowers. 
'1114 
Conclusions: The Gulf, the Indian Ocean and Extended Deterrence. 
The dilemmas discussed above will again indicate the wider agenda of 'extended 
deterrence'. In a summation of fmdings on 'The Future of Strategic Nuclear 
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Deterrence""' taken from the 1980 conference at the London International institute of 
Strategic Studies, IISS co-ordinator Christopher Bertram argues that the perceived or 
actual trend to ICBM imbalance between the U. S. and the Soviet Union does not effect 
the core proposition of nuclear deterrence; the 'ability -- Ao credibly threaten each other 
with nuclear devastation. "I' And whilst some stress was placed on the supposed Soviet 
nuclear 'war fighting' doctrine in the preamble to PD-59 and other statements of U. S. 
strategic doctrine considered in this study, the sheer level of unpredictability inherent in 
any direct nuclear engagement would, clearly, remain unaffected by possession or 
otherwise of options toward 'escalation dominance' or increasingly discriminatory 
counterforce. 117Harold Brown was surely correct in asserting that counterforce was not., 
a pfioti, 'a (nuclear) first strike strategy'. The contingencies where counterforce was 
seen to be functional, however, were those involving deterrence on the periphery; and 
notably, those covered here in the Gulf, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In proportion 
to the removal from (metropolitan and NATO) areas of clear 'core' significance to the 
United States, the logic of counterforce was to rest upon the exemplar of a perceived 
conventional 'first strike' capability in admitting greater credibility to threat-bargaining 
at ftu-ther levels of escalation. Here, Brown is clear that, "'Counterforce" covers much 
more dm central strategic systems ... we will give special attention, 
in implementing the 
countervailing strategy, *to, more effective and more flexible targeting of the full range 
of military capabilities. "I' 
Thus, the 'organic' link between counterforce, preemption and extended deterrence, as 
explored here in the case of South West Asia, was to proceed from the premise that the 
availability of, options between acquiescence and nuclear holocaust"89 would lend the 
deterrent effect of even small U. S. force commitments and territorial guarantees 
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increased 'credibility' - 'particularly', as Under Secretary Slocombe observes, 'to our 
friends in the area. 'I* 
In considering overall the interaction between the Iranian revolution, the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan and the return of U. S. policy to great power confrontationg 
it is unwise to disaggregate a priori a temporal ordering of events into causal sequence. 
Here, though, perhaps two observations are in order. Firstly, whilst the events in Iran 
and Afghanistan had indeed stemmed from discrete causes, an outline hypothesis for 
sequential significance may be approached by positing alternatives. The outbreak and 
course of the Iranian revolution was, as has been extensively argued above, entirely 
unprepared for by either Washington or Moscow. Given the predicted continuation of the 
Shah's regime it is arguable that, whilst the Soviet Union would have retained its 
strategic interest in the internal arrangements of Afghanistan, the exercise thereon would 
clearly have been effected by the prospect of arousing the hostility of a regime in Iran 
which, as has also been shown, Moscow had made considerable efforts to maintain good 
relations with. In this respect, the temporary power vacuum in Tehran had surely 
facilitated a greater span of options for Soviet Afghan policy. Secondly, however, it may 
be observed that the form of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was itself in some 
measure a product of earlier efforts by Iran to displace Soviet influence in Kabul. These, 
like the other aspects of the Shah's regional activism in Iraq, Oman and elsewhere, had 
the ftiH support of the United States. 191 And perhaps more important as a defining factor 
in Soviet policy was the perception of increasing U. S. hostility to Russia tout coun - 
underscored by the breakdown of NALT and conventional arms negotiations and non- 
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ratification of the SALT treaty - which had been catalysed, notably in its regional focus, 
by the ]Iranian revolution. 112 
In its effects on the United States' global position, the impact of the Iranian revolution 
can again be approached from two dimensions, of analysis. In the first instance, it 
removed the integrating focus for U. S. regional policy. No other power could have 
replaced the Shah's Iran in its linkages with Israel, Egypt, the Gulf States and the 
CENTO nations. At a strategic level, moreover, the 'loss' of Iran had removed a central 
pillar of 'essential equivalence'. From the beginning of the Carter administration, the 
Gulf and the Middle East were viewed as more integrated than before within U. S. global 
strategy - In particular, the region had become more closely integrated in global military 
posture. The groundwork for this process had, to be sure, been laid during the two 
Republican Presidencies, by Nixon and Kissinger. For the Carter administration, 
however, the effort to combine a greater integration of the Western alliance with a 
response to the increased level of Soviet capability and, critically, the focus brought to 
bear on such developments in the central balance by domestic critics, had identified the 
Gulf region as a common point of departure. 
The above discussion has summarized U. S. and Soviet perspectives on the Iranian 
revolution. It has also suggested a strategic context wherein the aims of United States' 
regional policy under the Carter administration were related to parallel objectives in the C; 
Western alliance and the central balance. In conclusion, an attributive framework can 
also be indicated. It can be thus observed that this linkage of regional, alliance and 
strategic policy was first made manifest in the programme of theatre arms expansion in 
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NATO, the PRM-10 proposals to form a regional strike force, and, indeed, the collateral 
considerations of counterforce within PD-18.193 To be sure, a 'worst case' planning 
scenario of a Soviet move in the Gulf was posited, from PD-18 onwards, as a possible 
precursor for action on the central front. Albeit, at an organizational level, the strategic 
stress on 'Europe and Japan's oil lifeline' had also emerged in the early planning process 
as a means to concert greater defence 'burden sharing' from the Western alliance, in 
order to better redeploy existing U. S. defence assets to the Gulf and Indian Ocean. 
Here, it can be recalled that the Carter administration's approach, for Indian Ocean 
region and the 'South' in general, had embodied a contradiction of means and, in similar 
respect, objectives, from the outset. It was undoubtedly viewed by many, and notably the 
President himself, as a policy area neglected by previous administrations and worthy of 
attention in its own right. It was also, however, regarded as a ripe ground for regaining 
U. S. influence. The Carter foreign policy platform had thus placed some stress thereby 
in the initiatives toward 'regional influentials', and more particularly for our study, those 
Indian Ocean nations - Somalia and Iraq - hitherto taken as allied to the Soviet Union. 
And if Washington was indeed to undertake the most sustained effort to date to establish 
arms limitation in the Indian Ocean region, the military component of policy, embodied 
early on in the ratification of James Schlesinger's contested (1974-5) planning for Diego 
Garcia, was not to be neglected. The 'Era Two' approach was, at least in the eyes of its 
authors, adopted very much under duress. It was, for Samuel Huntingdon, the perceived 
decline in U. S. military capability that had produced the stress on economic and political 
means toward 'resolving regional conflicts, reducing tensions and achieving verifiable 
arms agreements -"I 
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Given the existing current of great power relations, U-S. relations with allied powers 
and the terms of domestic opposition to the governing administration, the conjunctural 
impact of the Iranian revolution was, perhaps uniquely, such as to bring forth a fusion 
of perceived areas of challenge to the United States - As analyst Geoffrey Kemp was to 
observe two months after the fact, 'It has become increasingly difficult to separate the 
region's own internal conflicts from the broader question of U. S. -Soviet military 
rivalry. '191 And whilst the focus of the new U. S- strategy was placed on the Gulf, the 
diffused and variegated perception of the challenge was registered as global. This, as our 
study has indicated, was to find a strategic expression in planning for 'horizontal 
escalation'. It is worth remarking that the first public mention by President Carter of the 
RDF was in comection with the supposed Soviet 'Combat Brigade' in Cuba, in a speech 
of October, 1979.191 Such reaffirmations of U. S. global interests were integral to 
reassertion of U. S. singularity. The dilemma, though, remained that of reconciling the 
unavoidably increasing importance of the Gulf, Middle East and Indian Ocean regions 
to the United States' global position with decreasing comparative advantage toward other 
states, particularly in the non-military categories of power. The dichotomies of 'Era 
Two' were thus to be comprehensively settled in favour of addressing the - principally 
military - areas of remaining unilateral U. S. power. Areas whose 
failings had, 
regardless of the administration's intentions, objectively left the option of greater 
assertion inoperable. 
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CONCLUSION: From ARAMCO to CENTCOM. 
The signal advance of United States' engagement in the Indian Ocean region considered 
in this study would seem, at first sight, to represent the reversal of an historical trend. 
American power in the international system, preeminent for the first twenty years of the 
post-war era, had expressly begun a process of retrenchment during the Nixon and early 
Carter administrations, and this was recognized in the policies and 'doctrine' so 
promulgated. Clearly, the current of U. S. power was, in objective terms, unable to 
recapture the absolute primacy, admitted by a unique historical combination of economic 
strength and strategic nuclear superiority, which had earlier obtained. The advent of the 
'Carter Doctrine', its assumption of a fresh area of 'vital national interest' for the United 
States in the Gulf region, and of its associated military instruments, the Rapid 
Deployment Force and, later, the Central Command (CENTCOM)' was attended by 
much speculation that the U. S. was undergoing the classic process of attempting to 
replace economic with military power which would, effectively, retrace the path of 
eulier empires in decline. The 'imperial overstretch 12 thesis had, indeed, seemed to have 
gained some empirical validation, as the world of the 1980's took on politico/military 
characteristics seen by some analysts as a 'new cold war' and as the Reagan 
administration began accelerating such policies - not least in the Indian Ocean. 
The perspective of imperial overstretch, whilst attractively concise analytically, is 
though, and for this same reason, only valid in terms of the characteristics given for 
traditional empire. ' In this respect, it was surely predictable that a great power threatened 
in its economic interests, as was apparent with the United States' perception of the rise 
of OPEC, should take the traditional route of incorporating such concerns in its military 
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posture. However, whilst analytically coherent, this 'imperial' focus neglects, in other 
respects, the historical specificity of U. S. power and the domestic lineage of its 
engagement internationally, and Particularly, its military engagement. As John Lewis 
Gaddis has observed, the course of U. S. global strategy since 1950 has, 'To a 
remarkable degree ... been the product, not so much of what the Russians have done, 
or what has happened elsewhere in the world, but of internal forces operating in the 
United States. 14 The signifier for such forces, however, was from the time of Harry 
Truman onwards, the ideological confrontation with communism and its main secular 
exemplary, the Soviet Union. Throughout the post-war period, successive U. S. 
administrations have sought to address the 'menace of Soviet communism' to a 
sometimes sceptical domestic constituency. It can be recalled that the circumstances 
launching the 'Truman Doctrine' embodied precisely this aim. Opposition to the 
'Kremlin design', was, moreover, doubly functional as a counter to embedded domestic 
isolationism. If the Soviet strategic threat was real enough to U. S. policy makers, the 
more mundane threat to U. S. local economic interests would also require an active 
military and political involvement in world affairs. The Truman Doctrine was thus 
directed, inter alia, to oil producing countries on the USSR's Eurasian periphery; the 
first significant instance of concerted U. S. diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union 
concerned the national status of Iran. 
From the above perspective, the advent of formal U. S. incorporation of the Indian 
Ocean region within its global military posture can thus, with perhaps greater historical 
accuracy, be placed within this signal continuous domestic correlate in U. S. foreign 
policy - containment of the Soviet Union. If, during the 1970's, the 
United States had 
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clearly lost power in some categories, it had also, with the rise of significant local 
multipolarity - and critically, with the formation of a de facto strategic alliance with 
China - the means to make containment again truly global. Me China card', as Harold 
Brown observes, 'is actually a full deck. " It was this extension of endogenous local and 
regional political autonomy within a global economic frame of reference still predicated 
on the market power of the United States that was to give U. S. policy both its imperative 
and opportunity to advance a new period of strategic engagement in the Indian Ocean. 
If the realization of this objective had become a declared U. S. policy goal only at the 
end of the Carter administration, the opportunity was founded in the recognition of 
Soviet-Chinese emnity by the Nixon Doctrine. To be sure, the Nixon/Kissinger 
programme was itself a formationfaute de mieux after U. S. reverses in Vietaam, but 
again, the move by the Nixon administration to energetically reposition U. S. interests 
in the Gulf and Indian Ocean was part of the wider assertion of differentiation of 
(politico/military) means in U. S. global strategy. The specific modalities at issue here 
were, in simple terms, adopted as the most readily realizable under the historical 
circumstances. However, if the Nixon/Kissinger approach to China was, over time, 
moderated by the uncertain trend within Chinese politics itself - the eclipse of Zhou 
Enlai, the succession question following the (1976) death of Mao Zedong - it was also 
a product of the Nixon administration's strategic calculation that, whilst the threat of 
U. S. -Chinese alliance could induce co-operation from the Kremlin, the actuality would 
surely yield an unpredictable level of Soviet hostility. With the Chinese leadership after 
1978 again actively seeking such alliance with the United States, the proclivity widlin all 
factions of the Carter administration to avoid an 'excessive preoccupation' with U. S. - 
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Soviet affairs had removed this leeway for differentiation in the Washington 
/Moscow/Beijing strategic triangle. The corresponding hardening of attitudes from the 
Soviet Union that did indeed transpire from the 'China card, would, in turn, compound 
the existing U. S. trend toward an increasing stress on the military dimensions of power. 
And ftirther vivify the engagement of a fresh geopolitical front which, for the economic 
and alliance reasons which we have outlined, was already prominent in U. S. national 
security planning. 
Indeed, the Carter administration's concept of 'world order politics' had reflected, in 
some particulars, the critique of Nixon's policies fortned on the right of U. S. politics - 
notably, in respect of Kissinger's alleged 'historical pessimism' regarding the relative 
decline of the United States' global position. It is, in this respect, also worth recalling 
the domestic provenance of the Carter campaign platform, which was formed in express 
opposition to the McGovern Democrat's call to 'come home America. And if aspects 
of the programme adopted in public office, including, in the initial stages, moves on 
arms control and nuclear proliferation, were to so mark a distinction from some of the 
more narrow realpolifik perspectives of the Kissinger world view, the same logic could 
be applied, pafi passu, to such matters as regained U. S. strategic superiority. 
It is this latter issue that set the point of departure for the U. S. national security debate 
during most of the 1970's. And whilst often approached at a high level of abstraction 
within the Washington defence community, it also provided the touchstone for more 
diffused, inchoate fears amongst the American public, encompassing economic weakness, 
defeat in Vietnam and a generalized sense of diminishing U-S- influence in world affairs - 
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The period of United States' strategic superiority was associated with economic 
prosperity. The acceptance of 'rough parity' with the Soviet Union was linked in the 
public mind with economic recession. For those in the Policy community itself, such 
concerns lent a new immediacy to the dilemmas of 'Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear 
Age' which had characterized much of the post-war strategic theorizing. 
Thus, for the overall public agenda of U. S. foreign and security policy, the terms of 
discussion had devolved consistently toward an elision of strategic threat, most 
prominently, in respect of the advances in Soviet military capability and the rise of 
OPEC. This affective debate on the loss of United States' ability to concert desired 
outcomes for its policies was, in turn, relayed through the terms of internal and 
bureaucratic conflict within the formal policy apparatus which had, by 1973, itself 
broken forth into the public domain. Here, Admiral Zumwalt was to give forthright 
expression to one partisan perspective on, 'the inextricable relationship [that] the Nixon 
administration's perversion of the policy process bore to its ignoble outlook ... Its 
contempt for ... the judgement of its own officials and experts reflected 
Henry Kissinger's 
world view; that the dynamics of history are on the side of the Soviet Union. " The then 
Secretary of State's reported view that the Soviet Union had become 'Sparta to our 
Athens 17 was seized upon as symptomatic of a generalized administration malaise by 
critics on the liberal as well as the right wing Of the U. S. political spectrum. 
Clearly, the conduct of this debate was informed by outright partisan considerations and 
the conventions of public presentation - particularly in terms of its organized expression 
in such lobbies as the 'Committee on the Present Danger'. However, if in representing 
L 
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some of the more elaborated geopolitical scenarios of a Soviet 'grand design' extending 
from Mozambique to North Korea, ' these requirements, as leading CPD activist Paul 
Nitze was to acknowledge, 'often lead one to oversimplify', 9 the central thesis of a Soviet 
drive for strategic superiority was indeed intended to be taken at face value. As Nitze 
again observes, 'there is no point in "rough par "-- -in these stakes, who would want CP 
ity 
to be number two? '10 If the actual status of the central balance could be questioned 
empirically, the logic itself was inescapable. Harold Brown, whilst contending that 'it 
is unlikely that meaningful superiority can be achieved against a determined opponent' 
would, though, allow that, 'if superiority is an idle goal, inferiority is still a possible 
outcome ... The United States cannot afford inferiority. "I Former Secretary Brown was 
also expressing what had become the consensus Washington view in accepting a 
correlation between the 'shift since the late 1960's away from a perceived U. S. strategic 
superiority' and, 'its loss [having] had a significant effect on relations between the United 
States and its allies and on the attitudes of people in other countries towards the United 
StateS. '12 
This latter perspective, long featured in academic and official policy discussion, had 
formed the principal point of departure for the Nixon Doctrine. The Doctrine's apparent 
success in indeed addressing the 'potential of a pluralistic world' and seemingly reaching 
a pragmatic modus vivendi with the Soviet Union had - Vietnam aside - ensured that the 
'strategic superiority' issue had remained somewhat muted in the early days of d6tente 
and the Nixon administration. It had only really re-emerged on the public agenda after 
the OPEC 'oil shock' and the 1973 Middle East war. To be sure, the conclusion of the 
October war was, in objective tenns, a success for collaborative great power strategic 
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management. The combination and elision of nuclear threat, Soviet conventional 
capability and Arab economic leverage so revealed, was, though, to set the terms for 
national security discussion for the rest of the decade. And, more particularly, establish 
the Gulf/Indian Ocean region as the new theatre for great power strategic confrontation. 
The above argument has identified a rising focus on the East-West dimension to U. S. 
engagement in the Indian Ocean and wider Southern hemisphere, proceeding through 
the events of the 1973 war, the extended debate over Diego Garcia, Secretary Kissinger 
and President Ford's efforts to mount a U. S. military response to the Soviet/Cuban 
intervention in Angola and the intense govermnental. and Congressional interest in the 
several crises in the Hom of Africa region during the first two years of the Carter 
administration. The growth in Soviet strategic and conventional capability was thus 
having two consequences for the development of U. S. policy. Clearly, in the first 
tance, it had admitted a greater willingness to engage in regional intervention from 
Moscow itself. Such instances were, though, highly individuated, and susceptible, as in 
Egypt and Somalia, to reversal by appropriate U. S. and allied diplomacy - 
The second consequence went beyond considerations of political and military 
adjustment at local level, and derived from the advance of a real strategic dimension to 
multipolarity. To be sure, Soviet power, as senior NSC and State Department aide 
IT_ 
Helmut Sonnenfeld had observed, clearly was emerging in 'such a flawed way' as to be 
vulnerable to the sort of selective U. S. countermeasures set forth in the widely circulated 
analysis of 1975.11 It was, however, emerging in such a way as to provide the conditions 
for greater latitude to the respective regional powers, whether nominally allied to either 
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(great power) bloc. It was the latter, systemic, implications of a truly bipolar 
international order which had allowed India the scope for resisting U. S. military 
pressure in 1971 and given a competitive leverage in bilateral relations with Washington 
to the Shah's Iran. Kuwait and North Yemen had pointedly maintained good relations 
with Moscow as a counter to Saudi pressure, and perhaps most significantly for U. S. 
regional policy, the simple fact of a rival great power had countenanced the signal 
economic nationalism of OPEC, trenchant U. S. concerns for the 'strangulation of the 
industrialized world' notwithstanding. 
I 
With the advent of the Carter administration, the reciprocal dilenunas of regional 
leverage and Soviet strategic parity had become the main concern for U. S. national 
security policy. And from the outset, the administration had attempted a similarly multi- 
layered effort to resolve them. As has been shown, 'Era Two' had identified possible 
areas of advance in nuclear capability - notably, Trident, MX, Cruise and TNF in 
Europe - whilst an attempt to provide for a more credible programme for the 'lesser 
contingency' was advanced with PD-18. For the Indian Ocean in particular, there was 
also, in keeping with the 'World Order' perspectives of the early Carter 
administration, the parallel effort towards decoupling regional dynamics from the East- 
West matrix as such, pursued in terms of confidence building measures, U. S. -Soviet 
regional arms control and the curbing of arms sales to the region. Here, however, 
whilst what were perceived as excessive levels of U. S. arms sales were indeed addressed 
by the initial Carter programme - in line with much domestic and 
Congressional 
concern - the presumed political leverage afforded 
by such transactions remained, as 
under previous administrations, party to 'the increasingly intricate web of mutual 
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interdependence' between the United States and the significant local powers, replacing, 
in effect, the earlier level of technical leverage enjoyed by U. S. oil companies in the 
region. 
Moreover, in line with what we have identified as the established course of U. S. 
strategy, a modulated programme of arms transfers was deemed necessary - in any event 
- to secure the local conditions for 'essential equivalence', the strategic concept wherein 
the rise in Soviet capabilities was to be offset by the capabilities of 'prosperous and 
willing' U. S. allies. These offsets were, however, only operative in the conventional 
sphere. The equipping and amiing of regional surrogates, whilst functional in aggregate 
to the central balance, served a primary purpose in reasserting U. S. influence in inter- 
allied affairs, in response to such 'significant effect[s] on relations' as had been eroded 
by Soviet strategic parity in the first instance. 
Here, the strategic issues raised in disaggregating the reciprocal dynamics of 'essential 
equivalence' bear again upon an earlier aspect of this analysis, that of the Indian Ocean 
as an arena of direct U. S. -Soviet strategic confrontation. As discussed in chapter two, 
the complex of strategic arms negotiations of the Nixon first term - SALT I- had 
ratified a status quo position of mutual strategic restraint in the region. This was integral 
to the overall SALT protocol on ICBM/ABM's. As the record also makes clear, neither 
the United States nor the USSR had proceeded with a full Anti-Ballistic Missile 
programme. The Soviet Union had retained a minimal 'nth country' ABM deployment 
around Moscow. Washington had, in turn agreed de facto to not deploy SSBN 
offensive systems in the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon's 'option C' planning 
for Diego 
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Garcia was left in abeyance, and the region was explicitly categorized with reference to 
the agreement on 'Basic Principles of U. S. -Soviet Relations' of May 29,1972.14 
The grounds for U. S. Soviet strategic accord on the Indian Ocean, in simple terms, a 
trade-off between U-S. non-deployment of strategic systems in return for Soviet 
'restraint' in deploying other naval and conventional forces, were to be taken up more 
systematically in the moves toward a formalized Indian Ocean arms control regime. 
Here, the 1977-8 Naval Arms Limitation Talks were also in the forefront of the broader 
effort to address third world concerns undertaken by the early Carter administration. As 
shown in chapter five, these policies, epitomized by Andrew Young's tenure at the 
United Nations, were not unsuccessful in restoring a measure of U. S. influence amongst 
hitherto opposed nonaligned nations - India, Iraq - and, more pragmatically, in 
reducing the scope for Soviet 'opportunism' in the region. However, just as the 
administration's multilateral diplomatic approaches in the Indian Ocean were informed 
by a parallel level of strategic calculation, the direct, bilateral negotiations for regional 
arms control were also party to the wider U. S. considerations of the central balance. It 
was the mounting Washington debate on 'strategic superiority' which, by the end of 
1978, had finally convinced Congress that, to forgo the option of SSBN deployment in 
the Indian Ocean 'would give the Soviets a strategic gain that could not be matched by 
A- - the United States by simply limiting Soviet conventional forces to their 1977 level. 
If this general trend toward great power confrontation was thus already in evidence 
by 1978, and the Indian Ocean was becoming established as the specific regional focus, 
the Carter administration's concerns were brought into sharp relief by the revolution in 
I 
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Iran and the domestic reverberations of the hostage affair. Iran had been the unique focus 
for both the overall U. S. strategic posture in South Asia and the integration of U. S. 
policy for the Middle East. The shortcomings of the Pentagon's ability to provide for a 
military option were graphically revealed in the April, 1979 hostage mission, and the 
wider review of U. S. military posture surrounding 'Nifty Nugget. Moreover, the 
uncertain level of political and diplomatic support returned for the U. S. internationally 
was also indicative, for some in the NSC, that Washington required a more concrete 
foundation to exert power in the region. With the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 
this urgency was taken up by the military planning process, which had hitherto, as we 
have seen, been reluctant to commit large resources to a non-Soviet role. These two 
internal conditions for a more forward U. S. posture in the Indian Ocean region had been 
met; those external, concerning the moblization of regional and allied Western support, 
would be forthcoming from the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. 
It was thus the outbreak of war between an erstwhile Soviet ally, Iraq, and the former 
'keystone' of regional contaimnent which, ironically, provided the fmal enabling factor 
toward univocal assertion of U. S. military power in the Indian Ocean region. In 
a further irony, it was U. S. planning for a defence of America's most virulent third 
world opponent - revolutionary Iran - against the Soviet Union which provided 
the 
organizmg momentum for the concrete engagement of military posture. ii 
-weg, 
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CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVES. 
Thus, in summation, if a multi-layered and reciprocal dynamic of challenge to the United 
States' global position in the decade of the 1970s has been outlined - proceeding from 
economic rivals of the West, the emergent multipolarity of the third world and from the 
strategic parity with the Soviet Union - the U. S. response can similarly be viewed as a 
dynamic of reinforcement. The key variable for composing this response was taken up 
from the United States' position in the third world, and, more particularly, those regions 
4 
of the Middle East and South Asia which, for economic and geopolitical reasons, had 
earlier been central to establishing U. S. ascendancy after 1945. 
It is this redefinition of a primary role for the Indian Ocean in the U. S. global strategy 
of the 1970's that raises the questions of structure, agency and representation which have 
fonned the core of our analysis. If, as has been argued, the central concern of United 
States' administration's during this period was with addressing the unfolding secular 
trend of comparative disadvantage, it is also apparent that, as analyst Richard Higgott 
observes, 'The declining authority of many govenunents over the policy process has not 
been due to other states but to a world market economy under less political control than 
national economies have been in the past. "' In considering the identification of U. S. 
national interests through the policy process, it is clear that the structuring of such 
interests was increasingly to take account of both the constraints and opportunities 
offered by the growth multiple centres of influence, encompassing the realm of 
international politics, U. S. domestic politics and the often competing centres of inter and 
intra-bureaucratic power. 
RIW 
77' 
492 
From this perspective, analysis of policy development demonstrates recurring attempts 
at recapturing the authority of government over the policy process as over the trend in 
politics as such. As has been detailed in this study, a primary concern of the Kissinger 
NSC system was to curb perceived tendencies toward 'administrative democracy' within 
the process whilst opportuning for direct avenues of elite-based decision-making at 
interstate -level. In similar fashion, the 'multiple advocacy' approach of the Carter 
administration's foreign policy apparatus represented a further attempt to parallel 
assumptions about the role of power m Cae composition of world politics widiin the 
structuring of policy per se. 
Given the interaction of structure, agency and the distribution of power outlined 
above, analysis of the course of policy for the Indian Ocean region suggests a certain 
derivative and adventitious character. Here, just as Europe and Japan were increasingly 
challenging the United States economically, and in associated respects, politically in this 
region, the significant local actors on the Northern Indian Ocean littoral were themselves 
gaining further leeway from the emerging bipolar balance amongst the great powers. The 
opportunity offered for U. S. policy was, however, to effect a reversal of this dynamic, 
precisely because Soviet global power was indeed emerging in such a 'flawed way' - 
notably, in the disproportionate weight accorded its military manifestations. In terms of 
the representation of these issues in the policy process, the recurrence of 
categories drawn from classical geopolitics, the 'choke points' and 'fimel areas' 
denotative of a locational dimension to power, identify a continuing saliency of global 
relational factors in the emergence of the wider Indian Ocean region itself as a distinct, 
albeit, loosely bounded, strategic arena. Thus, by focusing again its own signal 
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predominance in strategic affairs and guarantor position of the general economic interest, 
the United States was to successfully negotiate a transition from regional delegation 
backed by strategic mobility - the Nixon Doctrine - to a reestablished role as key 
regional actor, manifest in the RDJTF, the Camp David peace accords and the advancing 
'special relationship' with the Arab oil producing states and particularly, Saudi Arabia. 
Throughout the post-war era, the bipolar U. S. -Soviet aspects of the composition of the 
international system had operated on two levels, a symbolic one of nuclear confrontation 
and a real one of respective military response to conflict in the third world. The relation 
between the two had also real consequences, however, in that the military preparations 
and posture configurations designed for nuclear war, whilst serving primary symbolic 
and political fimctions, were not addressing contingencies that were, a pfiofi, impossible. 
IC_ 
For the representational issues raised in considering the development of policy models, 
such 'counterfactual' perspectives 17 served to delimit a strategic grammar of abiding 
conceptual consistency - albeit, one informed by an increasing technical positivism. As 
A 
rUexander George, amongst others, has observed, the extent of theorizing about nuclear 
weapons, and the proliferation of the systems themselves, had the effect of eliding the 
concerns of nuclear security policy with those of security policy tout courT. 11 
The paradigm of containment had emerged as the principal referent for setting the 
analytic agenda for United States' national security policy from the outset of U. S. 
hegemonic predominance in the post-war period. If the passive construction of the term 
reflected fears concerning the unpredictability of the use of large scale military force in 
the nuclear age, the concrete translation of doctrine into policy was also contingent 
ft, 
12. 
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upon the historically unusual status of the principal hegemonic rival, the USSR, also 
representing both a radically alternative ideology and mode of economic organization. 
In direct proportion, the mobilizing logic for containment drew much from the resonance 
conveyed by both of these Soviet characteristics wifl-ýn the specific composition of U. S. 
domestic politics. It was also within this domestic milieu that two other factors were 
emergmg as cr determinants of policy relating to the geographical arena of our case 
study: namely, perceived U. S. vulnerability to OPEC economic nationalism and the need 
to sustain Israel. 
To be sure, the emergence of a strong, and, in the direct mode of its engagement, 
historically novel, containment posture in the Indian Ocean was not unquestioned in the 
U. S. policy community. And, as we have seen, considerable effort was placed upon 
advancing the case for more benign and differentiated counterfactuals - concerning, for 
example, the United States' abilities to reduce its oil vulnerability though domestic 
efforts, the disaggregation of support for Israel as a sovereign state from support for 
specific Israeli security policies - and notably, concerning the nature of the challenge 
from the Soviet Union. However, that the case for a regional det6nte with Moscow and 
for a more differentiated approach to the region itself was never fully developed suggests 
that a critical variable lay in the itself variegated nature of domestic consensus - As has 
been detailed in our study, 'doves' on U. S. -Soviet affairs could easily be 'hawks' on 
unquestioned military support for Israel - those urging disengagement from the 
Middle East power struggle were as likely to be uncompromising on rejecting a 
confidence-building approach to the USSR. Moreover, despite the declared stress on 
'World Order' politics advanced in the early Carter tenn, the inheritance of the Nixon 
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Doctrine - notably, its cultivation of 'moderate authoritarian' regimes in Iran and 
Saudi Arabia - was never fundamentally questioned due to the need to maintain, inter 
alia, the core contairunent value of 'essential equivalence. 
If the Carter administration's awareness of these issues was demonstrated by the wide- 
ranging agenda for bilateral and multilateral arms control of early 1977, a valid criticism 
must surely lie in the extent to which the administration was also to rely upon traditional 
instruments of policy, through which both directly deployed U. S. military capability and 
arms sales to the region itself were substantially increased. To be sure, the 
iii prospects of general East-West hostilities beginning in the Gulf - as envisaged in the 
Carter administration's PD-18 planning - were, again, not nugatory. Yet, the dynamic 
proceeding from this unitary logic of containment and, notably of its derivative of 
counterforce, was that which, by providing an increasing clarity of ends for the 
unifying of the Indian Ocean policy framework, worked in tandem to absorb such arisi 
empirical disparities - notably, those concerning autonomous political developments 
in the region - within, rather, an expanding differentiation of means. 
The encounter with regional multipolarity had thus revealed a fresh avenue for a 
resurgent containment strategy. The advocates of world order had initiated the 'greatest 
peacetime expansion of military capability in recent history"' and, far from 
disengagement, began rather taking an active and partisan role in regional conflicts - in 
the Yemen, Afghanistan and the Iraq-Iran war. 
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From the perspectives of 1994, it is clear that the burgeoning United States' military 
presence in the Indian Ocean did little to harm the Soviet Union militarily, but much to 
convince Moscow of the closing circle of a resurgent contaimnent, displayed also within 
a new line of U. S. interlocutors from Baghdad to Beijing. The USSR was, clearly, 
pursuing first and foremost its own political and security agenda in the region. However, 
the readiness by the United States to 'embrace any dictator' on the Soviet Union's 
Eurasian periphery must surely have constituted a primary reinforcement to both 
endogenous regional conflict and the negative strategic calculation of Moscow itself. 
Albeit, to adapt from a perspective of 'without apologies, neorealism', 10 the outcome of 
the policy process was and perhaps remains, one that was doubly functional to the pursuit 
of U. S. power for more immediate ends - continued political hegemony in the West and 
reciprocal reestablishment of the United States position in the geographical nexus of the 
post-war political economy - the regions of the Gulf, the Middle East and the Indian 
Ocean. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. 
A/A Air to Air (Missiles). 
ABM Anti-ballistic missiles. 
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations. 
A/G Air-to-ground (missiles). 
AIPAC America-Israel Public Affairs Committee. 
AIOC Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 
ANZUS Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty Organization. 
APC Armoured Personnel Carrier. 
APPU Arab Peninsula Peoples' Union. 
ARAMCO Arabian American Oil Company. 
ARMISH-MAAG Army Mission Military Assistance Group. 
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations. 
ASW Anti-submarine Warfare. 
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System. 
BIOT British Indian Ocean Territory. 
BPLF Baluchi Peoples' Liberation Front. 
CDM Coalition for a Democratic Majority 
CENTO Central Treaty Organization. 
CENTCOM Central Command. 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency. 
CiCS Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff. 
CINCLANT Commander-in-Chief Atlantic. 
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief Pacific. 
CMPS Combined Military Planning Staff (CENTO). 
CNO Chief of Naval Opperations. 
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COIN Counter-Insurgency. 
CONUS Continental United States. 
Cos Chief's of Staff (U. SJUK). 
CPD Committee on the Present Danger. 
CTG Carrier Task Group. 
DCI Director of Central Intelligence. 
DEFCON Defense Condition. 
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency. 
DOD Department of Defense. 
DOS Department of State. 
DPC Defence Planing Commmitt e (NATO). 
DPM Draft Presidential Memorandum (Nixon White House) 
EEC European Economic Community. 
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front. 
EPLF Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front. 
EUCOM European Command. 
EXIM Export-Import Bank. 
FDL Fast Deployed Logistics (U. S. Navy). 
F/G/A Fighter/Ground Attack. 
FMS Foreign Military Sales. 
GCI Ground Controlled Intercept. 
GNP Gross National Product. 
HASC House Armed Services Committee, 
HFAC House Foreign Affairs Committee. 
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. 
IG Interdepartmental Group (Nixon White House). 
liss International Institute of Strategic Studies (London). 
INR Intelligence and Research Bureau (State Department). 
IOPZ Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (United Nations). 
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IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile. 
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
LPG London Policy Group. 
MAAG Military Assistance Group. 
MAB Marine Amphibious Brigade. 
MAC Military Airlift Command (U. S. Airforce). 
MAGTF Marine Amphibious Task Group. 
MAP Military Assistance Programme. 
MIDEASTFOR Middle East Force (U. S. Navy). 
MILCON Military Construction. 
MIRV Multuiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles. 
MOD Ministry of Defence (UK). 
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. 
NALT Naval Arms Limitation Talks. 
NAM Non-Aligned Movement. 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
NAC North Atlantic Council (NATO). 
NDPC National Disclosure Policy Committee. 
NEA Near East and Asia (State Department). 
NEP New Economic Policy (Nixon Administration). 
NESA Near East and South Asia (State Department). 
NIEO New International Economic Order. 
NIOC National Iranian Oil Company (Iran). 
NLF National Liberation Front (South Yemen). 
NSA National Security Agency. 
NSC National Security Council. 
NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum (Nixon/Ford Administrations) 
NSSM National Security Study Memorandum (Nixon/Ford Administrations). 
NTPS Near-Term Prepositioning Ships. 
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OAPEC Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries: 
OAU Organization of African Unity. 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
PACOM Pacific Command. 
PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation (Department of Defense). 
PD Presidential Directive (Carter Administration). 
PDPA Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan. 
PDRY Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen. 
PFLOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf. 
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization. 
POL Petrol-Oil-Lubricants. 
PPP Pakistan Peoples' Party. 
PPBS Planning Programming and Budgeting System (Department of Defense). 
PRM Presidential Review Memorandum (Carter Administration). 
REDCOM Readiness Commind. 
RDF Rapid Deployment Force. 
RDJTF Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. 
SAC Strategic Air Command. 
SAF Sultan's Armed Forces (Oman). 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization. 
SFRC Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
SIG Senior Interdepartmental Group (Nixon/Ford Administrations). 
SLOC Sea Lanes of Communication. 
SSBN Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine. 
SSOD Special Session on Disarmament (United Nations) 
STIRJCOM Strike Command. 
521 
TACAIR Tactical Air capabilitY. 
TNF Theatre Nuclear Forces. 
TOA Total Obligational Authority. 
TOW Target-on-Wire (missiles). 
UNCLOS United Nations' Committee on the Law of the Sea. 
USAF United States' Air Force. 
USCINCMEAFSA Commander in Chief Middle East and Africa South of the Sahara. 
USMC United States' Marine Corps. 
VLF Very Low Frequency (communications). 
WSLF Western Somalia Liberation Front. 
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization. 
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SEA ROUTES TO SELECTED OIL HELOS 
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U. S. FLEET MOBILITY AUGMENTATION DISTANCES 
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Source: U. S. Department of Defense (1974). 
tLS. UNiREO AND SPECIRED COMMANDS 
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f. A 1r CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 
USSR FLEET MOBILITY AUGMENTATION DISTANCES 
110Th - ". i- £l .. d 
PA l,. 1 11 I. NdI - -. 
w . . 1 Ifl"4.11 -- 
11 
'lourceJohn M. Collins, U. S. - Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980). 
NB: Top number-is distance 
to point "XO with Suez Canal 
closed; bottom number is 
distance with Canal open and 
accessible to naval ships. 
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DEFENSE PROGRAMS TO U. S. DEFENSE OUTLAYS 
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1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986 
CALENDAR YEAR 
NOTES: 
I U. S. outlays exclude retirement pay, include Department of Energy and 
Coast 
Guard defense outlays. 
2. Estimated Soviet costs are based on what it would cost the U. S. to produce and 
man the Soviet military force and operate it as they 
do. 
3. Projections are based upon three percent annual. real growth 
for USSR. For U. S. 
real growth in outlays is projected aL about 
five percent. 
4. SEA: Southeast Asia (i. e., Vietnam costs). 
Source: DOD Annual Report FY 1982: p-224. 
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UNITED STATESISOVIET NAVY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN -SUPPUED BY DEPARTMENT OF NAVY 
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A modest support facility': Amouct 
Diego Garcia supplemental 
Description sew (thousands) 
request for FY 1974. 
FiKw; qear 1974 SupPlawntel request: 
IL storage facilities .......................... ..................... 50 f fb ibi 
$6,834 
Nor. -------------------- - 
eet o or ng ........... ---- * -------- 
5,100 
apion --- POW; 
i 
--- -- --------------- 
64.750 square yards ........... 2.279 
extension. - : -- ---- 
4.000 feet ................... -------------- * ------------ 
2,264 
215 arlsoing gar - - .. . -, , , Hanpr ................... ... operations builoing addition ....... 
:- 
- - - 
........................... 
2,85D square feet .............. 
440 
232 
Overhaul paving train ............. ......................................................... 4f eat 
250 
140 Tianxil build - -_ - nhiii '. ion- t=11din i S b 
---------- --- ------------------_---- 
. ..... .3 feet .............. 
- : 517 sq.., -- 393 _ .. . g s s u Bachelor enlisted 4vatteis ........ 
. . 
........................... 
277 men .............. ....... 3,882 Bachelor officer quarters .......... ti n t TV di ....... ............ ..... 
32 men ....................... 
........................... . 
1.360 
96 
..... o s a o/ Armed forces is . .... ....................... 220 Ready Issue ammo magazine ........... ... ..................... ................. __ . Cold storage addition.. ....... 4.190 square feet ............ . *. . . ... . . 
466 
. . Gonetal waishouse iiddiiion ..... ........ 
26,385 square feet ............. .. .. . 
1.251 
Receivei building addition ......... . ......................... 
1 250 square feet .............. 1: 110 square feet 
131 
40 Vehicle repair haidstlinal .......... ................ ......... ........ ..... 400 Kw 2 2.265 Powelplant expansion ............. .............. ........... ..... ............... . 1 065 Utilities ......... ............. .. ....... ............................. ..... ....... . 77 NMC8 camp ... ....... . ....... ........... ..... .......... ........ ............... . 
Total ...... .............. ............................... 
29,000 
Fiscal year 1975 request: Parking ipion. .-... _. I .. .......................... 
25,000 square yards ........... 1.000 
POL storage _ý...... ...... .. .... ............. ..... . 
jDalatedl ..... ............... 0110 squa(e yards ............ 6 
1,900 
500 Ammunition staialle ............... , .... ... .......... ý- 
Total ------------------ ----_ -------- ------------------------------------- --------- 
3,300 
